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HARNESSING PUBLIC RESEARCH
FOR INNOVATION IN THE 21ST
CENTURY
An International Assessment of Knowledge
Transfer Policies
Universities and public research institutes play a key role in the innovation
ecosystem. Many countries have implemented national strategies to
support the commercialization of knowledge produced by public
institutions, to help take their innovations and scientiﬁc breakthroughs to
market and ultimately boost economic growth. Research bodies themselves
have also introduced practices to support knowledge transfer activities.
The legal, policy, and institutional approaches to knowledge transfer
are diverse, and there is no standardized set of assessment metrics relevant
to both high- and middle-income countries. In this context, how can
policymakers best help countries and institutions improve the efﬁciency
of their knowledge transfer practices to maximize innovation-driven
growth and to seek practical solutions to critical societal challenges?
Comprised of research and insight by esteemed international
contributors, Harnessing Public Research for Innovation in the 21st
Century addresses this policymaking challenge. It assesses the current
role of public research institutions in modern innovation systems and
considers how to best optimize existing policies, based on inputs from
leading academics, practitioners, and policymakers. It analyses what does
and does not work in knowledge transfer practices, policy options, and
future measurement priorities, and looks in detail at three high-income
and three middle-income country examples. The book provides a useful
foundation for future empirical work, the development of appropriate
metrics, and for crafting new innovation policy approaches.
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“This book represents a major step towards reaching a systematic approach
to the measurement of knowledge transfer practices and outcomes.”
hu zhijian, President, Chinese Academy of Science and Technology for
Development
“Unlike most existing work in this area, this book emphasizes that ﬁrms
beneﬁt from academic research not only through formal but also more
informal channels and from open science, and that there are tensions, as
well as complementarities, between these two.”
bhaven sampat, Associate Professor, Columbia University
“Enabling access to cutting-edge research is vital to tackling the challenges
countries face, and for policymakers, it is thus ever more important to
identify which knowledge transfer practices work and which do not. This
research is critical in this regard.”
pippa hall, Director of Innovation and Chief Economist, Intellectual
Property Ofﬁce, United Kingdom
“This book does an excellent job of identifying key metrics that should be
measured by knowledge transfer ofﬁces.”
ragan robertson, Technology Transfer Ofﬁcer, University of
California, Los Angeles, and Association of University Technology
Managers (AUTM) Cabinet Member, Metrics and Surveys, United
States of America
“Brazil has established a comprehensive legal framework for innovation.
But is that enough? There are barriers that can only be overcome with
continuous adjustment of policies. In this context, this book provides
good guidance.”
antenor c.s. corrê a, Senior Analyst in Science and Technology, and
Fernanda V.M. Magalhães, Specialist in Public Policies and Government
Management, Federal Government of Brazil
“Going forward, knowledge transfer will play a pivotal role in driving
future growth in Africa. We welcome this book and encourage the African
measurement community to invest in related metrics.”
philippe kuhutama mawoko, Executive Secretary, African
Observatory for Science, Technology and Innovation, African Union
Commission
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FOREWORD

hu zhijian
President, Chinese Academy of Science and Technology for Development

Promoting public–private partnership knowledge transfer is one of common notice among countries at different economic development levels. A
vital question for policymakers today is how to improve the efﬁciency of
these knowledge transfer practices, maximizing innovation-driven
growth.
No unique knowledge transfer blueprint is recognized as time-tested
and universally optimal. The Chinese government has been continuously
highlighting and facilitating the transformation of scientiﬁc and technological achievements into real productive forces. The Chinese knowledge
transfer law, Promoting the Transformation of Scientiﬁc and
Technological Achievements, entered into force on October 1, 1996.
An amendment to the law was adopted at the meeting of Standing
Committee of the Twelfth National People’s Congress on August 29,
2015, and came into force on October 1, 2015. The modiﬁcation mainly
includes: reﬁning the science and technology performance assessment
system, improving the scientiﬁc and technological achievements disposal
and distribution right systems, perfecting the market pricing mechanism
of scientiﬁc and technological achievements, strengthening the awards
for main scientiﬁc and technological contributors, and so on. Meanwhile,
lots of high- and middle-income countries have been developing their
national law and policies for spurring on the commercialization of
publicly funded inventions. Unfortunately, it is not straightforward for
policymakers to access information on what works and what does not.
Initial evidence indeed suggests that different approaches are needed for
different stages of economic development and even for speciﬁc sectors.
Nevertheless, these experiences and lessons need reﬁning to be used by
political makers.
With this in mind, in 2015, under the auspices of the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and most of China, a joint
research project on knowledge transfer policies and practices was
xxix
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initiated with the support of some countries. Two such academic and
policy workshops were held with authors and experts in July 2016 and
March 2017 to validate the research focus and unify methodologies. We
have compiled the main research results into this book.
The main contribution of this book is twofold: To start with, the book
develops a conceptual framework to evaluate knowledge transfer practice
and outcomes. It provides a six-country study in the same conceptual
framework, three middle- and three high-income countries, and also puts
forward a standardized set of metrics for assessing national or institutional performance relevant to both high- and middle-income countries’
development. With all these efforts, it is possible to do an international
comparison at different income levels. The country cases will reveal a
wide range of approaches and a variety of tools for policymakers, professional associations, IP ofﬁces, and scholars.
I would like to take this opportunity to express my sincere gratitude to
the editors and authors for their great contribution to this book. The
research represents a major step toward reaching a systematic approach
to the measurement of knowledge transfer practice and outcomes. It lays
important groundwork for future empirical work, for the development of
appropriate metrics, and for crafting new innovation policy approaches. I
look forward to the WIPO contributing further valuable works on innovation, intellectual property, and economic development to better beneﬁt
its member states at large.
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pippa hall
Director of Innovation and Chief Economist, Intellectual Property Office, United
Kingdom

Knowledge transfer has received considerable attention over the past few
decades, and is recognized as playing a key role in a competitive knowledge-based economy. Enabling access to excellent, cutting-edge research
is vital to tackling the economic, social, and environmental challenges
countries face. Through knowledge transfer, public research organizations can maximize the impact of their research, delivering tangible realworld beneﬁts. For individual businesses, it can enable them to improve
performance, increase productivity and gain access to new resources and
world-leading expertise. And at a national level, knowledge transfer
drives economic growth and delivers social beneﬁts. Internationally,
there have been achievements in building partnerships and relationships
between businesses, research organizations, and government bodies, to
deliver real value. However, challenges remain, not least that of assessing
the impacts of knowledge transfer initiatives in order to understand how
to improve policies and practices.
This is easier said than done. How do you go about trying to evaluate these
impacts? Most data collection, if any, occurs at a national level and there is no
standardization of what data are collected. There also needs to be a clear
understanding of how the different approaches and different channels of
knowledge transfer work, such as the interplay between more open sciencetype approaches with the formal licensing and collaborative agreements.
This book aims to address these gaps. Its contributors are experts in
their ﬁelds and provide an international perspective on the different
approaches to knowledge transfer. It develops a conceptual framework
to enable the evaluation of different knowledge transfer policies and
practices, with a standardized set of metrics for assessing national or
institutional performance. It also makes a valuable contribution in developing a new methodology for how to measure and assess the global
volume and distribution of patenting activities carried out by public
xxxi
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research organizations. The development of a common evaluation
framework on the possible costs, beneﬁts, and impacts of knowledge
transfer activities is an important step forward, providing a better evidence base on which policy decisions can be taken. By assessing the
interaction of existing policies and the underlying innovation system
structures, the book identiﬁes what works best under different conditions
and makes policy recommendations relevant for both high- and
medium-income countries. For policymakers, it is vitally important to
identify both what works and what does not work, and in what situations,
in order to understand how to improve the efﬁciency of knowledge
transfer activities in order to achieve maximum impact.
I welcome the contribution this book makes to the evaluation of
knowledge transfer policies and practices, laying important groundwork
for future study and the development of innovative policy approaches.
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bart verspagen
Director, UNU-MERIT

Knowledge produced or built on by public research organizations such as
universities and public research institutes is a vital source of new technologies and organizational methods that can contribute to many of the
United Nations’ sustainable development goals, from improvements in
food security and health and a reduction in carbon emissions to economic growth. To achieve social and economic beneﬁts of value to these
development goals, relevant knowledge needs to be successfully transferred from public research organizations to ﬁrms and government
organizations that can use the knowledge to improve or create new
services, goods or processes.
Knowledge transfer is a complex process that involves multiple actors
and channels for transmitting knowledge. The six case studies in this
book for three middle-income and three high-income countries illustrate
how the design of policies to support knowledge transfer needs to take
into consideration the absorptive capabilities of domestic ﬁrms, the
research capabilities of universities and public research institutes, and
the skills of knowledge transfer professionals. For middle-income countries, in particular, these capabilities and skills are in ﬂux. The case studies
show how policies and practices to support knowledge transfer need to
both promote capabilities and skills and adapt to changing conditions.
The value of this book lies in its implications for policies and practices
to support knowledge transfer and in its practical recommendations to
collect a comprehensive set of metrics to ensure that all forms of knowledge transfer, both formal and informal, are placed in perspective. The
problems associated with a narrow set of metrics focused on patent
licensing have been known for some time. This book provides evidence
for why a broader set of metrics, covering contractual, consulting, and
informal channels, is important to prevent undue emphasis on some
forms of knowledge transfer over others.
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UNU-MERIT has been pleased to support some of the work behind
this book, both through the contributions of Anthony Arundel and by
hosting a workshop in Maastricht in March 2017 to discuss the conceptual framework provided in Chapter 2 and the six case studies in
Chapters 4 to 9. The results should be of value both to future research
on knowledge transfer and to the design of policies and practices that are
adapted to speciﬁc conditions within countries and within individual
universities or research institutes.
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PREFACE

Universities and public research institutes play a key role in enabling the
application of scientiﬁc breakthroughs and innovations in the marketplace or by government organizations. Their present and potential future
contribution to the production and application of knowledge to innovation is undeniable.
To further leverage this role, many countries – developed and developing alike – have implemented national strategies to support the application or commercialization of knowledge produced by public research
organizations. In addition, individual universities and public research
institutes have introduced practices to support these activities, for
instance, by including knowledge transfer to promote innovation as a
core part of their mission.
As a result, a vital question for policymakers – and the enquiry of this
book – is how to improve the efﬁciency of these knowledge transfer
practices to help maximize innovation-driven growth and/or to seek
practical solutions to critical societal challenges.
Unfortunately, it is not straightforward for policymakers or knowledge
transfer practitioners to access information on what works and what does
not. Countries and institutions have garnered substantial experience with
diverse approaches. Yet this information has not been distilled in a way
that can provide policy guidance for speciﬁc sectors or for countries at
varying levels of economic development.
With this in mind, the book pursued the following three objectives:
• to develop a conceptual framework to evaluate knowledge transfer
practices and outcomes
• to improve knowledge transfer metrics, surveys, and evaluation frameworks, resulting in a standardized method to assess national or institutional strategies in an internationally comparable way
• to generate ﬁndings on what works and what does not, and to propose
related policy lessons.
xxxv
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In pursuit of these objectives, we, as the editors of this book, laid
particular emphasis on three important realities.
Number one: Public–private knowledge transfer occurs through a
large number of formal channels, such as licensing intellectual property
(IP), contract research, and contracting, as well as through informal
channels, such as the sharing of research results via personal contacts
or by “open science” methods, including conferences and publications. It
is important to avoid casting these channels in a mutually exclusive way.
Indeed, the many forms and facets of these two channels are often not in
contradiction; they have fuzzy boundaries in many cases, and they can be
complementary and mutually reinforcing.
Number two: Mirroring the above point, policy options are also more
numerous and less binary than implied by commentaries that either
focus single-mindedly on knowledge transfer policies based on IP as
the only way forward or caution that the formalization of knowledge
transfer – and, to some extent, the privatization of the application of
knowledge – are serious threats to the functioning of a science system
based on the free ﬂow of knowledge. In reality, institutions and countries
do not have to choose between these two opposites or two radically
distinct policy options. Many nuanced policy approaches are possible.
Number three: No country or institution has yet to uncover the
ultimate law or tool that provides a silver bullet for achieving effective
knowledge transfer to potential users. Economies and institutions worldwide still have untapped potential to better harness the role of public
research for innovation. Knowledge of possible relevance to critical
topics such as food security, climate change, or health remains tied to
books, journals, and the scientiﬁc realm without making sufﬁcient
impact on innovation and the realities around us. Much of this knowledge may not be being used for other reasons, for example, because the
right regulatory systems are not in place or because multiple other
complementary activities are needed before it can be put to use. But the
potential is clearly there. This is a source of frustration but, ﬁrst and
foremost, also of important hope for the years to come as we get better at
making public research more useful to economies and societies
worldwide.
These three points are recurrent themes that underlie this book. They
also make the topic of this book timely and particularly important.
Many institutions and individuals deserve thanks for their contributions. The main trigger for this book was a discussion and agreement in
2016 among the then minister of the Ministry of Science and Technology
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of the People’s Republic of China (MOST), Wan Gang, and WIPO’s
director general, Francis Gurry, that more international work is needed
in the ﬁeld of knowledge transfer practices.
Under the minister of MOST, Wang Zhigang, this book’s work with
respect to China and a workshop were subsequently ﬁnancially supported and coordinated by Lin Xin, DG, Zhang Jiejun, (Deputy
Director General, DDG), Sun Yongjian (former DDG), and Zhang
Bingqing (DDG), all from the Department of Policy, Regulation, and
Innovation System within MOST.
For their steady support to this the project, we are also indebted to the
Chinese Academy of Science and Technology for Development
(CASTED) and its President Hu Zhijian. In particular, we thank Chen
Baoming, DDG, and Juan Yang, who was supported by CASTED to work
as a WIPO fellow for more than a year on this project, and the staff of the
CASTED Institute of Comprehensive Development.
In addition, there are many individuals and other organizations to
thank for their help with this book – too many to list. First and foremost,
special thanks go to the outstanding authors of the country studies that
accompanied this project for close to four years. It is rare to be able to
work with such an outstanding cast of academics from Asia, Europe, and
Latin America. This rollcall was complemented by notable experts from
IP ofﬁces, by knowledge transfer practitioners, and by leading policymakers. Particular thanks to the South African National IP Management
Ofﬁce, the IP Ofﬁce of the United Kingdom, and the Korean IP Ofﬁce, as
well as the Brazilian Ministry of Science, Technology, Innovations, and
Communications. Rosa Fernandez at the Department for Business,
Energy, & Industrial Strategy, Adrian Day, Lorena Rivera León, and
Antanina Garanasvili provided data and analysis for Chapter 1.
We would also like to thank all participants for their contributions to
two associated workshops on the International Comparison of
Knowledge Transfer Policies and Practices. The ﬁrst was held with
MOST and CASTED in Beijing, July 2016, and the second at the
United Nations University, Maastricht Economic and Social Research
Institute, on Innovation and Technology (UNU-MERIT) in March 2017.
This collaboration also showed that knowledge can ﬂow in all directions. While high-income economies and their institutions have extensive experience with knowledge transfer policies and practices, many new
experiences are emerging in middle-income economies such as Brazil,
China, India, and others. These innovative experiences are a possible
source of learning for all other countries.
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Thanks for substantive comments go to the editorial advisory board of
this book series, Mark Wu, Megan Macgarvie, and Beth Webster, as well
as the academic reviewers of this project, Fabio Montobbio and Bhaven
Sampat, and also to Carsten Fink, WIPO’s chief economist.
Excellent editing was provided by Tobias Boyd, then at WIPO. The
project management support and oversight by Charlotte Beauchamp,
Head of Publications and Design at WIPO is acknowledged with thanks.
We hope that this book will open a window to future work assessing
the diversity of knowledge transfer policies and practices. Its purpose is to
lay the groundwork for future empirical work, for the development of
appropriate metrics, and for crafting new innovation policy approaches.
Ideally, the survey and evaluation framework can also be deployed by
WIPO or by other organizations to yield comparable data from multiple
countries over time.
Anthony Arundel, Suma Athreye, and Sacha Wunsch-Vincent
Maastricht, Southend-on-Sea, and Geneva
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The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reﬂect the views of the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) or its member states.

xxxix

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 54.177.185.247, on 15 Nov 2021 at 19:13:31, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/979C0AAA92B1200DCE513DAAE4894BE7

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 54.177.185.247, on 15 Nov 2021 at 19:13:31, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/979C0AAA92B1200DCE513DAAE4894BE7

PART I
Setting the Context
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1
The Evolving Role of Public R&D and Public
Research Organizations in Innovation
suma athreye and sacha wunsch-vincent*

1.1 The Growth in Policies to Leverage Public R&D
1.1.1 Why Invest in Public R&D?
Science has consistently been shown to be a fundamental driver of
technological progress and economic growth and a source of innovation
to the business sector (Jaffe 1989; Adams 1990; Cohen et al. 2002). Its
importance for economic progress has grown due to an increase in the
role of knowledge as a driver of competitiveness in global markets and
from emerging technologies that have opened up new opportunities for
development. The increasingly science-based nature of modern technological advances has made interaction with science central to
innovation.1 Universities and public research institutes are crucial to
both the discovery of new technology and the training of students in
new techniques and technological developments, with the attendant
economic advantages.
Firms and other innovators depend on the contributions of public
research and of future scientists to produce innovations of commercial
signiﬁcance (see Nelson 2004). Basic research in science also serves as
a roadmap for ﬁrms, facilitating the identiﬁcation of promising avenues
for innovation and avoiding the duplication of effort by companies. Close
interaction with public research enables ﬁrms to monitor scientiﬁc
*

1

Lorena Rivera León, WIPO, and Antanina Garanasvili, consultant to WIPO, provided data
and analysis for this chapter. On some of these topics, see, also, WIPO (2011).
See OECD (2017), Paunov et al. (2019), and Section 3.4 on technology–science linkages in
OECD (2011). This inference is based on patents citing non-patent literature (forward and
backward citations). Patents that rely on scientiﬁc knowledge are on the increase in highgrowth industries such as biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, and information and communication technologies (ICT).

3
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advances that could transform their technologies and markets. It also
facilitates joint problem solving.
In light of the value of research to many ﬁrms rather than to one
particular ﬁrm or entity, economists have traditionally seen knowledge produced by universities as a public good. Indeed, university
knowledge has all the hallmarks of a public good – ﬁrst, the economic
value attached to certain kinds of basic and other research cannot be
fully appropriated by the actor undertaking the research, not least
because some of it may take several years to emerge. Second, the
economic value of such knowledge is often difﬁcult or impossible to
judge ex ante. As a result, without subsidy, ﬁrms would tend to
underinvest in the funding of research, in particular in ﬁelds that
show little prospect of near-term proﬁtability. To avoid this underinvestment in science and research, governments have funded universities to conduct teaching and basic research (the two traditional
missions of the university). Scientists are thus able to pursue bluesky research without the pressure of immediate business considerations. The reward system is based on the scientist’s publication and
dissemination record, and not on considerations of any kind of private
proﬁtability or income.
In many countries, intermediate institutions, in the form of public sector
institutions and laboratories, were also set up and funded by government,
in order to conduct translational research that could directly beneﬁt
industry. Such public research institutes have been important in the history
of many high-income countries (the United States of America (U.S.), the
United Kingdom) and continue to be important in others (Germany and
the Republic of Korea). Scholars such as Nelson, Freeman, and Lundvall
see universities and public research institutes as playing a key role in
shaping national innovation systems and in the growth and training of
scientists more broadly. This is because the magnitude and direction of
public research and development (R&D) inﬂuences the broader innovation system through three mechanisms: providing human capital and
training, advancing knowledge through public science, and through activities to transfer knowledge to economic actors. Recent experience with the
software industry has shown that many middle-income countries whose
universities only performed the teaching mission managed to accumulate
human capital in excess of their developmental needs. These countries
were also the most able to beneﬁt from the sudden opening of global
demand for software programmers (Arora and Gambardella 2005).
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Economic studies have examined the impact of public R&D on business innovation. While imperfect, aggregate studies have found that
academic research, and basic research in particular, has a positive effect
on industrial innovation and industry productivity. Importantly,
although public R&D does not directly contribute to economic growth,
it has an indirect effect via the stimulation of increased private R&D. In
other words, “crowding in” of private R&D takes place as public R&D
raises the returns on private R&D.
Studies examining social rates of return to public R&D are more
recent. Social returns to public R&D are often studied as the effect of
public R&D on private sector productivity, and are estimated to have
a (median) rate of 20 percent, which is smaller than the impact of private
R&D on private sector productivity (estimated to be between 30 and
45 percent). Econometric studies at the ﬁrm and country level provide
less conclusive results as to the positive impact of public R&D on private
productivity than estimates at the industry level. A more intriguing result
in the UK context found that the rate of return of public council funding
(i.e., grants to industry often in collaboration with university, distributed
through research councils) had higher social rates of return than direct
public sector R&D, often two to three times the rate of return suggested
by private R&D.
To some extent, the public good argument for public sector R&D does
suggest that we will ﬁnd such results. To recall, in the case of most public
goods, private rates of return are expected to diverge from social rates of
return. Public sector investments in R&D are in basic R&D that takes
more than seven years to translate into commercial products and needs
more private investment in R&D to be fully absorbed in industry. In
contrast, private R&D has a gestation lag of about three years, is in
applied areas that are less technologically risky, and is oriented toward
readily available (or creatable) markets.
Several empirical issues also contribute to the observed result that
public R&D does not show a strong direct impact on business innovation and economic growth. Given the many channels of knowledge
transfer from public science, estimating all of the economic effects of
public R&D is challenging. Transactions rarely leave a visible trace that
can be readily identiﬁed and measured. Second, the contribution of
public R&D can also take a long time to materialize and this time lag
can differ by sectors of activity. Finally, the noneconomic impact of
public research in areas such as health, and others, is even harder to
identify.
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1.1.2 The New Rationale for Public Support of “Third Mission” Policies
at Universities
Public R&D suffers from a key limitation when compared to private R&D.
When ﬁrms undertake R&D they usually have an idea of the type of
knowledge they need to produce and a commercialization strategy that is
directly attached to their R&D expenditure plans. This rarely happens with
public sector R&D, with the people undertaking R&D working in a separate
organization from the potential users of the knowledge. Consequently, there
is always a scope for discoveries, even those with commercial potential, to
fail to be commercialized.2 In other words, public research may produce a lot
of inventions, but no signiﬁcant innovations. It has also led to accusations
that academic research lives in an ivory tower, divorced and disengaged
from the real world and its problems.
Since the late 1970s, many countries have changed their legislation and
created support mechanisms to encourage interactions between universities
and ﬁrms, including through knowledge transfer (see Van Looy et al. 2011).
Placing the output of publicly funded research in the public domain is no
longer seen as sufﬁcient to generate the full beneﬁts of the research for
innovation (see OECD 2003; Wright et al. 2007). In high-income countries,
policy approaches promoting increased commercialization of the results of
public research have included reforming higher education systems to
include third mission activities creating clusters, incubators, and science
parks; promoting university–industry collaboration; instituting speciﬁc laws
and institutions to regulate knowledge transfer; and encouraging public
research organizations to ﬁle for and commercialize their IP. The transformation of research organizations into more entrepreneurial organizations is
also taking place by increasing the quality of public research, creating new
incentives and performance-linked criteria for researchers, enhancing collaboration of universities and public research institutes with ﬁrms, and
setting up mechanisms for formal knowledge transfer (see Zuñiga 2011).
Contrary to popular perception, it was not the U.S. but Israel that was
the ﬁrst country to implement IP policies for several of its universities in
the 1960s. However, in 1980 the US Bayh-Dole Act was the ﬁrst dedicated
legal framework to institutionalize the transfer of exclusive control over
federal government-funded inventions developed by universities and
businesses. The shift and clariﬁcation of ownership over these inventions
lowered transaction costs as permission was no longer needed from federal
2

It is also worth noting that there is a long history of mission-oriented R&D in the public
sector that has produced commercially viable products.
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funding agencies, and because this gave greater clarity to ownership rights
and therefore greater security to downstream – sometimes exclusive –
licensees. For instance, the Act also contains rules for invention disclosure
and requires institutions to provide incentives for researchers. It also contains march-in provisions reserving the right of government to intervene
under some circumstances.
Several European, Asian, and other high-income countries have adopted
similar legislation, in particular from the latter half of the 1990s onwards (see
Montobbio 2009; Geuna and Rossi 2011). In Europe, in many cases, the
challenge was to address the established situation according to which IP
ownership was assigned to the faculty inventor – the professor’s privilege –
or to ﬁrms that funded the research (see Cervantes 2009; Foray and Lissoni
2010). Since the end of the 1990s, most European countries have been
moving away from inventor ownership of patent rights toward university
or public research institute ownership.3 European policy efforts have sought
to increase both IP awareness within the public research system and the rate
of commercialization of academic inventions. In Asia, Japan was the ﬁrst to
implement similar legislation in 1998 and, in 1999, shifted patent rights to
public research organizations. The Republic of Korea implemented similar
policies in 2000.
Policymakers keen to bolster the effectiveness with which publicly funded
research can foster commercial innovation today have a rich menu of
options thanks to the experimentation with such policies in many countries
(see Just and Huffman 2009; Foray and Lissoni 2010). A number of middleand low-income countries have also moved in this direction (for more
details, see Zuñiga 2011). In spite of the lack of an explicit policy framework,
many of these countries have put in place general legislation regulating or
facilitating IP ownership and commercialization by research organizations.4
There are four distinct sets of approaches used by countries. In the ﬁrst set,
there is no explicit regulation but rather general rules deﬁned in the law –
mostly in patent acts – or legislation regulating research organizations or
government funding. A second model consists of laws in the form of
3

4

Professor’s privilege was abolished in Germany, Austria, Denmark, Norway, and Finland
during the period 2000–7, but was preserved in Sweden and Italy where, in the latter,
professor’s privilege was introduced in 2001.
See Zuñiga (2011). Thailand and the Russian Federation, for instance, do not have
speciﬁc legislation deﬁning ownership and commercialization rules for research funded
by the federal budget at universities and public research institutes. Yet existing revisions
to the patent law or other policies give universities the ﬂexibility to create and own their
own IP.
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national innovation laws. A third, adopted in Brazil, China, and more
recently in economies such as Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines, and
South Africa, builds on the model of high-income countries that confers
IP ownership to universities and public research institutes, spurring them to
commercialize. Fourth, some countries, for example Nigeria and Ghana,
have no national framework but rely on guidelines for IP-based knowledge
transfer.
Large middle-income economies, such as Brazil, China, India, the
Russian Federation, and South Africa, have already implemented speciﬁc
legislation or are currently debating its introduction. China was among
the ﬁrst to adopt a policy framework in 2002.5 In addition, a signiﬁcant
number of countries in Asia – in particular Bangladesh, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand – and in Latin
America and the Caribbean – Mexico in particular and, more recently,
Colombia, Costa Rica, and Peru – have been considering such
legislation.6 However, only Brazil and Mexico have enacted explicit
regulations regarding IP ownership and university knowledge transfer
so far. In India, institutional policies have recently been developed at key
national academic and research institutes, complementing legislative
efforts that aim to implement university IP-based knowledge transfer
rules (see Basant and Chandra 2007).
In Africa, most countries other than South Africa have neither a speciﬁc
law on IP ownership by research organizations nor any knowledge transfer
laws. However, several countries have started to implement policy guidelines
and to support knowledge transfer infrastructure. Nigeria and Ghana, for
instance, do not have speciﬁc legislation but are both in the process of
establishing knowledge transfer ofﬁces (KTOs) in all institutions of higher
education.7 Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia have been working on
5

6

7

In 2002, the government provided universities with full rights of ownership and commercialization for inventions derived from state-funded research. The Measures for
Intellectual Property Made under Government Funding legislation provides speciﬁc
rules for IP ownership and licensing, inventor compensation, and ﬁrm creation.
See Zuñiga (2011) and internal contributions to this report made by WIPO’s Innovation
and Technology Transfer Section.
Nigeria’s policy framework contains no speciﬁc law on IP creation and management at
publicly funded research organizations. Instead, regulations are set within federal research
institutes and the National Ofﬁce for Technology Acquisition and Promotion (NOTAP)
published “Guidelines on Development of Intellectual Property Policy for Universities and
R&D Institutions.” These guiding principles explain how each R&D institution can
formulate and implement its IP policy to protect tangible research products in order to
make them demand-driven and economically viable. The guidelines also promote the use
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drafts for similar legislation. In 2010, South Africa implemented the
Intellectual Property Rights from Publicly Financed R&D Act, which deﬁnes
a number of obligations ranging from disclosure, IP management, and
inventor incentives, to the creation of KTOs and policies regarding
entrepreneurship.
Studies conducted on the group of high-income countries reveal a few
important lessons.8 First, despite the general trend toward institutional
ownership and commercialization of university and public research institute
inventions, a diversity of legal and policy approaches persists, in terms of
both how such legislation is anchored in broader innovation policy and the
speciﬁc rules on the scope of university patenting, invention disclosure,
incentives for researchers (such as royalty sharing), and whether certain
safeguards are instituted to counteract the potentially negative effects of
patenting.9 Second, the means to implement such legislation, as well as the
available complementary policies to enhance the impact of public R&D and
to promote academic entrepreneurship, vary widely. Finally, legal changes
alone have not started or contributed to sustained patenting by public
research organizations. In the U.S., university patenting is also driven by
growing technological opportunities in the biomedical and other high-tech
ﬁelds, as well as a culture change favoring increased university–industry
linkages (see Mowery et al. 2001).

1.1.3 Conﬂicts and Tradeoffs between the Old and
New Rationales for Public R&D
Although, in theory, this rich menu of “third mission” policies was intended
to amplify the impact of public R&D, in practice, many countries adopting
these policies were also looking to cut back on public spending and intended
that budget cuts to universities should be compensated by proactive
approaches to revenue generation (Vincent-Lancrin 2006). There is increasing evidence that countries seek to recover the full economic cost of research
activity in order to allow research organizations to amortize the assets and

8

9

of IP for the beneﬁt of society, and strengthen research–industry linkages by establishing
intellectual property and technology transfer ofﬁces (IPTTO).
Unfortunately, we have very limited knowledge of the mechanisms at play in middle- and lowincome countries and this lacuna is an important reason for our comparative study in this
book.
These can range from legal approaches (standalone or as part of more comprehensive
reforms) and university bylaws, to “codes of practice” or general guidelines on IP ownership and management for fostering greater transparency and consistency. See OECD
(2003) and Grimaldi et al. (2011).
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overhead, and to invest in infrastructure at a rate adequate to maintain
future capability. Paradoxically, support for the third mission may have
come at the expense of cutbacks in funding for public R&D itself. Thus, in
practice, the policies of increasing commercialization of university research
and industry funding of public research were often adopted in the context of
a tightening of public investments in R&D. Thus, far from amplifying the
economic effect of public investments in R&D, commercialization of university research very quickly became a substitute for public funding of
research and so its net effect on the economy-wide diffusion of technology
may be difﬁcult to gauge.
Second, universities have always regarded themselves primarily as centers
of learning, where new knowledge is created and curated through research,
and ultimately disseminated via teaching. They see themselves as upholding
the four Mertonian norms of communism (common ownership of scientiﬁc
outputs without resort to secrecy), universalism (universal scientiﬁc validity
irrespective of who the source of scientiﬁc output is), disinterestedness
(acting in common scientiﬁc interest rather than for personal gain), and
organized scrutiny (critical scrutiny of scientiﬁc output before acceptance).
Academic researchers are a self-selected group who are largely driven by the
same set of norms in the pursuit of their individual research careers.
Commercialization activities contradict at least two of the four
Mertonian norms, given that they are motivated by private ownership
of intellectual property and private gain. This leads to a fundamental
tradeoff between the ideal of pure scientiﬁc exploration versus proﬁtdriven commercial exploitation. Furthermore, pure scientiﬁc exploration
is essential to the ﬁrst mission of the university, the provision of education. Universities caught between scientiﬁc exploration and exploitation
will struggle to simultaneously reconcile both these aims. Indeed, management science teaches that most organizations struggle both to explore
new knowledge and to exploit existing knowledge at the same time
(organizational ambidexterity), as the two sorts of activity require
a different type of management and entail different risks.
Public research institutes were set up as specialized intermediaries to fulﬁll
the commercialization function: to take up frontier science from universities
and adapt them to the needs of local communities and industry. More
recently, they have been in (possibly) terminal decline, even in countries
where they have been quite successful. The reasons for this decline are not
clear and probably deserve a book of their own to explore more rigorously,
but it is likely that shifting the locus of commercialization from these
specialized intermediaries to universities driven by Mertonian norms may
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have been inefﬁcient in countries where the institutional frameworks to
transfer knowledge directly from universities were still immature and poorly
developed. Third mission activities in many countries, however, came at the
expense of public research institutes. Whether universities’ third mission
activities can and should replace public research institutes remains an
underexplored question.
Lastly, while nobody denies that the payoffs of academic research are
maximized when the private sector uses and builds on research carried
out in the public sector, these are not one-way exchanges from universities to ﬁrms. Industrial research complements and also guides more
basic research. It is also a means of “equipping” university scientists with
new and powerful instruments. For such knowledge transfer to work,
ﬁrms need to be able to assimilate and exploit public research. This
capability often requires ﬁrms to actively engage in upstream research
and actively participate in science (see Cohen and Levinthal 1989). In
middle- and low-income countries, even large ﬁrms may lack this capability, while in high-income economies small ﬁrms may behave in this
way. Policies to promote outward knowledge transfer from universities
and public research institutes are likely to fail if local ﬁrms lack sufﬁcient
absorptive capacity.

1.2 Cross-Country Trends in Public R&D
The volume of public sector investment in scientiﬁc research is traditionally measured through expenditures on R&D ﬁnanced by government.
R&D expenditures, their distribution across industrial sectors, and the
proportion spent on applied and basic R&D are highly variable across
countries and have usually evolved with the growth of an economy and
the nature of industrial policies to support growth (see also National
Science Foundation 2018; UNESCO 2018). The increase in public or
private R&D, however, must be seen in the context of the overall growth
of R&D. An increase in public R&D is more effective if business expenditures on R&D are high or rising.
Figure 1.1 shows noticeably different overall trends in the R&D intensity
(share of R&D expenditures as a percentage of GDP) for high-, middle- and
low-income economies between 2000 and 2016. High-income countries
spend about 2.5 percent of GDP on R&D, and this is a much larger share
than any other group of countries. The sharpest growth in R&D, however,
has been in the upper middle-income countries. In both high- and lowincome countries, R&D expenditures as a share of GDP have struggled to
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grow, while lower middle-income countries (which includes countries such
as India) have seen a decline in R&D intensity.
Public sector R&D can be delivered through a variety of institutions.
Universities play a big role in high-income economies where industrial
capabilities are at the scientiﬁc frontier and so beneﬁt from close links
to the basic science produced in university science departments. More
specialized public research institutes may be preferred in middle- and lowerincome countries that have limited resources to invest in scientiﬁc infrastructure and that often prefer to concentrate such investments in a few areas
of greatest need to the economy and society. In general, as national income
per capita decreases, R&D by public research institutes plays an increasingly
important role in economic development. As ﬁrms in these economies
possess low levels of technological capability, they need the help of public
R&D to adapt frontier technologies to domestic conditions. Public research
institutes generally undertake applied research geared toward the building of
prototypes that can be manufactured by local industry.
In high-income economies, the public sector is responsible for anywhere between 20 and 45 percent of annual total R&D expenditure and
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Figure 1.1 Share of R&D (measured by GERD) in GDP by income group of countries,
2000–16
Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics, March 2019
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almost three-quarters of the expenditure on basic research, with the
remaining expenditure on private and applied R&D coming from the
private sector. On average, government funding is responsible for about
53 percent of total R&D in the middle-income countries for which data
are available. Thus, the distribution of R&D between public and private
sectors shows that as the level of a country’s per capita income decreases,
governmental funding approaches 100 percent.
The data on public and private R&D are patchy but in Figure 1.2
(panels A and B), we plot the data that are available to demonstrate the
variability of public R&D even within similar income groups. Although
not included in Figure 1.2B, the public sector funded 100 percent of R&D
in Burkina Faso in the last year for which data are available (see UNESCO
2018). In Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, India, Peru, and Romania (also not
included in Figure 1.2B) the share of public sector R&D often exceeds
70 percent of total R&D.10
Importantly, with some exceptions, governments usually provide the
majority of the funds for basic research. Basic research is experimental or
theoretical work undertaken primarily to acquire new knowledge of the
underlying foundation of phenomena and observable facts, without any
particular application or use in view (for the U.S., see the analysis in
Arora et al. 2015). On average, in 2009, the public sector performed more
than three-quarters of all basic research in high-income economies.11
These contributions to basic research are becoming more vital as ﬁrms
focus mostly on product development and as multinational companies in
high-income countries scale back their basic research in a number of
R&D-intensive sectors (see OECD 2008). In middle-income countries for
which data are available (see Figure 1.3), public research is responsible for
the majority of basic R&D: close to 100 percent in China, close to
90 percent in Mexico, about 80 percent in the Russian Federation, and
about 75 percent in South Africa. A high share of government in basic
research may also be an institutional legacy, often seen in former socialist
countries.

10

11

Exceptions are Malaysia, China, the Philippines, and Thailand where, for both R&D
funding and performance, the business sector has the largest share but, nonetheless,
public research organizations play a key role in contributing to industry R&D and
ensuing innovation.
See OECD, Research & Development Statistics. Depending on the country in question, it
accounts for about 40 percent (Republic of Korea) to close to 100 percent (Slovakia) of all
basic research performed.
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Figure 1.2 Share of public sector in total R&D, high- and middle-income economies
A. Share of public sector in total R&D in high-income countries, in percent, 2016 or
latest available year
B. Share of public sector in total R&D in middle-income economies, in percent, 2016 or
latest available year

1.3 Challenging Factors in Middle-Income Countries
The consistent increase in R&D intensity in upper-middle and middleincome countries – in the latter case much driven by China only – masks
several challenges.
Compared to high-income countries, science and technology (S&T)
and innovation conditions in middle- and low-income countries face the
following challenges:
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Figure 1.3 Share of basic research conducted by the public sector for 2017, or latest
available year, as a percentage of all national expenditures for basic research
Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Research
and Development Statistics Database, March 2019
Note: Figure 1.3 provides data from the most recent available years, between 2015 and 2017
for each country. Some of the distinction between higher education institutions –
universities and government as well as public research institutes – is simply deﬁnitional and
depends on what is deﬁned as a university or a public research institute in a given country.
*Case study countries

• a lower level of S&T;
• low research and innovation capabilities of domestic ﬁrms, with the result
that government and international donors are often the main funders of
S&T and national public research institutes are the main R&D performers;
• less developed human capital for S&T activity, particularly a low number of scientists in ﬁrms and the best domestic scientists moving abroad
(“brain drain” effect);
• lower quality research and relevance of public research to the business
sector;
• limited science–industry linkages, explained by a low absorptive capacity
of ﬁrms combined with an ensuing lack of “business” demand for S&T;
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• a lack of policies and structures to facilitate academic and other startups; and

• constrained access to ﬁnancing as a barrier to the development of
radical or early-stage innovations.

There are several reasons that explain the limited impact of science on
economic development in low- and middle-income countries. First of all, in
terms of policy strategies, is the need to address basic economic needs such
as poverty and health, with science and technology as second-order priorities. Second-, middle- and low-income countries are a very heterogeneous
group, with wide differences in the needs and conditions for knowledge
transfer. In most low-income countries, many of the necessary elements for
science to have an impact on industrial innovation and society are embryonic, while in middle-income countries the foundations exist but are weakly
articulated (WIPO 2011; Zuñiga 2011). It is clear, however, that R&D
capabilities – both in private and public institutions – in many middleincome economies have improved during the last decade and opportunities
to enhance technology commercialization through IP are emerging.
As the remainder of this book shows, structural features have also
constrained the development of linkages between universities and
ﬁrms.12 Often, commercial activity by universities and researchers has
been or is still highly regulated or even forbidden. With few exceptions,
most universities fully depend on federal budgets and have weak linkages
with regional governments and economies. The lack of absorptive capacity in ﬁrms and their natural focus on imitative innovation and acquisition of foreign technology as innovation strategies also contribute to
fragmentation in national innovation systems (see Navarro et al. 2010).
The technological strategies of ﬁrms in lower- and middle-income economies often depend on off-the-shelf imported technology, primarily in
the form of machinery and turnkey knowledge transfer from abroad.
Often these are also the only options for these ﬁrms to access current
technology.13 The barriers to industry–science collaboration reported by
ﬁrms include a lack of communication channels with universities, differences in organizational culture (in respect of timing and product
12
13

See in particular Chapters 10 and 11.
See Zuñiga (2011). In Argentina, for example, according to the innovation survey of
1998–2001, 84 percent of ﬁrms that cooperated with other actors in the national innovation systems did so for informational purposes and 58 percent for training purposes;
only 21 percent engaged in cooperation for R&D. In Colombia, the percentages of ﬁrms
(within those that reported links with agents providing technological services) are 31, 50,
and 15 percent, respectively.
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delivery), uncertainty of a market need/demand for research results, and
high costs for developing and commercializing university research.14
In this context, one of the main conclusions of this book is that
knowledge transfer policies that are not accompanied by policies to
strengthen R&D capabilities in ﬁrms and industry–science linkages are
unlikely to be successful. In addition, as in high-income countries,
transforming academia into more entrepreneurial institutions requires
cultural change – in particular among researchers, and often an increase
in university autonomy, including for more competitive hiring and in
terms of resource management. Compared to high-income countries, the
following are additional barriers to knowledge exchange from the science
base in low- and middle-income countries:
• lack of clear knowledge transfer policies for universities and public
research institutes;

• weak operative guidelines on patenting, for example on disclosure and
commercialization of IP at the institutional level;

• little awareness about and few incentives for researchers to participate
in IP-based knowledge transfer; and
• absence of or inadequate resources for KTOs, with staff lacking the
necessary skills and experience related to IP and commercialization.

More generally, an additional friction to the development of IP registration
and commercialization in many middle- and low-income countries is the
sluggish process of patenting at national patent ofﬁces and its relatively high
cost (see WIPO 2011; Zuñiga 2011; Chapters 10 and 11 of this book).
However, these characteristics are not shared equally across all lowand middle-income countries. For the most part, work is ongoing to
improve the systemic weaknesses in national innovation systems and to
give greater autonomy to universities. As evidenced earlier, many of these
countries are also in the midst of implementing or setting up knowledge
transfer policies and practices. Indeed, in some cases this has already led
to signiﬁcant impacts, both in terms of measured knowledge transfer and
the related broader impacts on public research organizations, ﬁrms and
the linkages between them.
Finally, this book emphasizes that high-income countries struggle with
many of the same challenges when it comes to putting in place functioning knowledge transfer practices. A blueprint that could easily be adopted
across institutions and countries therefore does not yet exist, even in
14

For evidence from China on this, see Guan et al. (2005).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 54.177.185.247, on 15 Nov 2021 at 19:13:31, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/979C0AAA92B1200DCE513DAAE4894BE7

18

a t h r e y e & w un s c h - v i n c e n t

high-income economies. Experience and the economic literature show
that different stages of development and different innovation systems
require different policies and incentives to promote the commercialization of public research (see Guellec et al. 2010). Conditions for knowledge transfer develop over time and depend heavily on research
capabilities and science–industry linkages. Having a broad view of the
concept of technology commercialization, looking at intermediate steps
and broad knowledge transfer activities – not exclusively focused on IP
creation and licensing, and academic entrepreneurship – makes for good
policy advice.

1.4 Rationale for the Selection of Country Cases
The heterogeneity of high- and middle-income countries with regard to
basic features about the organization of public R&D suggests that simply
instituting relevant laws and regulations is only a ﬁrst ingredient to
stimulating industry–science linkages. A number of conditions need to
be in place at the country and institutional level to reap the resulting
beneﬁts. Moreover, diverse stages of development will require different
approaches and complementary policies, including safeguards for avoiding the downside risks of university patenting.
Our approach in this book has been to explore in detail the interaction
between the institutional frameworks, public policy constraints, and
adoption of third mission policies in six countries with a view to distilling
lessons from their experience. Although heterogeneous in themselves,
this group of countries consists of three high-income economies (the
United Kingdom, Germany, and the Republic of Korea) whose experience of third mission policies differs from the oft-cited example of the
U.S. Germany is an exemplar of the institution of a collective market
economy where public sector R&D and the state more generally played
a large role in economic growth and technological prowess. The United
Kingdom, by contrast, is more similar to the U.S. in relying on liberal
market institutions to promote third mission policies. The Republic of
Korea (like Germany) relied on a strong public research institute sector
for technological catch-up but has found the institutional change needed
to implement broad-based growth (moving away from reliance on large
chaebol companies) hard to achieve. We also include the study of three
large middle-income countries, namely Brazil, China, and South Africa.
Brazil inherited institutions that are similar to those in continental
Europe, but it was also inﬂuenced by the US system. China transformed
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Figure 1.4 R&D intensity (GERD as a percentage of GDP), case study countries
Source: Authors based on data from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics and OECD

itself from a public research institute-led system to one in which universities were reformed to engage with domestic industry. South Africa
managed both radical political change and reformed its university system
and linkages to industry.
Figures 1.4 and 1.5 build on Figures 1.1–1.3 for the six countries that
we study in this book. They enable us to see the precise nature of
differences between countries that may often belong to the same income
group classiﬁcation.
Figure 1.4 on R&D intensity shows that the Republic of Korea, China,
and Germany saw rising shares of R&D in their economies. The United
Kingdom (despite being in the high-income group) had R&D shares that
were almost a whole percentage point lower than those in Germany and
lower than China (a middle-income country). The R&D intensity was
stagnant in the United Kingdom and similar trends are observed for South
Africa and Brazil. Figure 1.5 shows the percentage of gross expenditure on
R&D that was ﬁnanced by the government. All countries, except for South
Africa, show a declining trend. China and the Republic of Korea show
some of the lowest levels, while Brazil and South Africa have markedly
higher levels of government-ﬁnanced R&D. Thus, the six case studies
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conﬁrm that the backdrop against which stronger knowledge exchange
policies have been pursued has been a declining share of governmentﬁnanced R&D in the context of an overall decline in R&D intensities.
As we noted in Section 1.3, the distribution of R&D between the
public and private sectors has varied considerably between countries
even within a particular group. In general, countries that had a large role
for the state also ended up having large public R&D shares. Figure 1.2
also reports the distribution of public and private sector R&D, including
for the group of case study countries, except Brazil, for which no data
were available. The smallest shares of public R&D were for the Republic
of Korea and China, which have seen a strong role of the state and also
public research institutes in their growth histories. South Africa has the
largest share of public R&D followed by Germany and the United
Kingdom.
A last indicator worth looking at is the distribution of basic research
between the share of universities and the share of the government sector in
the six countries we study (see Figure 1.3). Here we ﬁnd that in China most
basic research (over 55 percent) happens in the government and the
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university sector (here institutions of higher education), whereas this is
much lower at about 30 percent for the Republic of Korea and Germany
and even lower, at 20 percent, for South Africa and the United Kingdom.
Basic research in universities is smallest for the United Kingdom and highest
for China.

1.5 Summary and Plan of the Book
The most appropriate frameworks for spurring the commercialization of
publicly funded inventions – whether in public research institutes or publicly funded universities – depends on the institutional context and will vary
due to different starting points. Yet, for the most part, a “one glove ﬁts all”
approach has dominated policy thinking in this area. At times, policymakers
and institutions have been overreliant on the ﬁling of IP as the only instrument to enhance the impact of science on the economy. A more realistic
assessment of the state of their research and innovation systems to identify
the role that IP can play in such development (given both its opportunities
and costs) is missing and sorely needed.
Providing a more nuanced understanding of optimal policies for
knowledge transfer is the overriding objective of this book. Such policies
need to be grounded both in the historical evolution of university–
industry relations and systematic data underpinned by a rigorous conceptual understanding of what is involved in knowledge exchange
between university and industry. In keeping with this objective, we use
a recursive approach in the book, as follows.
Part I develops an understanding of broad institutional differences in
the nature of public science across countries; a conceptual framework for
thinking about knowledge exchange, knowledge transfer metrics, and
survey and evaluation frameworks; and a standardized method to assess
national or institutional strategies. This ﬁrst chapter sets out the rationale
for third mission activities, shows how policies for third mission activities
developed in a ﬁscal situation that saw a decline in funding for public
R&D in many countries, and sets out the main institutional differences
between high- and middle-income countries. It also compares basic
trends in public R&D for the six countries studied. Chapter 2 develops
a conceptual framework to guide the evaluation of knowledge transfer
policies, practices and outcomes. Chapter 3 then looks at what corresponding patent metrics exist to produce (internationally) comparable
data on formal knowledge transfer practices.
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Part II (Chapters 4–9) recounts the historical evolution of knowledge
exchange policy and outcomes in three high-income countries (the
United Kingdom, Germany, and the Republic of Korea) and three middle-income countries (China, Brazil, and South Africa). Country authors
use the unique history of their country to produce narratives of policy
evolution and the reasons for success or failure of intended outcomes.
Part III uses an inductive approach to distill optimal policies and
identify optimum metrics to support a better framework for knowledge
exchange. An important differentiating feature of this book is that we
recognize that knowledge exchange is a two-way process where the
ability of ﬁrms to absorb university-generated knowledge is as important as the ability of the university to reach out. Thus, Chapters 10 and
11 outline policies to raise industrial involvement and university
involvement in knowledge exchange, respectively. In each chapter,
we contrast the experience of high-income and middle- income countries to draw out the policy implications. What knowledge transfer
laws and practices have been put in place in high- and middle-income
countries? How have new policies to support IP licensing affected
other knowledge transfer channels? Which approaches have demonstrated the best outcomes for public institutions and for ﬁrms but also
at the broader macro-level? Do approaches exist that are particularly
relevant to developing countries? Chapter 12 concludes the book by
discussing the interplay between the objectives of knowledge exchange
policy and the metrics available to evaluate these objectives, and what
remains to be done in this regard. Which overall economic and other
impacts have been measured and how? What additional data are
required to provide a comprehensive set of metrics for use in benchmarking, monitoring, and policy evaluation? What are the possible
sources of such data?
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Comment 1.1
fabio montobbio

This project provides an extremely interesting comparison of research
and technological transfer activities across different countries, and, in
parallel, promotes the use of a set of metrics. The approach takes its
departure from the analysis of the systems of innovation that encompasses the main actors and institutions involved in the process of knowledge transfer. It allows a ﬁne-grained analysis of the different details of
the context in which knowledge transfer takes place, exploiting a mixture
of quantitative and qualitative analysis. In so doing, it provides a very
valuable tool to help policymakers to measure the research, transfer, and
commercialization activities in order to design new innovation policy
approaches and sustain successful practices. On the one hand, it is
important to learn about successful examples and best practices, and,
on the other, efforts at emulation could have modest success if not
coupled with deep attention to the underlying structural differences
among the innovation systems of the different countries. Taking on
board the systemic approach, I would like ﬁrst to discuss my view on
possible ways to disentangle the complexity of the different environments in which knowledge transfer takes place and, second, to discuss
how normative statements can arise from this perspective. In particular,
I would like to underline ﬁrst how the different systems of innovation
depend on a set of structural characteristics, namely: the intensity of the
research effort, the technological specialization, and the industrial structures. Second, I would like to underline how systemic failures may occur
at different levels, and ﬁxing those failures naturally includes a quite
heterogeneous set of policy interventions.
The ﬁrst comment is that knowledge transfer practices are affected by
a set of structural characteristics of the countries. So when addressing
a comparison of knowledge transfer practices across countries, it is
important to take into account the relative strengths and weaknesses of
the public and private systems of R&D. For example, it emerges that the
25
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six countries considered in this project have very different R&D/GDP
expenditures (OECD 2017a). In 2015 in China, the R&D/GDP ratio was
2.1 percent, in Germany, 2.9 percent, in the Republic of Korea, 4.2 percent,
in the United Kingdom, 1.7 percent, in Brazil, 1.2 percent, and, ﬁnally, in
South Africa 0.7 percent. The growth of R&D intensity has been impressive
for China and Republic of Korea. For these countries the ﬁgures were
0.5 percent and 2.2 percent in 1995, respectively. It is also worth noting that
the share of gross domestic expenditure on R&D funded by the government is smaller in the Republic of Korea and China (21 percent and
23 percent, respectively, in 2015), denoting a relevant and increasing role
of the R&D funded by the private sector. In parallel, in Germany and the
United Kingdom, the share of R&D funded by the government is about
28 percent. This share for South Africa is 42 percent (OECD 2017b). For
Brazil, UNESCO data show that in 2014 the investment in R&D was BRL
65 billion, and almost two-thirds was funded by the government.
The ﬁgures given here show that countries like Brazil and South Africa
that have a lower R&D/GDP ratio are also the ones that display a weaker
role for private sector R&D. The relative role of the private sector, in turn,
is associated with the proﬁle of the country in terms of technological
specialization and with processes of structural change. Technological
capabilities tend to be associated to the technological specialization of
countries. For example, Brazil and South Africa did not undertake
a major process of structural change as China did. In China, a high
growth in technological capabilities is associated with a substantial shift
toward the electronic and telecommunications equipment industry and
computers. These industries are a major driver of the aggregate growth of
national and international patenting of the country (e.g., Malerba et al.
2011; Hu et al. 2017).
The distribution of technological capabilities in a country innovation
system depends on the presence of different types of organization. In
particular, it is important to have a balanced evolution of the different
actors, with a growth of the presence of both multinational corporations
and domestic innovators. China, for example, has a growing presence of
both domestic and foreign companies in electronics. This conﬁrms the
major role played by ICT in the growth of the Chinese economy, as well
as the role played by foreign companies in China. In parallel, the impressive growth of patenting activity at the Chinese Patent Ofﬁce is mainly
driven by new entrants: ﬁrms that were not systematically applying for
patents in the past (Hu et al. 2017). The dynamism of the domestic
private sector witnesses the ability to absorb foreign knowledge and to
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beneﬁt from the big investments in public institutions and infrastructures documented by Chapter 8 in this book.
An additional important aspect is the coherence between the technological activities of the different actors within the country innovation
system. In Brazil and South Africa, universities and public research
institutes tend to innovate and patent relatively more in chemicals,
pharmaceuticals, and biotechnology. This presence has been growing
over time and the Brazilian government has supported research in
pharmaceuticals and biotechnology in both universities and public
research institutes (see Chapter 7 of this volume and Ferrer et al. 2004).
In parallel, the specialization proﬁle of domestic multinational companies tends to remain stable in more traditional sectors such as consumer
goods, engineering, and transport. Similar considerations could be put
forward for South Africa. This potential mismatch between the activities
of universities and public research institutes and the technological proﬁle
of the companies suggests that well-tuned knowledge transfer policies
and practices are key for a balanced and sustainable path of growth (see
Chapter 9).
Other structural aspects that might affect the way knowledge transfer
takes place are the quality of the research system and the quality of the
institutional framework. This book provides an excellent guide to assessing and comparing the complexities of the different countries. In particular it is worth noting that, in general, it is quite difﬁcult to understand
all the sources of public research funding in a country. Public funding
passes through different levels of governance (e.g., state, regions, municipalities) and different types of organization (e.g., public/private/nonproﬁt/ foundations). There may be public research institutes that depend
entirely on regional administrations or are owned by other public nonresearch entities. A quite heterogeneous set of government acts channels
public money into knowledge transfer activities. All these countryspeciﬁc features affect the level of knowledge transfer activity but also
the channels used and the quality of that transfer. For example, different
public research intitutes may have different types of constraint in terms
of patenting activity, and they may exploit the formal and informal
channels of knowledge transfer to different degrees (see, for example,
the discussion in the chapters on Germany and the UK in Chapters 5 and
4, respectively).
Finally, geographical aspects play an important role. The presence of
innovative geographically concentrated clusters could provide, on the
one hand, speciﬁc agglomeration effects and, on the other, regional
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imbalances. Knowledge transfer practices may vary dramatically according to whether companies and universities and public research institutes
are colocated in a technological cluster or in a science park or whether the
region is characterized by the prevalence of rural areas.
My second comment discusses how normative statements can arise
from this perspective, and I would like to underline that a precise qualitative and qualitative description of the systems of innovation shows
where the successes and the potential failures of the processes and
practices of knowledge transfer actually are. This book addresses the
issue of knowledge transfer with a broad view that institutions and
regulations are constitutive elements of the innovation system. In particular, a substantial effort of the different studies is dedicated toward
understanding the different speciﬁc regulations that different countries
adopted. These regulations generate the speciﬁc conditions under which
ﬁrms, individuals, universities, and public research institutes own immaterial assets and the new knowledge they produce. These regulations
should create incentives to invest in new knowledge and in parallel
facilitate diffusion and commercialization. It is emphasized that the
process of knowledge transfer is characterized by a set of formal and
informal channels, and these channels depend on different types of
regulation: hard regulations and soft regulations (Borrás and Edquist
2014). Soft regulations are not legally binding and hard regulations are
a set of rules with some mechanism for monitoring and promoting
compliance with the rules.
So systemic failures may take place at different levels, and ﬁxing those
failures naturally includes a quite heterogeneous set of policy interventions. The interesting aspect is how to frame precisely normative issues
with this approach. Actually, the approach is very ﬂexible and allows,
through detailed case studies, the identiﬁcation of speciﬁc problems in
the innovation system that could unfold at different levels. For example,
at the policy level it is difﬁcult in many cases to be able to clearly argue
whether there is the need for more R&D or more knowledge transfer (or
more knowledge transfer ofﬁces) or more university–industry cooperation. In many cases, knowledge transfer policies are simply imported
from other countries without a precise understanding of the bottlenecks
in the system (Ejermo and Toivanen 2018). However this approach –
beyond simple policy prescriptions on market failures – allows us to
identify different types of speciﬁc failure and problem in the system and
allows for the identiﬁcation of speciﬁc policy answers (Edquist 2011).
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This book provides many different examples of potential design
failures, network failures, or capability failures. Design failures occur
when a regulation generates incentives that are not compatible with
the policy objective; network failures happen because of a lack of
linkages between actors. This creates a weak exploitation of complementarities and learning. We observe a network failure also when
ﬁrms and companies in a country are tightly connected but remain
locked in and miss out on new outside developments. Capability
failures take place when ﬁrms, universities, public research institutes,
and, in particular, KTOs lack the capabilities to learn rapidly and
effectively and hence remain locked into existing practices. This
conceptual framework therefore provides detailed guidance on how
to evaluate existing knowledge transfer policies, practices, and outcomes, to identify in a comparative way potential failures and problems, and, ﬁnally, to design speciﬁc targeted policy intervention.
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li e n v e r ba u wh e de ko g li n

Globally, there is a growing interest in the role of universities and public
research institutes in the alchemy of innovation, the emphasis being on
how they can make more systematic efforts to unlock the commercial
value of their research. While many of these feel it is imperative that their
knowledge transfer activities work to recover costs, from my experience,
revenue generation, in most cases, is not and in my view should not be
the primary motivation. The reasons these institutes engage in knowledge transfer is to advance education and research; and at the same time
it helps to ensure that public investment in research is impactful, that it
contributes to broader socioeconomic development objectives. However,
the going is tough, even in high-income countries and the entrepreneurial character of these institutes remains the subject of academic scrutiny.
The chapter inspires a deeper understanding of this critical area by
examining the evolving role of institutes in national innovation systems.
It also examines the impact of legislative and policy initiatives that
promote protection of inventions through patenting and their commercialization through licensing and startup formation.
WIPO has developed several programs in an endeavor to help public
research organizations set the right institutional policies in order to
successfully harness public research for innovation and contribute to
socioeconomic development in their regions.1 In this context, I have
witnessed two particular trends concerning universities’ engagement
with IP-based commercialization, where improved understanding and
additional metrics would seem to be desirable: (1) an expansion of
academic incentive schemes and (2) an increased commitment to socially
responsible commercialization.
1

See WIPO’s web page on universities and IP at https://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/universities_research/. To support its activities, WIPO has created an IP Policy Template for
Universities and Research Institutions, Guidelines for Customization of the IP Policy
Template, and an IP Policy Drafters’ Checklist.

30

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 54.177.185.247, on 15 Nov 2021 at 19:13:31, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/979C0AAA92B1200DCE513DAAE4894BE7

comment 1.2

31

Trend toward Actively Motivating and Empowering Researchers
to Participate in Knowledge Transfer
The direct involvement of academic researchers has proved to be
a determinant in the success of knowledge transfer. This clearly calls
for cultivating a culture that supports and encourages both invention
disclosures and the participation of inventors in the transfer process.
There is also a need for a better understanding of the strategies of the
various types of inventor/researcher involved and their motivations to
participate in the process.
To boost academic entrepreneurial activity, universities, and public
research institutes are introducing an ever wider range of incentives for
researchers, where IP and commercialization efforts receive greater
rewards comparable to publications. Among the speciﬁc incentives are:
generous royalty and equity terms; tying IP generation and research
commercialization to career development; sufﬁcient time to engage in IPrelated activities (leave of absence, course reductions, relief of admin
responsibilities, etc.); research funding and infrastructure; internal commercialization support and mentoring; entrepreneurship education programs; recognition through awards and public acknowledgement, etc.
Empirical ﬁndings seem to suggest that the inﬂuence of such incentives
(both monetary and nonmonetary) is not always predictable, given the
differences in motives, perspectives and cultures of the academic scientists.
Questions that merit further empirical investigation include:
• What drives academics to be engaged in the commercialization of their
research outcomes?
• Which factors can have an impact on the attractiveness of academic
incentives (such as differences between the researchers in terms of
gender, age, research ﬁeld, characteristics of the ecosystem in which
they operate, the seniority of researchers)? Is it therefore possible that
a variety of incentives may be required for different types of
researchers?
• What is the effect of the royalty share allocated to researchers? A large
share can potentially enhance technology licensing, whereas a lower
share is more likely to boost spinoffs; at the same time, too low a share
allocated to the institution may not be sufﬁcient to cover overall costs
and may challenge the quality of services their knowledge transfer
ofﬁces (KTO) provide.
• Is giving inventors a share of the equity in a spinoff rather than
a simple share of returns a more effective way to motivate, considering
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the higher levels of uncertainty over returns, but also the prospect of
higher returns than might accrue to licensing?
• What kind of remuneration packages are necessary to attract highly
skilled employees at the KTO, noting that internal policies may prevent
institutes from providing competitive salaries?
• How can the efﬁciency of institutes’ support services be improved (e.g.,
by creation of an association of KTOs to pool support efforts)?
• How does the existence of competing incentives affect the engendering
of an entrepreneurship culture, considering that researchers tend to
have multiple “principals” (mainly the university itself, heads of
departments, KTO, research council, government and external agencies) who often incentivize different outputs?
To evaluate the effectiveness of their incentives program, institutes
must also establish comprehensive and systematic performance indicators, including some speciﬁc to IP-based commercialization. Empirically
grounded metrics are critically important to an effective incentive structure. An important caveat is that incentive structures tend to be too
focused on the supply side, which is the ability of the university to
transfer knowledge. Attention needs also to be paid to the demand side,
which involves the demand from industry for assistance in resolving
problems and the region’s ability to absorb the research results.

Trend toward Socially Responsible Research Commercialization
It would appear that entrepreneurial institutions around the world face
more pressure to be responsive to the needs of society and environmental
issues. The growing concern of this social dimension of higher education
calls for resolute efforts to devise strategies that will establish them as
drivers of societal well-being, while identifying the right indicators to
monitor socioeconomic beneﬁt ﬂowing from such engagement.
Successful cases prove that institutes have the means at their disposal to
integrate a social dimension in their knowledge transfer practices
(including those that are IPR-based), such as creating research programs
directed to solving social and environmental problems; anticipating
which technologies may have applications that address important
unmet social needs; adopting socially responsible licensing provisions
that increase the availability of medicines and environmental technologies in developing countries; retaining the right to grant additional
licenses to manufacturers of generic drugs; negotiating licensing terms
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that allow third parties to access and distribute the innovation and its
derivative products; promoting the creation of spinoffs; participation in
community-based research; etc. In addition to those, the chapter presents
a set of levers for preventing the potentially negative impacts of IPRbased knowledge transfer.
While policymakers and institutes tend to collect and employ mostly
quantitative performance indicators to capture scientiﬁc productivity
and commercial outcomes, the local/regional impact of universities and
public research institutes extends far beyond knowledge transfer and
tangible outputs (in terms of human capital attraction, formation of
entrepreneurship capital within a locale, informal networks, new ideas,
etc.). However, as the chapter indicates, establishing clear causal relationships between IPR-based knowledge transfer and these societal beneﬁts is
hard. Accordingly, statistics on the number of licenses issued or the
number of spinoffs established do not effectively do justice to answering
the question of how institutions address tangible socioeconomic
outcomes.
Despite the fact that there is a trend afoot in some high-income
countries to assess the success of knowledge transfer using alternative
criteria, such as social impact or contribution to welfare, there is still
no consensus on a set of systematic social impact measurements.

Concluding Observations
There is no magic formula for harnessing public research for innovation, given that different factors and levels of support interventions
affect knowledge transfer outcomes. At the same time, there are
magical “elements” or “factors” that the success stories have in common. The chapter does a nice job in elucidating such success factors at
the country and institutional level. It is, however, important to note
that success is a result of more collaborative efforts within an innovation ecosystem. For example, Yale’s success in creating the biotech
cluster is to a large extent due to the fact that it implemented changes
in collaboration with other players in the region, to push for local
economic impact. Countries also need to put into practice initiatives
that promote and strengthen academia and business collaborations.
One example in Brazil is the ITec platform, which was ﬁnanced by
the Ministry of Science & Technology and counts on the participation
of companies and universities to feed the framework of demands and
offers.
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At the micro/institutional level, two efforts deserve closer attention
and empirical investigation, namely, getting appropriate incentive structures and the commitment to socially responsible commercialization.
The transformation of institutes to become more entrepreneurial may
be supported by creating new incentives and performance-linked criteria
for researchers. How academic incentives work, and how they can be
used to achieve intended results, remains a contested issue. In the
university and public research institute contexts, the pursuit of science
and innovation driven by external incentives, especially ﬁnancial
rewards, is considered by some as going against the traditional values
of academia. However, international experience shows that institutionalizing an efﬁcient incentive program is a critical precondition for increasing opportunities for commercializing university inventions. The
challenge for institutes lies in selecting the types of incentive and their
associated metrics, based on the institute’s mission, culture, and goals,
and the country’s innovation ecosystem.
Socially responsible entrepreneurship is in large part a cultural attribute. Institutes can do their bit to encourage its development by, for
instance, formulating policies that promote ethically acceptable and
socially desirable knowledge transfer coupled with appropriate performance indicators. It would appear that institutes still struggle with (1)
deﬁning what “socially responsible” means and (2) measuring the extent
to which their socially responsible policies and practices have meaningful
impact. Maintaining a system of comprehensive indicators, including
variables that can also measure social impact, is crucial for any country,
regardless of its level of development, to help institutes better evaluate
their roles in the creation of regional innovation and social value through
research commercialization.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 54.177.185.247, on 15 Nov 2021 at 19:13:31, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/979C0AAA92B1200DCE513DAAE4894BE7

2
Evaluating Knowledge Transfer Policies and
Practices: Conceptual Framework and Metrics
anthony arundel and sacha wunsch-vincent

2.1 Introduction
As outlined in Chapter 1, a common policy goal in both high- and middleincome countries is to increase the commercialization of research ﬁndings
produced by the public research sector in order to support economic
growth. This process involves the transfer of knowledge produced by
public research organizations, including both universities and public
research institutes, to private sector businesses or government agencies.
A diverse range of policies have been implemented in many countries to
encourage knowledge transfer, including the establishment of knowledge
transfer ofﬁces (KTOs)1 at universities and public research institutes. Other
policies include support for open publication and close collaboration
between universities/public research institutes and businesses. One important issue is how to evaluate the success of these policies in terms of their
economic impacts and their effect on various actors within an innovation
system. Possible evaluation methods include case studies and the collection
and analysis of knowledge transfer metrics. The latter have often involved the
use of IP licensing data.
IP licensing is only one of several channels for transferring knowledge produced by universities and public research institutes to private ﬁrms. However, it is an important focus for research on
knowledge transfer, both in the research reported in this book and
in the academic literature. The research focus on IP licensing partly
reﬂects its importance to knowledge transfer policies in developed
countries, as described in Chapter 1, and partly reﬂects the widespread
1

KTOs were originally known as “technology transfer ofﬁces,” or TTOs. The use of “TTO”
has fallen out of favor because transferred knowledge can be nontechnological, such as the
rights to biological tissue or software programs.
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availability of relevant data, in contrast to a lack of data for other
knowledge transfer channels.
This chapter provides a conceptual framework for the country case
studies included in this book, and identiﬁes the most commonly used
metrics for knowledge transfer mediated by the licensing of IP. It
describes different methods of knowledge transfer, policies and practices
for supporting knowledge transfer (particularly via IP), and the costs and
beneﬁts of IP licensing. One key message from the chapter is that reliance
on IP metrics may underestimate the extent of knowledge transfer in the
economy and that informal methods of transfer may be a precursor to
more formal relationships.

2.2 Channels of Knowledge Transfer
The public research sector has three main roles that are supported by
government policy. The ﬁrst is to create trained and educated citizens,
the second is to push the frontiers of knowledge by undertaking cutting
edge research, and the third is to support economic activity through
several channels for transferring knowledge from universities and public
research institutes to the business sector (see Figure 2.1). In recent years
this third role of knowledge transfer is becoming increasingly important
and is often referred to as the “third mission” of universities.
Economically useful knowledge can also be transferred to government
and nonproﬁt organizations. The transfer of knowledge to government
often occurs through the procurement of research services, with the goal
of improving public services or addressing social needs.
Knowledge transfer occurs through both informal and formal channels.
Informal channels include reading the literature, attending conferences,
hiring trained graduates,2 and discussions via personal contacts. These
have also been combined under the rubric of “open science” because they
make knowledge publicly available at little or no cost (Cohen et al. 2002).
Formal channels include licensing, collaboration and research agreements,
and contracting-out. In general, informal channels do not require the recipient of the knowledge to make a payment to the institution via a contract,
whereas formal channels use a contract to mediate payment. Knowledge can
be transferred entirely through informal channels, entirely through
2

See Foray and Lissoni (2010). Hiring university graduates is one of the most important channels
from the perspective of businesses, but is arguably not a formal channel because it does not
require a contract with a university. Conversely, hiring academics for a limited period of time,
such as in a personnel exchange, requires a contract between a business and a university.
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Research
and publications
Dissemination of knowledge via
conferences, seminars, meetings
with industry and others

Public
research and
education

Education and training of
students / researchers recruited
by the private sector
Consultancies, contract
research, university–industry joint
research projects, joint research
centers and PhD projects
Creation of IP available for
licensing to established firms
and new startup companies

Industry
and
innovation

Formal
knowledge
transfer
practices

Creation of spinoff and
other forms of academic
entrepreneurship of faculty or
students (with or without IP)

Figure 2.1 Knowledge transfer channels between the public research sector and
businesses
Source: WIPO (2011)

formal channels, or through a combination of both, for instance, when
informal discussions lead to a research agreement that results in an IP
license.
It is important to place knowledge ﬂows from public research to ﬁrms
in context. They play only a minor role in the ﬂow of knowledge within
an innovation system. A 2010 survey of manufacturing ﬁrms in the
United States of America (U.S.) found that 49 percent of ﬁrms obtained
the invention behind their most important innovation from external
sources, attesting to the importance of knowledge ﬂows to an innovation
system, but only 10 percent of them reported that this invention was from
a university. Importantly, however, inventions obtained from technology
specialists, including universities, were of higher value than inventions
obtained from other sources such as customers or suppliers and 37
percent of inventions obtained from technology specialists were based
on a formal channel (Arora et al. 2016).3
3

The authors do not break down the use of formal channels within the category of technology
specialists, which includes universities, independent inventors, and consultants/service
providers.
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A consistent issue, identiﬁed in multiple studies, is the dependence of
knowledge transfer on the ability of ﬁrms, particularly ﬁrms in the region
where the university or public research institute is located, to absorb or
use inventions produced by public research. Research shows that knowledge transfer activities increase with the technological capabilities of
domestic or regional ﬁrms (Van Looy et al. 2011; Curi et al. 2012; HewittDundas 2012; Calderón-Martínez and García-Quevedo 2013; Okamuro
and Nishimura 2013; Hussain et al. 2014; Ranga et al. 2016). This is an
important issue in low- and middle-income countries and for regional
institutions in developed countries, where ﬁrms may lack sufﬁcient
absorptive capacity (see Chapter 10). In addition to regional differences,
ﬁrms that rely on informal personal contacts are smaller and have lower
levels of absorptive capacity than ﬁrms that use formal knowledge transfer methods (Freitas et al. 2013).
Not surprisingly, ﬁrm involvement in knowledge transfer from public
research organizations increases with the ﬁrm’s R&D intensity (Freitas
et al. 2013; Okamuro and Nishimura 2013; Kafouros et al. 2015). One
study also ﬁnds that ﬁrm involvement with universities increases with the
number of universities in a region, possibly because it increases the
probability of a good match between the needs of ﬁrms and what universities can offer, or because greater competition between universities
increases the ﬂexibility of academic and KTO staff (Okamuro and
Nishimura 2013).
Albuquerque et al. (2015) describe an international survey on the use
of different knowledge channels by ﬁrms in low and middle-income
countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. In two low-income countries (Nigeria and Uganda) informal methods dominate (Kruss et al.
2015), whereas in middle-income countries in Asia (China, Malaysia,
and Thailand) the most common methods are consultancy and research
contracts (Schiller and Lee 2015). One explanation for the importance of
contractual relationships in Asia is their usefulness in building innovative
capacity and problem-solving abilities in ﬁrms. In four middle-income
Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, and Mexico),
both contracts and informal channels are used more frequently than IPmediated methods (Dutrénit and Arza 2015).
From a public policy perspective, providing information to businesses
at no cost via informal channels will be beneﬁcial if it increases the
number of businesses that use the information to develop commercial
products and processes. In addition, competition will reduce costs for
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consumers. The exception is when no business will invest in commercializing knowledge without an exclusive license, for instance, when the
cost of commercializing knowledge is high but the cost for competitors to
copy it is low. In this case, public research institutes and universities need
to be able to provide ﬁrms with exclusive licenses to IP-protected
knowledge.
One of the main purposes of the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act in the U.S. was to
allow public research organization to provide exclusive licenses. The Act
also led to widespread adoption of the “IP licensing model” for knowledge transfer, deﬁned in this book as the use of IP to mediate the transfer
of knowledge. The IP licensing model has been widely used, even when IP
is not required for ﬁrms to develop and commercialize knowledge, as
when an exclusive license is not given. This is partly because universities
and public research institutes were attracted by the potential income
from both nonexclusive and exclusive licenses, as well as the need to
recover the costs of maintaining a KTO. In addition, the IP licensing
model can have other beneﬁts, such as signaling the existence of inventions to ﬁrms.
Importantly, policies or research that account for only one type of
linkage can provide only a partial understanding of the patterns of
interaction between the public research sector and businesses.
Nevertheless, the focus of this conceptual framework is on knowledge
transfer systems that involve, at some point, formal transfer methods,
while recognizing that many formal methods will originate in informal
relationships between university researchers and private businesses.

2.3 The Role of Policies and Practices in Promoting
Knowledge Transfer
Policies to support knowledge transfer between public research institutes and universities and ﬁrms should be designed to support
multiple knowledge channels and should take into consideration
the advantages and disadvantages of each channel and the suitability
of different types of knowledge for speciﬁc channels. The role of
KTOs has adapted over time to take these issues into account, with
a greater recognition of the need for KTOs to support informal
channels (for instance by arranging “meet and greet” events between
academics and business), in addition to their traditional role in
supporting the IP licensing model.
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Universities and public research institutes can also create
a supportive environment for knowledge transfer through secondary
activities such as educational programs to teach entrepreneurship to
students and faculty and by creating innovation incubators and science
parks (Rothaermel et al. 2007). Incubators and science parks can attract
businesses to conduct some of their activities close to the university and
encourage contacts with researchers and entrepreneurial students and
staff.
Relevant policies and practices to support knowledge transfer occur at
both the national and institutional level.
A review of existing policy research to date reveals a few important
lessons (WIPO 2011). First, despite the general trend toward institutional ownership and commercialization of university/public research
institute inventions, a diversity of legal and policy approaches persists
in terms both of how legislation is anchored in broader innovation
policy and of the speciﬁc rules on the scope of patenting, invention
disclosure, incentives for researchers (such as royalty sharing), and
whether safeguards are instituted to counteract the potentially negative effects of patenting. Second, there is a large variation in the
means of implementing such legislation, as well as the available
complementary policies to enhance the impact of public R&D and
to promote academic entrepreneurship.

2.3.1 National and Institutional Policies and Practices to Support
Knowledge Transfer
The most common national policy of direct relevance to knowledge
transfer concerns the ownership of IP developed in the public research
sector. In some countries, such as the U.S., national laws give ownership
to the institution, other countries, Sweden, for instance, assign ownership
to the inventor, while yet others, such as Canada, leave the decision to the
institution.
An extensive literature exists on the factors that are linked to successful
knowledge transfer by KTOs, but there is only limited research on the
effect of institutional practices at the level of the university or public
research institute (Barjak et al. 2015; Belenzon and Schankerman 2009).
Relevant practices include:
• activities to create an institutional culture that supports knowledge
transfer;
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• the establishment of institutional strategies for knowledge transfer and
commercialization, such as rules for transparency in contract
negotiations;
• incentives for staff to disclose inventions and support knowledge
transfer by working with potential licensees;
• policies that encourage academic startups, such as allowing faculty to
create and own a share in a startup or to take a leave of absence, the
provision of ﬁnance, and supportive infrastructure such as incubators
and science parks.
Overall, the evidence stresses the importance of a well-deﬁned IP
policy. Universities with internal rules supporting the participation of
researchers in knowledge transfer perform better than universities without such rules (Debackere and Veugelers 2005). Further discussion of the
effect of institutional policies on knowledge transfer is provided in
Chapter 10.

2.4 Costs and Beneﬁts of the IP Licensing Model
Since knowledge transfer can occur through multiple channels, an
important policy goal is to ensure that the IP licensing model will drive
knowledge transfer and business innovation while at the same time
preserving open science (Foray and Lissoni 2010) and the beneﬁts of
other contractual or informal channels for knowledge transfer (Rosli and
Rossi 2014; Veugelers 2016).4 Combining informal and formal channels
can have a positive effect on innovation outcomes (Siegel et al. 2003; Link
et al. 2007; Grimpe and Hussinger 2013). The use of both channels could
be especially important to spinoffs (Hayer 2016).
Maintaining multiple channels and supporting positive synergies
among them depends on maximizing the advantages and minimizing
the disadvantages of existing and potential policy approaches. Effective
outcomes also depend on the speciﬁc details of IP policy implementation
at the national, regional and institutional levels.
The potential costs and beneﬁts of the IP licensing model, as discussed
in the literature, are summarized in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. Table 2.1 distinguishes between possible beneﬁts and costs for the two respective main
4

Czarnitzki et al. (2016) ﬁnd that the change in Germany from professor’s privilege
(academics may own the IP) to institutional ownership did not result in an increase in
new startups, possibly because the new policy interfered with the previous knowledge
transfer system that was based on academic–ﬁrm interactions.
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Table 2.1 Impacts of IP-based knowledge transfer policies on universities/
public research institutes and ﬁrms

Public research
organizations

Potential beneﬁts

Potential costs (or
investments)

1)

1)

2)

3)

Firms

1)

Increased IP ownership
facilitates entrepreneurship and vertical
specialization
• Reinforces other policies aimed at academic
entrepreneurship (e.g.,
enhancing access to
ﬁnance)
• Licensing and other
revenues (e.g., consulting) can be
invested in research
Cross-fertilization
between faculty and
industry
• Intangible beneﬁts to
university/public
research institutes’
reputation and the
quality of research
• Helps to identify
research projects with
a dual scientiﬁc and
commercial purpose
Increased student
intake and ability to
place students in ﬁrms
Facilitates university–
business linkages
• Enables ﬁrms to have
access to top scientists
and to collaborate in
developing innovations within a clear
contractual setting

2)

1)

Diversion of time away
from academic research
• Distorts incentives for
scientists, leading to
changes in the type of
research that is
conducted
• Reorganizes university
processes and culture
with a view to
commercialization
IP-related establishment
and maintenance costs
• Cost of establishing
and maintaining
a KTO and related IP
management, including investment in
expertise and human
resources
• Cost of time on IP ﬁlings and knowledge
transfer (even if contracted out to a KTO)
• Additional ﬁnancial
and reputational costs
associated with defense
of IP rights
Barriers to access to
university inventions
• Reduced free access to
university inventions
and research tools,
except where they
result from
a sponsored contract
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Table 2.1 (cont.)
Potential beneﬁts
2)

3)

Enables the creation of
a market for ideas and
contracting with
universities
• Framework diminishes transaction costs
and increases legal
certainty, facilitating
investment by private
sector
• Securing an exclusive
license increases
incentives for further
investment
• Ability to specialize is
a competitive advantage (vertical
specialization)
• Increases transparency
through published
databases on licensing
and management
practices
• Improves content of
patent databases
Commercialization of
new products, generating proﬁts and growth

Potential costs (or
investments)

2)

• Lack of access if
another ﬁrm has
secured an exclusive
license
IP-based transaction
costs and tensions in
industry–university
relationships
• University scientists
lack an understanding
of development costs
and market needs,
leading to a higher
probability of bargaining breakdown
• IP negotiations can
interfere with establishment of joint R&D
and university–industry relations when
institutions act as revenue maximizers with
a strong stance on IP

Source: Authors

agents (ﬁrms and public research organizations), while Table 2.2 summarizes the systemic impacts of IP licensing on science, the economy,
and society. Table 2.3 adds additional notes of relevance to middleincome countries (WIPO 2011; Zuñiga 2011).
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Table 2.2 Socioeconomic effects of IP-based knowledge transfer policies

Broader impacts
on science

Potential beneﬁts

Potential costs

1)

1)

2)

3)

Increased impact of
more focused research
with potential for
application
Improved innovation
system linkages
• Efﬁcient division of
labor in the generation and commercialization of new
inventions
• Private sector contribution to funding
basic and applied
research
Increase in the quality
of research and
education

2)

3)

Reorientation of the
direction of research
• Overemphasis on
applied, short-term,
more lucrative
research
• Less diversity in scientiﬁc disciplines as
focus on patentable
outcomes increases
• Other university missions such as teaching
and training are
neglected
Negative impacts on
open science
• Crowds out/displaces
the use of other
knowledge transfer
channels to industry
• Publication delays,
increased secrecy, less
sharing, including the
withholding of data
• Decrease in international scientiﬁc
exchanges
The prospect of
income for universities/public research
institutes can reduce
government commitment to funding
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Table 2.2 (cont.)

Innovation and
growth

Potential beneﬁts

Potential costs

1)

1)

2)

3)

Commercialization of
inventions with economic and social
impacts
• Increase in consumer
welfare and business
productivity via
access to innovative
products and
processes
(Localized) positive
impacts on R&D, technology spillovers,
entrepreneurship,
employment and
growth
Higher competitive
position of country in
global market

2)

3)

Long-run negative
effect of diverting
attention away from
academic knowledge
production
Long-run negative
effects of IP on open
science and follow-on
innovation
• Patenting of broad
upstream inventions,
platform technologies
and research tools
increases the cost of
follow-on research
and innovation
• Reduces the diversity
of research
Focus on IP might
inhibit rather than promote the commercialization of inventions

Source: Authors

2.4.1 Advantages
Due to data availability (discussed in section 4), we know more about the
IP licensing model in high- and middle-income countries than other
forms of knowledge transfer. Patents are the classic form of IP, but IP is
also used to protect plant varieties (plant breeders’ rights), biological
tissue, knowhow (protected under secrecy), industrial designs, and copyright (relevant to software outside the U.S.).5
Studies show that the IP licensing model has supported the emergence of
new industries, such as the scientiﬁc instruments industry, semiconductors,
computer software, and the nano- and biotechnology industries (Rosenberg
5

Trademarks constitute another form of IP, but are rarely licensed by universities or public
research institutes.
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Table 2.3 Impacts on low- and middle-income countries
Potential beneﬁts

Potential costs

1)

1)

2)

3)

All the beneﬁts mentioned above
(see Tables 2.1 and 2.2)
This depends, however, on the
capacity of businesses to absorb
and further develop university
inventions – either by domestic
ﬁrms or by locally present multinational ﬁrms – and whether or
not these inventions are relevant
to the needs of low- and middleincome countries
Ability to contribute to local or
global markets for university
inventions
This depends on the capacity to
generate university inventions and
ﬁle patents
University inventions might
also attract the presence of multinational companies and their
associated complementary R&D
Strengthened science–industry
links could help reorient research
toward local needs
Improved visibility of public
research inventions
Local ﬁrms may ﬁnd it easier to
identify relevant inventions and
academics through patent searches
than through searches of academic
literature

All the above-mentioned costs
(see Tables 2.1 and 2.2), some of
which are ampliﬁed given the
greater resource constraints of
less-developed economies
• Reduced or no access to critical
technologies owned by universities in high-income countries
• Overemphasis on applied,
lucrative projects may lead to
less useful inventions from the
point of view of low- and middle-income countries
• The decrease in international scientiﬁc exchanges and a reduced
willingness of institutions in highincome countries to collaborate as
a result of more complex IP
ownership issues and secrecy
• High cost of obtaining international patent protection for
university inventions and
resulting opportunity costs

Source: Authors

and Nelson 1994; Zucker et al. 1998; Di Gregorio and Shane 2003). Startups
based on university/public research institute IP are also more likely than
established ﬁrms to commercialize new technologies that are radical, early
stage, or of a general-purpose nature. However, attributing these positive
impacts exclusively to the IP licensing model is difﬁcult in the absence of
research on the role of other knowledge transfer channels.
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The IP licensing model has secondary beneﬁts other than its primary
objective of transferring a speciﬁc set of knowledge to one or more
businesses. These other beneﬁts depend on the ability of a patent to
signal the presence of expertise within a university/public research institute via the information contained in it, which can lead to mutually
beneﬁcial collaborative and contract research agreements, placements
for graduate students, funded PhD scholarships and improvements
in research quality. The cross-fertilization of ideas, problems, and
knowledge between universities/public research institutes and ﬁrms can
facilitate joint problem solving and open up new avenues for research
(Owen-Smith and Powell 2003; Azoulay et al. 2009). While this has been
an ongoing trend in high-income economies over the last few decades, it
has enormous potential beneﬁts for low- and middle-income economies,
particularly in building up the research capabilities of universities.
Many of the secondary beneﬁts extend beyond unidirectional knowledge
exchanges between universities or public research institutes and ﬁrms.
Industrial research can complement and guide the direction of basic
research. Contractual arrangements with ﬁrms can provide university scientists with funds to purchase advanced equipment and instruments.
The signaling function can also be met through publication in scientiﬁc and technical journals, but the focus of patents on inventions with
commercial possibilities could have an advantage over publications,
where commercial ideas could be more time-consuming (and therefore
costly) for businesses to identify. Furthermore, the existence of patents
signals the willingness of the institution to license knowledge.

2.4.2 Disadvantages
Open science is based on the norms of rapid disclosure of research results
and an environment of knowledge sharing, co-authorship and joint
projects that contribute to cumulative learning. The patenting of university inventions could have negative effects on these norms by slowing the
diffusion of university inventions, including research tools. This could
have an unintended effect of stiﬂing private sector innovation (Eisenberg
1989; Heller and Eisenberg 1998; Kenney and Patton 2011).6 In particular, the exclusive licensing of patents to single ﬁrms could limit the
6

Kenney and Patton (2011) note that the institutional arrangements within which KTOs are
embedded have encouraged some of them to become revenue maximizers rather than
facilitators of technology dissemination.
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diffusion of knowledge generated with public funds, reducing the diversity and number of follow-on innovations.
Moreover, strong IP policies could negatively affect other knowledge
transfer channels that might be equally or more effective in supporting
knowledge transfer under speciﬁc conditions. These include informal
knowledge exchanges between businesses and academics as well as formal R&D collaboration, which could be affected by the need for complex
negotiations over IP rights.
The nonﬁnancial disadvantages of close university–industry linkages
include a loss of academic freedom, a decline in basic research,7 a shift
away from research of low commercial interest, and restrictions on or
delays in publication due to the interest of commercial partners in
secrecy (Van Looy et al. 2004; Tartari and Breschi 2012; Muscio and
Pozzali 2013). Examples have been noted of companies restricting the
ﬁndings of university researchers or researchers denying others access to
their data (Campbell et al. 2000; Campbell et al. 2002). Despite these
examples, none of the research to date has found strong negative effects
that cannot be managed with good university codes of practice (Fabrizio
and Di Minin 2008; Czarnitzki et al. 2009; Grimaldi et al. 2011).
The lack of strong evidence of negative impacts could be partly due to
research designs that are unable to detect problems. For example, the
importance of publication delays is likely to be greatest for early-career
researchers such as PhD candidates and post-doctorates who need to
build up a list of publications rapidly. Yet this possible effect is missed in
studies that focus on heads of research groups or university departments.
This could be one reason why a study of departmental heads ﬁnds that
publication delays are given a low importance ranking as a barrier to
collaboration with industry, whereas the choice of research ranks much
higher (Muscio and Pozzali 2013).
The risk of industry exerting an undue inﬂuence on academic research
is constrained by the small share of university R&D that industry funds.8
In the U.S., for example, industry ﬁnances about 5 to 6 percent of all basic
7

8

Thursby and Thursby (2007) ﬁnd a small decline in the number of publications in basic
science journals in years in which academics disclose a discovery. This could be because
disclosure creates work related to patenting and licensing that decreases the time available
for basic research.
Ofﬁcial statistics show a modest but increasing share of industry-funded R&D carried out
in academia. This has increased in OECD countries from an average of 2.9 percent in 1981
to 6.6 percent in 2007. In Argentina, China, and the Russian Federation, ﬁrms also fund
a stable or increasing percentage of academic R&D.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 54.177.185.247, on 15 Nov 2021 at 19:13:31, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/979C0AAA92B1200DCE513DAAE4894BE7

evaluating knowledge t ransfer policies

49

and applied academic R&D, respectively, although its share (and likely
inﬂuence) is much higher in health-related R&D.
The adoption by universities of a proactive patenting strategy can
create other disadvantages. Long delays in reaching an agreement over
IP terms, or university actions to maximize their potential revenue (Alexy
et al. 2009; Wadhwa 2011),9 can discourage university–industry collaboration. Firms can also be discouraged if institutions use a “one-size-ﬁtsall” approach to patenting research results that ignores the evidence that
patents and exclusive licensing play different roles in the development of
complex versus discrete technologies (So et al. 2008).
Few studies have assessed the disadvantages of institutional IP strategies. Instead, studies show that often – and despite potential friction –
university IP, collaboration, and research productivity go hand in hand.
Universities that collaborate more with industry also tend to have the
most patents.
The IP licensing model could have negative effect on low- and mediumincome countries by raising the costs for businesses to license research tools,
databases, and technologies (Boettiger and Bennett 2006; Engel 2008;
So et al. 2008; Montobbio 2009). In particular, by increasing prices, stricter
IP practices could hinder access to technologies in agriculture, health, and
essential medicines that are of critical importance to less-developed economies (Boettiger and Bennett 2006). Another concern is that opportunities
for scientiﬁc networking or collaboration between scientists in high-income
and less-developed countries could be negatively affected by conﬂicts over
university patenting strategies (Clemente 2006).

2.4.3 Minimizing the Costs of IP-Mediated Knowledge Transfer
Universities/public research institutes, funding agencies, donors, and governments have two levers for preventing or limiting the potentially negative
impacts of IP-based knowledge transfer. First, the patenting and licensing of
speciﬁc types of invention can be restricted. For instance, guidelines can
demand that patents should be sought, and exclusive licenses attributed,
only where they are a necessary condition for their commercialization.
University policies and government bodies can also declare certain areas offlimits to university patenting: basic research, research tools, or technologies
critical to public health in low-income countries.
9

Firm managers have argued that it has distanced universities from ﬁrms in the U.S. and has
been one reason why US ﬁrms collaborate more with ﬁrms abroad (Litan et al. 2008).
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Second, when inventions are patented, the type of and access to
downstream licenses can be inﬂuenced by legislation or institutional
policies. For instance, licensees of government-funded technologies can
be required to disclose follow-on investment and the steps taken to
commercialize the patent. The goal is to prevent ﬁrms from using
licensed patents to block follow-on inventions by other ﬁrms. Other
requirements can ensure that products derived from licensed inventions
are sold to consumers or poorer countries on reasonable terms (OECD
2003; So et al. 2008). Field-of-use restrictions can be implemented to
ensure that the IP is made available for future research, including to other
ﬁrms. Governments can also reserve the right to practice the invention or
override exclusive licensing rights (“march-in rights”).
Universities and public research institutes are experimenting with
a number of interesting additional approaches, such as open IP policies.
These include patenting and licensing strategies (e.g., granting ﬁrms
nonexclusive rather than exclusive licenses, making licenses available
for free or at low cost if used for humanitarian or not-for-proﬁt purposes or by small ﬁrms or startups in selected technologies), and
providing easier access to research tools and to copyrighted works
such as teaching materials, an often-neglected IP issue.

2.5 Measuring Knowledge Transfer
Table 2.4 lists the variety of possible knowledge channels, including informal
channels consisting of “open science” and two types of formal channel.
There is a lack of consistency in the literature on the deﬁnition of formal
channels, with some studies combining consultancy and contract research
with informal methods in order to focus on the difference between IPmediated channels and all other channels (Tartari and Breschi 2012; Abreu
and Grenevich 2013). The formal channels are divided into those that
support the creation of new knowledge by a university or public research
institutes, and contractual methods for accessing existing knowledge produced by a university/public research institute via IP licensing. Table 2.4 also
identiﬁes the main data sources on knowledge transfer for each channel.
With a few exceptions,10 surveys show that the most common channels for both ﬁrms and academics in high-income countries are open
10

Shapiro (2012) ﬁnds that ﬁrm managers in Korea give low importance to informal
methods such as publications and conferences. Hiring is given the highest importance,
followed by patents and contracts.
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Table 2.4 Knowledge transfer channels and data sources
1

2

3

Open science (informal)

Contractual (formal)

IP mediated (formal)

Training of ﬁrm staff by
institutions, placement
of postgraduates in
a ﬁrm for an internship

Problem solving/
consultancy with
academics1

Hiring university
graduates

Research contracts
(research supported by
ﬁnancial or in-kind
contributions from
government or
industry)
Collaborative R&D
projects (joint funding
and participation by
the public organization
and government or
industry)

Licensing of institutions’
IP (patents, copyright,
industrial designs,
plant breeder’s rights,
knowhow, etc.)
Spinoffs/startups using
the institute’s IP

Attending conferences or
workshops

Reading academic
literature
Personal contacts
Access to advanced
facilities or equipment
Data sources
Surveys of ﬁrms or
academics

Surveys of academics,
ﬁrms, or KTOs1

Joint ventures using the
institute’s IP

Surveys of KTOs, ﬁrms,
or public data sources

Source: Cohen et al. (2002); Cosh et al. (2006); Ramos-Vielba and FernándezEsquinas (2012); Tartari and Breschi (2012)
1
KTOs may be unaware of many private consultancies between academics and
ﬁrms, particularly if academics are not legally required to report private
consultancies to their institution.

science, followed by contracts for the creation of new knowledge (Cohen
et al. 2002; Siegel et al. 2003; Cosh et al. 2006; D’Este and Patel 2007;
De Fuentes and Dutrénit 2012; Hughes and Kitson 2012; Grimpe and
Hussinger 2013; Freitas et al. 2013; Okamuro and Nishimura 2013;
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Dutrénit and Arza 2015; Kafouros et al. 2015; Kruss et al. 2015; Schiller
and Lee 2015). This is also partly reﬂected in the source of knowledge
transfer income. In the United Kingdom, contract and collaborative
research account for the majority of university income from knowledge
transfer, with IP income accounting for only 2 percent to 4 percent of the
total (Cosh et al. 2006; Zhang et al. 2016).

2.5.1 Basic Metrics of Knowledge Transfer via Licensing
Metrics include statistics and indicators. Relevant statistics for knowledge transfer include count data such as number of patent applications
and the total amount of license income earned. Indicators standardize
a statistic, for instance by providing the number of patent applications
per 1,000 research academics in the sciences or the amount of license
income earned per EUR 1 million in research expenditures. Both statistics and indicators need to refer to a deﬁned time period such as one
calendar year.
Indicators are essential for benchmarking performance. Using statistics to compare the number of invention disclosures among a group of
universities would be seriously misleading if the group included universities with large differences in the number of academic staff or in the
types of discipline. A university that focuses on law and the humanities is
likely to have far fewer opportunities for consulting contracts than one
that focuses on science, technology, and medicine.
There are three main reasons for collecting knowledge transfer metrics
for licensing:
1. to benchmark knowledge transfer activities, for instance to permit
comparisons in performance within an institution, across institutions,
or over time;
2. for use in analyses to identify the factors that either support or hinder
knowledge transfer; and
3. to inform policy, such as determining the effect of a change in policy
on knowledge transfer outcomes.
These three reasons are linked because research on the factors that
support knowledge transfer can use benchmarking data as an output
measure, for example, in a study of the factors that increase the number
of patents or the amount of license revenue. Plus, research on “what
works” can be of value in developing or improving policies to support
knowledge transfer.
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2.6 Collecting Knowledge Transfer Metrics for Licensing
The most common source of basic metrics is surveys of KTOs on activities that are part of the IP licensing model. These metrics are available on
an intermittent or annual basis in many high-income countries, including the member states of the European Union, the U.S., Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand. Most surveys of KTOs follow the deﬁnitions and standards set by the AUTM for its surveys of KTOs in the
U.S. and Canada. The AUTM has been collecting metrics since the early
1990s.
Table 2.5 summarizes seven basic metrics from KTO surveys: the
number of (1) invention disclosures, (2) patent applications, (3) patent
grants, (4) research agreements, (5) license agreements, (6) startup establishments, and (7) total license revenue earned. None of these metrics is
a direct measure of commercialization. Invention disclosures refer to an
Table 2.5 Basic metrics from KTO surveys
Statistic

Deﬁnition1

1

Number of invention
disclosures

2

Number of patent applications

3

Number of patents granted

4

Number of research
agreements

Descriptions of inventions or discoveries
that are evaluated by the KTO staff or
other technology experts to assess their
commercial application
New priority patent applications. Exclude
double-counting, such as a patent
application for the same invention in
more than one patent jurisdiction
Technically unique patents granted.
Count a patent grant for the same
invention in two or more countries as
one technically unique patent. If
a technically unique patent grant has
been counted in a previous year, it may
not be counted again
All contracts where a ﬁrm funds the
university or public research institute to
perform research on behalf of the ﬁrm,
with the results usually provided to the
ﬁrm. Include collaborative agreements
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Table 2.5 (cont.)
Statistic

5

Number of licenses executed

6

Number of startups2

7

Total license revenue earned

Deﬁnition
where both partners provide funding
and share the results. Exclude cases
where the ﬁrm funds a research chair or
other research of no expected
commercial value to the ﬁrm
Include all licenses, options and
assignments (LOAs) for all types of IP
copyright, knowhow, patents, etc.
Count multiple (identical) licenses with
a value of less than EUR 500 each as one
license. A license grants the right to use
IP in a deﬁned ﬁeld of use or territory.
An option grants the potential licensee
a time period to evaluate the technology
and negotiate the terms of a license. An
assignment transfers all or part of the
right to IP to the licensee
A new company expressly established to
develop or exploit IP or knowhow
created by the university/PRO and with
a formal contractual relationship for
this IP or knowhow, such as a license or
equity agreement. Include, but do not
limit to, spinoffs established by the
institution’s staff. Exclude startups that
do not sign a formal agreement on
developing IP or knowhow created by
the institution
Total income from all types of knowhow
and IP (patents, copyright, designs,
material transfer agreements,
conﬁdentiality agreements, plant
breeders’ rights, etc.) before
disbursement to the inventor or other
parties. Include license issue fees,
annual fees, option fees, and milestone,
termination and cash-in payments.
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Table 2.5 (cont.)
Statistic

Deﬁnition
Exclude license income forwarded to
other institutions than those served by
the KTO or to companies

Source: Authors
The deﬁnitions follow those used by the AUTM, but have been adapted for
simplicity and for use in countries other than the U.S. See European Commission
(2009).
2
Startups include both spinoffs established by university/public research institute
staff using the institution’s IP and new companies that take a license to
commercialize an institution’s IP, but do not include its staff.
1

unknown potential for commercialization, with many never patented or
licensed. Patent grants can remain unlicensed, research agreements can
result in no new knowledge of commercial value, and licenses may never
lead to commercialized processes or products.
None of these seven metrics measures the successful commercialization of IP produced in universities and public research institutes – all are
metrics of inputs into potential commercialization.11 The ﬁrst three
metrics (invention disclosures, patent applications, and patent grants)
are the furthest from commercialization, but invention disclosures are
the ﬁrst step in an IP-mediated commercialization process. The next step,
if an evaluation of the invention disclosure results in a decision that there
is commercial potential, is to ﬁle a patent application or seek other forms
of IP if a patent is not suitable.
The two metrics that are closest to commercialization are the number
of startups established and license revenue earned. Licenses indicate
that a ﬁrm has an interest in commercializing the licensed IP, but many
licenses, particularly for generic technologies or research tools, fail to
lead to the commercialization of new goods, services or processes.12
Similarly, research agreements and startups indicate that a ﬁrm is
11

12

Kochenkova et al. (2015) note that there is very little research on the effect of policies to
support knowledge transfer on commercialization outcomes, with most studies focusing
on intermediate outcomes such as patent counts.
An example is the Cohen-Boyer patents, which covered a basic research technique that
almost all ﬁrms active in biotechnology needed to license. Some of these ﬁrms were startups that never produced a commercial product.
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interested in the commercial potential of knowledge produced by institutions, but we do not know if the research agreement produced useful
research results or if the startup was able to commercialize a product or
process.
Identifying the commercialization of new knowledge produced by
universities and public research institutes requires the ability to identify
licenses that earn running royalties (royalties earned on and tied to the
sales of products) or the ability to follow startups over time and determine if they commercialized IP obtained from the institution. Recent
AUTM surveys have collected data on running royalties (AUTM 2015b)
and “net product sales,” which includes sales from IP licensed to
startups.13 European KTOs have begun to track outcomes for startups,
but there is not yet agreement on the types of outcome that should be
collected over time (Arundel et al. 2013).

2.6.1 Supplementary Metrics from KTOs
In addition to the basic metrics covered in Table 2.5, KTO surveys can
provide a variety of supplementary indicators of relevance to licensing.
Table 2.6 lists supplementary indicators and their relevance to policy.
The list is limited to indicators of value for benchmarking performance,
the development of policies to support knowledge transfer and the ability
of KTOs to efﬁciently manage patent portfolios.
A 2009 review of KTO metrics in Europe and the U.S. found that only
two of the supplementary metrics listed in Table 2.6 were collected in
most countries: the number of valid patents in the patent portfolio
(item 3) and licenses by ﬁrm size (item 5). Data on exclusive and nonexclusive licenses were available only for the U.S. and Canada via the
AUTM survey and in a Swiss survey (European Commission 2009), but
questions on exclusive and nonexclusive patents have been included in
later European surveys (Arundel et al. 2013).
Table 2.6 includes counts for PCT patent applications. These can be
ﬁled instead of a national application and lead to patent protection in up
to 140 countries. The PCT is usually only used when the applicant wishes
to acquire a patent in one or more nondomestic countries. In most
countries, its use therefore indicates a higher-quality patent with good
commercial potential.

13

Question S-3, AUTM (2015b).
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Table 2.6 Supplementary metrics from KTO surveys1
Statistic
Supplementary metrics for patents
1
Domestic patent applications
or grants

2

Foreign patent applications or
grants (USPTO, EPO,
PCT, etc.)

3

Number of granted patents in
the current portfolio that are
valid (patent renewal fees
have been paid)

Policy use
These can be “entry-level” patents with
limited commercial application,
particularly if domestic patenting costs
and/or the bar for a patent are low.
A continuing high share of domestic
patents out of total patents over time
could indicate low commercialization
potential or that too many low-value
inventions are patented
Foreign patents in large markets such as
the European Union or the U.S.
indicate high commercialization
potential. An increase in the share of
foreign patents out of all patents
indicates an improvement in inventive
capabilities/commercialization
opportunities over time
Combined with the next indicator, data on
the size of the patent portfolio can be
used to determine the share of patents
that have ever been patented. This
should increase over time as the KTO
gains greater experience

Supplementary metrics for licensing
4
Number of patents in the
The share should increase over time.
current portfolio that have
A stable or declining share could indicate
ever been licensed
that the KTO is applying for a patent for
too many invention disclosures
5
Licenses by licensee type:
The share of licenses to regional ﬁrms
startups, SMEs, regional
(SMEs or startups) is of interest if the
ﬁrms, etc.
government has a policy of encouraging
local development. The disadvantage is
that focusing on regional IP partners
can reduce license revenue2
6
Exclusive and nonexclusive
Nonexclusive licenses are income earners
licenses
for universities/public research
institutes, but are not necessary (no IP
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Table 2.6 (cont.)
Statistic

7

Licenses by type of IP (patents,
knowhow, copyright, etc.)

8

Licenses by technology ﬁeld
(software, biomedical,
nanotechnology, etc.)

Supplementary revenue indicators
9
License revenue from running
royalties/sales of products
based on university/public
research institute IP
Supplementary revenue indicators
10
Startups that have
commercialized university/
public research institute IP
11
Startup sales of products from
university/public research
institute IP, employment in
startups with such sales

Policy use
is required) if the policy goal is to get as
many ﬁrms as possible to take up the
knowledge covered by the license
Patentability is limited to speciﬁc types of
knowledge, with other types of IP
required for other types of knowledge.
Data on other types of IP used in
licensing can identify if the license
portfolio is commensurate with the
types of knowledge produced by the
university/public research institute
Speciﬁc technology ﬁelds can dominate
licensing and license revenue (in
Europe, it is the biotechnology/medical
ﬁelds). Good benchmarking across
universities and public research
institutes should therefore be based on
comparing metrics by technology ﬁeld
to compare like with like. Licensing by
ﬁeld can also be an indicator for
decisions on research investments
Measures of commercialization of
knowledge produced by universities/
public research institutes

Measure of commercialization of
knowledge produced by universities/
public research institutes
Measure of commercialization of
knowledge produced by universities/
public research institutes

Source: Authors
For brevity, this table does not include foreign research agreements or licenses.
2
Belenzon and Schankerman (2009) ﬁnd that universities with strong local
development objectives generate less license income but have more licenses to local
startups.
1
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Standardized Indicators
The metrics in Tables 2.5 and 2.6 should be standardized for both
internal and international comparisons. For instance, combining the
number of current patents that have been licensed with the total number
of valid patents in the university/public research institute’s patent portfolio produces an indicator for the share of licensed patents. Many of the
metrics can be standardized by calculating the rate per 1,000 academic
staff or per USD 1 million in purchasing power parities for research
expenditures.14 Table 2.7 describes these two standardization variables.
Collecting data on research expenditures is necessary in order to
compare results with the U.S., as the AUTM does not collect data on
the number of academics. Research expenditures are inﬂuenced by differences in purchasing power parities (PPP) in different countries. It is
a simple matter to use PPP currency conversions, but PPPs are calculated
for all economic costs, not just for research costs.
For international comparisons other than with the U.S., there are
advantages in using the number of academics rather than research

Table 2.7 Variables for standardizing knowledge transfer ofﬁce (KTO)
metrics
Statistic

Policy use

1

Total number of academic staff
at a public research
organizations active in ﬁelds
with a potential for
commercialization

2

Total research expenditures in
ﬁelds with a potential for
commercialization

All basic metrics and most of the
supplementary metrics can be
standardized per 1,000 academic staff.
Standardization per 1,000 academics is
less relevant for the supplementary
licensing metrics
As above, but this information is
necessary to compute standardized
metrics for comparison with the AUTM
surveys for the U.S. and is also required
to calculate the license income share of
total research expenditures

14

Arundel and Bordoy (2010) explore the possibilities and difﬁculties of developing internationally comparable output indicators for the commercialization of public science.
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expenditures to produce standardized indicators. The number of
academic staff in full-time equivalents (FTEs) is possibly more comparable across studies. National differences per 1,000 academics can
also be a useful (albeit not an ideal) indicator of academic performance. An alternative is to standardize by the number of peer-reviewed
publications (or a quality-adjusted publication measure) per 1,000
academics. Publication counts are positively correlated with patent
applications (Van Looy et al. 2011; Berbegal-Mirabent and Sabate
2015).

Metrics for the Characteristics of the KTO and its Institution
For econometric research, it is important to collect control variables on
the characteristics of the KTO itself and the institution to which it is
responsible. Relevant KTO variables include its age and number of staff
and, if possible, the area of expertise of KTO staff and the KTO budget.
The KTO’s age is particularly important to obtain because it has
a signiﬁcant effect on many knowledge transfer outcomes, due to
a positive relationship between KTO age and institutional experience
and knowledge transfer activities (Friedman and Silberman 2003; Conti
and Gaule 2011; Berbegal-Mirabent and Sabate 2015).
Data should also be collected on several characteristics of the public
research institutes and universities that can inﬂuence knowledge transfer
activities, including:
• the location of the institution in a dynamic region near innovative
ﬁrms, venture capital, etc.;
• the size and type of the institution: private universities with
a commercial orientation can be more active than public universities;
• the portfolio of disciplines, some of which are more prone to knowledge transfer, such as biomedical research;
• the research quality of the institution, its reputation and network; and
• the extent of existing collaboration between the institution and ﬁrms.

2.7 Conclusions
This chapter describes the different channels that are used by universities,
public research institutes, and ﬁrms to transfer knowledge between them
and the role of policies and institutional practices in supporting knowledge transfer. The chapter largely focuses on the IP licensing model, due
to extensive academic research on this channel and data availability, but
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it is essential for a full understanding of knowledge transfer to also
evaluate the role of informal and contractual knowledge transfer channels, as summarized in Table 2.4. Several of the country studies in this
book take a more holistic perspective by evaluating the role of each
channel and how these channels have changed over time in response to
policy changes or economic development.
The collection of metrics on knowledge transfer via licensing is
essential for benchmarking, identifying the factors that support or
hinder knowledge transfer, and to inform policy. There are seven basic
metrics that all countries should collect on the IP licensing model, plus
supplementary metrics of relevance to speciﬁc policy issues, such as if
licensing is beneﬁting domestic ﬁrms or the efﬁciency of IP use, as
measured by the share of IP that is licensed. Additional metrics that
would support a holistic perspective on knowledge transfer are discussed in Chapter 12.
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Comment 2.1
bhaven sampat

Background
This chapter provides an excellent overview of how to think about
evaluating public sector knowledge transfer activities. It provides both
a conceptual framework for doing so, as well as potential metrics. And it
also includes a nice review of the now large body of economic and policy
literature on these topics that has been developed over the past two
decades.
Overall, the conceptual framework seems complete. Unlike much
previous work in this area, it emphasizes that ﬁrms beneﬁt from academic research not only through what the authors call formal channels
(patenting and licensing) but also through more informal channels, often
associated with so-called open science. And that there may be tensions, as
well as complementarities, between the two channels.
Here, I offer a few additional thoughts on the conceptual framework
and the indicators, and also on public policy and evaluation going
forward.

Conceptual Framework
As I mentioned, the conceptual framework seems fairly comprehensive.
There are, however, three things that I think are missing from the
potential beneﬁts side of the equation.
First, while the authors mentioned ﬁnancial beneﬁts, it is important to
emphasize that these revenues are not “proﬁts” for public research organizations, but rather are typically used to fund future research. That is, the
potential beneﬁt is more funding for science and technology, which may be
particularly important in resource-constrained environments. I am not
68
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necessarily endorsing this rationale: as the authors point out, the ﬁnancial
beneﬁts for many organizations may be small, and there are costs as well,
But I think it is an important one to keep in mind since it is often a major
part of the justiﬁcation for formal involvement in knowledge transfer
activities.
A second motivation for knowledge transfer organizations, and taking
out patents and licenses in particular, is to create a way to incentivize
inventor involvement and commercialization. I did not see much about
this in the chapter. This may be particularly important in countries and
contexts where academic involvement has previously been limited or
where there are strong cultural norms militating against it. And it is most
important for “embryonic” inventions needing further development,
where the inventor possesses specialized tacit knowledge. However, in
this context, it should be emphasized, at least in countries where inventors rather than the public research organizations previously held title to
patents, that it is unclear that shifting toward ownership by the research
organizations increases inventor incentives, and could in fact blunt them.
Hvide and Jones’s (2018) paper in the American Economic Review provides one example. Speciﬁcally, in Norway, university researchers used to
have rights to their own inventions, under the so-called “professor’s
privilege.” After this was changed to be more like the US model, in
which universities took rights, entrepreneurship and patenting rates by
academic researchers decreased. But in general, the conceptual framework might also consider the effects of these organizations, and of patent
rights, on incentivizing inventor involvement in the commercialization
process.
Third, another potential beneﬁt public sector ownership is the ability
to harness this ownership to inﬂuence downstream outcomes, such as
prices, access, or availability. This is mentioned in passing in the discussion of patents and access to medicines in developing countries. But it
might be brought into the conceptual framework as well. That said, as far
as I know, this potential role for public sector ownership has been used
only sparingly.
Another observation is less about the conceptual framework than
about its application. I would like to see more recognition in academic
knowledge and knowledge transfer in general about what is one of the
most robust empirical ﬁndings from economics over the past halfcentury: Patents matter more for research incentives in some ﬁelds
than others. In particular, in drugs and chemical-based industries,
patents are more important for appropriating returns from R&D than
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in other sectors (Cohen et al. 2000). Although there is no direct evidence
on this in the context of university or public sector knowledge transfer (at
least as far as I can recall), it would stand to reason that patents (and the
prospect of exclusive licenses) are more important as commercialization
incentives in some ﬁelds than others. (Drugs and biotech inventions
seem like the strongest case.) In some industries, academic patents and
KTOs might simply get in the way of transfer or commercialization
(although they may help achieve other objectives noted here and in the
chapter, such as ﬁnancial returns or upstream control of particular
technologies). I suspect that the costs and beneﬁts of different channels
of knowledge and knowledge transfer presented in the conceptual framework will vary sharply by ﬁeld, a fact that should be considered in its
application.

Indicators
The list of indicators provided is quite comprehensive. One thing I will
add is that at least some of these indicators could be manipulated. For
example, it is possible for an organization to increase invention disclosures and patent applications without really increasing the underlying
construct of interest, namely, the extent of knowledge or knowledge
transfer. Often the policy discussion ends up focusing on the indicator
rather than the underlying construct. The fact that there are multiple
indicators, not all of which are so easily manipulable, does help here.
But this leads to my second point, one that the authors acknowledge
but is important enough to restate. It is much easier to measure the more
formal activities than to measure the informal ones. If one accepts that
the informal ones are important (maybe even more important based on
the qualitative and historical analyses cited in the chapter), this presents
a big problem. Speciﬁcally, it is possible that KTO activities could be
nominally increasing some of the formal indicators but having
a detrimental effect on knowledge transfer using informal channels.
But evaluators are not really seeing it since we cannot measure the latter
well. Even worse, and this is a theme emphasized in personnel economics, if performance is multidimensional but we only have good performance measures for some dimensions and reward based on those, this
could distort incentives (for organizations, researchers) toward the better
measurable but less important dimensions. I am not sure what to do
about this – perhaps better bibliometric measures of more informal
contributions would help (see, e.g., Bryan et al. 2019) – but policymakers,
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in particular, should keep this in mind. Mission statements acknowledging that traditional channels of knowledge dissemination are also important to the organization may also be helpful in setting norms.

Beyond Benchmarking: Better Evidence for Policy
Let’s step back a bit. The academic knowledge transfer movement started
to accelerate in the United States of America in the 1970s and was
codiﬁed by the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980. I and others have argued that
Bayh-Dole was passed based on questionable evidence that the lack of
patents and exclusive licenses on academic research had previously
limited social returns from public research in any serious way, with the
possible exception of some pharmaceuticals requiring signiﬁcant investment in clinical trials (Eisenberg 1996; Mowery et al. 2004). Bayh-Dole
ignored technology and knowledge transfer through the informal channels, and differences across ﬁelds in the importance of patents. And the
speciﬁc indicators measuring how well the formal channels were (or were
not) working were problematic (Eisenberg 1996). Similarly, other countries emulating Bayh-Dole have drawn largely on aggregate evidence of
patenting and licensing (and perhaps revenues and startups) to make the
case that this policy was a success, with a lack of attention to (a) the extent
to which these indicators actually capture knowledge transfer and (b)
potential negative effects on informal channels (Mowery and Sampat
2004).
This has been an active debate for several decades, and need not be
rehashed here. However, to avoid having this same debate again several
decades from now, it might be useful to implement new KTOs and patent
policies in a way that facilitates evaluation going forward. That is, drawing on the conceptual framework presented in this chapter, it would be
useful to prespecify outcomes and indicators of interest (including effects
on formal and informal knowledge transfer), and to be clear about what
would constitute evidence that the policies and institutions are working
or not. Since prepost analyses can be hard to interpret, some experimentation may also help, for example rolling out policies across institutions
or regions or campuses in a way that facilitates quasi-experimental
evaluation. The questions raised in this chapter about what works, and
potential tradeoffs, are hard ones, and in addition to collecting better
indicators, policymakers might implement new laws in a way that helps
us learn from new experiences in a more structured way than was
possible with Bayh-Dole and its early counterparts in other OECD
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countries. This approach will also force organizations to be transparent
and precise about the objectives they hope to achieve.
One type of experimentation that might be particularly fruitful is on
licensing practices. As this chapter points out, to the extent that the goals
of KTO activities are more than simply ﬁnancial, patents and exclusive
licenses are really only needed only for a subset of research outputs.
Codifying this idea in KTO policies and missions, and making better
efforts to gauge the need for an exclusive license, could also be useful
(Ayres and Ouellette 2016). Building a rebuttable presumption of lowcost non-exclusive licensing into KTO patent policies and practices
might be one way to do this. It may work better in some ﬁelds and
countries than others, but could also create an additional layer of bureaucracy that impedes knowledge transfer, or be subject to gaming. It is
quite hard to know theoretically. This is exactly why more experimentation – with a commitment to later evaluation, based on prespeciﬁed
indicators and hypotheses, drawing on the framework presented in this
chapter – could be extremely valuable.
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Comment 2.2
ragan robertson

With the deluge of data generated daily by a knowledge transfer ofﬁce
(KTO), strategic decisions and operational functions rely on metrics to
identify areas of improvement or focus. Given the complexity of tasks
managed by a KTO, determining what metrics are measured is critical.
Coming from an academic background, I’ve been taught to ask “what is
the goal?” or “what is the question?” before setting forth and measuring
something. Asking these questions ﬁrst helps determine the variables
being measured, as well as ensuring that the measurers and those who
will review the metrics are all in agreement as to what is being asked and
answered. When focusing on measuring the functions of a KTO, I ask
questions such as “what can be measured?,” “why measure?,” and “how
does a metric affect other metrics?” Addressing these questions typically
results in identifying the core functions of a KTO and focusing on the
counts of these actions, such as licenses executed and patent applications
ﬁled. The AUTM Licensing Activity Survey is an excellent source of some
of these measurements, as are the annual reports produced by KTOs.
Some of these metrics are also highlighted in Table 2.5 in this chapter.
Accumulation of broadly applicable data in a centrally accessible database can help facilitate these goals. This also allows for KTOs to compare
their metrics with those of their peers to establish benchmarks. Another
beneﬁt of creating data as a shareable resource is the ability to share data
with other interested parties, including policymakers and academics. In
this way, this practice can further beneﬁt the knowledge transfer ﬁeld as
a whole in addition to the ofﬁce itself.
As data become more available, and our economies become more
complex, KTOs are being asked to do more and more functions. One
reason is that the KTO acts as a node, a nexus where industry connects to
73
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research, where intellectual property connects to contracts, where business development connects to academic pursuits. These connections in
and of themselves lead to additional metrics that can be measured. How
many meetings with industry occurred in the last quarter? How many
different patent application families were put under an exclusive license
this past year? How many sponsored research agreements were executed
with licensees? As KTOs function in more roles at the interface of
academics and business, more measurable data are generated and can
be analyzed. However, as the roles of our ofﬁces expand, we must ensure
that the data we are generating and measuring can lead to potential
actions and not just to the act of obtaining data. We must always ask
why we are measuring something and what we can do to change it for the
better.
Naturally, due to the nature of the knowledge managed by KTOs,
ofﬁces are becoming more involved within the entrepreneurship ecosystem. Subdivisions within KTOs, and even entire new departments, are
being formed to address this growing role. The function as a nexus causes
KTOs to be well-positioned to have an incredible impact in this ecosystem. By having the connections to industry, as well as access to new
research being conducted, KTOs can identify the opportunities where
new research results can lead to the formation of a new company. The
ultimate result is that KTOs can have a signiﬁcant impact on the economy, especially at the local level. New companies formed, new jobs
created, new revenue generated, and new taxes paid are some of the
more easily identiﬁable beneﬁts to economic output that can be sourced
from the work performed by a KTO. This additional role for KTOs
within the entrepreneurship ecosystem can also lead to unintended
beneﬁts, such as new institutional donors, or diversiﬁcation of industry
within a local ecosystem.
However, we do have to be careful to assign economic output to KTOs
accurately and avoid generalization of data or misattribution of revenue.
Skeptics of the industry have focused on return on investment (ROI),
typically syncing research dollars sourced from a governmental agency
and the licensing revenue received directly by a KTO. While this connection is an oversimpliﬁcation, expanding to the other extreme of attributing all economic beneﬁt generated by external entities connected to
a KTO is also misleading. In addition to drawing conclusions based on
overgeneralization of data, KTOs must also be wary of “paralysis of
analysis” in which the goal is to gather more data without making
a decision, or the confusion that results from an overabundance of data

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 54.177.185.247, on 15 Nov 2021 at 19:13:31, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/979C0AAA92B1200DCE513DAAE4894BE7

comment 2.2

75

from multiple sources. This speaks directly to the question as to what the
true impact is downstream of a KTO’s activity. This harks back to asking
ourselves the question of why we are measuring something and what we
can do to change it for the better.
This chapter does an excellent job of identifying key metrics that
should be measured by KTOs, along with the reasons why they are
measured and the potential economic impact. While these metrics are
clear and should be implemented by KTOs, the industry still lacks
metrics to measure several important functions of KTOs. These include
metrics to measure the effect of a KTO’s work on societal impacts. As
identiﬁed in this chapter, these impacts are very difﬁcult to measure,
typically relying on case studies such as those found in the AUTM Better
World Project. Case studies, unfortunately, can be overly speciﬁc and
their conclusions can be difﬁcult to apply to general practice. However,
there are metrics that could be used to address this impact. For example,
for the past few years, AUTM has been collecting data regarding women
inventors, speciﬁcally how many disclosures include a woman and how
many new patent applications include a woman. What actions can or
should be taken related to these data are only now being developed, but it
is a start toward how to address a signiﬁcant societal impact. Expanding
on the theme of inclusion, metrics could also be collected related to race
or ethnicity. KTOs may already have some of these data, as we must
report citizenship within patent applications, but they have yet to be
utilized. These data have the potential to have a far-reaching impact
outside of the knowledge transfer or academic spheres, and it will be
interesting to see what comes of them.
As identiﬁed, metrics are a key necessity for any KTO to inform
strategic decisions and operational functions. Metrics need not only
include the core functions, such as patent application ﬁlings and licenses
executed, but also other important economic drivers, such as startups
formed and investments raised. However, no matter what metrics a KTO
measures, they are numbers for numbers’ sake if the metrics are not
aligned with a KTO’s goals. Metrics must be actionable – how can a team
affect them and what does that effect mean? By being clear and transparent as to how a metric informs and achieves its goals, a KTO is on the
path to making an economic and societal impact.
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The chapter examines various modes of knowledge transfer from universities and public research institutes to industry, together with the policies
that support knowledge transfer, in order to develop a conceptual framework for comparative country studies and identify relevant and useful
metrics for assessing the economic impact of this activity.
While some common trends can be seen in policy and legislation
around the world, a variety of policy instruments and methods are
employed in developing and implementing relevant legislation and policy. It is recognized that knowledge transfer takes place through both
formal and informal channels, and in different countries and organizations, the predominance and importance of each may differ. The prevailing mix in a particular context must be taken into account in making
policy (at both national and institutional levels), to avoid inadvertent
consequences of policies aimed at promoting one channel negatively
impacting on others that may, in fact, be of greater importance in the
relevant environment.
As a starting point, this calls for a comprehensive understanding of the
ecosystem and its various actors and institutions. Disruptions to the
status quo can yield both positive and negative effects and the possible
impact of both must be considered to ensure that potential beneﬁts
outweigh potential costs. Assumptions must be validated so that existing
strengths can be built on, gaps can be ﬁlled, and, ultimately, that ﬁt-forpurpose policy can be developed.
Policy priorities should be clearly articulated. Different policies may be
needed to promote different objectives, rather than trying to achieve too
many outcomes by means of a single policy, especially when such outcomes might not support one another. Where different bodies are
responsible for making policy for different knowledge transfer channels,
76
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effective coordination between them becomes critical to ensure that
conﬂict does not arise. If tradeoffs are required to achieve an optimal
balance, these must be identiﬁed and agreed.
It is always useful to draw from experiences and best practice elsewhere
when developing policy. Understanding what has not worked well, and
why, is arguably as important as examining successful interventions. At
the same time, borrowing uncritically without making relevant adaptations for a particular country’s own circumstances is likely to lead to
suboptimal results. This is perhaps especially true where policies and
practices from developed countries are applied in low and middle income
countries characterized by less developed innovation ecosystems and an
industry sector with inherently less absorptive capacity for new
innovations.
New policies must be sufﬁciently ﬂexible to accommodate responses
necessary to correct for unintended consequences that may be experienced. The choice of policy instrument should therefore be carefully
considered. At national or regional level, legislation creates certainty
and demands compliance, but making amendments becomes onerous.
By thesame token, if policy is implemented via nonlegislated policy
documents, frameworks, codes of good practice, or guidelines, these
can be adapted with greater agility.
Policy should, in the ﬁrst instance, aim to create an enabling environment that allows knowledge transfer to thrive, by providing support and
incentives. Overly prescriptive requirements or those introducing undue
administrative burdens carry transaction costs that can detract from
productive knowledge transfer activity and disincentivize compliance.
One-size-ﬁts-all policies may lead to certain channels of knowledge
transfer being neglected.
Once policies are put in place, it becomes critical to evaluate their
implementation objectively on a regular basis, to ensure that they are
functioning effectively. Measuring performance allows comparisons to
be made, trends to be identiﬁed and the achievement of targets and goals
to be assessed. This yields information on what is working as intended
and what needs to be improved or changed, and can be used to inform
adjustments in policy and practices to achieve greater impact.
The chapter provides an instructive examination of a range of knowledge transfer metrics that are and, further, that can be collected, together
with explanations of the reasons for and value of gathering different types
of metric, both basic and supplementary. It also emphasizes the importance of using a variety of data sources to obtain a balanced view. While
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surveys from knowledge transfer ofﬁces are perhaps the most common
source of data in this regard, they should be supplemented with data from
other stakeholders, such as industry and researchers, particularly for knowledge transfer channels other than IP licensing. Recommendations are made
in respect of which metrics should be regularly collected, from where, and
how frequently.
Designing, collecting, and reporting a suitable set of metrics is not,
however, a trivial exercise. In doing so, it is worth recalling William Bruce
Cameron’s observation that “not everything that can be counted counts,
and not everything that counts can be counted.”1 The chapter notes that
many of the available data relate to the knowledge transfer channel of IP
licensing (in high- and middle-income countries). This can be attributed
at least in part to the fact that many of the activities associated with this
channel provide several easily quantiﬁable indicators along the value
chain, such as invention disclosures, patent applications, issued patents,
licenses executed, and license fees earned. Most of these are, however,
indicators of inputs into or progress toward commercialization rather
than of economic impact or social beneﬁts, which still remain difﬁcult to
measure directly and accurately (since the outcomes concerned are
usually not solely attributable to knowledge transfer, but also to a range
of other factors and inﬂuences).
Metrics can serve as signiﬁcant drivers of behavior, particularly when
linked to individual or institutional performance evaluation frameworks.
Overemphasis on input metrics is likely to lead to increased activity in
these areas, but will not always result in improved outputs or outcomes,
unless appropriate ecosystem support and complementary incentives are
in place.
“Vanity” metrics, which may superﬁcially tell a positive story but fail to
provide practical information on performance, should be avoided in
favor of actionable metrics that can be used as a basis for implementing
improvements to policy and practice.
The more comprehensive a set of metrics is the greater its value. But in
selecting which metrics to capture, attention must be paid to the ease of
acquiring and accessing the requested data by the survey respondents. If
the data requirements are too ambitious, there is a risk of lower response
rates, and/or supply of incomplete or inaccurate data.

1

Cameron, William Bruce, “Informal Sociology: A Casual Introduction to Sociological
Thinking” (1963).
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Where metrics are used speciﬁcally for benchmarking purposes, data
must be appropriately normalized (standardized) to ensure that one is
comparing “like with like.”
Where a set of metrics focuses on a particular knowledge transfer
channel, institutions or regions that pursue other channels more actively
might be reluctant to participate, fearing that their performance will not
reﬂect favorably when measured against that of other institutions/
regions.
Each of these challenges must be acknowledged and tackled.
Nonetheless, the beneﬁts of a robust set of metrics generated on
a regular basis cannot be denied. This is achievable with buy-in from
all key stakeholders who recognize the value this can bring for improving
performance and enhancing impact in their respective spheres, whether
as policymakers or practitioners.
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Measuring Global Patenting of Universities
and Public Research Institutes
j ua n y a n g , i n t a n h a m d a n - l i v r a m e n t o , b r u n o l e
fe u vr e , s a ch a wun s ch - v i n c e n t, an d h a o z h ou

3.1 Introduction
Policymakers increasingly seek to bolster the effectiveness of academic
research in fostering innovation. Universities and public research institutes are encouraged to engage with industry partners and spur knowledge transfer from academia to the private sector.
One way of facilitating this knowledge transfer is by patenting research
outputs from universities and public research institutes. Patents, plus
close engagement between universities and public research institutes and
the private sector, are two important factors that make university–industry knowledge transfer successful (Perkmann et al. 2013).
Collaboration between academic organizations and the private sector
is not new. Universities and public research institutes played important
roles in propelling developments in agriculture, aviation, and the chemical and pharmaceutical sectors as early as the nineteenth century
(Mowery et al. 2004; Rosenberg and Steinmueller 2013; WIPO 2015).
Academic patenting has also been used by university researchers since
the late 1800s (Mercelis et al. 2017).
Since the late 1970s, many countries have changed their legislation and
created support mechanisms to encourage interaction between universities
and ﬁrms, including through knowledge transfer (Graff 2007). In 1980, the
United States of America (U.S.) passed the Bayh-Dole Act, landmark legislation which allowed for patenting of research outputs funded by the government. Many European countries followed suit about a decade later (Wright
et al. 2008; Van Looy et al. 2011). A direct effect of this type of policy is a rise
in academic patenting and licensing activities in universities and public
research institutes across the U.S. and in certain European countries.
80
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Policies that encourage patent protection of government-funded
research work are intended to promote the commercialization of university inventions, with the aim of facilitating innovation-led economic
growth (So et al. 2008). As a by-product, this type of policy provides an
avenue for generating income for universities (Geuna 2001) and tracking
patenting by research organizations has become one way of measuring
their performance.
This chapter focuses on how to identify patenting activities by universities and public research institutes so as to develop cross-country comparison of academic patenting activities. In particular, it proposes
a harmonized approach to capture patent ﬁlings for these public research
organizations across different countries using patent data ﬁled through
the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) as well as national-level patent data
compiled using the PATSTAT database.
Using patent ﬁling data from the PCT and PATSTAT, we present
a new data set of universities and public research institutes which allows
for better insights into how effective university knowledge transfer
mechanisms have been, and will potentially help to analyze their research
performance. Our objective is to gauge the patenting outputs of these
organizations, allowing us to measure the evolution of patenting activity
over time, benchmark the performance of public research organizations,
and enable cross-country comparisons.
This chapter is organized as follows. The next section focuses on academic
patenting, in particular, what the data tell us as well as their limitations, and
discusses how academic patenting may or may not have changed the norm
of universities and public research institutes. We present our methodology
for capturing the patenting activities of universities and public research
institutes in the third section. The penultimate section analyzes the results
of our work by showcasing the results from using the PCT and PATSTAT
databases through cross-country and cross-technology comparisons. The
last section concludes with direction for future research.

3.2 Why Focus on Patenting in Academia?
Total patent ﬁlings at the national level are often used as an indicator of
the innovativeness of a certain country. By the same logic, patent ﬁling
activities can measure the innovativeness of a university or public
research institute. But this is not the complete story.
The availability of patent data from the US Patent and Trademark
Ofﬁce (USPTO) and the European Patent Ofﬁce (EPO) has contributed

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 54.177.185.247, on 15 Nov 2021 at 19:13:31, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/979C0AAA92B1200DCE513DAAE4894BE7

82 yang, hamdan-livramento le feuvre, wunsch-vincent, & zhou

to a rise in quantitative analyses of academic patenting (Rothaermel et al.
2007). University and public research institutes patent ﬁling activities
have been used by decision makers to assess the effectiveness of their
knowledge transfer ofﬁces (KTOs), whether research projects are close to
the technological frontier and inventive, the performance of their
research staff, and so on. But it is important to remember that this metric
is an imperfect measure of innovativeness.

3.2.1 What Do Patent Data Tell Us?
There are many limitations to using patenting data to track the performance of public research organizations. First, patent data say relatively
little about whether the patented inventions actually result in innovations. In particular, patented inventions from universities tend to be
further from commercialization potential than those in the private sector
(Henderson et al. 1998; Sterckx 2011). In this sense, patent data provide
a relatively imperfect measure of technological activity.1
Second, patents are used by universities and public research institutes
in a somewhat different way from private sector patents. In the private
sector, patents are generally used to appropriate the ﬁrms’ returns on
investing in innovation.2 Universities and public research institutes, by
contrast, do not directly commercialize their inventions and instead rely
on patents to attract industry counterparts. Thus, patents are used as
a signal to indicate the value of the protected invention.
Third, a signiﬁcant share of inventions originating from research
performed at universities or public research institutes – universityinvented patents – are not patented under the organization’s name.
Depending on their employment contract and applicable laws, academics
and researchers working in these organizations may be able to ﬁle the
patent under their names and may later assign the rights to universities.
Others may prefer to ﬁle under their own names to start their own
companies later. A small percentage of university faculty assign the
university invention under ﬁrm names only and not under the university’s name, contrary to university policies (Thursby et al. 2009).
In our methodology, applicants are classiﬁed according to their names
only, without considering their employment relationship or address.
Therefore, where a natural person is the applicant ﬁling on behalf of an
1
2

See Khan and Wunsch-Vincent (2011), Chapter 1.1, Box 3.
See Chapter 2 of WIPO (2011).
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educational organization, that application would not be classiﬁed as
belonging to a university. Instead, it is imperative that the ﬁrst applicant
is the university or public research institutes itself in order to be categorized as a university or public research institutes patent.
Last, many methods of capturing academic patenting are based on
keyword searches and a list of university names. Lesser-known universities or public research institutes, or even those who ﬁle their
patent applications using different names, may not be captured. As
a result, a sizable share of patents derived from public research is
underestimated.

3.2.2 How Does This Apply to Public Research Organizations?
Academic patenting is not new (Mercelis et al. 2017). For a long while –
before laws such as the Bayh-Dole Act came to pass – academics
enjoyed the privilege of having the ﬁrst commercial rights over their
inventions (Kelly 2016). Some ﬁled for patents on their research work to
ensure control over how their work was used, others to build their
reputations.
Before the Bayh-Dole Act in the U.S., there was a low level of knowledge transfer from universities to industry; only 5 percent of
government-owned university patents were commercialized (Schacht
2006). One of the main barriers to the transfer was the issue of relinquishing ownership rights. First, there were approximately twenty-six
different agency policies governing how results of federally funded
research and development (R&D) would be used. Second, licensing
policies in place did not provide the appropriate incentive mechanisms
to facilitate knowledge transfer.
Changes in the rules governing university patenting have had an
impact on the academic patenting culture. First, there has been
a general increase in university patenting (Geuna and Rossi 2011;
Thursby and Thursby 2011). Second, academic patenting has
increased the probability that researchers and professors will start
their own companies (Aldridge and Audretsch 2011; Kenney and
Patton 2011). Third, while publishing research work in journals continues to be important, there are noticeable delays in publication
(Blumenthal et al. 1997). These changes and more have led many to
consider universities now as entrepreneurs, not merely knowledge
generators (Grimaldi et al. 2011).
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3.3 How to Measure Academic Patenting?
3.3.1 Data Source
The most comprehensive patent data available today are the WIPO PCT
and EPO PATSTAT (April 2016 edition) data sets. We use these two data
sets complementarily because they are able to capture patenting activities
worldwide. The difference between them is that PATSTAT compiles
national patent data from many countries while the PCT captures patents
ﬁled through the international PCT system.
The advantage of using the PCT database is that the information is
complete and comparable across countries. Patent applicants who wish to
ﬁle for patent protection in multiple jurisdictions may use the simpliﬁed
PCT patent ﬁling system. An applicant may deposit their international
patent application directly with WIPO either online or by mailing it in, or
through national IP ofﬁces that send the application to WIPO later. All
PCT member countries are able to use this simpliﬁed patent ﬁling system.
However, PCT ﬁling is only a subset of all patenting activities. First,
applicants who decide to use the PCT route do so because they are
interested in ﬁling in several national patent ofﬁces and the PCT system
allows for a simpliﬁed application process (see Box 3.1). It is generally
accepted that patented inventions that have been ﬁled at more than one
large IP ofﬁce are of higher value than those that are ﬁled domestically
(Dernis and Khan 2004). In this regard, patent applications under the
PCT may be considered of higher value due to the potential to acquire
patent rights in multiple jurisdictions.
Second, applicants may use the PCT ﬁling system as a business strategy. Universities and public research institutes that choose the PCT
system may do so because of the thirty-month transition time between
ﬁling for a patent and national phase entry. Anecdotal evidence suggests
that some KTOs in universities prefer using the PCT system because it
gives them additional time to ﬁnd commercialization partners for their
university inventions. Other applicants may use the PCT system to assess
the likelihood of their invention being patentable (Guellec and van
Pottelsberghe de la Potterie 2007).
Third, PCT ﬁling may also reﬂect universities’ and public research
institutes’ stronger or weaker propensity to ﬁle abroad.
These factors point to the drawback of using PCT data – that they may
underrepresent the total universe of academic patenting, and may merely
reﬂect the strategic patent ﬁling behavior of different universities and
public research institutes.
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BOX 3.1 DEFINING PATENT FAMILY

A patent family is a set of interrelated patent applications ﬁled in one or more
ofﬁces to protect the same invention. The patent applications in a family are
interlinked by one or more of: priority claim, PCT national phase entry, continuation, continuation-in-part, internal priority, and addition or division.
A special subset comprises foreign-oriented patent families – those patent
families that have at least one ﬁling ofﬁce different from the ofﬁce of the applicant’s country of origin. Some foreign-related patent families include only one
ﬁling ofﬁce because applicants may choose to ﬁle only with a foreign ofﬁce. For
example, if a Canadian applicant ﬁles a patent application directly with the
USPTO without having previously ﬁled with the patent ofﬁce of Canada, that
patent family will constitute a foreign-oriented patent family with just one ofﬁce.

Moreover, there are also cost considerations in ﬁling through national
IP ofﬁces or through the PCT system. The PCT system is a rational ﬁling
method if the applicant intends to ﬁle in multiple jurisdictions; if not, the
costs of application may outweigh the beneﬁts.
The EPO’s PATSTAT database, by contrast, allows us to examine a larger
set of university and public research institute patenting activities. The
PATSTAT data set comprises patent data from different national IP ofﬁces
that share their data with the EPO, making it easier to capture universities
and public research institutes that choose to apply in a single jurisdiction.
But unlike the PCT ﬁling data, the PATSTAT data set is not always
complete. Many IP ofﬁces in high-income countries provide their patent
data to the EPO; the same cannot be said for less-developed economies.
Missing data for some ofﬁces and years makes the use of this database to
run cross-country analysis challenging.
One way to check PATSTAT country and year coverage is to compare
the total counts of patents listed in PATSTAT with information collected
by WIPO. WIPO conducts an annual survey of national and regional
patent ofﬁce data on patent applications ﬁled. PATSTAT includes only
data on published patent applications. A small discrepancy between the
two groups – ﬁled versus published – is to be expected: the former is
always larger, since some applications are withdrawn before publication,
and there is a time lag between ﬁling and publication. If the difference
between the numbers as reported to WIPO and PATSTAT for
a particular national IP ofﬁce is small then we can consider PATSTAT
coverage of that country reliable; if the difference is large then the data
should be analyzed with caution.
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Table 3.1 Comparison of PATSTAT national patent data coverage for
featured countries
National IP ofﬁce

In
PATSTAT

Brazil
China
Germany
South Africa

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Republic of Korea

Yes

United Kingdom

Yes

PATSTAT coverage
Good
Good
Good
Mostly good, patchy for
some
Mostly good, patchy for
some
Good

Incomplete
information
2011–14
1984
1986–9, 2008–10,
2013–14
1985–97
1980–82

Source: WIPO Department for Economics and Data Analytics Internal Documents,
September 2017

Table 3.1 provides a quick overview of national patent data coverage at
PATSTAT for the six countries studied in this book. It compares the
number of patent ﬁlings at the different jurisdictions as reported to
WIPO with the number provided by PATSTAT. For South Africa and
the Republic of Korea, there are signiﬁcant discrepancies between the
total number of patents ﬁled as reported to WIPO and PATSTAT. There
are many possible explanations for this. National events or even changes
in legislation in a country may be reﬂected in its reported IP data.

3.3.2 Identifying Public Research Organizations
Identifying universities and public research institutes using patent data is
not straightforward. Due to the differences in the patent data contained
in the PCT and PATSTAT databases, we employ similar methods but
with a few important variations to capture academic patenting activities.
First, patent documents do not contain standardized information on
the applicant type, so we rely on the information contained in the
applicant’s name or address in developing search algorithms to identify
university and public research institute patents.
Using the PCT database, we search the names of applicants or their
addresses as recorded in patent documents, and determine whether
the applicant is a university, public research institute, company, or
individual using certain words, for example, “university,” “college,”
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“school,” “government,” and “ministry.” We perform this search in
various languages to make sure that we also capture organizations in
non-English-speaking countries. Moreover, we have a list of universities
and public research institutes that we use speciﬁcally in the context of
PCT ﬁlings to help us identify academic patents.
The PATSTAT database provides a table which categorizes applicant
types by the following four categories: individuals, private business ﬁrms,
universities and higher education organizations, and government agencies.3
This applicant classiﬁcation was developed by the Catholic University of
Leuven in Belgium, which employed a similar search strategy to ours.4 We
use this categorization to target the subcategory of patent applicants that
have been classiﬁed as “universities and higher education institutions.”
Second, name-cleaning is tedious. Applicant names provided in the PCT
and PATSTAT are neither standardized nor harmonized, making it challenging to identify universities and public research institutes by either keywords
or names. In addition, applicant names and addresses may be in languages
other than English and may be written in non-Latin characters.
Ensuring that the list of university and public research institute names
captured is representative of the different languages as well as non-Latin
characters would require additional lists of keywords or similar name
matches. In this respect, the PCT database provides an advantage over
PATSTAT. PCT ﬁling requires applicants to provide their names in
a standardized English version as well as in the nine other languages
accepted.5 The applicants’ names and addresses have to be indicated in
Latin characters, either as transliteration or translation into English.6
The national IP data provided for PATSTAT, however, can be in any
language, including exotic languages, and the applicants’ names and
addresses may be listed in non-Latin characters. Accordingly, we employ
a WIPO-created list of university and public research institute names and
the associated keywords to capture academic applicants that may have been
unintentionally omitted by PATSTAT through its applicant type table.
This list was created through direct contact with government ofﬁcials,
and veriﬁed by consulting government websites as well as university and
public research institute directories. It contains the names of universities
3
4
5

6

This category was developed by the KU Leuven group. See Du Plessis et al. (2010).
See Du Plessis et al. (2010).
Applicants may ﬁll their patent applications in any of the following ten ofﬁcial languages:
Arabic, Chinese, English, French, German, Japanese, Korean, Portuguese, Russian, and
Spanish.
See Rule 4.16 of the Regulations under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (1970).
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in ﬁfty-four countries and public research institutes in thirty-eight
countries.7 We mined the list to identify keywords that would help us
tag universities and public research institutes in the different languages.
We further added to this list the top 200 publishing organizations from
sixty-two different countries that we have established using Scopus,
a database containing citations and abstracts for scientiﬁc journal
articles.8 And last, we use the Scimago Institutions Rankings World
Report (2010) to include the top publishing organizations in the
world – 2,833 in total.
Third, the name-matching processes for academic organizations
under PCT and PATSTAT differ due to the volume of data to process.
At the last count, PATSTAT covers over 100 million patent documents
while the PCT covers 3.5 million patent documents.9
For the PCT, once we have identiﬁed patents from universities and
public research institutes, we manually match all the names that seem
similar. In the case of PATSTAT, we focus on the top ﬁlers, assign
a similarity value based on the similarities of the names, and try to
match them. So for example, if we wish to identify the top 100 academic
organizations we look at the top 300 ﬁlers, ﬁnd those that are similar and
then match them manually.
Fourth, the decision on patent family deﬁnition (see Box 3.1) should be
tailored to the research question, especially in the case of PATSTAT.10
Since PATSTAT provides all available national patent data collection,
universities and public research institutes that have ﬁled for patents in
multiple jurisdictions for one invention would need to be accounted for
7

8
9
10

The ﬁfty-four countries for which a university list has been compiled are: Argentina,
Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Cuba,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan,
Republic of Korea, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria,
Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia,
South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, Ukraine, U.S.,
Uzbekistan, and Venezuela. The thirty-eight countries for which a public research institute
list has been compiled are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile,
Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the U.S.
The Scopus database contains 12,400 organizations in total.
Based on PATSTAT Spring 2017 edition and PCT 2017 edition.
See Martínez (2011) for the different patent family types and how they relate to the
research question.
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so that we do not double-count those ﬁlings. This is not the case for PCT,
as it is just a patent-ﬁling method.
For the purposes of this chapter, we deﬁne a patent family based on the
earliest ﬁling and where all other ﬁlings claim this ﬁrst ﬁling as a priority. In
particular, we focus on patent families that are associated with patent
applications with inventions and exclude those associated with utility
model applications. The beneﬁt of this patent family deﬁnition is that it
enables us to track where the invention was ﬁrst ﬁled and where the applicant
later sought protection for that particular invention (Martínez 2011).
And last, assigning the origin of the university and public research
institute patent is usually done based on the residence – not the nationality – of the ﬁrst applicant. In the case of PCT data, it is simply the ﬁrst
applicant’s residence as noted in the PCT ﬁling document. For
PATSTAT, it would be the residence of the ﬁrst applicant of the ﬁrst
ﬁling for that patent family.

3.3.3 Quality Checks
One of the main issues in identifying patent activities by public research
organizations is to ensure that we have correctly captured applicants who
fall within this category.
When carrying out the strategy of identifying public research organizations, researchers need to ask themselves which problem is worse:
including applicants who do not fall under the category of public research
organizations (false positive) or excluding those applicants who do fall
under the category (false negative)?
Several quality checks have been performed, especially on the method
used to extract university and public research institute patents from the
PATSTAT database. Two issues emerged: ﬁrst, whether the data compiled by PATSTAT has good country and time coverage; and, second,
whether the search method employed performed well in identifying the
academic organizations.
The ﬁrst question can be addressed by comparing PATSTAT data on
aggregate applications per year per country of origin to aggregate numbers reported to WIPO by national and regional patent ofﬁces, as we did
to produce Table 3.1 above.
To verify how well the search method identiﬁes organizations, we
compare the results obtained with government reports for selected countries wherever available.
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3.4 Who Is Patenting and Where?
Academic patenting – measured by patent ﬁling activities by universities and
public research institutes worldwide – is on the rise. Since 1995, the number
of PCT applications ﬁled by universities and public research institutes has
been steadily increasing (see Figure 3.1). The growth in PCT applications
ﬁled by university and public research institute applicants combined since
1995 can be divided into two periods. In the period 1995–2008, the average
annual growth rate in academic patent ﬁlings was 13.3 percent. The period
2009–16 saw average annual growth of 2.4 percent in PCT applications,
2.3 percent in university applications and – 0.4 percent in public research
institute applications. Growth in public research institute and university
PCT ﬁlings declined during and after the economic downturn of 2009
compared to the previous period of high growth.
Patent ﬁlings captured by PATSTAT data also show an increase in
academic patenting. Figure 3.2 shows the total number of patent families
created by universities and public research institutes. In 2014, about 162,000
patent families were created by university and public research institute
applicants worldwide. On average, the total number of university and public
research institute patent families (16.5 percent) grew much faster than
overall total number of patent families (4.9 percent) over the period from
1995 to 2014. As a result, the share of university and public research institute
patent families in total families has been increasing rapidly – especially for
universities – reaching 11.4 percent in 2014, up from 1.5 percent in 1995.
Again, the trend in university and public research institute patent families
can be divided into two distinct periods. The period 1995–2004 saw average
annual growth of 12.1 percent, with patent families from universities
(12.3 percent) and public research institutes (11.8 percent) growing at almost
same pace. The period 2005–14 saw even faster growth. The average annual
growth rate for this period was 5.4 percent for all families and 19.6 percent
for university and public research institute families combined. However,
patent families from universities (22.4 percent) grew much more quickly
than those from public research institutes (11.3 percent).
The slowdown of the growth in PCT patent ﬁlings and the increasingly
rapid growth of PATSTAT patent ﬁlings seem to contradict one another.
However, this is not necessarily the case.
The share of foreign-oriented patent ﬁlings by academic organizations
has been decreasing. Figure 3.3 shows the number of foreign-oriented
patent families created by universities and public research institutes from
1995 to 2013 and the share of foreign-oriented patent families in total
patent families for each type of applicant.
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Figure 3.1 Public research institute and university PCT applications, absolute
numbers (left) and as a percentage of total PCT applications (right), 1995–2016
Source: WIPO Statistics Database, July 2017
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Figure 3.2 Trend and share in university and public research institute patent families
worldwide, 1995–2014
Sources: WIPO Statistics Database and EPO PATSTAT database, July 2017
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Figure 3.3 Trend in university and public research institute foreign-oriented patent
families worldwide and share of total, 1995–2013
Sources: WIPO Statistics Database and EPO PATSTAT database, July 2017

Figure 3.3 shows that while the number of foreign-oriented patent families from universities and public research institutes increased steadily over
the past two decades, their respective shares of total patenting activity by
those organizations decreased sharply. In 1995, universities created 2,058
foreign-oriented patent families and public research institutes created 1,177.
In 2013, universities and public research institutes created three to four times
more foreign-oriented patent families – 5,858 and 4,702, respectively. The
combined total of foreign-oriented patent families for universities and public
research institutes increased each year between 1998 and 2013 to reach
10,560 in 2013.By way of contrast, the share for universities decreased
from 39.5 percent of foreign-oriented patent families in 1995 to 4.8 percent
in 2013. This indicates that the number of patent families that have no
international dimension is increasing much more rapidly than the number
of foreign-oriented patent families.
What explains the drop in foreign-oriented patent ﬁlings by universities and public research institutes? That is outside the scope of this
chapter. It may indicate a change in academic patenting strategy, with
more universities and public research institutes preferring to ﬁle in one
ofﬁce rather than several. But it could also be due to the ﬁling strategy of
academic organizations of one country: China.

3.4.1 By Income Level
In the PCT data, European and US universities and public research
institutes have traditionally accounted for the bulk of academic ﬁlings
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globally.11 These high-income countries accounted for the vast majority
of university (87 percent) and public research institute (80 percent) PCT
ﬁlings in 2016. US universities accounted for 38 percent of all PCT
applications ﬁled by universities in 2016, about 11 percentage points
below their 2007 share (Figure 3.4). In the same year, the shares of the
top ﬁve public research institute origins in total public research institute
ﬁlings ranged from 19 percent for France to 9 percent for Germany.12
However, Asian academic organizations, led by China, have been
catching up quickly over the past few decades. The top ﬁve origins of
university PCT ﬁlings in 2016 were the U.S. (4,050), China (1,169), the
Republic of Korea (1,139), Japan (985), and the United Kingdom (446).
In contrast, the top ﬁve origins of university PCT ﬁlings in 2007 were the
U.S., Japan, France, the United Kingdom, and Germany. The change in
top ﬁve origin ranking between 2007 and 2016 can be explained by the
sharp rise in PCT patent ﬁlings from China and the Republic of Korea –
by 9 and 7 percentage points, respectively.
Shares for the middle-income group increased rapidly between 2007
and 2016, by 10 percentage points for universities and by 13 percentage
points for public research institutes (see Figure 3.5). Chinese universities
accounted for 83 percent of total middle-income university ﬁlings in
2016, while Chinese public research institutes represented 72 percent of
total middle-income public research institute ﬁlings. The other main
middle-income origins in 2016 for universities were South Africa (fortyseven applications), Turkey (thirty-six), India (thirty-three), Malaysia
(thirty-two), Colombia (twenty-eight), Brazil (twenty-ﬁve), Mexico
(nineteen), and Morocco (eighteen); and for public research institutes
they were India (132), Malaysia (ﬁfty), South Africa (twelve), Turkey
(eleven), and Brazil (nine).

Comparing Academic Patenting in High- and Middle-Income
Economies
Figure 3.6a shows the share of university and public research institute
PCT applications in the total number of PCT applications by income
group. The shares for high-income countries grew consistently during
11

12

The country assigned to an application is the country of residence of the ﬁrst applicant.
Data are classiﬁed either by origin (all applications with the ﬁrst applicant originating
from that country) or by ofﬁce (all applications ﬁled in that country).
Public research institutes in France ﬁled the most PCT applications in 2016, with 745 PCT
ﬁlings, followed by China (573), the U.S. (569), the Republic of Korea (491) and
Germany (372).
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Figure 3.4 Share of university and public research institute PCT ﬁlings for top ten origins in 2007 and 2016
Source: WIPO Statistics Database, July 2017
Note: PCT data are based on the publication date and ﬁrst-named applicant. Universities include all types of educational organizations, and public
research institutes include private nonproﬁt organizations and hospitals.
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Source: WIPO Statistics Database, July 2017
Note: PCT data are based on the publication date and ﬁrst-named applicant.
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the period 1980–2015, and ranged from 5.1 percent to 8.5 percent. In the
period 1980–90, university and public research institute PCT applications from middle-income economies represented just over 2.8 percent
of those countries’ PCT applications. That share increased dramatically
to over 8.0 percent in 1991–2000, and was fairly stable at almost 9.1 percent during the period 2001–15. PCT ﬁlings from China could potentially
bias the middle-income share due to the high ﬁling activity in that
country. However, if China is removed from the count, the share of
university and public research institute PCT applications in the total
number of PCT applications from middle-income countries actually
increases to 10 percent. This shows that universities and public research
institutes play an important role in the innovation capability of a number
of middle-income economies.
Figure 3.6b depicts the share of university and public research institute
patent applications in total patent applications by income group. For
high-income economies, this share increased gradually from about
1.2 percent to 5.1 percent between 1980–90 and 2011–13. Most of this
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increase originated from universities. The share of university and public
research institute applications in middle-income countries has exceeded
that of high-income economies since 1980, and increased sharply from
about 5.0 percent in 1980–90 to nearly 18.9 percent in 2011–13.
Figure 3.7 decomposes the patenting activity for the most active
countries over the last decade. As Figure 3.7a shows, in 2004–13 China
accounted for slightly less than half (49.0 percent) of all patent applications ﬁled by universities across the world. It was followed by the U.S.
(14.0 percent), and the Republic of Korea (11.3 percent). These top three
countries combined accounted for nearly three-quarters (74.3 percent) of
the ﬁlings originating from the world’s universities.
Filings from public research institutes are less concentrated than those
from universities, as shown in Figure 3.7b. Public research institute
ﬁlings from China (31.2 percent), the Republic of Korea (23.3 percent),
and France (12.5 percent) combined accounted for 67.0 percent of total
ﬁlings – 7.3 percentage points below the combined share for the top three
countries in university ﬁlings (74.3 percent). These shares also reﬂect
a shift in university and public research institute ﬁlings from the U.S. and
Europe toward Asia.
Figure 3.8 shows the trend over the past decade in PCT ﬁlings for
selected origins. The key ﬁndings can be summarized as follows: US
university PCT ﬁlings represented about 7.6 percent of total US PCT
ﬁlings between 2006 and 2015. The number of US university PCT ﬁlings
remained relatively stable throughout this period, varying between
a minimum of 3,560 in 2010 and a maximum of 4,573 in 2014. US public
research institute PCT ﬁlings accounted for slightly more than 1 percent
of total US PCT ﬁlings over the past decade and amounted to 753 PCT
ﬁlings in 2015.
The shares of university and public research institute PCT ﬁlings from
Germany were also quite stable, each representing between 2 percent and
3 percent of total PCT ﬁlings from Germany between 2006 and 2015. For
universities, the total number of PCT ﬁlings in 2015 was 490 and for
public research institutes 456.
PCT ﬁlings by French universities accounted for between 3.2 and
7.5 percent of the country’s PCT ﬁlings since 2006. The number of
PCT ﬁlings from French universities increased from 204 in 2006 to 671
in 2015. The share of French public research institute PCT ﬁlings was
nearly 12 percent in most of the reported years, and their number of PCT
ﬁlings increased from 646 in 2006 to 1,165 in 2015.
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Figure 3.7 University and public research institute patenting by leading origin
countries
3.7a University patent applications in the world for selected countries (%), 2004–13
3.7b Public research institute patent applications in the world for selected countries
(%), 2004–13
Sources: WIPO Statistics Database and EPO PATSTAT database, April 2016
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As for the share of university PCT ﬁlings from the United Kingdom, it
tended to increase slightly over time and accounted for 10.3 percent of
total UK PCT ﬁlings in 2015. The number of PCT ﬁlings reached 545 in
2015. The share of UK public research institute PCT ﬁlings was 1.1 percent in 2015 and represented only ﬁfty-seven PCT ﬁlings.
The share of Japanese university and public research institute PCT
ﬁlings tended to decrease over time. The share for universities decreased
from 5.3 percent in 2006 to 3.1 percent in 2015, while that for public
research institutes fell from 2.6 percent to 1.1 percent. These declines are
due to a fall in the number of PCT ﬁlings originating from Japanese
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Figure 3.8 The trend over the past decade in PCT ﬁlings for selected origins
3.8a Public research institute and university PCT applications from high-income
countries, absolute numbers, 2006–15
3.8b Share of public research institute and university PCT applications from highincome countries, country shares (%), 2006–15
Sources: WIPO Statistics Database and EPO PATSTAT database, April 2016
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universities and public research institutes; in 2015 they ﬁled 1,346 and
480 PCT ﬁlings, respectively.
The share of ﬁlings from universities in the Republic of Korea’s PCT
ﬁlings increased markedly during the period, from 5.1 percent in 2006 to
9.4 percent in 2015, with the number of PCT ﬁlings rising from 306 in
2006 to 1,364 in 2015. In contrast, public research institute PCT ﬁlings
decreased as a share of the total from 7.8 percent in 2006 to 3.6 percent in
2015, mainly because the overall number of PCT ﬁlings from the
Republic of Korea increased faster than the number of public research
institute ﬁlings.
Figure 3.9 shows data for a selection of middle-income countries.
Indian public research institutes accounted for 9.6 percent of total
Indian PCT ﬁlings in 2015, with 135 ﬁlings. The share for universities
peaked at 6.5 percent in 2010, having increased regularly over the
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previous decade. It stood at 1.8 percent in 2006 and 3.4 percent in 2015,
with ﬁfteen and forty-eight PCT ﬁlings, respectively.
The share of university PCT ﬁlings from South Africa has increased
markedly over the past decade, from 5.4 percent in 2006 to 18.1 percent
in 2015. This reﬂects an increase in the number of PCT ﬁlings from
twenty-three in 2006 to ﬁfty-six in 2015. In contrast, the shares and
numbers of PCT ﬁlings from South African public research institutes
have remained stable since 2006; in 2015 South African public research
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Figure 3.9 University and public research institute PCT ﬁlings in middle-income
countries
3.9a Public research institute and university PCT applications from middle-income
countries, absolute numbers, 2006–15
3.9b Share of public research institute and university PCT applications from middleincome countries, country shares (%), 2006–15
Source: WIPO Statistics Database, April 2016
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(cont.)

institutes ﬁled ten PCT applications, representing 3.2 percent of the
country’s PCT ﬁlings.
As for Mexico, the numbers and shares of public research institute and
university PCT ﬁlings remained small for the whole period. Mexican
public research institutes and universities ﬁled on average about twentyﬁve PCT applications per year each in most of the years reported, accounting for a maximum of 15.8 percent of total PCT ﬁlings from Mexico.
The share of public research institute PCT ﬁlings from Malaysia has
increased sharply since 2006 and accounted for nearly half of total PCT
ﬁlings originating from the country (44.0 percent). The number of public
research institute ﬁlings increased from two in 2006 to ninety-two in
2015. Likewise, the share of university PCT ﬁlings increased, from
5.0 percent in 2006 to 14.5 percent in 2015, with numbers up from just
three ﬁlings in 2006 to thirty-nine in 2015. University and public research
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institute PCT ﬁlings combined accounted for two-thirds (65.0 percent) of
PCT ﬁlings from Malaysia in 2014.
Chinese university and public research institute PCT ﬁlings remained
quite stable as a share of total Chinese PCT ﬁlings between 2006 and
2015, with on average 4.7 percent and 3.1 percent respectively throughout this period. However, the numbers of PCT ﬁlings were six to eight
times higher in 2015 than a decade earlier. The number of PCT ﬁlings for
universities increased from 183 in 2006 to 1,547 in 2015, and from
ninety-six to 607 for public research institutes.
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Figure 3.10 University and public research institute patent ﬁlings using PATSTAT
data
3.10a Public research institute and university patent applications from high-income
countries, absolute numbers, 2004–13
3.10b Public research institute and university patent applications from high-income
countries, country shares (%), 2004–13
Sources: WIPO Statistics Database and EPO PATSTAT database, April 2016
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According to PATSTAT data, university and public research institute
patent ﬁlings in France increased by an average annual growth rate of
4.7 percent between 2004 and 2013, reaching 4,810 applications
(Figures 3.10a and 3.10b). In Japan, the number of university and public
research institute applications stood at 7,264 in 2010, but declined to
5,100 in 2013. In the Republic of Korea, 22,441 university and public
research institute applications were ﬁled in 2012, and the average annual
growth rates is 15.9 percent in 2004–13.
Patents ﬁled by US universities and public research institutes
amounted to about 11,000 and 14,000 per year in the period 2004–13,
with a decline to around 12,000 in 2005–10. US universities have been
patenting their innovations for many years but because of the number of
patents ﬁled by the private sector, the university share stood at about
3.9 percent of total ﬁlings in 2013.
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In China, university and public research institute patent applications
combined grew from 8,740 in 2004 to 111,397 in 2013, with an average
annual growth rate of 33.2 percent since 2004 (Figures 3.11a and 3.11b).
Chinese university patenting since 2004 shows a sharp increase in ﬁling,
making some Chinese universities among the most active in the world in
terms of patent-ﬁling activity. This can be explained in part by government grants to research institutes and universities that ﬁle a large number
of patent applications, and related initiatives.
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Figure 3.11 University and public research institute patent ﬁlings for middle-income
countries
3.11a Public research institute and university patent applications from middle-income
countries, absolute numbers, 2004–13
3.11b Public research institute and university patent applications from middle-income
countries, country shares (%), 2004–13
Sources: WIPO Statistics Database and EPO PATSTAT database, April 2016
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(cont.)

Two main points emerge from the above comparisons. First, the share
of university and public research institute patent ﬁlings in all applications
in high-income countries is more stable than their share in the middleincome group. Second, in terms of numbers of ﬁlings, middle-income
countries are more heterogeneous than high-income countries.
Figure 3.12 shows the share of patent applications from universities
and public research institutes in selected countries. The countries with
the highest share of university ﬁlings in their total ﬁlings are China
(14.8 percent), Malaysia (12.8 percent), Spain (6.9 percent), Israel
(6.0 percent), Brazil (4.2 percent), and the Republic of Korea (4.2 percent). The countries with the highest share of public research institute
applications are India (9.1 percent), France (5.7 percent), China
(3.6 percent), the Republic of Korea (3.6 percent), and Spain
(3.4 percent).
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Figure 3.12 University and public research institute patent applications as a share of
total applications for selected countries (%), 1980–2013
Sources: WIPO Statistics Database and EPO PATSTAT database, April 2016

The shares of university and public research institute patent ﬁlings
tend to be higher in the middle-income group than in the high-income
group. It therefore seems particularly appropriate to encourage knowledge transfer in certain middle-income countries such as Brazil, China,
India, Malaysia, and South Africa.

3.4.2 By Technology Field
Overall, university and public research institute patenting activity primarily concerns biomedical and pharmaceutical inventions, broadly
deﬁned.13 This is true of high-income countries and other economies
alike. It is not surprising, as these industries are the most science-driven.

13

WIPO’s IPC technology concordance table was used in this section to convert IPC codes
into corresponding ﬁelds of technology (see “Concept of a Technology Classiﬁcation for
Country Comparisons,” Final Report to the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO), Ulrich Schmoch, June 2008). For an electronic version of the IPC technology
concordance table, see www.wipo.int/ipstats.
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PCT applications from universities, 2007–16
1%
6%

17%

Chemistry
Instruments
Electrical engineering
51%

Mechanical engineering
Other fields

24%

PCT applications from PRIs, 2007–16
1%
7%
Chemistry
Instruments
44%

28%

Electrical engineering
Mechanical engineering
Other fields

19%

Figure 3.13 Distribution of PCT applications by technology sector, 2007–16
Source: WIPO Statistics Database, July 2016

However, whether patenting in these technological ﬁelds is demand- or
supply-driven is less clear.
On the basis of PCT data, it can be shown that for the period 2007–16,
university ﬁlings mainly occurred in the chemistry sector (51 percent)
(Figure 3.13), followed by instruments (24 percent), and electrical engineering (17 percent). The three sectors combined accounted for 92 percent
of PCT applications ﬁled by universities.
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Public research institutes also made their largest share of PCT applications in the chemistry sector (44 percent). Their share of PCT applications ﬁled in the electrical engineering sector was relatively high, at
28 percent of their total ﬁlings. Together with instruments (20 percent),
the top three sectors for public research institutes accounted for 92 percent of their total ﬁlings, precisely like the cumulative share of the top
three sectors for universities.
In 2016, universities ﬁled the largest number of PCT applications in
the ﬁelds of pharmaceuticals (15 percent), biotechnology (13 percent),
and medical technology (10 percent) (see Figure 3.14). These were also
the top three ﬁelds for public research institutes. For public research
institutes, pharmaceuticals accounted for 12 percent of total PCT ﬁlings,
as did biotechnology. Medical technology represented 8 percent of public
research institutes’ total PCT ﬁlings.
Table 3.2 shows the share of patent applications ﬁled worldwide
by universities and public research institutes for selected technology
ﬁelds in 2013–15, based on data from the PATSTAT database. Of the
thirty-ﬁve technology ﬁelds, university applicants ﬁled 40 percent of their
applications in their top ﬁve ﬁelds: biotechnology (14.9 percent), pharmaceuticals (8.5 percent), measurement (5.7 percent), materials, metallurgy (5.5 percent), and organic ﬁne chemistry (5.3 percent).

University

PRI

16%
14%
12%
10%
8%
6%
4%
2%
0%
Pharmaceuticals

Biotechnology

Medical technology

Figure 3.14 Share of PCT applications for the top three ﬁelds of technology, 2016
Source: WIPO Statistics Database, July 2016
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Table 3.2 Share of patent applications ﬁled in selected technology ﬁelds by
applicant type, 2013–15
As a share of all
university/public
research institute
ﬁlings (%)

Technology ﬁeld

Applicant type

Patent ﬁlings

Biotechnology
Pharmaceuticals
Measurement
Materials, metallurgy
Organic ﬁne
chemistry
Chemical engineering
Basic materials
chemistry
Other special
machines
Computer technology
Electrical machinery,
apparatus, energy
Biotechnology

University
University
University
University
University

184,175
183,509
143,493
80,614
114,147

14.9
8.5
5.7
5.4
5.3

University
University

72,235
66,177

4.3
3.6

University

58,141

2.8

University
University

91,807
77,325

2.7
2.3

Public research
institute
Public research
institute
Public research
institute
Public research
institute
Public research
institute
Public research
institute
Public research
institute
Public research
institute
Public research
institute
Public research
institute

64,110

5.2

62,151

2.5

48,923

2.3

31,605

2.1

33,323

2.0

42,277

2.0

31,323

1.7

28,653

1.4

37,728

1.1

33,861

1.0

Measurement
Pharmaceuticals
Materials, metallurgy
Chemical engineering
Organic ﬁne
chemistry
Basic materials
chemistry
Other special
machines
Computer technology
Electrical machinery,
apparatus, energy

Sources: WIPO Statistics Database and EPO PATSTAT database, April 2016
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Patent applications ﬁled by public research institutes were not as
concentrated among their top ﬁve (14.1 percent) as universities. These
top ﬁve ﬁelds were: biotechnology (5.2 percent), measurement (2.5 percent), pharmaceuticals (2.3 percent), materials, metallurgy (2.1 percent),
and chemical engineering (2 percent).
As described already, universities and public research institutes largely
concentrate their ﬁlings – patent ﬁlings as well as PCT ﬁlings – in sciencebased technology ﬁelds, especially in pharmaceuticals and the biological
ﬁelds.
The ﬁve universities that ﬁled the largest number of PCT applications in 2016 were all in the U.S. (Figure 3.15). They mainly ﬁled in
pharmaceuticals and biotechnology. Pharmaceuticals accounted for
the largest share of PCT ﬁlings by Johns Hopkins University and the
University of Texas System, while biotechnology was the main ﬁeld
of technology for Harvard University, MIT, and the University of
California.
The top ﬁve public research institutes in PCT ﬁlings were more
diversiﬁed. Only ASTAR and INSERM had two of their three main
technology ﬁelds belonging to the chemistry sector. China Academy of
Telecommunication Technology ﬁled the bulk of its applications in
digital communications. The Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique et
aux Energies Alternatives (CEA) and the Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft had
each of their three main ﬁelds of technology within the electrical engineering sector.
Figure 3.16 shows the share of the top three ﬁelds of technology for
selected universities and public research institutes in their total patent
families created worldwide in 2010–13. All selected universities and
public research institutes created a quarter or more of their patent
families in their top three ﬁelds of technology. Precisely half the patent
families created by the Korea Electronics Telecomm belonged to digital
communications, telecommunications, and computer technology. The
CEA is also highly concentrated in its top three ﬁelds of technology
(electrical machinery, measurements, and semiconductors) as these
three ﬁelds accounted for 41.3 percent of its total families.
Among this selection of ten universities and public research institutes,
eight had measurement and six electrical machinery among their top
three ﬁelds of technology. Pharmaceuticals and biotechnology – which
are two popular ﬁelds of technology among universities and public
research institutes – appears only among the top three ﬁelds of one
public research institute (CNRS) and one university (Tokyo
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Figure 3.15 Shares of leading technology sectors in PCT applications ﬁled by the top
ﬁve universities
Source: WIPO Statistics Database, April 2017
Note: ASTAR is the Agency of Science, Technology and Research, CEA is the
Commissariat à I’Énergie Atomique et aux Énergies Alternatives, INSERM is the
Institut National de la Santé et de la Recherche Médicale, MIT is the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology. Public research organizations include private organizations
and hospitals. For conﬁdentially reasons, data are based on publication date. WIPO’s
IPC technology concordance (available at: www.wipo.int/ipstats) was used to convert
IPC symbols into thirty-ﬁve corresponding ﬁelds of technology.

University). This is due to the selection of universities and public
research institutes, which shows that large organizations can be specialized in quite different ﬁelds of technologies.

3.4.3 By University
The University of California was the largest user of the PCT System in
2016, with 434 published PCT applications (Table 3.3). It has maintained
that position since 1993. Massachusetts Institute of Technology (236)
ranked second, followed by Harvard University (162), Johns Hopkins
University (158), and the University of Texas System (152). Seven of the
top ten universities were located in the U.S.; Seoul National University of
the Republic of Korea (122) – in sixth position – was the highest-ranking
non-US university, while Japan’s University of Tokyo (108) ranked
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Figure 3.16 Top three technology ﬁelds for selected universities and public research institutes, 2010–13
Source: WIPO Statistics Database and EPO PATSTAT database, October 2016
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seventh. While the top ten was dominated by U.S.-based organizations,
the top twenty list comprised ten US and ten Asian universities. China’s
Shenzhen University was in joint thirteenth position with eighty-seven
published PCT applications, making it the highest-ranking Chinese
university for PCT ﬁlings.
For the sixth consecutive year, the CEA of France was the top PCT
applicant among public research institutes, with 329 published PCT
applications (Table 3.4). It was followed by the FraunhoferGesellschaft zur Förderung der angewandten Forschung of Germany
(252) and the Agency of Science, Technology and Research of
Singapore (162).
Figure 3.17 shows the distribution of PCT applications for the top
thirty origins, broken down by four types of applicant: businesses, individuals, universities, and government and research organizations. In
2016, 85.5 percent of all PCT applications belonged to business applicants, 7.5 percent to individuals, 5 percent to universities and 2 percent to
public research institutes. Among the top thirty origins, universities
accounted for a large share of applications in Morocco (42.9 percent),
Colombia (33.7 percent), South Africa (16.2 percent), and Malaysia
(14.4 percent). These ﬁve origins all belong to the middle-income category. They were followed by applicants from Singapore (14 percent),
Spain (13.6 percent), Israel (9 percent), Australia (8.9 percent), and the
United Kingdom (8.6 percent). In contrast, several countries – including
Egypt, the Philippines and Sweden – had no PCT applications ﬁled by
universities in 2016.
Public research institutes represented a high share of applications
originating in Malaysia (22.5 percent), Singapore (17.8 percent), the
Philippines (11.8 percent), India (9.5 percent), and France (9.3 percent).
Eleven of the top thirty origins had no PCT ﬁling activity from public
research institutes in 2016. For Colombia (33.7 percent), Malaysia
(36.9 percent), and Morocco (42.9 percent), university and public
research institute PCT ﬁlings combined accounted for more than onethird of their total PCT ﬁlings.
With 34,352 patent families worldwide, Panasonic of Japan was the top
PCT applicant for the period 2010–13 (Table 3.5). It was followed by two
other Japanese companies: Canon (29,036) and Toyota Jidosha (26,844).
The top 100 list mainly comprises multinational companies. However,
eleven Chinese universities and one Korean university as well as one
Korean public research institute feature among the top 100 applicants.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 54.177.185.247, on 15 Nov 2021 at 19:13:31, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/979C0AAA92B1200DCE513DAAE4894BE7

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 54.177.185.247, on 15 Nov 2021 at 19:13:31, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/979C0AAA92B1200DCE513DAAE4894BE7

Table 3.3 Top PCT applicants for the university sector in 2016
Overall
rank
35
83
119
125
133
172
198
207
220
232
235
243
262
262
262
270

Published
applications

Change from 2015

USA
USA

434
236

73
23

USA
USA
USA
Republic of Korea
Japan
USA
Republic of Korea
USA
USA
USA
Republic of Korea
China
Republic of Korea

162
158
152
122
108
104
101
97
96
94
87
87
87

4
−12
−11
27
7
5
33
−11
20
−22
12
58
30

84

−18

Change in position applicant’s name from 2015

Origin

15 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
8 MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY
10 HARVARD UNIVERISTY
11 JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
12 UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS
63 SEOUL NATIONAL UNIVERSTY
25 UNIVERSITY OF TOKYO
22 LEUAND STANFORD JUNIOR UNIVERSTY
118 HANYANG UNIVERSITY
23 UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
62 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA
57 UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
42 KOREA UNIVERSITY
480 SHENZHEN UNIVERSITY
120 KOREA ADVANCED INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY
50 TSINGHUA UNIVERSITY

China
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Table 3.3 (cont.)
Overall
rank
270
307
314
314
321
329
329
342
343
350
350
361
361
396
396
396
411

Change in position applicant’s name from 2015

Origin

Published
applications

Change from 2015

228 CHINA UNIVERSITY OF MINING AND
TECHNOLOGY
3 CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
222 KING ABDULLAH UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY
17 KYOTO UNIVERSITY
421 NAGOYA UNIVERSITY
181 NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY
43 COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
20 OSAKA UNIVERSITY
6 NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY
70 DUKE UNIVERSITY
40 DANMARKS TEKNISKE UNIVERSITY
116 UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA
137 ECOLE POLYTECHNIQUE FEDERALE DE
LAUSANNE
64 YONSE UNIVERSITY
14 KYUSHU UNIVERSITY
6 TOHOKU UNIVERSITY
127 PEKING UNIVERSITY

China

84

41

USA
Saudi Arabia

73
72

−1
32

Japan
Japan
USA
USA
Japan
Singapore
USA
Denmark
USA
Switzerland

72
69
67
67
65
64
62
62
60
60

−4
40
25
−13
−7
1
10
−12
15
17

Republic of Korea
Japan
Japan
China

56
56
56
54

−14
−1
0
−27
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420
435
435
449
459
468
468
482
486
486
495
495
518
530
546
561
571
571

173 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO
9 SOUTH CHINA UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY
45 UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON
49 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH
166 ISIS INNOVATION LIMITED
155 UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND
375 INDIANA UNIVERSITY
111 KYUNGPOOK NATIONAL UNIVERSTY
151 NATIONAL UNIVERSTY OF SINGAPORE
50 UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA
64 STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
15 YALE UNIVERSITY
222 CORNELL UNIVERSITY
6 IMPERIAL INNOVATIONS LTD.
n/a UMM AL-QURA UNIVERSITY
51 YEDA RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
CO. LTD.
49 UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON
106 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

USA
China
USA
USA
UK
USA
USA
Republic of Korea
Singapore
USA
USA
USA
USA
UK
Saudi Arabia
Israel

52
50
50
49
48
47
47
46
45
45
44
44
42
41
40
39

15
1
−6
6
−30
12
22
9
−24
5
−7
2
−35
1
36
−3

USA
USA

38
38

−3
6

Source: WIPO Statistics Database, April 2017
Note: The university sector includes all types of educational organizations. For conﬁdentiality reasons, data are based on publication
date.
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Table 3.4 Top PCT applicants among governments and public research institutes in 2016
Overall
rank
52
81

119
143
146
156
172
194
273
307

Change in position applicant’s name from 2015

Origin

Published
applications

Change from
2015

9 COMMISSARIAT A L’ENERGIE ATOMIQUE ET
AUX ENERGIES ALTERNAT1VES
22 FRAUNHOFER-GESELLSCHAFT ZUR
FORDERUNG DER ANGEWANDTEN
FORSCHUNG EV.
23 AGENCY OF SCIENCE TECHNOLOGY AND
RESEARCH
12 INSTITUT NATIONAL DE LA SANTE ET DE LA
RECHERCHE MEDICALE (INSERM)
33 CHINA ACADEMY OF
TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLCGY
1 CENTRE NATIONAL DE LA RECHERCE
SCIENTIFIQUE (CNRS)
22 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED
INDUSTRIAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
7 COUNCIL OF SCIENTIFIC AND INDUSTRIAL
RESEARCH
56 KOREA INSTITUTE OF INDUSTRAL
TECHNOLOGY
83 SLOAN-KETTTERNG INSTITUTE FOR
CANCER RESEARCH

France

329

−80

Germany

252

−71

Singapore

162

14

France

146

9

India

145

27

France

135

−2

Japan

122

10

India

109

−1

83

12

73

17

Republic of
Korea
USA
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324
403
449
459
486
495
495
518

518
561
571
571

50 CONSEO SUPERIOR DE INVESTIGACIONES
CIENTFICAS (CSC)
64 MAYO FOUNDATION FOR MEDICAL
EDUCATION AND RESEARCH
5 BATTELLE MEMORIAL INSTTUTE
283 RIKEN (THE INSTITUTE OF PHYSICAL AND
CHEMICAL RESEARCH)
309 MIMOS BERHAD
27 KOREA ELECTRONICS TECHNOLOGY
INSTITUTE
128 COMMONWEALTH SCIENTIFIC AND
INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH ORGANISATION
173 NEDERLANDSE ORGANISATIE VOOR
TOEGEPAST NATUURWETENSCHAPPELIJK
ONDERZOEK (TNO)
252 MAX-PLANCK GESELLSCHAFT ZUR
FORDERUNG DER WISSENSCHAFTEN E.V
162 KOREA RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE
AND BIOTECHNOLOGY
84 ELECTRONICS & TELECOMMUNICATIONS
RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF KOREA
197 JAPAN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
AGENCY

Spain

68

9

USA

55

−12

USA
Japan

49
48

0
19

Malaysia
Republic of
Korea
Australia

45
44

−76
3

44

9

Netherlands

42

−22

Germany

42

14

Republic of
Korea
Republic of
Korea
Japan

39

−16

38

5

38

−21
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Table 3.4 (cont.)
Overall
rank
630

669
688
708
708
727
727
752
752
752

Published
applications

Change from
2015

USA

35

17

Republic of
Korea
Republic of
Korea
China

33

15

32

−18

31

−5

China

31

13

USA
USA
China

30
30
29

2
−1
10

Republic of
Korea
Republic of
Korea

29

7

29

−1

Change in position applicant’s name from 2015

Origin

523 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AS
REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY OF THE
NAVY
484 KOREA INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY
251 KOREA INSTITUTE OF ENERGY RESEARCH
94 DALIAN INSTITUTE OF CHEMICAL PHYSICS
CHINESE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
445 SHENZHEN INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED
TECHNOLOGY
43 CEDARS-SINAI MEDICAL CENTER
32 CLEVELAND CLINIC FOUNDATION
341 INSTITUTE AUTOMATION, CHINESE
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
213 KOREA INSTITUTE OF MACHINERY &
MATERIALS
36 KOREA RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF
STANDARDS AND SCIENCE

Source: WIPO Statistics Database, April 2017
Note: The government and public research institutes sector includes private nonproﬁt organizations and hospitals. For conﬁdentiality
reasons, data are based on publication date.
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Figure 3.17 The share of the business sector in total PCT applications from selected
origins
Source: WIPO Statistics Database, April 2017
Note: The government and public research organizations (PROs) sector includes
private nonproﬁt organizations and hospitals. The university sector includes all
educational institutions. For conﬁdentiality reasons, data are based on the publication
date.
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Table 3.5 Top ﬁfty-ﬁve patent applicants worldwide, based on total number of patent families, 2010–13

Applicant

Origin

2010

2011

2012

2013

Total number
of patent families, 2010–13

Panasonic Corporation
Canon Inc.
Toyota Jidosha KK
Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd
Toshiba KK
Mitsubishi Electric
Corporation
Honghai Precision Industry
Co. Ltd
International Business
Machines Corporation
Ocean’s King Lighting
Science & Technology
Co. Ltd
Sharp Corporation
Seiko Epson Corporation
Ricoh Co. Ltd
Robert Bosch GmbH
ZTE Corporation

Japan
Japan
Japan
Republic of Korea
Japan
Japan

10,780
6,686
7,040
5,873
6,087
5,389

10,284
7,132
7,962
5,865
6,055
5,415

8,295
7,507
6,317
6,666
6,030
5,893

4,993
7,711
5,525
8,243
5,422
5,435

34,352
29,036
26,844
26,647
23,594
22,132

Taiwan, Province of
China
USA

6,783

4,842

4,254

4,539

20,418

4,463

4,419

5,108

5,298

19,288

China

1,755

2,310

5,028

9,914

19,007

Japan
Japan
Japan
Germany
China

4,756
5,531
4,402
3,674
5,065

5,013
5,374
4,397
3,814
4,521

5,929
3,833
4,155
4,339
3,577

3,082
3,715
4,781
4,339
2,219

18,780
18,453
17,735
16,166
15,382
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Huawei Technologies
Co. Ltd
Fujitsu Ltd
Denso Corporation
State Grid Corporation of
China
China Petroleum &
Chemical Corporation
Honda Motor Co. Ltd
Kvasenkov Oleg Ivanovich
LG Electronics Inc.
Sony Corporation
Siemens AG
Hitachi Ltd
Fujiﬁlm Corporation
NEC Corporation
Hyundai Motor Co. Ltd
Hongfujin Precision
Industry (Shenzhen)
Co. Ltd
Zhejiang University
General Electric

China

2,124

3,240

4,644

5,117

15,125

Japan
Japan
China

3,488
3,337
361

3,768
3,435
1,039

3,663
3,460
3,327

3,562
3,694
8,005

14,481
13,926
12,732

China

2,436

3,092

3,394

3,802

12,724

Japan
Russian Federation
Republic of Korea
Japan
Germany
Japan
Japan
Japan
Republic of Korea
China

3,533
4,344
3,558
3,635
2,524
2,917
3,646
3,149
2,149
2,799

3,156
2,288
2,882
3,325
3,083
2,839
3,047
2,434
2,604
2,840

3,019
2,648
2,594
2,569
2,979
2,938
2,291
2,404
2,569
2,475

2,992
3,407
2,813
2,234
2,769
2,602
1,989
2,455
2,706
1,754

12,700
12,687
11,847
11,763
11,355
11,296
10,973
10,442
10,028
9,868

China
USA

2,111
2,235

2,217
2,609

2,380
2,436

2,780
1,995

9,488
9,275
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Table 3.5 (cont.)

2012

2013

Total number
of patent families, 2010–13

1,996
2,105
2,099

2,694
2,366
2,067

2,558
2,175
2,262

9,000
8,554
8,437

1,986
1,895

2,131
2,031

2,147
1,959

2,034
1,820

8,298
7,705

China
Republic of Korea
Japan
Japan
Republic of Korea
Japan
Republic of Korea
USA
Republic of Korea
Japan
USA

1,643
1,963
1,951
1,755
1,659
1,923
2,103
2,291
1,314
1,744
1,597

1,779
1,867
2,000
1,846
1,868
1,956
2,547
1,978
1,723
1,435
1,742

2,125
1,754
1,766
2,059
1,926
1,798
1,480
1,357
1,973
1,708
1,546

2,060
1,918
1,719
1,642
1,702
1,461
934
1,409
1,798
1,507
1,236

7,607
7,502
7,436
7,302
7,155
7,138
7,064
7,035
6,808
6,394
6,121

Germany

1,193

1,538

1,556

1,743

6,030

Japan

1,474

1,562

1,645

1,276

5,957

Applicant

Origin

2010

Korea Electronics Telecomm
Dainippon Printing Co. Ltd
Nippon Telegraph &
Telephone
Daimler AG
Sumitomo Electric
Industries
Tsinghua University
LG Display Co. Ltd
Brother Ind Ltd
Mitsubishi Heavy Ind Ltd
Samsung Electro Mech
Kyocera Corporation
LG Innotek Co. Ltd
Microsoft Corporation
Posco
Fuji Xerox Co. Ltd
GM Global Tech
Operations Inc.
Schaefﬂer Technologies
GmbH & Co. Kg
Nippon Kogaku KK

Republic of Korea
Japan
Japan

1,752
1,908
2,009

Germany
Japan

2011
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Harbin Institute of
Technology
Shanghai Jiao Tong
University
Nissan Motor
Southeast University
Hyundai Heavy Ind Co. Ltd
Samsung Display Co. Ltd
Sanyo Electric Co.
Konica Corporation
Sumitomo Chemical Co.
Toppan Printing Co Ltd
Hewlett Packard
Development Co.
Tencent Technology
(Shenzhen) Co. Ltd
LG Chemical Ltd
JFE Steel KK
Sankyo Co.
Google Inc.
Renesas Electronics
Corporation
Sumitomo Wiring Systems
Tianjin University

China

1,168

1,146

1,574

2,065

5,953

China

1,135

1,338

1,573

1,763

5,809

Japan
China
Republic of Korea
Republic of Korea
Japan
Japan
Japan
Japan
USA

963
961
747
7
2,033
646
1,596
1,384
1,107

1,238
1,304
1,393
983
1,887
327
1,708
1,299
1,147

1,673
1,433
1,946
1,671
931
2,211
1,304
1,312
1,288

1,825
1,939
1,437
2,791
510
2,147
662
1,268
1,566

5,699
5,637
5,523
5,452
5,361
5,331
5,270
5,263
5,108

453

829

1,889

1,905

5,076

Republic of Korea
Japan
Japan
USA
Japan

643
1,137
686
435
1,567

903
1,494
767
1,189
1,446

1,345
1,260
1,548
1,828
1,150

2,178
1,010
1,872
1,421
612

5,069
4,901
4,873
4,873
4,775

Japan
China

1,008
749

1,128
1,015

1,199
1,294

1,358
1,572

4,693
4,630

China
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Table 3.5 (cont.)

Applicant

Origin

2012

2013

Bridgestone Corporation
Peugeot Citroen
Automobiles SA
Samsung Heavy Ind
Beihang University
Lenovo (Beijing) Co. Ltd
South China University of
Technology
Yazaki Corporation
Peking University
Olympus Corporation
Intel Corporation
Jiangnan University
Casio Computer Co. Ltd
Murata Manufacturing Co.
Kyocera Document
Solutions Inc.
Telefonaktiebolaget LM
Ericsson (Publ)
Korea Advanced Inst Sci &
Tech
Kao Corporation

Japan
France

1,471
1,209

1,386
1,213

908
1,149

848
970

4,613
4,541

Republic of Korea
China
China
China

1,039
1,007
260
773

1,050
1,112
608
955

1,314
1,128
1,854
1,231

1,131
1,262
1,786
1,450

4,534
4,509
4,508
4,409

Japan
China
Japan
USA
China
Japan
Japan
Japan

1,074
904
1,197
544
678
1,226
940
148

1,093
993
1,188
1,443
992
929
1,026
1,100

1,021
979
911
1,170
1,281
1,008
1,009
1,235

1,116
1,316
884
1,013
1,219
998
1,157
1,603

4,304
4,192
4,180
4,170
4,170
4,161
4,132
4,086

831

1,009

1,121

1,058

4,019

Republic of Korea

1,015

1,006

1,101

856

3,978

Japan

1,025

972

1,016

906

3,919

Sweden

2010

2011

Total number
of patent families, 2010–13
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Daikin Ind Ltd
Kyoraku Sangyo KK
Hyundai Mobis Co. Ltd
Ford Global Tech LLC
Taiwan
Semiconductor MFG
SK Hynix Inc
BOE Technology Group
Co. Ltd
JTEKT Corporation
Hyundai Steel Co.
Toray Industries
Konica Minolta Business
Tech
Inventec Corporation
Nitto Denko Corporation
Jiangsu University
Toyota Ind Corporation

Japan
Japan
Republic of Korea
USA
Taiwan, Province of
China
Republic of Korea
China

838
1,157
859
683
567

1,008
865
847
660
787

1,140
741
1,228
874
1,054

856
1,076
880
1,579
1,358

3,842
3,839
3,814
3,796
3,766

661
139

1,083
474

1,199
1,233

776
1,863

3,719
3,709

Japan
Republic of Korea
Japan
Japan

731
1,044
810
1,856

942
986
898
1,713

1,004
1,014
959
32

973
601
970
2

3,650
3,645
3,637
3,603

Taiwan, Province of
China
Japan
China
Japan

1,262

900

671

713

3,546

793
462
464

887
523
730

921
961
1,236

888
1,509
1,022

3,489
3,455
3,452

Sources: WIPO Statistics Database and EPO PATSTAT database, October 2016
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Combined, these thirteen applicants accounted for 8 percent of all patent
families held by the top 100 applicants.
In 2010–13, the top three universities in patent families worldwide
occupied positions thirty, thirty-seven, and ﬁfty-one among the top
applicants. These universities are Zhejiang University (9,488 patent
families), Tsinghua University (7,607) and Shanghai Jiao Tong
University (5,809). Two public research institutes took positions
thirty-two and ﬁfty: the Korea Electronics Telecomm (9,000) and the
Harbin Institute of Technology (5,953).
Table 3.6 shows the top ﬁve university and public research institute
applicants in patent families for selected origins in 2010–13. The top ﬁve
university and public research institute applicants in China each created
between 5,000 and 10,000 patent families during this four-year period. As
shown in Table 3.5, all top ﬁve university and public research institute
applicants from China are among the top 100 applicants in patent
families worldwide.
Each of the top ﬁve university and public research institute applicants
in the Republic of Korea had between about 2,000 and 9,000 patent
families in 2010–13. Three university and public research institute applicants in Japan created more than a thousand patent families during
2010–13, while two public research institutes in France and one in
Germany were also above the 1,000 mark.
The number of patent families created worldwide in 2013 was
higher than that in 2010 for nineteen of the thirty university and
public research institute applicants listed in Table 3.6, including all the
top ﬁve for China and France. Compared to 2010, the number of
patent families created in 2013 more than doubled for Southeast
University of China, INSERM of France, and Northwestern
University of the U.S.

3.4.4 By IP Ofﬁce
In terms of the absolute number of nonresident university and
public research institute patent applications, the top destinations
over the past ten years have been the State Intellectual Property
Ofﬁce of China (SIPO), the United States Patent and Trademark
Ofﬁce (USPTO), the European Patent Ofﬁce (EPO), the Japan
Patent Ofﬁce (JPO), the Canada Intellectual Property Ofﬁce
(CIPO), and the Korea Intellectual Property Ofﬁce (KIPO)
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Table 3.6 Top ﬁve university and public research institute patent applicants worldwide by selected origins, 2010–13

Applicant

Origin

2010

2011

2012

2013

Total number
of patent families, 2010-13

Zhejiang University
Tsinghua University
Harbin Institute of Technology
Shanghai Jiao Tong University
Southeast University
CEA
CNRS
INSERM
Univ Claude Bernard Lyon
Centre Nat Etudes Spatiales
Fraunhofer Ges Forschung
Deutsches Zentrum fur Luft
und Raumfahrt
Univ Dresden Tech
Max Planck Gesellschaft
Karlsruhe Inst Technologie
Nat Inst of Adv Ind & Tech

China
China
China
China
China
France
France
France
France
France
Germany
Germany

2,111
1,643
1,168
1,135
961
585
484
58
39
34
434
232

2,217
1,779
1,146
1,338
1,304
634
485
129
31
41
441
205

2,380
2,125
1,574
1,573
1,433
665
516
119
52
45
491
222

2,780
2,060
2,065
1,763
1,939
731
532
172
49
38
523
238

9,488
7,607
5,953
5,809
5,637
2,615
2,017
478
171
158
1,889
897

Germany
Germany
Germany
Japan

75
82
58
801

78
60
59
664

78
60
51
677

26
53
16
628

257
255
184
2,770
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Table 3.6 (cont.)

Applicant

Origin

2010

2011

2012

2013

Total number
of patent families, 2010-13

Tokyo University
Tohcko University
Osaka University
Kyoto University
Korea Electronics Telecomm
Korea Advanced Inst Sci &
Tech
SNU R&DB Foundation
Yonsei University
Univ Korea Res & Bus Found
US Navy
Northwestern University
US Army
Massachusetts Institute of
Technology
Wisconsin Alumni Res Found

Japan
Japan
Japan
Japan
Republic of Korea
Republic of Korea

379
365
243
212
1,752
1,015

364
337
226
210
1,996
1,006

327
324
272
224
2,694
1,101

408
300
256
235
2,558
856

1,478
1,326
997
881
9,000
3,978

Republic of Korea
Republic of Korea
Republic of Korea
USA
USA
USA

621
535
494
231
73
165
88

550
552
518
204
103
126
76

609
577
509
92
91
61
56

599
611
473
65
167
64
33

2,379
2,275
1,994
592
434
416
253

USA

40

52

54

98

244

Sources: WIPO Statistics Database and EPO PATSTAT database, October 2016
Note: A patent family is deﬁned as patent applications interlinked by one or more of: priority claim, PCT national phase entry,
continuation, continuation-in-part, internal priority, and addition or division. Patent families include only those associated with
patent applications for inventions and exclude patent families associated with utility model applications.
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Figure 3.18 Nonresident university and public research institute patent applications
for selected patent ofﬁces, 2006–15
Source: WIPO Statistics Database and EPO PATSTAT, January 2017

(Figure 3.18).14 Interestingly, the nonresident share of total university and public research institute patent applications is much higher
at the JPO (58.6 percent), US PTO (54.0 percent), and EPO
(49.5 percent) than at SIPO (13.1 percent) and KIPO (7.0 percent)
(see Figure 3.19).
In the period 2006–15, the main sources of patent applications
going outside a country were the U.S., France, Germany, the
Republic of Korea, Japan, and China (Figure 3.20). However, the
share of patent applications ﬁled abroad by university and public
research institute applicants was highest for the following countries
of origin (Figure 3.21): Israel (90.9 percent), France (69.8 percent), the
United Kingdom (66.1 percent), the U.S. (62.9 percent), Germany
14

Data by ofﬁce are broken down into resident applications (ﬁled at the home ofﬁce) and
nonresident applications (ﬁled by an applicant residing outside the jurisdiction of the
ofﬁce).
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Figure 3.19 Share of nonresident university and public research institute patent
applications for selected ofﬁces, 2006–15
Source: WIPO Statistics Database and EPO PATSTAT, January 2017

(61.7 percent), Canada (59.6 percent), Italy (57.5 percent), South
Africa (56.3 percent), and India (46.1 percent).

3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we proposed a methodology for measuring academic
patents. Using WIPO’s PCT and the EPO’s PATSTAT data, we provided a relatively comprehensive picture of global academic patenting
data.
We showed that global patenting by public research institutes and
universities has increased in the last thirty-ﬁve years and the map of
the main actors has changed signiﬁcantly. The main ﬁndings can be
summarized as follows.
The main actors in global patenting are still private sector businesses,
but university and public research institute applications are surging as
important innovation drivers.
The biggest trend over the last thirty-ﬁve years has been a shift in
university and public research institute patenting dominance from
Europe and the U.S. to Asia.
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Figure 3.20 Patent applications ﬁled abroad by universities and public research
institutes for selected origins, 2006–15
Source: WIPO Statistics Database and EPO PATSTAT, January 2017
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Source: WIPO Statistics Database and EPO PATSTAT, January 2017
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Applications by universities recorded in the PATSTAT and PCT
databases were concentrated in science-based technology ﬁelds, especially pharmaceuticals and the biological sciences.
In the middle-income group of economies, universities hold more
patents than public research institutes, while in the high-income
group public research institutes tend to patent more than universities.
However, it is important to remember that there are numerous factors
that can contribute to a university or public research institute’s proclivity
to patent. A strong focus on science, technology, engineering, and mathematics, public policies that govern IP ownership between university and
industry, as well as other policies that enhance the use of patents are all
likely to inﬂuence the patenting activities of universities and public
research institutes across countries (Perkmann et al. 2013).
Nevertheless, while there are many limitations in using patent data and
the extent to which it measures innovativeness, we contend that these
data are useful in helping to identify potential weaknesses and highlight
the strengths of universities and public research institutes.
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Annex: Verifying the Accuracy of WIPO University and Public
Research Institute Applicant Names
To verify the accuracy of our identiﬁcation of university and public
research institute patents, and going beyond the use of existing applicant
information, our strategy involved a semi-automated process in two
stages, web crawling and modeling.
Web crawlers, also known as spiders or robots, are programs that
automatically download web pages. Different tools can be applied to the
crawling method, such as SAS, R, and Python. The aim is to identify
a series of category-related words for each applicant using the Baidu search
and recommendation system. For universities, we used words such as
“university,” “college,” and “universities” to identify organizations. For
public research institutes, keywords used were “research” and “institute.”
For corporations, several synonyms were applied to the keywords.
The web-crawling stage involved four steps. First, according to the
applicant’s name, the programs generated a series of URLs to be sent to
the Baidu search engine system. Second, the program inspected the
source code of the result pages including a Baidu-generated recommendation list as a raw textual data set. Third, the program removed
unwanted text, leaving a cleaner textual data set. Fourth, it extracted
the keywords within the textual data set with Perl regular expression.
The modeling stage, in turn, involved a typical data-mining process with
two steps. In the ﬁrst step, also called the training phase, a learning algorithm
used the training data to generate a classiﬁcation model. In second step, that
learned model was applied to the test samples to identify names that met the
criteria and to increase the accuracy of our institutional classiﬁcations. An
underlying assumption in that process was that the distribution of keywords
for the training examples was identical to that for test examples.
All in all, this process helps to further ﬁne-tune our patent categorizations
and their corresponding institutional afﬁliations. This opens a new way of
classifying organizations as compared to classical patent search strategies to
identify university and public research institute patents in the literature.
Still, the approach does not necessarily generate perfect results: ﬁrst,
the classiﬁcation algorithms may not be sufﬁciently sound and
robust; second, the results generated are based on probability rather
than on certain veriﬁcations. Given these risks, manual checking was
undertaken to conﬁrm the accuracy of the ﬁnal results.
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4
United Kingdom
f e d e r i c a r o s s i a n d s u m a at h r e y e

4.1 Introduction
The public research system in the United Kingdom is composed of many
universities and a smaller number of public research institutes. Over time,
knowledge transfer has been institutionalized as a key mission of public
research performers, as important as their longstanding commitment to
research (Lockett et al. 2014). As in other countries, the institutionalization
of the knowledge transfer mission has largely been driven by policy incentives (Sánchez-Barrioluengo 2014; Pinheiro et al. 2015). The purpose of this
chapter is to analyze, on the one hand, the United Kingdom’s institutional
setup (including the characteristics of the country’s public research system
and of the policies implemented therein), and, on the other hand, the variety
of knowledge transfer activities undertaken and of governance models
adopted in order to carry them out.
The United Kingdom provides an interesting case study for several
reasons. First, the UK public sector research system has a variegated structure that can support a variety of models of knowledge transfer engagement.
Indeed, the wide variety of knowledge transfer activities undertaken, and the
diversity of approaches adopted, suggests that institutions pursue the strategy of knowledge transfer engagement that best suits their comparative
advantages. This also leads to strong path dependency and a symbiotic
relationship with the underlying socioeconomic structure of the country
and its regions. Second, as UK universities have operational ﬂexibility
reminiscent of that of the United States of America (U.S.), but are also
dependent on public funds very much like their European neighbors, this
case can offer insights for countries with predominantly publicly-funded
systems that intend to adopt an incentive-based approach to policy. The
main policy tool used by the UK government to foster university–industry
141
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interaction and knowledge transfer has been the provision of performancebased funding in order to create a ﬁnancial incentive for universities to
engage in knowledge transfer activities and achieve measurable results that
can be rewarded economically. Moreover, since knowledge transfer activities are income-producing in themselves, in a period of prolonged decline
in public funding, universities have had strong incentives to engage in
knowledge transfer activities irrespective of the presence of policy schemes.
Consequently, there seems to have been a reorientation of the public science
system toward more commercializable research. In turn, this raises the
question whether the UK system is generating enough basic research on
its own to keep it at the science frontier and make it possible to quickly
absorb and exploit new technology. Investment in basic science – the
original argument for public funding of education – could get lost in the
thrust of policy to promote research commercialization.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 provides a brief
overview of the organization of the United Kingdom’s public research
system. Section 4.3 describes the historical evolution of policies in support of university–industry knowledge transfer in the United Kingdom,
considering both the evolution of the institutional setup and of the
supply- and demand-side policy instruments implemented. Section 4.4
examines the variety of knowledge transfer channels used by universities
and public research institutes, with a particular focus on their performance in intellectual property (IP) commercialization, and compares the
differential performance of universities and public research institutes in
knowledge transfer, investigating some possible causes. It also considers
the demand for university knowledge from the private sector. Section 4.5
delves into the institutional infrastructures that universities have set up to
manage their knowledge transfer activities, and their practices. Finally,
Section 4.6 concludes with some policy lessons.

4.2 Universities and Public Research Institutes
in the United Kingdom
The earliest universities in Britain were founded in the Middle Ages, with
Cambridge’s charter dating back to 1209. Only a handful of institutions
were created between then and the early nineteenth century, which saw
the progressive establishment of many further education colleges that
provided vocational training in a range of subjects, including teaching
(teacher training colleges), various branches of engineering or agriculture
(polytechnics), and the arts (arts colleges). These institutions (which were
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part of the public sector under the control of local education authorities,
and sometimes religious foundations) contributed collectively to a binary
higher education system, with universities educating the elite and colleges providing vocational education for the middle class.
This system began to change in the 1960s, with a shift toward mass
university education thanks to the creation of twenty-ﬁve new universities. This trend received further impetus in 1992, as several existing
polytechnics gained degree-awarding powers,1 and the process has continued since then with the transformation of teacher training colleges, art
colleges, and other colleges into universities. Today, the UK university
system includes 161 ofﬁcially recognized degree-awarding higher education institutions. Figure 4.1 shows the cumulative number of universities
founded since 1900. The 1960s, 1990s, and 2000s saw the largest increases
in the number of institutions.
Eighty-three percent of institutions are based in England (of these,
one-third are in London), 10 percent in Scotland, 5 percent in Wales, and
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Figure 4.1 Cumulative number of degree-awarding institutions active since 1900
Source: Authors, based on data from the Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA)
and individual universities’ websites

1

The Education Reform Act (ERA) of 1988 freed polytechnics and higher education
colleges of local authority control and created a new national funding body, the
Polytechnics and Colleges Funding Council (PCFC). In 1992, this was merged with the
University Funding Council to create the Higher Education Funding Council (HEFC)
with separate agencies for England, Scotland, and Wales, and thirty-nine polytechnics and
colleges were given university status (Bathmaker 2003).
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the remaining 2 percent in Northern Ireland. Their nature is varied: some
universities specialize in world-class research and others (particularly those
that were previously focused on vocational education) in specialist training
often closely linked to local industry. The UK university system is traditionally public, but particularly since the 2000s, a small but growing number of
entirely private universities have emerged (the ﬁrst of these, the University of
Buckingham, was founded in 1973). Even those universities that receive
most of their funding from the government are not formally part of the
public sector as they are in some countries (such as in Germany, where
academics are civil servants). Instead, UK public universities are regulated as
nonproﬁt institutions governed by the Charities Act 2006, and, as such,
enjoy considerable operational autonomy.
The United Kingdom’s science, research, and higher education policy
is the responsibility of the Department for Business, Energy, and
Industrial Strategy (BEIS) and of the Department for Education (DfE).
Funding allocation is devolved to the higher education agencies of the
four countries of the UK: the Higher Education Funding Council for
England (HEFCE), the Department for Employment and Learning
Northern Ireland (DELNI), the Scottish Funding Council (SFC), and
the Higher Education Funding Council for Wales (HEFCW). Each is
responsible for funding universities’ ordinary teaching and research
activities as well as for implementing policy instruments in support of
knowledge transfer engagement.
Research and teaching are funded through separate streams. Since the
mid-1980s, recurrent research funding is distributed on a quality-related
basis building on a periodic nationwide assessment of the quality of university research. Over time, the research assessment exercise has changed its
name (from Research Selectivity Assessment to Research Assessment
Exercise to Research Excellence Framework), its frequency (currently
every six to seven years), the method of assessment (peer review of scientiﬁc
output has been complemented by bibliometric measures and by an assessment of impact case studies), and the formula used for the funding distribution (Geuna, Piolatto and Sylos-Labini 2015). Research funds are also
allocated to academics on a competitive basis by seven research councils.2
2

The research councils are divided into broad subject ﬁelds: Arts and Humanities (AHRC),
Biotechnology and Biological Sciences (BBSRC), Engineering and Physical Sciences
(EPSRC), Economic and Social Research (ESRC), Medical Research (MRC), Natural
Environment (NERC), and Science and Technology Facilities (STFC). In 2018, these
research councils were merged into a single agency called UK Research and Innovation
(UKRI), which also includes the innovation funding agency Innovate UK.
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Until recently, recurrent funding for teaching was distributed to universities entirely according to a formula based on student numbers, weighted
according to, among others factors, ﬁeld, mode, and level of study (HEFCE
2015). In 2012/13, the government introduced a new system whereby
universities receive a large share of their income directly from loan-backed
tuition fees, while the amount of recurrent funding for teaching distributed
by HEFCE has substantially decreased. A new teaching quality assessment
system, the Teaching Excellence Framework (TEF), was introduced in 2017
with the objective of allowing institutions that gain a higher teaching quality
score to increase their tuition fees in line with inﬂation.
Figure 4.2 shows how the sources of funding for universities have changed
over the last ten years. Recurrent funding for teaching has been curtailed
sharply since 2011/12, only partly compensated by a temporary increase in
research funding. Universities have compensated for this drop in public
funding by increasing undergraduate tuition fees to up to £9,000 per year.
Income from knowledge transfer activities consists of two categories:
research grants and contracts, which includes income from collaborative
research (competitively allocated grants from the research councils, government departments, and the European Commission as well as trusts and
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Figure 4.2 Universities’ sources of income
Source: Authors, based on data from HESA
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charities) and from research contracts with industry and the public sector;
plus other income, which includes income from the sale and licensing of
intellectual property (IP) (including sales of equity shares in spinoffs),
consultancies, facilities and equipment, professional development (CPD)
and continuing education (CE) courses, and regeneration programs. These
sources of income have increased slowly but steadily and together currently
amount to about £12 billion – about 36 percent of overall income. IP income
is a small share, just 3–4 percent of the income from knowledge transfer
activities (Geuna and Rossi 2011). A few universities (namely, Oxford and
Cambridge colleges) beneﬁt from considerable land endowments.
Public research institutes, funded by government departments or research
councils, are collectively known as public sector research establishments
(PSREs). They are important actors in the United Kingdom’s research
system. Unlike the university sector, the PSRE sector in the United
Kingdom has shrunk due to mergers, closures, and numerous transfers to
the private sector. There are currently thirty-ﬁve active PSREs (Smith 2015),
each funded by a speciﬁc government department3 or research council.4 In
addition, there are twenty-six research institutes that are part of the Medical
Research Council (MRC) and twenty-four cultural institutions funded
mainly by the Department of Culture, Media, and Sport and by the Welsh
and Scottish governments (Smith 2015).5 The main difference between
departmental PSREs and research council PSREs, besides their different
sources of funding – the former are funded directly from the budgets of
the departments they belong to, the latter are funded through the science
budget – is that the former perform “responsive research” on topics directly
mandated by the government, while the latter are more autonomous in
setting their research priorities within their ﬁeld.6 Figure 4.3 shows the
cumulative number of PSREs over time. PSREs associated with government
3

4

5

6

These are: the Department for Business Innovation and Skills (4), the Department for
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (5), the Department for Energy and Climate Change
(1), the Department of Health (1), the Health and Safety Executive (1), the Forestry
Commission (1), the Ministry of Defence (3), the Scottish Government (3) and the
Northern Ireland Government (1).
These are: the Natural Environment Research Council (6), the Medical Research Council
(3), the Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council (2), the Science and
Technology Facilities Council (4).
Cultural institutions mainly focus on the arts and humanities and rarely produce research
that can be easily commercialized through, for example, patents and spinoffs. Other
PSREs, by contrast, may be actively engaged in the production of commercializable IP.
From an interview with a government economist working at the UK’s Department of
Business, Energy, and Industrial Strategy.
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Figure 4.3 Cumulative number of public sector research establishments active since
1950
Source: Authors, based on data reported in BIS (2011a, 2014; Smith 2015); MaxwellJackson (2011); Government Ofﬁce for Science (2013); NCUB (2016b)

departments have shown the largest decrease, in keeping with the idea of
“lean government.”
PSREs receive a much smaller amount of funding than the university
sector. The Ofﬁce for National Statistics (ONS 2016) reports that in 2014 the
research councils spent £819 million on in-house R&D while government
departments spent £1,391 million. Although reconstructing the amount of
government funds that accrue to the PSRE sector is quite difﬁcult, these
approximate ﬁgures suggest that the sector currently receives about
30–35 percent of the recurrent funds allocated to universities. Interestingly,
the ratio between the number of current PSREs (including cultural institutions but excluding MRC university-based units) and the number of university institutions is similar (about 36 percent), so we can estimate the size of
the PSRE sector to be about one-third the size of the university sector.
Very limited information has been collected on the different sources of
income of PSREs. A study of PSREs’ knowledge transfer activities (BIS
2014) estimated that in 2012/13, PSREs gained £195 million from intellectual property licensing, £166 million from consulting activities, and
£133 million from the use of facilities and equipment and training.7
Therefore, income from knowledge transfer is about 23 percent of the
income that PSREs derive from government funding. In contrast to
7

The estimates presented in the BIS (2014) refer not only to the PSREs afﬁliated to
government departments and research councils, but also to cultural institutions, MRC
institutes, and research bodies that are part of the National Health Service.
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Table 4.1 Public funding of universities and PSREs

2008/9
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14

Universities

PSREs

8,819
9,043
8,878
8,271
7,032
6,080

2,128
2,216
2,287
2,199
2,045
2,153

Note: Values are in million GBP, current prices. Universities’ public funding includes
recurrent funding for teaching, recurrent funding for research, and capital grants
(source: HESA). PSREs’ public funding includes government expenditure for R&D
performed by UK government (civil departments and research councils only).
Source: ONS (2016)

universities, PSREs’ IP income is a high share (about 65 percent) of their
overall income from knowledge transfer activities.
PSREs operate under a variety of governance arrangements: they can
be fully owned by a government department or research council, government-owned but contractor-operated (GOCO), registered charities,
executive agencies, trading funds or nondepartmental public bodies.
This variety of governance arrangements in the PSRE sector and the
universities’ status as charities have meant that both these institutions
have greater operational autonomy in the United Kingdom than do
similar institutions in Europe, and, in turn, this freedom has enabled
them to be nimble and responsive to emerging market trends.
Table 4.1 compares public funding of universities and PSREs between
2008/9 and 2013/14. The table shows different trends, with public funding of PSREs remaining stable and public funding of universities declining – although the decline has occurred in relation to university teaching
funding (a 67 percent drop in the period), while university research
funding has increased.

4.3 An Overview of Knowledge Transfer Policy
in the United Kingdom
4.3.1 A Short History of Knowledge Transfer Policy in the United Kingdom
The UK government’s concern with supporting university–industry knowledge transfer began in the late 1970s, when a debate emerged on the United
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Kingdom’s presumed failure to exploit research (Grady and Pratt 2000).
Institutional and cultural barriers at the time had made cooperation between
academic and industrial scientists difﬁcult, and academia lacked incentives
to engage with industry. The National Research Development Corporation
(NRDC), a governmental body charged with facilitating the commercialization of research produced by public R&D (particularly defense) laboratories,
had been created in 1948, but it played a limited role. John Hendry’s
Innovating for Failure (1993), which recounts the early attempts to drive
the creation of a computer industry in Manchester in the 1950s, is instructive. Despite having the new technology at the University of Manchester, an
identiﬁed champion (Ferranti) and a government willing to provide funds
for the enterprise, a technology industry based on computing failed to
emerge, as the required interaction between the scientists and the managers
at Ferranti did not take place. An industry based on computing technology
did emerge in the 1980s, but at Cambridge, supported by the Cambridge
colleges, and largely free from government inﬂuence (Athreye 2004). This
early failure to seize the opportunity in a sector where the United Kingdom
had numerous advantages may have contributed to policymakers moving
away from directly supporting speciﬁc technologies. Instead, policy interventions increasingly involved promoting general framework conditions for
innovation, including promoting universities’ engagement with business.
Several initiatives to support university–industry interactions implemented since the mid-1970s exempliﬁed such an indirect approach to
technology policy. These included the Teaching Company Scheme,
launched in 1975, which involved placing graduates in companies on
projects jointly supervised by academics and company staff (Senker and
Senker 1994) and the LINK scheme, launched in 1986, which aimed to
support collaborative research partnerships between industry and the
research base (Grimaldi and Von Tunzelmann 2002). In the early 1980s
the government assigned the exclusive right to commercialize universitygenerated intellectual property to the British Technology Group (BTG,
formed through the merger of the NRDC with the National Enterprise
Board), and, a few years later, in 1985, universities were given the choice
whether to commercialize academic inventions independently or to rely on
the services provided by BTG.8

8

In 1992, BTG was privatized and became a private supplier of IPR brokerage services; it is
currently still operating but now focuses on acquiring, developing, and producing
pharmaceutical drugs.
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Starting from the mid-1990s, government policy documents began to
explicitly identify universities as the central focus for economic development, and to emphasize the importance of partnerships between
industry, government, and the science base (OST 1993). With the
move of the Ofﬁce of Science and Technology (OST) from the
Cabinet Ofﬁce to the Department for Trade and Industry (DTI) in
1995, responsibilities for science and technology policy were centralized in a single department, which facilitated the emergence of
a coordinated national policy on university knowledge transfer
(Grady and Pratt 2000).
Rosli and Rossi (2016) argue that UK policymakers’ views about how
universities engage in knowledge transfer, and how policy should support them, have evolved over time. Until the early 2000s, policymakers
envisioned a model of university engagement that borrowed heavily from
the sciences and engineering (Kitagawa and Lightowler 2012): innovation was viewed as a linear process whereby universities would transfer
technology to business, by selling patents and licenses, performing contract research (National Committee of Enquiry into Higher Education
1997; DTI 1998), or directly commercializing their technology through
spinoff companies (Lockett, Wright, and Wild 2014).
During the 2000s, policy documents began to reﬂect a more nuanced
view, supported by growing empirical evidence highlighting the diversity
of channels through which universities engage with businesses and with
other economic and social actors (D’Este and Patel 2007; Bekkers and
Bodas Freitas 2008; Hughes and Martin 2012). Having identiﬁed the
drawbacks of focusing too much on patenting and on the pursuit of
narrow ﬁnancial returns (Lambert Review: HM Treasury 2003; Gowers
Review: HM Treasury 2006; Saraga report: DIUS 2007), universities were
encouraged to realize the potential of their intellectual property beyond
their patent portfolio, focusing on other areas such as copyright
(Hargreaves Review: BIS 2011b). They were also encouraged to focus
on their comparative strengths, since different universities had different
contributions to make, some as world-class centers of research excellence
and players in global markets, and others primarily as collaborators
engaged with local businesses, communities, and regional bodies (DTI/
DFES 2005; DIUS 2008a, 2008b). It was argued that public funding
should encourage such choice, by providing incentives for institutions
to become more entrepreneurial, build closer links with business and the
community, and have proper arrangements for exploiting the results of
their work. The term “knowledge transfer” gained prominence (DES
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2003; HM Treasury 2003), suggesting that universities transfer more than
just technology produced by science and engineering departments, and
contribute through the whole spectrum of academic disciplines.
More recently, a broader view has emerged whereby universities are
seen to be part of complex ecosystems of innovation characterized by
collaboration and exchange among a variety of stakeholders, aimed at
addressing complex social and economic challenges (Andersen, Brinkley,
and Hutton 2011; BIS 2015). The bidirectional and collaborative nature
of the interactions between universities and businesses (or other stakeholders), is reﬂected in the increasing use of the term “knowledge
exchange” (DIUS 2008b; BIS 2012, 2013, 2015).
Another aspect of the evolution of knowledge transfer policy concerns the level of implementation. In the ﬁrst decade of the 2000s,
attention was paid to the regional dimension of universities’ knowledge transfer engagement (Potts 2002; DES 2003; Lambert Review:
HM Treasury 2003), and a new Regional Innovation Fund worth
£50 million per year was set up to enable regional development
agencies (RDAs) in England to support clusters, incubators and networking among scientists, entrepreneurs, managers, and ﬁnanciers.
However, all RDAs were closed in 2010, leading the government to
abandon this regional focus (Cochrane and Williams 2013). In the
absence of regional policy institutions, the implementation of regional
policies for knowledge transfer has become more difﬁcult, and universities’ efforts to engage in knowledge transfer within their region
are neither monitored nor encouraged. While numerous local enterprise partnerships (LEPs) between local authorities and businesses
were established in 2011, covering all areas of England (BIS
Committee 2014), how innovation and knowledge transfer policies
can be implemented in the LEP context remains unclear. LEPs
argue that their remit has expanded over time, and that their
resources are insufﬁcient (National Audit Ofﬁce 2016). Although
university representatives sit on the board of many LEPs, a recent
review suggests that the relationship expected between LEPs and
universities appears ill-deﬁned and that engagement between them is
patchy (BIS 2015), with LEPs lacking any ﬁrm obligation or support
to help businesses connect with universities. In consequence, universities may have been discouraged from pursuing an agenda of contributing to regional development, focusing instead on different
objectives (Kitagawa et al. 2016). However, little empirical evidence
exists at the moment to show whether this has been the case.
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4.3.2 Supply-Side Policy Instruments Supporting Knowledge Transfer
Most of the policy instruments devised by the government in order to
promote knowledge transfer have been targeted at universities (Science
and Technology Committee 2017). The ﬁrst comprehensive package, the
Knowledge Exploitation Programme, was launched in 1999 and included
three instruments (HEFCE 1999):
(i) The Higher Education Reach-out to Business and the Community
(HEROBAC) Fund (£60 million allocated competitively in
1999–2004). Its aim was to help universities to build organizational
capability and infrastructures to engage with business and the wider
community.
(ii) The Science Enterprise Challenge (SEC) fund (£45 million allocated
competitively in 1999–2004). It aimed to support entrepreneurially
oriented education and training within universities.
(iii) The University Challenge Seed Fund (£60 million overall allocated
via two competitions, in 1999 and 2001). It provided access to seed
funds to exploit science and engineering research outcomes and
support the creation of university spinouts.
The Higher Education Innovation Fund (HEIF), a permanent stream
of funding to support universities’ knowledge transfer activities, was
announced in 2001/2 and implemented the following year. The activities
originally funded by HEROBAC, the SEC and the University Challenge
Seed Fund were progressively brought within HEIF’s remit. After
a marked increase between 2004 and 2008, the fund later stabilized at
about £130 million per year, which is almost three times as much as it had
been in 2001. The amount distributed through HEIF and parallel funding
streams in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland equates to approximately 2.4 percent of the recurrent government funding allocated to
universities for teaching and research, and about 9 percent of the recurrent government funding allocated to research alone (Kitagawa and
Lightowler 2013). Over time, HEIF has become a very important source
of support for knowledge transfer activities, with about 34 percent of
universities’ knowledge transfer income resulting from HEIF-funded
activities (Coates Ulrichsen 2014).
HEIF’s allocation system has changed over time. Initially, funds were
allocated to universities competitively on the basis of the project proposals
that they presented, with the objective of helping them build capacity for
knowledge transfer (Kitagawa and Lightowler 2012). Since 2006 this has
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been progressively replaced by a formula based on the income that universities accrue from knowledge transfer, so that money is channeled to the
institutions that are already more commercially successful. The introduction
of a minimum eligibility threshold of £250,000, an increase in the maximum
award that can be received by each university (£2.85 million), and the
allocation of additional funds to top performers (£6 million to twelve
institutions in 2012/13 and £20 million to twenty-seven institutions in
2014/15) have also contributed to greater funding concentration since
2011 (Coates Ulrichsen 2014; Day and Fernandez 2015), reversing the
previous trend whereby smaller institutions used to have higher income
growth9 (Day and Fernandez 2015).
In addition to HEIF, several other instruments support universities’
knowledge transfer activities. HEFCE runs the Catalyst Fund, which distributes funds competitively to projects aimed at driving innovation in higher
education (£37.6 million in 2013/14) and the UK Research Partnership
Investment Fund, which funds large-scale collaborative projects between
universities and private partners (£136 million in 2013/14). Innovate UK
also runs a number of schemes. The Knowledge Transfer Partnership (KTP)
scheme, launched in 2003, is a revamped version of the Teaching Company
Scheme. In 2013/14 it allocated £16.9 million. The Catapult Centres,
launched in 2013, are research and technology innovation centers set up
as collaborative ventures between universities and businesses, each focused
on a speciﬁc area of research and technological development. The twelve
“catapults” were allocated £121.30 million in 2013/14. Innovate UK also
funds collaborative R&D projects and feasibility studies involving businesses
and research organizations (£172.9 million in 2013/14), collaborative
research in biomedicine (Biomedical Catalyst, £30 million in 2013/14),
Knowledge Transfer Networks (£15.2 million in 2013/14), and Innovation
and Knowledge Centres (£1.9 million in 2013/14).
The overall set of government-supported knowledge transfer schemes
allocated by HEFCE and Innovate UK amounted to approximately
£696 million in 2013/14, which was about 37 percent of the recurrent
government funding allocated to university research in the same period
(NCUB 2016a). Small funding schemes supporting knowledge transfer
activities, often restricted to speciﬁc academic ﬁelds, are also implemented by the devolved governments (Huggins and Kitagawa 2012), by
9

The introduction of a cap on the maximum and minimum annual changes in funding
allocations – allocations may increase by 50 percent at most, and may not drop by more
than 50 percent – was not sufﬁcient to offset this concentration process.
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many of the research councils and by selected charities such as the
Wellcome Trust and the Royal Society (Lockwood 2012, cited in Coates
Ulrichsen 2014).10
Few policy instruments have been set up in support of the knowledge
transfer activities of PSREs. In 2001, the government set up the Public Sector
Research Exploitation Fund, awarding nineteen PSREs a total of £10 million
of public venture capital to develop potential products to the point where
they could be successfully marketed to the private sector. Two additional
rounds of funding in 2004 and 2006 allocated a further £40 million. Since the
demise of this instrument, there are no lines of funding speciﬁcally dedicated
to supporting PSREs’ knowledge transfer activities.
Not all policy instruments consist of the provision of funding. The
Lambert Agreements are a set of decision tools and standard agreements
created in 2005 to simplify contracting for business–university collaborations. Evidence on the success of these tools is mixed: most users report that
they simplify processes and provide useful information and precedents (BIS
2015); however, their use is not widespread. While universities are generally
aware of these tools and 63 percent use them to some extent (Tang et al.
2009), less than 10–15 percent by value of collaborative research between
universities and business is based on a Lambert-type agreement (BIS 2015).
For the most valuable agreements, companies are more likely to impose their
preferred contractual forms. Scotland has mandated the use of template
contracts for interactions funded by the Scottish Funding Council’s innovation voucher and related schemes (BIS 2015).
A crucial nonﬁnancial policy instrument that affects knowledge transfer is the government regulation of IP rights. In the United Kingdom,
there is no strong legislative framework regulating academic patenting,
and, unlike other countries that have enacted speciﬁc laws on university
IP, the assignment of IP rights over research outputs is governed by the
general provisions on employee inventions contained in the Patent Law
of 1977. The United Kingdom has a system of “automatic ownership,”
such that the university is the ﬁrst owner of the IP, which usually cannot
revert to the inventor.11 However, if research is sponsored fully or in part
by external contractors, parties may negotiate a different agreement on
10

11

PACEC (2012) found evidence that universities use a wide range of funding sources to
support their knowledge transfer activities, with HEFCE, the RDAs, the research councils,
the EU, and Innovate UK being the most frequently used.
Other countries such as Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, and Norway apply, fully or in part, the “pre-emption rights” principle,
whereby the researcher is the ﬁrst owner of the invention but the university has the right
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the allocation of IP rights. In some cases, the university may override
existing regulations by developing internal IP rights regulations and
procedures to enforce them. Issues such as the share of royalties to be
assigned to the academic inventors, the rights of inventors who are PhD
students, and the timing of patent ﬁling procedures can vary widely
among universities.
Mainly because of its ﬂuidity, the policy framework around IP has not
undergone radical changes over time. The main policy change, introduced in 1985, has been the possibility for universities to directly commercialize their intellectual property. This has encouraged an increase in
the patenting activities of universities. In fact, UK universities tend to
own a large share (over 50 percent) of patents invented by academics,
similar to the U.S. (where the share is 69 percent) and unlike many other
European countries, where the majority of academic-invented patents
are owned by private companies; for example, Lissoni et al. (2008) show
that university-owned patents constitute no more than 11 percent of all
academic patents in France, Italy, and Sweden.

4.3.3 Demand-Side Policies Supporting Knowledge Transfer
Business also has a vital part to play in successful knowledge transfer.
A number of policies exist to support business investment in R&D, which
in turn should increase businesses’ commercial demand for university
research. These include (BIS 2011a):
R&D tax credits, which offer relief from corporation tax (equal to 22.5 percent of qualifying expenditure) with the objective of incentivizing companies in all sectors to undertake more R&D. The government has also
introduced a simpliﬁed tax regime for small companies and made it easier
for them to claim the R&D tax credit.
Open funding competitions (formerly Smart Programme) to support
ﬁrms’ R&D projects that are “likely to lead to sustainable gains in productivity and/or access to new overseas markets through export led business growth.”12
The Small Business Research Initiative (SBRI), which aims to enable
innovative companies to solve challenges for government departments.
Support for venture capital funding, through government investment
in the Enterprise Capital Funds program, in the Co-Investment Fund

12

to claim it within a speciﬁed period. In the event that the invention is not claimed within
the speciﬁed period, the rights remain with the inventor (DLA Piper et al. 2007).
www.gov.uk/government/publications/innovate-uk-open-funding-competition/innov
ate-uk-open-funding-competition-brief.
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(aimed at backing business angels), and in the UK Innovation Investment
Fund (one of Europe’s largest technology funds investing in life sciences,
digital, advanced manufacturing and clean-tech companies). Additionally,
several schemes provide tax relief to investors providing venture capital to
qualifying seed companies (the Seed Enterprise Investment Scheme, SEIS),
SMEs (the Enterprise Investment Scheme, EIS), or social enterprises (Social
Investment Tax Relief, SITR).13

The recent Industrial Strategy White Paper (BEIS 2017) has outlined
a more proactive role for the UK government in driving industrial policy
in the wake of the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union and
proposed several supply-side and demand-side interventions. On the
supply side, the government has committed to increase investment in
R&D by around 20 percent via an additional £4.7 billion of government
R&D funding by 2020–1. Additional spending of £100 million has been
committed to measures to incentivize universities to collaborate with
businesses. These might include the expansion of existing mechanisms
such as HEIF and KTPs, the introduction of new schemes aimed at
funding industry placements for scientists, and supporting world-class
clusters of research and innovation. A new Industrial Strategy Challenge
Fund is planned to back technologies at all stages where the United
Kingdom has the potential to take an industrial lead. This Fund will
support a range of industrial R&D activities: joint research projects
between business and academic researchers, graduate placements, setting
up demonstrators to test near-to-market technologies in real-world
environments and creating centers to bring together academic experts
with entrepreneurs to promote commercialization (BEIS 2017).
On the demand side, a few measures aimed at driving up the level of
business R&D investment have also been announced. These include:
a review of the tax environment for R&D, a new challenge prize to support
“everyday entrepreneurs” and a review of the IP system to stimulate
collaborative innovation and licensing opportunities. The Science and
Technology Committee (2017), while welcoming the government’s
renewed emphasis on knowledge transfer, remained concerned that its
previous efforts had focused disproportionately on the “supply” of
research by universities rather than the level of “demand” from businesses,
and that the overall R&D intensity and productivity of the UK business
sector continue to be low compared to that in other OECD countries.
13

www.gov.uk/guidance/venture-capital-schemes-raise-money-by-offering-tax-reliefs-toinvestors.
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4.4 Knowledge Transfer Activities of Universities and PSREs
4.4.1 The Variety of Knowledge Transfer Activities
Knowledge transfer channels have been comprehensively classiﬁed in recent
work by the National Centre for Universities and Business (NCUB 2016a,
2016b) into four categories: commercialization, problem-solving, peoplebased, and community-based activities. Commercialization activities
include patenting, licensing research, consulting, and spinning out companies. Problem-solving activities include joint publications, joint research,
consultancy services, prototyping and testing, research consortia, contract
research, hosting personnel, providing informal advice, external secondment, and setting up physical facilities. People-based activities include
standard-setting forums, participating in networks, attending conferences,
student placements, giving invited lectures, curriculum development, sitting
on advisory boards, employee training, and enterprise education.
Community-based activities include social enterprises, museums and art
galleries, public exhibitions, heritage and tourism, community-based sports,
performing arts, school projects, and lectures for the community. While
universities have been engaging in people-based and community-based
activities for a long time, the literature has only relatively recently begun to
acknowledge their importance in disseminating and sharing academic
knowledge to the public (British Academy 2008, 2010; Olmos-Peñuela,
Benneworth and Castro-Martínez 2014; Campaign for Social Science 2015).
Figure 4.4 shows the shares of academics and of PSRE staff who engage
in each type of activity. Commercialization and problem-solving activities are relatively more important for PSRE staff than for academics,
while the converse is true for people-based and community-based activities. This may be due, in part, to differences between ﬁelds of science,
since commercialization and problem-solving are particularly important
in engineering and materials science, while the arts and humanities and
the social sciences, which are not represented in the set of PSREs considered in this study, lead in community-based and people-based activities respectively (NCUB 2016a). It is also apparent that both academics
and PSRE staff engage far less in commercialization activities than in all
other activities. In line with a large amount of evidence suggesting that
IP-based activities are concentrated in a few ﬁelds, commercialization is
particularly high among engineering and materials science academics,
and among BBSRC-afﬁliated PSRE staff.
A more ﬁne-grained analysis comparing the shares of academics
(excluding those in the social sciences and the arts and humanities, for
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Figure 4.4 Shares of university and PSRE staff involved in different types of
knowledge transfer activity
Source: Authors, based on data from NCUB (2016a, 2016b)

greater comparability) and the shares of PSRE staff who engage in each of
the activities listed under the four main categories of commercialization,
problem-solving, people-based, and community-based activities, suggests that the pattern of engagement is very similar. Academics are
marginally more engaged in most activities, except for joint research,
research consortia, giving informal advice, and attending conferences,
while PSRE staff are marginally more active in several community-based
activities. It appears that, in spite of the lack of speciﬁc policy schemes
supporting PSREs’ knowledge transfer activities, PSRE staff engage with
external stakeholders through a variety of channels.

4.4.2 Engagement in IP Commercialization
While commercialization of IP has historically been considered an
important avenue for university–industry knowledge transfer, in practice, it involves fewer academics and generates less income than all other
knowledge transfer channels. There is a substantial amount of research
investigating the patterns and determinants of university patenting,
licensing, and spinouts in the United Kingdom. Table 4.2 presents the
evolution of a subset of indicators of IP-related activities for the period
from 2003–4 to 2014–15. IP income increased at about 11 percent
per year, excluding the exceptionally good performance of 2008, which
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Table 4.2 Indicators of research commercialization activities in UK universities

FTE staff employed in
commercialization
ofﬁces
A) Patent applications
B) Patents granted
C) Formal spinouts
established
D) Formal spinouts still
active after three years
E) IP income (£ million)1
F) Other knowledge
transfer income
(£ million),2 of which:
Collaborative research
Consultancy
Contract research
CPD
CPD and CE
Facilities and
equipment-related
services

2003–4

2004–5

2005–6

2006–7

2007–8

2008–91

2009–10

2010–11

2011–12

2012–13

2013–14

2014–15

1,508

1,518

1,612

1,829

1,910

2,001

2,975

2,209

2,269

3,395

3,720

3,936

1,308
463
167

1,648
711
148

1,536
577
187

1,913
647
226

1,898
590
219

2,097
653
191

1,994
820
207

2,256
757
236

2,274
826
170

1,936
951
131

2,076
969
130

2,156
953
129

688

661

746

844

923

982

806

825

818

793

802

836

49
2,479

71
2,549

70
2,688

69
3,054

76
3,158

140
3,188

92
3,284

74
3,448

83
3,487

89
3,588

133
3,840

155
4,020

699
272
745
282
99
103

665
281
773
347
127
95

725
294
792
349
142
109

791
340
925
415
159
110

802
385
960
442
176
119

821
372
1,052
430
197
124

819
397
1,075
445
189
126

930
395
1,123
439
207
137

915
418
1,148
437
236
146

979
412
1,201
435
237
146

1,156
446
1,205
430
255
165

1,257
442
1,210
443
272
191
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Table 4.2 (cont.)

Regeneration and
development
programs
Ratio E/F (%)

2003–4

2004–5

2005–6

2006–7

2007–8

2008–9

2009–10

2010–11

2011–12

2012–13

2013–14

2014–15

279

261

276

314

274

193

233

217

189

177

183

205

2.0

2.8

2.6

2.3

2.4

4.4

2.8

2.1

2.4

2.5

3.5

Source: Presented in Geuna and Rossi (2011), updated using HESA data
1
Includes income from license agreements involving patents, copyright, design registrations, and trademarks.
2
Includes income from collaborative research, research contracts, consultancies, facilities and equipment, CPD, CE courses, and regeneration
programs.

3.9
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was largely due to one university selling its share of a well-established
company (HEFCE 2010). Income from other knowledge transfer activities increased on average by 10.9 percent per year. However, these two
types of income are very different in magnitude, with income from IP
accounting on average for only 2.8 percent of total annual income from
knowledge transfer. The number of patents applied for and granted (both
national and international ﬁlings, but not counting multiple ﬁlings of the
same patent in different countries) increased on average by 5.3 percent
and 8.3 percent respectively each year. From the mid-2000s there appears
to have been a leveling-off in the growth of university-owned patents.
This matches the experience of the U.S., another country with a long
tradition of institutional IP ownership (Mowery and Sampat 2005;
Tang et al. 2009). Over time, knowledge transfer ofﬁces (KTOs) have
gained experience in realistically assessing inventions’ commercial and
licensing potential, and have therefore become more selective in deciding whether patent applications should be made (Tang et al. 2009). As
a consequence, the quality of university patents has improved, as
suggested by several trends: an increase in the number of nonsoftware
license agreements, an increase in the share of spinouts surviving for
more than three years, and an increase in the share of patent applications that are eventually granted.
Despite the large number of universities that engage in patenting and
spinning out (between 2009–10 and 2014–15, 122 universities ﬁled at least
one patent, generated income from IP, or created at least one spinout
company), the bulk of these activities are concentrated in a subset of
research-intensive universities with a substantial presence in engineering,
materials science, biology, chemistry, and veterinary science (NCUB 2016a).
In 2014–15, six institutions (3.7 percent) produced 40 percent of patent
applications, and twenty-ﬁve institutions (16 percent) produced 80 percent
of patent applications. The distribution of IP income is even more concentrated: just three institutions (1.8 percent) produced 41 percent of IP income,
and seventeen institutions (11 percent) produced 80 percent of IP income.
Twenty-seven institutions (17 percent) produced 80 percent of income from
research contracts. The skewed distributions of patent income might suggest
a skewed ability of institutions to produce high-quality patents, since evidence suggests that patents licensed to industry are of better quality than
patents that are not licensed (Sterzi 2013).
Figure 4.5 summarizes some of the data from Table 4.2. The number of
new spinouts established each year has been quite stable (although
declining in recent years), but the number of spinouts surviving at least
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Figure 4.5 Patenting and spinout activities of universities
Source: Authors, based on data from HESA
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Figure 4.6 Patenting and spinout activities of PSREs
Source: Authors, based on data from BIS (2014)
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three years has increased. While failure rates remain high and a great
number of spinouts may still not survive in the long run (HM Treasury
2003), the survival rate14 of university spinouts in the United Kingdom is
high by comparison with many other countries (Lawton Smith and Ho
2006).
One interesting aspect of Figure 4.5 is the close relationship between
patents granted and spinout activity. It has been argued that patent
licensing and spinning out companies are alternative modes of commercializing research results, and that one or the other will prevail depending
on institutional and context conditions. International evidence suggests
that those countries that have maintained an inventor-ownership model
(such as Sweden and Italy) focus more on spinouts than countries that
have a university-ownership model, which tend to focus on patent
licensing. The University of Cambridge seems a case in point. Before its
switch to the institutional-ownership model in 2005, the University of
Cambridge had, for a long time, uniquely maintained a professor’s privilege system similar to that implemented in Germany and the Nordic
countries. Cambridge’s historic success at spinout creation (Athreye
2004) might suggest that the lack of institutional ownership acted as an
incentive to commercialize research results via spinout companies
instead of relying on patent licensing.
However, the analysis of patenting and spinout data over time suggests
that universities that make more income from technology licensing and
ﬁle more patents may also create more successful spinouts. This relationship is consistent with the skew in the generation of new science noted
earlier and suggests that universities have developed a range of competencies that allow them to engage in both licensing and spinouts.
A growing literature on university KTOs appears to tell a similar story.
Tang et al. (2009) reported that KTOs have improved their ability to
explain the commercialization processes and options to academics, and
to work with academics on deﬁning appropriate IP ownership arrangements and ﬁnancial incentives. Most KTOs continually review and
restructure their strategies, and promote themselves as interface organizations between the academics (and university) and external parties,
including venture capitalists (Chugh 2004). The number, experience,
and knowledge of KTO staff have been found to be positively related to
14

It must be noted, however, that survival is not a measure of proﬁtability or even viability;
many university spinouts, it has been shown, are able to survive with minimal business
activity thanks to their ability to keep down costs by using university structures and
personnel (Jelfs 2016).
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the number of spinouts (Lockett and Wright 2005; Powers and
McDougall 2005) and to the quality of the advice and contacts they
provide (Franklin, Wright, and Lockett 2001). The number of university
spinouts is also positively correlated with university R&D spending,
spending on IP disclosure, and the ability to develop new business
(Lockett and Wright 2005) – but it is quite likely that these factors also
determine how many patents the university can apply for. The ability to
generate spinout companies also depends on university characteristics
(such as institutional reputation, which makes it easier for academics to
bring together resources to create spinouts, and the presence of cultures
or norms that nurture entrepreneurial activity (DiGregorio and Shane
2003), and on external factors like the availability of local venture capital:
the level of investment in ﬁrms located ten miles from a venture capital
head ofﬁce is double that of ﬁrms sited 100 miles away (Wright et al.
2004), and on individual attributes and experience (Clarysse, Tartari, and
Salter 2011).
Information about the commercialization activities of PSREs is collected less systematically than information about universities’ knowledge
transfer activities. Between 2003 and 2004, the Department for Business,
Innovation, and Skills (BIS 2011a, 2014) carried out seven surveys of
knowledge transfer activities in all the PSREs funded by government
departments and by the research councils, as well as in cultural institutions and regional NHS hospital trusts. Table 4.3, drawn from the latest
available study (BIS 2014), shows grossed-up estimates for the whole
sector. PSREs’ commercialization activities have grown over time –the
number of FTE staff in commercialization ofﬁces has grown by about
36 percent – as has business representation on their governing boards. As
a group, PSREs outperform universities on a range of metrics. If we
compare data from universities and PSREs in the last year for which
they are available (2012–13), it is interesting to observe that while the
number of patent applications by PSREs is much lower (322 versus 1,936
by universities), their probability of being granted is much higher (twothirds versus less than half) and so is their income from licensing
(£195 million versus £61 million). Consequently, the average licensing
income per granted patent is much higher for PSREs (£570,175) than for
universities (£64,143), although we do not have information about the
distributions: it is possible that a small number of blockbuster patents
account for the largest share of income, for either or both PSREs and
universities.
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Table 4.3 Summary indicators of research commercialization activities in UK PSREs
2003–4

2004–5

2005–6

2006–7

2007–8

2008–9

2012–13

Number of PSREs covered

107

116

135

138

138

143

FTE staff employed
in commercialization
ofﬁces
A) Patent applications
B) Patents granted
C) Formal spinouts
established
D) IP income (£ million)
E) Income from
consultancy (£ million)
F) Income from use of
facilities and equipment
and training (£ million)
Ratio D/(E+F) (%)

385

368

513

669

486

448

316
228
69

335
148
84

290
193
74

316
172
101

379
188
89

392
230
83

322
342
143

33
36

46
31

186
26

116
43

146
37

198
100

195
166

Source: BIS (2014)

grossed-up
values
611

133

91.7

148.4

715.4

269.8

394.6

198.0

65.2

166

ross i & at h re ye

Table 4.3 also shows that PSREs’ commercialization activities have
been on the rise. Although patent applications have not increased much,
the number of patents granted has increased. The number of spinouts
doubled between 2008–9 and 2012–13, with PSREs owning some equity
in 93 percent of these cases. Income from commercialization activities
including business consultancy has also increased dramatically over time,
and particularly since 2008–9. By way of contrast, a steady increase in
licensing agreements (and corresponding income) in the early years has
been followed by a decline in the last three years. Unlike universities,
PSREs derive most of their knowledge transfer income from IP; for most
of the period covered, income from IP was several times larger than
income from consulting and other sources. Only in the most recent
survey has the situation has changed: with IP income stable and rapid
growth in other sources of knowledge transfer income, the former has
dropped to only 65 percent of the latter. By contrast, universities’ income
from other knowledge transfer activities is much higher than that of
PSREs (£2,269 million versus £299 million), indicating that universities
engage in a broader range of activities.
In comparing the commercialization activities of universities and
PSREs, we may wonder whether we are comparing like with like. With
161 universities, the university sector is likely to be far more diverse than
the thirty-ﬁve PSREs focused narrowly on a few subject areas. A narrow
focus is more likely to generate economies of specialization in research,
which are much harder for universities to achieve given their broader
mandate.
Data collected from two surveys by NCUB, one of academic staff
(NCUB 2016a) and one of PSRE staff (NCUB 2016b), allows us to
perform some comparisons. It is apparent that PSRE staff can dedicate
the majority of their time to research rather than teaching and administration, which instead take up a large part of university academics’ time.
Even though academics in the sciences spend on average a greater share
of their time on research than academics in the social sciences and
humanities, they still devote much less time to research than PSRE
staff. However, while this might explain why a PSRE researcher produces
more output than an academic, it still does not explain why their research
enjoys greater commercial success.
PSREs’ greater success in commercialization may be explained by their
greater focus on more applied, mission-oriented research. However,
whether PSREs’ research is more applied than that conducted at universities is not clear. A comparison using NCUB data (2016a and 2016b) of
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the time allocated by academic and PSREs researchers between pure
basic, user-inspired basic and applied research (as deﬁned by the
Frascati Manual, OECD 2003, pp. 77–9) suggests that the differences
between research ﬁelds are greater than those between universities and
PSREs: in both sectors, researchers in health and engineering spend
relatively more time doing applied research, while researchers in biology,
chemistry, and the natural sciences spend relatively more time doing
basic research. Hence, categorizing research according to its objectives
does not seem to reﬂect the commercialization potential of the resulting
outcomes.
Another explanation might be that PSREs are more oriented to ﬁelds
that are characterized by immediate commercial applicability, such as
computer science and biotechnology. Data on the distribution of PSRE
staff across ﬁelds of research are not collected systematically. By integrating information on the orientation of PSREs to various research ﬁelds
(BIS 2015) with data on the number of staff employed in PSREs in
2012–13 (BIS 2014), we can estimate the share of PSRE staff in each
ﬁeld. These shares can be compared with the distribution of academics in
each ﬁeld in the same year. Considering only academics and PSRE staff
employed in the sciences, we ﬁnd that universities have greater shares of
staff in medicine and in engineering and technology, while PSREs have
greater shares of staff in the natural sciences (particularly biology, environmental, and sustainability studies) and in agriculture and veterinary
science. While this shows different patterns of specialization in the two
sectors, it is not immediately possible to deduce information about the
ease of commercial applicability of the resulting research outcomes.
One reason why it is not so easy to explain the differential commercialization success of universities and PSREs is that the government is
likely to have privatized, over time, exactly those PSREs whose research
results could be commercialized more easily, since these would be more
likely to survive without government funding. Therefore, the remaining
PSREs are more likely to focus on the production of research outcomes
that are less likely to generate large private returns, and which are thus
more similar to the kind of research outcomes produced by universities.
Academics and PSRE staff appear to have similar patterns of engagement
in different channels of knowledge transfer, and to initiate interactions
with external partners in similar ways. Further research in this area
should adopt more ﬁne-grained units of analysis. In particular, given
that PSREs focus on narrow ﬁelds of research, their knowledge transfer
performance should be compared with that of university departments or
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even research centers engaged in similar ﬁelds. Data at this level are
currently not available systematically and would require ad hoc data
collection.

4.4.3 Industry Demand for Knowledge from Universities and PSREs
Universities in the United Kingdom interact with a variety of industries.
According to data from HESA, almost all universities work with organizations in the education, health and arts sectors, while three-quarters
work with manufacturing. Almost every industrial sector draws on
university knowledge: only ﬁve sectors approached fewer than eighty
universities, and of these, only two sectors approached fewer than forty.
However, when businesses are asked about their sources of knowledge
for innovation, universities are not ranked highly: the most frequently
cited sources of knowledge are the company itself, clients or customers,
suppliers, and competitors in the same line of business (Hughes and
Martin 2012). The fact that only 1 percent of the businesses report using
the business sector alone, while 18 percent report using the business
sector together with intermediaries, and over 80 percent report using
some combination of sources from all three groupings, suggests that
businesses use university knowledge in combination with other sources.
Data from the most recent Community Innovation Survey (BIS 2016)
provide additional information about business engagement with universities. In the CIS sample of 15,091 companies,15 between January 1, 2012 and
December 31, 2014, 7 percent of the companies collaborated on innovation
activities with universities or other higher education institutions, and 5 percent collaborated on innovation activities with government or public
research institutes. Table 4.4 shows a cross-tabulation of information on
collaboration on innovation activities with universities and government or
public research institutes. A total of 729 companies collaborated with the
government, 1,068 with universities, 593 with both government and universities, 136 with the government but not with universities, and 475 with
universities but not the government. The vast majority of ﬁrms (13,887)
collaborated with neither universities nor government.
Breaking down these data further, we ﬁnd that of the CIS sample of
15,091 companies, 13 percent collaborated on innovation activities in the
United Kingdom at the regional level, 19 percent collaborated at the
15

In the sample, 44 percent of ﬁrms are small, 36 percent medium-sized, and 20 percent
large. The median ﬁrm is medium-sized.
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Table 4.4 Collaboration with universities and governments
Collaborated with
government?

Collaborated with
university?

No
Yes
Total

No

Yes

Total

13,887
475
14,362

136
593
729

14,023
1,068
15,091

Source: Authors, based on data from BIS (2016)

national level, 9 percent collaborated with European countries, and
8 percent collaborated with non-European countries. However, relatively
few companies collaborated with either universities or government, as
can be seen from Table 4.5.
According to Abreu et al. (2008), who surveyed 1,449 UK ﬁrms, the
channels most frequently used by ﬁrms to access university knowledge were
the distribution of scientiﬁc knowledge through open science (publications
and scientiﬁc conferences) and the appointment of graduate personnel.
These far outstripped direct research collaborations between universities
and ﬁrms (through research collaborations, research contracts and consultancies), while patents and licenses were used least of all. Data from HESA
show differences between large ﬁrms and SMEs in the use of university IP:
SMEs and non-commercial organizations generate 42 percent of universities’ non-software licensing income, 64 percent of software licensing
income, and 98 percent of other IP income (including income from copyright licensing).

4.5 Organizational Practices in Knowledge Transfer
Universities in the United Kingdom have very different knowledge
transfer strategies (Hewitt-Dundas 2012) which tend to be aligned to
their organizational goals and objectives (Buckland 2009) and to their
tangible and intangible resources (research intensity, subject specialization, entrepreneurial culture, competencies within the KTO) (HewittDundas 2012; Kitagawa et al. 2016; Rossi 2017). Typically, knowledge
transfer channels based on exploiting IP (patent licensing, spinouts) and
research contracts are more prevalent in research-intensive institutions
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Table 4.5 Cooperation on innovation activities with universities and government at different geographical levels
Cooperates on innovation activities with government or public research institutes
Cooperation on
innovation
activities with
universities or
other higher
education
institutions
None
Nationally
Internationally
Nationally and
internationally
Total

None

Nationally

Internationally

Nationally and
internationally

Total

13,887
422
20
33

120
358
9
25

10
10
117
8

6
16
2
48

14,023
806
148
114

14,362

512

145

72

15,091

Source: Authors, based on data from BIS (2016)
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and in those that include science, engineering, and medical subjects. In
these institutions, the research and grants ofﬁce may manage a larger
share of university income than the KTO. By contrast, more teachingintensive institutions tend to focus on consultancy, the provision of CPD,
and regeneration programs (Hewitt-Dundas 2012) aiming to provide
skills and knowledge to their local communities (Jones and Craven
2001; Meagher, Lyall, and Nutley 2008; Wright et al. 2008). Universities
specialized or oriented toward engineering, natural sciences, or information technology mainly interact with industry partners, while those
specialized in the humanities, arts, and social sciences usually interact
with public bodies, nonproﬁt organizations, and other community
groups with lower purchasing power (Benneworth and Jongbloed 2010).
While different types of universities may prioritize different types of
knowledge transfer activities, it is unclear which of these approaches
bring the greatest economic returns: universities that are less researchintensive often receive more funds from industry than those that have
a proﬁle of research excellence (Geuna 1999). Compared with top universities, mid-range universities engage in a wider range of knowledge
transfer activities (Wright et al. 2008) and serve a broader range of
stakeholders (De La Torre, Rossi, and Sagarra 2017).
The knowledge transfer management practices adopted by universities
are likely to play a role in their performance. Several studies have
attempted to categorize different models for managing knowledge transfer activities. Rogers et al. (2009) identify four main models of research
commercialization: the Cambridge Inventor-Ownership Model, based
on academics’ direct ownership of the IP originating from their research;
the In-House Model, where the university manages the entire knowledge
transfer process through an internal organization; the Stand-Alone
Company Model, where the university establishes a dedicated, independent limited company to act as a conduit between university research and
business; and ﬁnally the Hybrid Model, where the university signs a longterm partnership agreement that grants a private company a share in the
university’s IP (and income generated from its commercialization) in
exchange for advice, funding, and expertise. A not-dissimilar classiﬁcation was provided by Tang et al. (2009), who distinguished between
having an internal organization wholly within the university structure,
an organization operating outside of the university but reporting to it, an
external nonproﬁt-making organization wholly owned by the university
but operating autonomously and reporting to a board for all decisions,
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and an external proﬁt-making commercial organization listed on the
stock exchange.
Using survey data for 2006 and 2007, Rogers et al. (2009) showed that
the share of universities using the services of external agents was increasing. Unsurprisingly, the universities that managed their IP licensing and
ﬁling internally tended to have larger KTOs. Even those universities that
fully outsourced their IP activities and those that did not engage in IP at
all still maintained an internal department for the management of other
types of knowledge transfer activities. However, despite the variety of
models, KTOs tended to centralize all university invention and commercialization activities and required all academic staff to notify them of their
discoveries and to delegate all rights to negotiate licenses on their behalf.
This prompted some (Rogers et al. 2009; Tang et al. 2009) to call for more
varied approaches to knowledge transfer.
In a more recent study, Sengupta and Ray (2017) suggest that models
of knowledge transfer governance have indeed grown more decentralized
over time. By focusing on two dimensions – the extent to which knowledge transfer management is outsourced or performed in-house, and the
extent to which knowledge transfer responsibilities are centralized or
devolved to individual departments – their study identiﬁes four models:
coordinating KTO: most knowledge transfer functions are devolved to
departments and performed in-house; absentee KTO: most knowledge
transfer functions are devolved to departments and outsourced; traditional KTO: most knowledge transfer functions are controlled centrally
and performed in-house; outward-facing KTO: most knowledge transfer
functions are controlled centrally, with some outsourced. They also argue
that: (1) universities whose strategy involves engagement with research
users are more inclined to devolve a higher proportion of knowledge
transfer responsibilities to departments, and (2) universities that exhibit
relatively high volumes of application-oriented research outputs are
more inclined to wholly or partly outsource key KTO functions to
external organizations.
According to data from HESA, in 2013–14 only nineteen universities
out of 161 (11.8 percent) did not have a formal KTO. The remaining 142
had an internal KTO or a subsidiary company (either majority or minority owned), or both. The functions of the KTO included providing
support for SMEs (82 percent), drawing up contracts for various kinds
of knowledge transfer interaction (66 percent), and providing indemnity
insurance for staff (87 percent).
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Most universities had some infrastructure to manage the ﬁling and
commercialization of patents and other types of IP. As many as 146
universities (91 percent) had a formal structure (whether an internal
ofﬁce or external agency) in place to support the process of seeking
protection for their IP. Eighty-four percent also had a formal structure
(whether an internal ofﬁce or external agency, or both) to support IP
commercialization. Infrastructures to support academic and student
entrepreneurship were also widespread: most universities provided business advice and entrepreneurship training services, followed by seedcorn investment and incubators, and ﬁnally by venture capital and
science park accommodation. All these services were provided either
directly by the university or by a partner organization, or both.
Most universities implemented incentives for academics to engage in
knowledge transfer and to disclose their activities to the institution.
Compulsory disclosure requirements were widespread. Furthermore,
80 percent of universities rewarded their staff individually (ﬁnancially
or by other means) for the IP they generated, and most universities
(91 percent) believed that staff had medium or high incentives to engage
in knowledge transfer. Academics’ freedom to engage in private consulting activities presented a more mixed picture, since only 34 percent
reported that they had a policy allowing them to do so; those that did
allowed academics to spend, on average, twenty-eight days per year on
private consulting.
Despite the vast improvement in KTOs’ resources, competencies and
strategies, a number of bottlenecks and barriers to knowledge transfer
persist (Science and Technology Committee 2017). These include lack of
access to ﬁnance to commercialize research, particularly early-stage
funding and sustained funding for longer-term commercialization projects; difﬁculty in valuing IP assets and a lack of negotiating skills; the
complexity of the policy support mechanisms for research and innovation; and the lack of a clear role for regional policymaking bodies in
supporting knowledge transfer.

4.6 Conclusion
In the United Kingdom, as in many other countries, there has been
a recurrent concern that university engagement with industry is not
part of the institutional ecosystem for innovation in the way that such
engagement is for US universities (Rosenberg and Nelson 1994). In order
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to promote knowledge transfer, the UK government, while concerned to
make the academic sector accountable for the public science funding it
receives, has always preferred a light-touch approach based on the
creation of appropriate incentives rather than centralized management.
This incentive-based approach to policy, combined with universities’
extensive operational ﬂexibility and autonomy (whereby they have extensive freedom to alter courses, compete for students and research with
other universities, hire faculty and develop new revenue streams),
makes the UK university system more similar to the U.S. one than to
higher education systems in continental Europe. At the same time, the
reliance on public funding has made it less similar to the U.S. and more
similar to Europe. This halfway positioning of the UK model provides
an interesting case study for those countries with predominantly
publicly-funded systems that intend to adopt an incentive-based
approach to policy.
The UK case study conﬁrms that knowledge transfer as a phenomenon
is characterized by strong path dependency and a symbiotic relationship
with the underlying socioeconomic structure of the country and its
regions. The United Kingdom’s older, most research-intensive institutions have historically maintained strong relationships with industry,
including with large industrial ﬁrms and the public sector, including
defense. Policies directed at supporting knowledge transfer have allowed
these universities to institutionalize knowledge transfer processes that
were previously carried out by individual academics and research groups,
and to increase the scale of their knowledge transfer engagement.
Intensive engagement with industry via research contracts and patent
commercialization remains typical of a small number of institutions.
Other universities, particularly those that were previously vocational
training colleges, also had historical relationships with industry, but
these mainly revolved around training and problem-solving activities.
For these universities, the institutionalization of knowledge transfer has
mostly implied a scaling-up of their training and consultancy operations.
Hence, universities’ growing incentives to engage in knowledge transfer
have led them to build on their preexisting networks, competencies and
capabilities, and to develop models of engagement that are in harmony
with the needs of the actors in their local social and economic context.
We can also draw some lessons from the speciﬁc kind of incentives that
the UK system has generated. The main policy tool used by the UK
government to foster university–industry interaction and knowledge
transfer has been the provision of performance-based funding in order
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to create ﬁnancial incentives for universities to engage in knowledge
transfer activities and achieve measurable results that can be rewarded
economically. This is different from the U.S. model, where individuals
are rewarded for better performance by direct income-generating activities, often taxed very lightly. However, universities in the United
Kingdom do reward their star scientists and researchers with better pay
and promotion prospects, reﬂecting their reliance on such individuals’
performance to attract research income. Moreover, since knowledge
transfer activities are income-producing in themselves, in a period of
prolonged decline in public funding, universities have had strong incentives to engage in knowledge transfer activities irrespective of the presence of policy schemes.
Universities’ incentive to play to their strengths by engaging in those
activities where they are more likely to be successful, and the government’s lack of precise direction on what activities they should be
engaging in, has led universities to adopt a varied range of modes of
engagement, in terms both of the variety of knowledge transfer activities
undertaken and of the organizational models they have adopted in order
to carry them out. The variety of approaches shows a broad experimentation with a strategy that best suits the comparative advantages of the
university.
At the same time, there are some risks inherent in having a system of
incentives to engage in knowledge transfer that are primarily monetary in
nature. First, they may encourage universities to refrain from engaging in
activities that are beneﬁcial for society while generating little or no
income for the university (Rossi and Rosli 2015). Second, these incentives
may encourage universities to focus predominantly on forms of research
that are certain to bring economic rewards in the relatively short term,
moving away from more uncertain and risky basic research.
A reorientation of the system toward more commercializable research
appears to have occurred in the PSRE sector, too. However, this raises the
question whether the UK system is generating enough basic research on
its own to keep it at the science frontier and make it possible to quickly
absorb and exploit new technology – a question that is particularly
pressing in the context of the present productivity stagnation in the UK
economy (see, e.g., The Economist 2017). Evidence from the United
Kingdom that high levels of engagement in patenting on the part of
academics (in both applied and theoretical ﬁelds) reduces their scientiﬁc
productivity (Crespi et al. 2011; Banal-Estanol, Jofre-Bonet, and Lawson
2015) suggests that a broader debate on the effects of strong incentives to
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engage in knowledge transfer on the amount and nature of basic research
pursued in academia should be had.
Hence, policymakers should think very carefully about the consequence of performance-based funding on the performance of the overall
system. Public funding of R&D rests on the argument that there is
a market failure that leads to private underinvestment in basic research.
Creating a system of monetary incentives for universities based on
success at commercialization risks undermining this basic goal. If universities are to continue to engage in basic research, we have to accept
that some universities may never do knowledge transfer – there must be
slack in the system.
As in everything else, we have come full circle but the golden mean
remains elusive.
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Germany
d i r k c za r n i t z ki a n d g e or g l i ch t

5.1 Introduction
The transfer of knowledge and technology is a key task of publicly
ﬁnanced research in Germany. This chapter analyzes the structures and
processes for such transfer, based on a review of scholarly literature as
well as original qualitative and quantitative research.
Germany is a federal republic, and some major governmental tasks,
including science and education, are administered at the level of each
state (Land; plural Länder). Germany’s sixteen states thus administer
their own education systems, including universities and other institutions of higher education (HE). As a result, the public science landscape
in Germany is very diverse.
Universities and other HE colleges are not the only signiﬁcant research
organizations in Germany. In addition, the governments of the Länder
and the federal government maintain a number of important public
research institutes, some of which are much more focused on science
and knowledge transfer than universities and other HE colleges are. The
Fraunhofer Association in particular engages in highly industry-relevant
research, and the Helmholtz Association, the Max Planck Association,
and the Leibniz Association are also important players in public science.
These institutions are supplemented by a number of public research
institutes ﬁnanced by the Länder.
Because the public science and education system is decentralized
across the sixteen states, there is a dearth of centrally collected data
about knowledge transfer. This chapter draws on several different
sources but only a few ofﬁcial public statistics; most data were collected
manually from the Internet, academic publications, and various policy
reports, mostly published only in German.
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The chapter is structured as follows. In Section 5.2, we outline the
German landscape of public scientiﬁc organizations. This is followed in
Section 5.3 by a discussion of common channels of knowledge transfer.
Section 5.4 discusses policies designed to enhance science and knowledge
transfer, while Section 5.5 reviews the main ﬁndings of the scholarly
literature concerning knowledge transfer in Germany. We then present
our own research ﬁndings from interviews with selected university
knowledge transfer ofﬁces (KTOs) and policymakers as well as results
from a survey sent to all KTOs at German universities. A ﬁnal section
summarizes our conclusions.

5.2 The Role of Universities and Public Research Institutes in
Germany’s National Innovation System
According to the German Federal Statistical Ofﬁce,1 the higher education
system consisted of 427 institutions in 2014/2015, including 107 universities and 217 universities of applied sciences (Fachhochschulen).2 In
addition, there were six pedagogical colleges, sixteen theological colleges,
ﬁfty-two colleges for arts and twenty-nine public administration colleges.
Without question, the main knowledge transfer channel from these
institutions to industry is the education of highly skilled labor. Figure
5.1 shows trends in numbers of students at different types of HE college.
Between 1994 and 2015, the overall number of students increased from
about 1.9 million to almost 2.8 million. While the share of colleges of arts,
pedagogics, theology, and administration remained small at between 3 to
4 percent, the share of students at universities of applied sciences
increased from 21 percent to 34 percent.
In addition to the HE colleges, Germany has several important research
institutes: the Fraunhofer Association, the Helmholtz Association of German
Research Centres, the Max Planck Association, the Leibniz Association, and
several others with research missions that are ﬁnanced either by the federal
government or the Länder.
Figure 5.2 shows the distribution of R&D expenditure in Germany in
2010. According to the Federal Ministry of Education and Research
(BMBF), total R&D expenditure amounted to about EUR 67 billion,
1

2

Source: German Federal Statistical Ofﬁce, www.destatis.de/DE/ZahlenFakten/
GesellschaftStaat/BildungForschungKultur/Hochschulen/Tabellen/Hochschulen
Hochschularten.html.
Universities of applied sciences focus on applied aspects of higher education. They grant
bachelor and master’s degrees but are generally not entitled to grant doctorates.
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Figure 5.1 Number of students at different types of HE college in Germany
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2016), Fachserie 11, Reihe 4.1.
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Figure 5.2 Distribution of R&D expenditure in 2010
Source: BMBF (2012)
Note: FhG is the Fraunhofer Association, HGF is the Helmholtz Association and MPG
is the Max Planck Association.

with about EUR 45 billion spent by the private sector, and EUR 22 billion
by the public sector. Universities and other HE colleges spent about
54 percent of that EUR 22 billion. The rest was distributed among public
research institutes, with the largest share of 15 percent being spent by the
Helmholtz Association, followed by the Max Planck and Fraunhofer
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Associations with about 7 percent each, and the Leibniz Association with
5 percent. The other public research institutes spent about 12 percent of
the total public research budget.
The Fraunhofer Association’s research activities are conducted by
sixty-nine institutes and research units at locations throughout
Germany. It employs around 24,500 people, who work with an annual
research budget totaling EUR 2.1 billion. Of this, EUR 1.9 billion is
generated through contract research. More than 70 percent of its contract
research revenue is derived from contracts with industry and from
publicly ﬁnanced research projects (Fraunhofer Association 2015).
The Helmholtz Association of German Research Centres was created in
1995 to formalize existing relationships between several independent
research centers that are mainly engaged in “Big Science.” It employed
38,237 people in 2015, and distributes core funding from the BMBF to its
eighteen autonomous research centers. The 2015 budget amounted to EUR
4.45 billion, with roughly two-thirds coming from public sponsors (split 9:1
between federal and state authorities). The individual Helmholtz Centres
attract more than 30 percent of funding themselves through contracts with
public and private sector sponsors (Helmholtz Association 2016).
The Max Planck Association consists of eighty-three institutes (including
ﬁve abroad) and mainly engages in basic research. As at January 2016, it had
a total of 22,197 staff. The federal and state governments each provide half
the institutional funding for its budget, which totaled around EUR 1.8 billion
in 2016 (Max Planck Society for the Advancement of Science 2016).
The Leibniz Association is a conglomerate of research institutes that
are members of the so-called Blue List – institutes that were originally
founded by the Länder, but which are now regarded as being of federal
importance and therefore coﬁnanced by the federal government. In 2015,
Leibniz comprised eighty-nine institutes employing 18,476 people with
a total budget of EUR 1.73 billion, of which around 21 percent came from
third-party funding.3
Table 5.1 summarizes some key features of the major public research
institutes.

5.2.1 Knowledge Transfer Prior to the 2000s
The knowledge and technology transfer (KTT) activities of German
universities/HE colleges and public research institutes differ, reﬂecting
3

Source www.leibniz-gemeinschaft.de/ueber-uns/organisation/leibniz-in-zahlen.html.
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Table 5.1 Selected key features of German public research institutes

Orientation
Institutes
Staff
Budget

Fraunhofer

Helmholtz

Max Planck

Leibniz

Applied
69
24,500
EUR
2.1 billion
(EUR
1.9 billion
from
contract
research)

Big Science
18
38,237
EUR
4.45 billion
(2/3 from
public
sponsors;
9:1 federal–
state split)

Basic
83
22,197
EUR
1.8 billion
(50:50
federal–
state split)

Diverse
89
18,476
EUR
1.73 billion
(21 percent
third-party
funding)

Sources: Various annual reports of the institutions

their differing missions. Based on a survey of professors at universities
and Fachhochschulen plus heads of departments at public research
institutes, Czarnitzki et al. (2000) assessed the extent to which different
institutions met preconditions for KTT and how much KTT they actually
carried out. This analysis was further developed by Edler and Schmoch
(2001), and is shown in Figure 5.3.
Information on the preconditions for KTT was derived from institutions’ mission statements supplemented by their size in terms of budgets
and staff as well as their thematic orientations. These preconditions were
then compared to the actual extent of KTT activities, as derived from the
survey responses of almost 1,000 professors and heads of department.
The extent of KTT takes into account the industry afﬁnity of each
institution’s research, its interaction with industry, staff mobility between
the institution and industry, and research funding obtained from
industry.
Institutions are localized on the “KTT activity map” roughly according
to their missions. The Fraunhofer Association had the highest predisposition for KTT to industry and also achieved the highest extent of KTT. It
was followed by technical universities as a distinct subgroup of universities that are well suited to KTT because they generally focus on subjects
that are highly relevant to industry. The Helmholtz Association seemed
to meet many preconditions for KTT but was less active in practice than
the technical universities. There were then signiﬁcant variations among
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Figure 5.3 KTT missions and activities of different institutions in German public
science
Note: Adapted from Rammer and Czarnitzki (2000) and Edler and Schmoch (2001).
The size of the bubbles shows the extent of factors impeding KTT according to survey
responses. FH is Fachhochschulen (universities of applied science), FhG is the
Fraunhofer Association, HGF is the Helmholtz Association, MPG is the Max Planck
Association, TU is the technical universities and Uni is other universities.

other universities and universities of applied sciences in terms of preconditions for KTT. Some faced signiﬁcant barriers, such as understaffed
KTOs and misaligned incentives. Of all the institutions, the Max Planck
Association was least active in KTT, reﬂecting its basic research mission
within the public science system.

5.2.2 Knowledge Transfer at a Glance
Knowledge Transfer from Universities
As the universities and Fachhochschulen are administered by the Länder,
no comprehensive metrics on KTT exist centrally and we are obliged to
use secondary data sources. The Munich Innovation Group (2013) published a study comparing patent applications by German universities
with those by Chinese institutions, and analyzed the PATSTAT database
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of the European Patent Ofﬁce, which contains data from many different
national patent ofﬁces.4 The ﬁfteen German universities with the highest
patent activity between 1990 and 2009 are shown in Table 5.2. To
compare this ranking with research activity, the table also includes the
Table 5.2 Top-ranking universities for patent applications, 1990–2009,
and research

University
KIT, Karlsruhe
Institute of
Technologyd
Technische
Universität
Dresden
Albert-LudwigsUniversität
Freiburg
Freie Universität
Berlin
Eberhard Karls
Universität
Tübingen
HumboldtUniversität zu
Berlin
Universität
Stuttgart
Universität Jena
FriedrichAlexanderUniversität
ErlangenNürnberg

4

Rank: patent
applicationsa

Number of
patent
applicationsa

Rank:
citations per
facultyb

Rank:
academic
reputationc

1

3,780

5

12

2

1,495

3

16

3

1,103

6

7

4

1,038

9

4

5

1,027

36

13

6

839

18

2

7

770

19

18

8
9

769
708

33
1

28
22

For more discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of PATSTAT as a data source, see
Chapter 3 in this volume.
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Table 5.2 (cont.)

University
Technical
University of
Munich
Ruprecht-KarlsUniversität
Heidelberg
LudwigMaximiliansUniversität
München
RWTH Aachen
University
Georg-AugustUniversity
Goettingen
Technische
Universität
Berlin (TU
Berlin)
Leibniz
Universität
Hannover
Technische
Universität
Darmstadt
JuliusMaximiliansUniversität
Würzburg
University Ulm
Universität
Rostock

Rank: patent
applicationsa

Number of
patent
applicationsa

Rank:
citations per
facultyb

Rank:
academic
reputationc

10

635

24

5

11

598

16

3

12

536

10

1

13

515

13

6

14

389

27

8

15

381

22

9

n/a

n/a

2

29

n/a

n/a

4

23

n/a

n/a

7

24

n/a
n/a

n/a
n/a

8
11

27
43
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Table 5.2 (cont.)

University
WHU – Otto
Beisheim
School of
Management
Ruhr-Universität
Bochum
Justus-LiebigUniversity
Giessen
Rheinische
FriedrichWilhelmsUniversität
Bonn
Universität
Hamburg
Universität
Frankfurt am
Main
University of
Cologne

Rank: patent
applicationsa

Number of
patent
applicationsa

Rank:
citations per
facultyb

Rank:
academic
reputationc

n/a

n/a

12

45

n/a

n/a

14

25

n/a

n/a

15

42

n/a

n/a

28

11

n/a

n/a

35

10

n/a

n/a

37

14

n/a

n/a

38

15

Notes:
a.
Source: Munich Innovation Group (2013).
b.
Source: QS World University Ranking 2016/2017; www.topuniversities.com/
university-rankings/world-university-rankings/2016. Ranks are within
Germany and are based on a citation-to-paper ratio per faculty member in order
to remove size effects. The publication and citation analysis is based on the
Scopus database.
c.
Source: QS World University Ranking 2016/2017; www.topuniversities.com/
university-rankings/world-university-rankings/2016. Ranks are within Germany
and are based on a survey of scientists.
d.
The Karlsruhe Institute of Technology is a merger between the former University
of Karlsruhe and the Forschungszentrum Karlsruhe, an institute of the
Helmholtz Association.
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ﬁfteen top-scoring universities in terms of research publication citations
based on the Scopus database as well as the highest ranking in terms of
academic reputation according to the QS World Ranking of Universities.
As can be seen, top patenting correlates with top research, but not as
strongly as one might expect.
Unfortunately, patent applications are almost the only indicator of
KTT from universities and Fachhochschulen that can be traced systematically with moderate effort. Other indicators such as licensing, spinoff
activity, joint research projects with industry, and other more informal
contacts are not collected on any systematic basis. Such data could only
be gleaned from the annual reports of individual institutions (and even
then comprehensive data are not available) or collected through surveys.

Knowledge Transfer by Public Research Institutes
A decade after the analysis by Rammer and Czarnitzki (2000) and Edler
and Schmoch (2001), a survey of public research institutes conducted in
2009 by the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) offered an
updated perspective. The heads of different public research institutes
were asked whether various tasks featured in their institute’s main mission. Public research institutes are often associations of many different
institutes, and so there was scope for considerable variation among
replies from heads within a single umbrella public research institute.
Interestingly, the heads’ subjective assessment in this survey generally
chimes with the earlier ﬁndings reported in Figure 5.3.
Table 5.3 shows some key results of the 2009 survey. The most
emphatic replies came from the Max Planck Association and the
Fraunhofer Association. As expected, Max Planck views itself as provider
of basic research insights: 100 percent of its heads view basic research as
one of their main tasks. This is followed by providing PhD and other
education (22 percent), which can be seen as an indirect channel of
knowledge transfer (not necessarily to industry), and the provision of
scientiﬁc information to the public (19 percent). Note the striking gap
between basic research (100 percent) and the next most important task,
PhD education (22 percent) – the most pronounced unimodal orientation among all public research institutes. Active knowledge transfer is not
seen as one of the institute’s main tasks.
This stands in stark contrast to the Fraunhofer Association, which has
traditionally focused more on applied research. Here 91 percent of heads
see applied research as a main task of their institute, followed by
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Table 5.3 Public research institute heads’ assessment of their institutes’ key tasks (%)
Total
Basic research
Applied research
Technical development
Testing, standardisation, and
certiﬁcation
Information and
documentation
PhD education, Further
education
Providing scientiﬁc
infrastructure
Tech transfer to private sector
Scientiﬁc information of public
Counseling services public
administration
Fulﬁllment of regulatory tasks

Max Planck

Fraunhofer

Helmholtz

Leibniz

PRO (Federal)

44
57
18
11

100
3
3
0

9
91
46
17

46
57
26
6

62
48
6
6

7
74
7
26

11

3

3

3

23

22

16

22

3

34

19

7

15

6

11

37

13

15

26
15
20

3
19
3

57
0
9

31
14
17

12
23
19

7
15
78

13

3

3

9

10

56

Source: ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research 2009 PRI Survey
Notes: Figures show the percentage of heads at each public research institute judging a speciﬁc task as a goal of their institute.
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knowledge transfer to industry (57 percent) and technical development
(46 percent).
The Fraunhofer and Max Planck Associations take extreme positions
in terms of basic versus applied research and development and active
knowledge transfer. Other public research institutes have more balanced
missions. For instance, the heads of the Helmholtz institutes regard basic
and applied research as almost equally important (57 percent versus
46 percent). Helmholtz represents Big Science in Germany, and its
heads see the provision of scientiﬁc infrastructure (which can also be
accessed by non-Helmholtz researchers) as their third most important
task. Direct knowledge transfer to industry is ranked ﬁfth after providing
PhD education. In sum, although Helmholtz still places more importance
on basic and applied research, knowledge and technology transfer is on
the agenda of its constituent institutes.
Like Helmholtz, the Leibniz Association is a hybrid between basic and
applied research that does not see knowledge transfer as its main goal.
Information, documentation, and the dissemination of scientiﬁc information to the public feature among its perceived missions.
The 2009 survey also provides interesting information about other
public research institutes. These institutes have a strong focus on applied
research (mentioned by 74 percent of their heads) and on monitoring
and advising public administration (78 percent). A good example is the
Robert Koch Institute, Germany’s central institution for disease prevention and control, which operates under the Federal Ministry of Health
and conducts research into vaccination and related ﬁelds. It has about
1,110 employees, including 450 scientists.
Another example is the German Meteorological Ofﬁce (Deutscher
Wetterdienst, DWD), which is attached to the Federal Ministry of
Transport and Digital Infrastructure and whose principal tasks include
warning against weather-related dangers and monitoring and rating the
impact of climate change in Germany. The DWD runs atmospheric
models on its supercomputer for precise weather forecasting as well as
managing the national climate archive and one of the world’s largest
specialized libraries on weather and climate issues. While it does undertake
climate research, its main tasks relate to information and documentation.
For more information about knowledge transfer from public
research institutes to industry speciﬁcally, annual reports are a useful
source. The main transfer channel is undoubtedly direct research
collaboration with industry, but data on this are not readily available.
Instead, Table 5.4 reports key ﬁgures on KTT based on annual reports.
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Table 5.4 KTT by leading German public research institutes at a glance
Patenting

Licensing

Spinoffs

Other

Fraunhofer

563 applications in 2014,
506 in 2013

Not available

Not available

Max
Planck

131 applications in 2014,
127 in 2013

117 spinoffs since 1990,
83 of them actively
managed by MaxPlanck Innovation;
c.3,000 jobs created as
of 2014

Helmholtz

c.400 per year

118 spinoffs between
2005 and 2014, 21 in
2015

c.EUR 150 million
per year revenue from
industry partnerships

Leibniz

2,605 between 1990 and
2009

80 exploitation
agreements in 2014
generating revenues
of EUR 23.5 million;
93 agreements in 2013
and revenues of EUR
22.5 million
Revenues of EUR
20 million in 2012 and
2013, and EUR
11.7 million in 2015
n/a

EUR 641 million
revenue from projects
with industry in 2015
c.2,000 collaborative
projects with industry
per year generating
annual revenues of c.
EUR 158 million in
2014

n/a

Third-party funding of
c.EUR 363 million in
2014 (22.1 percent of
all funding)

Sources: All data derived from annual reports of the public research institutes except for patent data for the Leibniz Association, which
comes from Munich Innovation Group (2013)
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As expected, the Fraunhofer Association is very active in patenting due
to the applied nature of its research, and secured EUR 641 million
revenue from projects with industry in 2015. The Helmholtz
Association is also very active in patenting – perhaps more than one
might expect given its focus on Big Science – but earns much less than
Fraunhofer from industry partnerships. The various Max Planck institutes patented only 131 inventions between them in 2014, in line with
their basic research focus.
According to the Munich Innovation Group (2013), the Leibniz
Association patented 2,605 inventions between 1990 and 2009, giving
a similar annual total to that of Max Planck. Third-party funding
amounted to about EUR 363 million, but it is unclear how much of this
came from industry.
For Max Planck and Helmholtz, licensing income and spinoff numbers are also available, but these are difﬁcult to compare across institutions. Max Planck reports that it has created117 spinoff companies since
1990, which in turn created about 3,000 jobs as of 2014, but it is unclear
whether those jobs still existed in 2014, or whether the ﬁgure refers to
employment in terms of “person-years” since 1990. Helmholtz outperformed Max Planck by creating 118 spinoffs between 2005 and 2014, but
reported only EUR 20 million of research revenues compared with Max
Planck’s EUR 23.5 million. Furthermore, Helmholtz’s revenues trended
downward during the period of the study.
In summary, German universities and Fachhochschulen are not the
only relevant institutions for knowledge and technology transfer from
science to industry; public research institutes without teaching obligations play a crucial role in the public science landscape. Knowledge
transfer seems to be actively supported by most universities and public
research institutes.

5.2.3 Leading Users of Commercially Valuable Knowledge
In the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP), which constitutes the German
part of the pan-European Community Innovation Surveys (CIS), ﬁrms are
regularly asked about their innovation activities. The survey takes
a representative sample of German manufacturers and selected services
and its results can thus be extrapolated to all German ﬁrms in these sectors.
Among many other questions, ﬁrms are asked to report on their
partners in innovation projects. As well as lead customers, suppliers,
ﬁrms from the same industry and consultants, they also indicate whether
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they collaborate with universities, including universities of applied sciences, and public research institutes.
As can be seen in Table 5.5, of ﬁrms in the R&D service sector,
66 percent collaborate with universities and 40 percent with other public
research organizations. This is followed by the pharmaceutical sector,
where 54 percent of ﬁrms report collaboration with universities and
30 percent with public research institutes. Other sectors that collaborate
extensively with public science include ICT equipment, vehicles, machinery, chemicals, metal, and the ICT industry.
Interestingly, universities are generally reported more frequently than
public research institutes. In part, this may simply be because they outnumber public research institutes, but it also shows that universities are frequently involved in knowledge transfer activities through joint research.
These activities may well exceed the patenting of university inventions by the
university KTOs themselves in terms of both frequency and importance.
For public research institutes, there is also survey data on the users of
their research results. In the 2009 ZEW public research institutes and
universities survey, heads of institutes were asked to report on their most
important user groups. Interestingly, their most important user group
was universities, mentioned by 52 percent of respondents, followed by
other public research institutes on 37 percent. Small and medium-sized
ﬁrms and large ﬁrms were each mentioned by around one-third of
respondents (see Table 5.6).
Once again, the biggest differences between public research institutes
occur between Max Planck and Fraunhofer. While Max Planck heads
almost exclusively report other scientiﬁc institutions as their main user
group (universities and public research institutes with 84 percent and
40 percent, respectively), the Fraunhofer institutes focus unambiguously
on industry, with large ﬁrms mentioned by 83 percent of heads and SMEs
by 91 percent.
For the other institutions, the picture is again more mixed but public
science as user dominates, except for other federal public research institutes that do not belong to one of the four major associations, where
public administration is evidently the most important “client.”

5.2.4 Changes in the German Knowledge Transfer System
In the period 1998–9, the BMBF commissioned a study of knowledge and
technology transfer in Germany, the results of which were published
(Schmoch et al. 2000). In response to the study, the BMBF launched
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Table 5.5 Leading collaboration partners by sector, 2008–10
Collaborations with:
Universities and Fachhochschulen

R&D services
Pharmaceuticals
ICT equipment
Vehicles
Machinery
Chemicals
Metal
ICT services

Other public research organizations

Rank

Share of innovators*
(in percent)

Rank

Share of innovators*
(in percent)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

66
54
47
43
38
33
32
32

1
2
3
4
6
5
7
8

40
30
29
26
19
25
15
14

Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Mannheim Innovation Panel (2011)
*
Share of innovating ﬁrms reporting collaboration within the context of innovation projects.
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Table 5.6 Main users of public research institute research, as identiﬁed by public research institute heads
Total
Universities
PRIs
Public administration
Large ﬁrms
SMEs
Industry associations
Broader public

52
37
27
30
33
7
12

Max Planck
84
40
0
0
0
0
3

Fraunhofer
11
3
9
83
91
14
0

Helmholtz
54
34
23
37
17
3
9

Leibniz
77
64
31
15
19
4
15

PROs (Fed.)
33
33
96
11
7
7
22

Others
40
33
19
31
54
10
19

Source: ZEW 2009 public research institute and universities survey
Notes: Figures show the percentage of respondent public research institute heads who reported a speciﬁc user group as using their
institution’s research.
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a campaign called “Knowledge Creates Markets” in 2001 with four major
objectives: (i) a valorization campaign to increase patenting by public
research organizations; (ii) a spinoff campaign to encourage them to
found companies; (iii) a collaboration campaign to foster bilateral
research agreements between public research organizations and companies; and (iv) a competence campaign to increase awareness of the potential usefulness of public science among companies. In total, the four
campaigns included twenty-six sub-schemes.
Major subsequent changes with respect to KTT in Germany included
the abolition of professor’s privilege and the establishment of regional
“patent valorization agencies” (PVAs) intended to support university
KTOs and researchers in commercializing their discoveries.

The Abolition of Professor’s Privilege
The abolition of professor’s privilege was a major change both legally and
culturally. Under Clause 42 of the German employee invention law,
university researchers owned inventions made in the course of their
work. This was a unique legal privilege – ownership of all other inventions created in the course of employment are vested in the employer –
and reﬂected Article 5 of the German constitution, which protects the
freedom of science and research.
Under the new law, introduced in 2000, German university researchers
are now required to scrutinize their research ﬁndings and report any inventions to the university – unless they decide to keep their inventions secret by
not publishing or patenting. The university has four months to consider
patenting any inventions so submitted. If it does not claim the invention,
rights to patent and commercialize it revert to the researcher. If it does claim
it, the inventor is entitled to at least 30 percent of revenues from successful
commercialization, but nothing otherwise. Furthermore, the university handles the patenting process and pays all related expenses such as processing
fees, translation costs, and legal expenses. University researchers retain the
right to disclose the invention through publication two months after submitting it to the university. Prior contractual agreements with third parties
also remained valid during a prescribed transition period.5
A handful of studies have examined the effects of abolishing professor’s privilege on patenting rates and ownership patterns in Germany.
Schmoch (2007) found that the number of university-owned patents
5

Contracts made before July 18, 2001 were treated under the old law until February 2003
(Gesetz über Arbeitnehmererﬁndungen, § 43 ArbnErfG).
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increased. Based on inventor lists, his data also suggest that the new law
changed the propensity to invent among academics, discouraging those
who had previously ﬁled their own patents while encouraging nonpatenters. In a follow-up study, Cuntz et al. (2012) showed that the
share of university-owned inventions increased after 2002 while the
share of individually or industry-owned university inventions decreased.
Von Proff et al. (2012) found that the policy change did not increase
university-invented patents, but that ownership merely shifted from
individual- and ﬁrm-owned patents to universities.
Czarnitzki et al. (2015c) analyzed the effects of the change in law
through a more rigorous micro-econometric study using the differencein-difference methodology, comparing university-based patenting to the
patenting activity of a control group of inventors before and after the
change.
In essence, Czarnitzki et al. (2015c) argue that university patenting
cannot be compared to general patenting activity in Germany, which is
dominated by inventors employed in ﬁrms. As the reward systems in
ﬁrms and public science are very different, they instead aim to compare
patenting by university researchers with patenting by researchers
employed by public research institutes.
Choosing a good control group of inventors is clearly crucial to
evaluate the impact of policy changes. Figure 5.4 shows patenting activity
in Germany, with the dotted line at the top showing the overall trend.
The underlying data are applications ﬁled with the German Patent and
Trademark Ofﬁce (DPMA) and the European Patent Ofﬁce (EPO)
between 1978 and 2008 involving at least one German inventor. Data
were collected from PATSTAT. Treating 1995 as the baseline (100 percent), patenting grew until the year 2000 and reached about 145 percent,
then fell to about 140 percent in 2002, and then grew again to reach
160 percent in 2008. However, academic patenting developed very differently. Patent ﬁlings based on university and public research institute
inventions both grew from 100 percent in 1995 to roughly 110 percent in
1998, but then both fell, to 70 percent and 80 percent respectively, in 2002
when the law changed. This pattern was found by prior researchers
(Schmoch 2007; Cuntz et al. 2012; Von Proff et al. 2012). Analysts have
speculated about the reasons for the decrease: suggestions include an
increasing emphasis on publication in academic performance evaluations, decreased entry into academic jobs, the end of the New
Economy boom and legal uncertainty surrounding patenting in the
ﬁeld of biotechnology (Schmoch 2007: 5–8; Cuntz et al. 2012: 21–2).
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Figure 5.4 Patenting in Germany before and after the abolition of professor’s privilege
Source: Czarnitzki et al. (2015c)

Patenting by public research institutes did at ﬁrst recover slightly after
the change in law, but university patenting continued to decline.
For more rigorous analysis, Czarnitzki et al. (2015c) collected a panel
of patent and publication data at the level of individual inventors at
universities and public research institutes. The panel methodology allows
one to control for individuals’ ability to commercialize research, annual
macroeconomic shocks, and each researcher’s career age and publication
record. Publications may serve as a control variable, reﬂecting potentially
patentable new knowledge.
Figure 5.5 shows trends for the study group (university researchers)
and the control group (public research institute researchers) as “within”
demeaned average time series, that is, average patenting activity for each
person over the whole panel time period is subtracted from their actual
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Figure 5.5 Trends in German patenting for university and public research institute
researchers (“within” transformed), 1995–2008
Source: Czarnitzki et al. (2015c)
Note: The lines show “within” demeaned, averaged values for university and public
research institute researchers. The 2002 vertical solid line marks the date of the actual
policy change. The 1998 dashed vertical line shows the date on which the ﬁrst public
discussion took place, according to Internet searches.

observed patenting. This wipes out differences in levels of the time series
which might be due to individuals’ speciﬁc ability to patent. Here, we are
more interested in changes over time rather than different levels of
patenting activity among individuals. The ﬁgure shows that patenting
by researchers at universities and public research institutes followed
a similar trend before the law changed and diverged slightly between
1998 and 2001, when abolition of professor’s privilege was under discussion, but that they diverged strongly after abolition. While public
research institute patenting ﬁrst stabilized in 2005, university patenting
dropped steadily until 2008.
Having run micro-econometric ﬁxed-effect panel regressions that also
control for researchers’ career ages and publication records, Czarnitzki
et al. (2015c) conclude that the law change caused patenting by university
researchers to fall by about 17 percent. Thus, the policy failed in its goal of
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Table 5.7 University researchers’ patent activity by applicant type,
1995–2008
Before 2002

Applicant
type
Industry
Individual
University
Sum
Total*

Average
patents per
inventor
per year
0.45
0.14
0.02
0.61
0.58

Relative frequency
(in percent)
74
23
3
100

After 2002
Average
patents per
inventor
per year
0.23
0.04
0.10
0.37
0.34

Relative frequency
(in percent)
62
11
27
100

Source: Czarnitzki et al. (2016)
*
Note: In total, the average number of patent applications per identiﬁed university
inventor per year amounted to 0.58. However, a few patents are co-assigned to
multiple types, e.g., a ﬁrm and a university ﬁle a joint patent application. These are
counted for each type, so the total by type amount to 0.61 before 2002 instead
of 0.58.

increasing patenting. The authors argue that policymakers misperceived
the incentives of university researchers. It was assumed that university
researchers were mainly interested in publishing their work in academic
journals and most were not interested in commercializing their research
results. Instead, however, researchers who were interested in commercialization before the law changed maintained viable networks of industry contacts and often patented in collaboration with companies. These
networks were disrupted by the law change, and university researchers
instead had to involve university KTOs in negotiations about contract
research, IP, and related collaborations.
Czarnitzki et al. (2015c) argue that the cost-and-beneﬁt schedules for
university inventors have shifted because of the change in IP ownership.
On the one hand, KTOs now cover the cost of patent applications and
associated fees, and are also supposed to look for industry partners for
commercialization. Prior to the law change, researchers had to invest
effort and their own money to realize commercial opportunities. On the
other hand, researchers have lost the opportunity to appropriate all
revenues from their patenting activity. Prior to the law change, they
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could theoretically enjoy 100 percent of potential revenues; now, they
obtain a 30 percent royalty on all revenues, and the universities own the
other 70 percent. In addition, bargaining has become more complex as
now, in addition to the researchers, the university’s KTO is involved in
negotiations with the ﬁrm. The empirical results of Czarnitzki et al.
(2015c) suggest that the negative incentives (forgone private beneﬁts of
commercialization) outweigh the positive incentives (lower private cost
of commercialization).
Czarnitzki et al. (2016) separates patenting by university researchers
by applicant type (see Table 5.7). Before 2002, total patenting per university inventor per year amounted to about 0.58 patent applications
per year. After the law changed, this total dropped to 0.34. However,
the decline causally related to the law change is about 17 percent of the
initial value of 0.58 only (according to the results from Czarnitzki et al.
2015c). More interestingly, Table 5.7 shows that a large chunk of the
decline in patenting is due to a fall in patents where university researchers
appear as inventors on corporate patent applications. These patents
related to industry have declined by around 50 percent, from 0.45 before
the law change to 0.23.
In addition, patents may be ﬁled by individuals, typically university
inventors themselves, or by the university. Before 2002, an average of
0.14 patents were ﬁled individually by each university inventor, and
0.02 by each university. As can be seen in Table 5.7, these numbers
basically switched around, in line with the change in the law on IP
ownership. After 2002, patents ﬁled by individuals fell to 0.04 while
university-ﬁled patents increased from close to zero to 0.10, amounting
to 27 percent of total patent applications based on university inventions. Applications by individual researchers amount to just 11 percent.
These are inventions where the KTO was not interested in claiming
ownership or the university researcher did not report the invention to
the university. Patent applications with industry are still the largest
share with 62 percent. Note that universities are not required to claim
ownership of the IP. They may well contract to transfer ownership to
ﬁrms. The key change is that prior to 2002, the researcher was able to
negotiate directly with industry, while now it is the university KTO that
does so.
Patents ﬁled along with industry applicants dropped dramatically from
0.45 to 0.23 per inventor per year. These most likely stem from direct
research collaborations or contract research between industry and university researchers, strongly suggesting that the abolition of professor’s
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privilege reduced actual knowledge and technology transfer. The loss of
private income opportunities seems to have outweighed the possible
beneﬁts in terms of the reduced cost of commercialization for
researchers.

The Introduction of Patent Valorization Agencies
As part of the Knowledge Creates Markets campaign, the BMBF established patent valorization agencies (PVAs). By 2012, twenty-nine PVAs
had been created, with at least one in each state (Cuntz et al. 2012). Their
primary mission is to help universities commercialize their research by
providing advice on patenting, licensing and forming spinoffs. They also
help to ﬁnd business partners and licensees.
The main public funding for the PVAs is provided through the SIGNO
program of the Federal German Ministry of Economics (BMWi).
Funding is assigned to universities, which then use it to request services
from the PVAs. The SIGNO budget amounted to EUR 29 million
between 2001 and 2003, EUR 38 million between 2004 and 2007, and
EUR 29 million between 2008 and 2010. Universities must top this up
through co-payments. Cuntz et al. (2012) calculated that the PVAs’
annual budgets totaled between EUR 9 and EUR 10 million in the period
2002–9.
Cuntz et al. (2012) also calculated that the revenues generated by the
PVAs did not cover their cost: between 2002 and 2009, they never
exceeded EUR 6 million.
It may be, however, that although the PVAs operate at a loss, their KTT
activities bring indirect beneﬁts. For instance, the foundation of more
spinoff companies would not necessarily be reﬂected in higher PVA
revenues. Researchers may be more likely to found their own companies,
possibly in collaboration with a university KTO, after the establishment
of PVAs and the abolition of professor’s privilege, as KTOs may now be
more actively pushing commercialization through spinoffs and this process may be strengthened by the presence of the PVAs. To test this
hypothesis, Czarnitzki et al. (2016) investigated whether more or fewer
spinoff companies have been founded since the abolition of professor’s
privilege and the establishment of PVAs. They collected data by searching for identiﬁed academic inventors among the population of ﬁrm
founders in Germany. The Creditreform database (the German part of
Bureau van Dijk’s Orbis database) includes the names of all ﬁrm founders
along with information on the foundation year, shareholdings, basic
ﬁrm-level accounting, and supplemental data. Importantly, this captures
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not only spinoffs established by university or public research institute
KTOs, but also those launched by researchers independently.
Table 5.8 summarizes their ﬁndings. Before 2002, university
researchers were involved in about 46 startups per year and this number
reduced to about 43 per year. The annual probability of a researcher
founding a company remained constant at 4 percent. For public research
institute researchers, the number of companies founded was lower and
constant over time, with 29 spinoffs per year – 1 percent per researcher
per year.
Annual within-demeaned spinoff probabilities at the researcher level
are shown in Figure 5.6. As can be seen, while average annual spinoff
probabilities ﬂuctuate, they remain broadly constant over time and are
unaffected by the law change. This is in line with micro-econometric
ﬁndings by Czarnitzki et al. (2016). Using panel ﬁxed-effects estimators
in a difference-in-difference setup, they found no direct effect of the law
change on university spinoffs. In summary, it seems that university KTOs
and PVAs have not successfully pushed spinoff creation as the prime
channel for commercializing academic inventions.

Other Major Funding Schemes
A major program involving KTT goals was the German University
Excellence Initiative (www.dfg.de/en/research_funding/programmes/
excellence_initiative/index.html). This was intended to promote science
and humanities to enhance Germany’s international competitiveness and

Table 5.8 Academic entrepreneurship before and after the 2002 policy
reform (annual mean values), 1995–2008

University
researcher
PRI researcher

Before 2002
After 2002
Before 2002
After 2002

Startups founded
per year

Startups founded
per year per
inventor

46.43
42.57
29.43
28.71

0.04
0.04
0.01
0.01

Source: Czarnitzki et al. (2016)
Note: The sample included 1,946 patenting university researchers and 4,551 public
research institute researchers.
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Figure 5.6 Average trends of spinoff activity (within demeaned)
Note: The vertical line in 2002 denotes the abolition of professor’s privilege.
Source: Czarnitzki et al. (2016)

increase the visibility of top-level universities. It ran from 2005 to 2017
and comprised three funding lines:
• the establishment of graduate schools at universities to promote young
researchers;

• funding “clusters of excellence” to promote top-level research; and
• institutional strategies to strengthen the institution “university” and its
research setting as a whole.

In total, EUR 4.6 billion of funding was approved through the three
funding lines, EUR 1.9 billion in the program’s ﬁrst phase (2006–12) and
EUR 2.7 billion in its second phase (2012–17). While the program was not
directly targeted at knowledge transfer, it helped universities strengthen
their stafﬁng and equipment, and some of these additional resources may
have been used for business-relevant research and knowledge transfer.
Another relevant policy is the Spitzencluster (“top cluster”) initiative
(www.spitzencluster.de), in which universities, public research institutes, and ﬁrms team up to boost their research and innovation activities. Fifteen clusters were selected in three different program rounds,
and each could obtain funding up to EUR 40 million over a ﬁve-year
period.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 54.177.185.247, on 15 Nov 2021 at 19:13:31, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/979C0AAA92B1200DCE513DAAE4894BE7

208

c z ar n itz ki & l ich t
HIGH

MODERATE

LOW

NONE

Licensing of technology
Temp. personnel exchange
Academic Institutions
Contract research
Joint research
Advisory services of acad. inst.
Collaboration for
Masters/PhD research
Informal contacts
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Figure 5.7 The ﬁrms’ perspective on KTT channels
Source: ZEW Mannheim Innovation Panel (Survey 2003), authors’ calculations

A very recent program launched in 2016 and directly targeted at KTT
is the Innovative Hochschule scheme (www.bmbf.de/de/innovativehochschule-2866.html), which targets Fachhochschulen and small and
medium-sized ﬁrms and has a budget of up to EUR 550 million to be
disbursed in two ﬁve-year rounds until 2027. The main applicants are
universities but ﬁrms can also be supported within project consortia. The
goal is to strengthen universities’ KTT activities, increase links within
regional economies, and promote innovative forms of collaboration with
business.
The EXIST program (www.exist.de) has supported academic entrepreneurship since 1998. It has three main pillars: (i) the “founder’s fellowship” supports potential ﬁrm founders in academia to develop their
business idea and create a business plan; (ii) the “research transfer” is
intended to help develop applied research projects with commercial
potential; and (iii) the “foundation culture” aims to help universities
strengthen their infrastructure and enhance researchers’ awareness
of KTT.
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5.3 Common Knowledge Transfer Channels
To identify important channels of knowledge transfer in Germany and
see how they have changed over time, we can use two surveys by ZEW.
The ﬁrst survey was carried out in the year 2000 and included 856
responses from university professors and public research institute
department heads (Czarnitzki et al. 2000).
Among many other questions, respondents evaluated the importance
of different knowledge transfer channels on a four-item Likert scale (0 =
no importance, 3 = high importance). Table 5.9 shows the average values
per type of institution, including general universities, technical universities, and universities of applied sciences. In the period 1997–9, general
universities regarded publication in academic journals as the main knowledge transfer channel. Technical universities rated joint research projects with ﬁrms as important as publication and also emphasized the
importance of contract research, collaborations on master’s and PhD
theses, and contacts from researchers’ former occupation in the corporate sector. For universities of applied sciences, thesis collaboration was
the most important channel, followed by former work contacts, and joint
research projects, all of which ranked above academic publication.
Surprisingly, staff mobility was not rated as a major transfer channel
for any type of university, but it was expected to gain importance in the
future. All types of university also expected ﬁrm formation by academic
researchers to become more important along with other KTT measures
such as seminars and lectures for ﬁrms.
Overall, university respondents expected almost all KTT channels to
become more important, indicating the growing importance of KTT
generally as the third mission of the university system.
Responses from public research institutes reﬂected each institution’s
mission. Generally, respondents from the Fraunhofer institutes focused
on direct knowledge transfer channels such as joint research projects,
contract research, and presentations to ﬁrms. Respondents from Max
Planck and Helmholtz tended to emphasize basic research and academic
publication. For the Leibniz institutes, the results were more mixed but
generally closer to Fraunhofer than to the other public research institutes.
In 2008, the ZEW conducted another survey among around 1,500
researchers (Grimpe et al. 2009). Although the questions in that survey
are not fully comparable to the ones in Czarnitzki et al. (2000), some
insights can be gained.
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Table 5.9 Importance of main knowledge transfer channels, by universities and public research institutes, 1997–9

Publication in academic
journals

Joint research projects with
ﬁrms
Presentations to ﬁrms or
related organizations

Publication of research
results in the press
(newspapers, magazines)
Contract research for ﬁrms

UNI

TU

UAS

MPG

HGF

FhG

WGL

2.2

2.1

1.3

2.8

2.2

2.0

2.4

(–0.0)

(+0.1)

(+0.2)

(+0.1)

(+0.0)

(+0.1)

(+0.1)

1.6

2.1

1.7

1.6

1.7

2.9

2.2

(+0.3)

(+0.2)

(+0.4)

(+0.4)

(+0.5)

(+0.1)

(+0.1)

1.4

1.6

1.5

1.5

1.5

2.6

1.7

(+0.2)

(+0.1)

(+0.3)

(+0.2)

(+0.3)

(+0.1)

(+0.3)

1.2

1.4

1.2

2.0

1.6

2.2

1.7

(+0.1)

(+0.2)

(+0.2)

(+0.1)

(+0.1)

(+0.2)

(+0.2)

1.2
(+0.3)

1.8
(+0.2)

1.4
(+0.5)

0.3
(+0.2)

1.2
(+0.5)

2.9
(0.0)

1.3
(+0.3)
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Master’s and PhD theses in
collaboration with
ﬁrms
Personnel mobility of
researchers between
research organizations
and ﬁrms

Contacts from academics’
former occupation
in the corporate sector
Joint publications and patent
applications
with ﬁrms
Seminars and lectures for
ﬁrms

1.3

1.8

2.5

0.9

0.9

1.6

1.0

(+0.3)

(+0.2)

(+0.0)

(+0.2)

(+0.4)

(+0.2)

(+0.3)

1.4

1.6

0.9

1.6

1.3

2.0

1.2

(+0.4)

(+0.4)

(+0.4)

(+0.3)

(+0.4)

(+0.2)

(+0.5)

1.0

1.7

2.1

1.2

1.0

2.0

0.9

(+0.1)

(+0.0)

(+0.0)

(0.0)

(+0.1)

(+0.2)

(+0.3)

0.8

1.0

0.8

1.1

1.0

1.9

1.3

(+0.4)

(+0.2)

(+0.4)

(+0.5)

(+0.5)

(+0.2)

(+0.3)

0.7

0.9

1.3

0.7

0.7

1.4

0.7

(+0.4)

(+0.4)

(+0.5)

(+0.1)

(+0.3)

(+0.4)

(+0.3)
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Table 5.9 (cont.)

Firm formation by academic
employees

UNI

TU

UAS

MPG

HGF

FhG

WGL

0.6

0.8

0.6

0.9

0.7

1.0

0.8

(+0.5)

(+0.5)

(+0.5)

(+0.6)

(+0.6)

(+1.0)

(+0.6)

Source: Czarnitzki and Rammer (2000)
Notes: The numbers are averages of the four response scores (0 = no importance, 1 = minor importance, 2 = moderate importance, 3 =
high importance) for the importance of the different channels in the years 1997–9. The expected change in importance of each channel
in the future is given in the parentheses (calculated as positive or negative deviation from the mean of its current importance).Types of
institutions: UNI = general universities, TU = technical universities, UAS = universities of applied sciences (Fachhochschule), MPG =
Max Planck Association, HGF = Helmholtz Association, FhG = Fraunhofer Association, WGL = Leibniz Association
(Wissenschaftsgemeinschaft Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz).
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Table 5.10 External funding and channels of commercialization as
reported by researchers in 2008

External funding:
Third-party funding
Industry funding
Channels of
knowledge
transfer:
Joint
commercialization
of technology
Joint publications
Consulting
Company formation
Companies based on
research results

Uni

Fraunhofer

Max
Planck

88
37

88
80

73
15

79
24

81
26

43

87

21

39

44

24
20
20
12

43
26
18
16

15
11
12
8

14
8
10
7

20
8
9
6

Helmholtz

Leibniz

Source: ZEW survey of scientists 2008, authors’ calculations

First, most academic researchers reported having used some external
funding (see Table 5.10). At universities and Fraunhofer research units,
88 percent of respondents said they had sourced external funding, but
whereas 80 percent of the Fraunhofer researchers said they had received
funding from industry, only 37 percent of university researchers obtained
industry funds. Max Planck, Helmholtz, and Leibniz researchers received
third-party funding less frequently than those at universities and
Fraunhofer, but the rates of receipt were still high: 81 percent of
researchers at Leibniz, 79 percent at Helmholtz, and 73 percent of Max
Plank researchers said they had beneﬁted from external funds. However,
only 26 percent of researchers at Leibniz, 24 percent at Helmholtz, and
15 percent at Max Planck reported having received funding from
industry.
As regards knowledge transfer channels, 87 percent of Fraunhofer
researchers said they had been involved in joint research and joint
commercialization of technology with industry – far higher than the
corresponding numbers of researchers at Leibniz (44 percent), universities (43 percent), Helmholtz (39 percent), and Max Planck
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(21 percent). Joint publications were generally the second most
important channel. Private consulting activities and company formation were mentioned much less frequently. Interestingly, university
researchers were more likely than other respondents to have been
involved in founding an enterprise (20 percent), followed by those
from Fraunhofer (18 percent). It is noteworthy, however, that in
40 percent of cases, university researchers’ startups were not based
on research results: while 20 percent reported involvement in establishing a ﬁrm, only 12 percent said it was based on research results. At
Fraunhofer, 16 percent of respondents reported being involved in
a startup based on research results. As expected, ﬁrm formation was
less frequent among researchers at the other respondent public
research institutes.
To investigate KTT channels at the ﬁrm level, we can use the
Mannheim Innovation Panel Survey from 2003. Companies were
asked to evaluate their contacts with research institutions according
to their importance. Around 2,500 ﬁrms reported active contacts with
public science between 2000 and 2002. The respondents were
asked to rank every KTT channel according to its importance for the
ﬁrm’s access to knowhow on a scale between 0 and 3 (no to high
importance).
Interestingly, informal contacts were the most important. More than
70 percent of ﬁrms with any active contact with science rated these as
either highly or moderately important. This was followed by collaborations on master’s and PhD theses, which almost 50 percent of ﬁrms
ranked as highly or moderately important. Advisory services from academic institutions were highly or moderately important to 43 percent.
Other formal channels such as joint research, contract research, training
of employees in academic institutions, and temporary exchange of personnel as well as technology licensing played a less important role for
most ﬁrms.

5.4 Economic Literature on Knowledge Transfer in Germany
The picture of KTT in Germany given above can be supplemented
through a discussion of the scholarly literature. Here, we are particularly
interested in two issues: the limits to and opportunity costs of KTT from
science to industry, and its beneﬁts downstream in the manufacturing
and service sectors.
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5.4.1 Limits to and Opportunity Cost of KTT
Czarnitzki et al. (2007, 2009a) studied the growing importance of universities’ unpublished technology-relevant research and cooperation with
industry. As more and more scientiﬁc researchers became active in
commercializing their discoveries, policymakers and academics debated
whether patenting as a channel of entrepreneurial activity might signiﬁcantly reduce scientiﬁc output in the economy, with potentially detrimental implications for long-term growth, competitiveness, and
employment. Productivity in science can be measured in terms of the
publication output and research quality of scientists engaging in commercialization. Czarnitzki et al. combined bibliometric and technometric
indicators and econometric techniques to investigate the correlation
between patenting and publication output and quality for a large data
set of academics active in several research ﬁelds in Germany. Their 2007
study found no overall negative correlation between patenting and the
scientiﬁc output of the academics in their sample, but more detailed
analysis revealed heterogeneity in patenting behavior. Whereas some
patent applications might result from purely intrinsically motivated
research, others were the output of specially funded contract research,
especially for industry. Czarnitzki et al. (2009a) classiﬁed academics’
patent applications into corporate patents and academic patents using
applicant data, distinguishing between patents where one or more academics featured as an inventor but the patent was ﬁled by a company and
those ﬁled by another applicant (e.g., the academic themselves or
a university or public research institute). Factoring this distinction into
their multiple regression models, they found that academic-ﬁled patents
did not harm academics’ scientiﬁc output, but company-owned patents
were associated with (subsequent) lower publication output and also
lower publication quality (as measured through subsequent citations by
other academic papers). Czarnitzki et al. interpreted this as evidence that
the researchers were likely to have engaged in company-relevant research
for commercialization/knowledge transfer purposes and that such
research could distract them from their own, original academic research.
If one accepts that company-relevant research is likely to be of a more
applied nature than normal university research then intensiﬁed knowledge transfer efforts by universities may indeed partly crowd out the
freely accessible knowledge produced in science in terms of (highquality) academic publications, potentially harming technological progress and economic development in the long run.
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The opportunity cost of knowledge transfer has also been documented.
In general, academic patents are more basic than corporate patents, and
patents by academic inventors ﬁled along with corporations feature
inventions that are based on more applied research than those academicinvention patents owned by universities, public research institutes, or
academics personally (Czarnitzki et al. 2009b, 2012). Czarnitzki et al.
(2011) revealed a steady decline in the quality of academic patents. They
investigated forward citations received by patent applications –
a measure often employed as capturing the social value of an invention,
as forward citations approximate how many subsequent inventions build
on the patented technology. Czarnitzki et al. compared the forward
citations received for patents by German university academics with
a randomly chosen control group of patents ﬁled by corporations in the
same application year and technology ﬁeld. They found that in the early
1980s, the average academic patent received signiﬁcantly more forward
citations than the control group of corporate patents, and they took this
to indicate that academic patents were more fundamental and basic, and
therefore more relevant to subsequent technological progress, than corporate patents. But as efforts to foster KTT from universities to industry
grew in subsequent decades, differences between the quality or social
value of academic and corporate patents, as measured by forward citations, diminished. By the beginning of the 2000s, there was no longer
any statistically signiﬁcant difference between forward citations of academic and corporate patents. This suggests that the move toward commercialization in academia has had a negative impact on the average
social value of academic activities such as patenting. The boundary
between not-for-proﬁt academic and for-proﬁt business R&D has
become blurred.
Further studies have examined the impact of private industry funding
of scientiﬁc activities on the publication of academic research results and
the sharing of research materials. Czarnitzki et al. (2015a) showed that
increased industry funding in Germany had hindered the dissemination
of research in public science through disclosure restrictions. Arguing that
the viability of modern open science norms and practices depends on
public disclosure of new knowledge, methods, and materials, they sought
to examine the relationship between industry sponsorship and restrictions on disclosure using individual-level data on German academic
researchers. Their evidence, which controls for self-selection into extramural sponsorship, strongly supports the proposition that industry sponsorship jeopardizes the public disclosure of academic research. Academic
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scientists who adopt industry sponsorship are subject to more stringent
contract terms that restrict the disclosure of academic research results
through delay and secrecy. Controlling for scientist selection, the results
show that the likelihood of such restrictions more than doubles with
industry sponsorship, because ﬁrms expect proprietary beneﬁts from
their sponsorship relationships and realizing these beneﬁts often requires
disclosure restrictions that academic researchers would not otherwise
impose.
These results are in line with those of Czarnitzki et al. (2015b) on
access and sharing of research inputs among public scientists. The
authors found that scientists who received industry funding were twice
as likely to deny requests for research inputs as those who did not.
Receiving external funding in general did not affect denying others
access, but scientists who received external funding of any kind – from
industry or elsewhere – were 50 percent more likely to be denied access to
research materials by others.
In summary, active knowledge transfer does not come without opportunity cost. There is mounting evidence that the research output of public
scientists is affected by their engagement in active knowledge transfer.
Some may move toward more applied research, with potentially negative
long-run impacts on the basic science that underpins future progress. In
other cases, the dissemination of new academic knowledge may be
directly impeded through disclosure restrictions imposed by private
industry partners or sponsors.

5.4.2 Beneﬁts to Business of Knowledge Transfer
While knowledge transfer can clearly have some negative impacts on the
academic side, there are obvious potential beneﬁts too. First and foremost, knowledge transfer may include private research sponsorship that
enhances academic research capacities, allowing more doctoral students
to be educated and so on. And even in the absence of major budget
increases for public science, KTT may bring societal beneﬁts.
The most extreme form of academic commercialization is academics’
involvement in spinoff companies. In such cases, academic research is
deemed valuable enough to warrant forming a company, transferring
technology to the private sector and potentially adding social value by
creating jobs and generating taxable revenues. Czarnitzki et al. (2014)
investigated how far German academic startups grew in their ﬁrst few
years. They collected representative sample data from German ﬁrm
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foundation cohorts between 1996 and 2000 in knowledge-intensive and
high-tech sectors. More than 57,000 new ventures were contacted by
means of computer-aided telephone interviews, and about 20,000 interviews conducted. In their empirical analysis, Czarnitzki et al. estimated
a model of company growth. They identiﬁed academic entrepreneurs
among the sample of newly founded ﬁrms, and controlled for “ﬁrm
survivor bias” by applying a sample selection model.6 They found that
academic spinoffs grew by around 3 percent more per year on average
than other startups.
In a companion paper based on similar data, Toole et al. (2015)
examined how university research alliances and other cooperative links
with universities contribute to startup employment growth. They argued
that “scientiﬁc absorptive capacity” at the startup is critical to reap the
beneﬁts from university research alliances, but not necessarily for other
university connections. They estimated the aggregate employment contribution of startup ﬁrms and attributed those employment gains to
university research alliances and other university connections. They
found signiﬁcant contributions to employment growth from university
research alliances and other university connections, but also found that
scientiﬁc absorptive capacity was critical for university research alliances.
Only 7 percent of startups maintained a university research alliance, but
3.4 percent of all jobs created by those ﬁrms were attributable to their
alliances.
These numbers obtained from econometric regression analysis can be
extrapolated to the population. For the period from 1996 to 2001,
German National Account statistics show that total employment in the
knowledge-intensive sectors increased by 701,000 jobs. Based on the
results of Toole et al. (2015), 453,422 of these jobs were created by
171,833 companies founded between 1996 and 2000 that survived until
the end of 2001. This is about 65 percent of total net jobs in the sectors
covered. Among all the startups in this cohort, it can be estimated that
51,908 companies had some kind of university connection(s) in the postfoundation period and created 223,969 jobs. Using the Heckman regression model results, Toole et al. estimate that university connections
(research alliances and all others) accounted for 9.2 percent (or 20,535)
of these jobs. Turning to university research alliance relationships, they
6

Several ﬁrms within the startup population could not be contacted for interviews as they
had gone out of business by the time of the survey. The sample selection model takes into
account this potential source of “survivor bias,” which might otherwise have led to an
overestimation of the growth potential of newly founded ﬁrms.
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calculate that a total of 11,896 startups within the population had such
relationships and created a total of 72,857 jobs. The model results indicate that 3.4 percent (or 2,453) jobs can be attributed to university
research alliances.
These results suggest that university connections are quite important
for job growth, and university research alliances contributed substantially to job creation for those ﬁrms that had such alliances.
When it comes to innovation by established ﬁrms, studies have considered spillovers from public science in general and also beneﬁts to
companies from direct interaction with public science in the form of
research collaborations.
Cappelli et al. (2014) focused on “essential knowledge spillovers” that
companies received from public science. While some such spillovers may
be obtained from simply reading academic publications, they may also
result from direct interaction through contract research or joint research
collaborations. In one wave of the Mannheim Innovation Panel, ﬁrms
were asked about “essential inputs for innovation” that they had received
from other actors in the economy including customers, suppliers, competitors, and public science. The term “essential” was deﬁned in the
survey to mean that an input had been indispensable for the development
of a new product, service or process.
Cappelli et al. related ﬁrms’ sales of market novelties to these reported
spillover measures and found that essential information received from
customers and public science was associated with higher sales of new
products. On average, innovative ﬁrms in their sample achieved 9 percent
of their sales from products that were novel in their main product
market. Regression results showed that spillovers from public science
pushed this share to about 13.2 percent.
In a very recent study, Comin et al. (2018) analyze the case of the
Fraunhofer Association, the largest applied research public research
institute in Germany. They investigate whether interacting with
Fraunhofer institutes in research projects affects ﬁrms’ performance
and strategic orientation. To do this, they assembled a data set based
on Fraunhofer’s (conﬁdential) internal project management system and
merged it with the Mannheim Innovation Panel. They found that project
interaction had a strong positive effect on ﬁrms’ turnover and productivity growth. They also showed that a major driver of these positive
effects is the ﬁrms’ increased share of sales from new products and an
increase in the share of their workers with tertiary education. More
detailed analyses reveal, among other things, that performance effects
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become stronger the more often ﬁrms interact with Fraunhofer and that
interactions aimed at generating technology have a stronger effect than
those merely intended to implement existing technologies.
In summary, the literature has shown quite clearly that (active) knowledge transfer from public science to industry has positive effects on the
business sector in Germany. The documented effects range from job
creation to new product sales and productivity growth. These positive
effects have been found in both startup companies (including academic
startups) and established companies.

5.5 Supporting Interviews
To explore KTT in German universities in more depth, three supporting case
studies including interviews were conducted for the research project on
which this chapter draws – at the University of Heidelberg, FriedrichSchiller-University (FSU) Jena, and Ludwig-Maximilian University (LMU)
Munich. Table 5.11 shows some key characteristics of these institutions.
The University of Heidelberg is located in the state of BadenWürttemberg in an area characterized by a strong science base, close to
many other leading scientiﬁc organizations such as:
• the German Cancer Research Institute – a research institute of the
Helmholtz Society with more than 3,000 employees;
• the National Center for Tumor Diseases Heidelberg – a joint venture
between the German Cancer Research Institute and the University of
Heidelberg;
• the European Molecular Biology Laboratory (EMBL) – one of the
world’s leading research institutions and Europe’s ﬂagship laboratory
for the life sciences. This is an intergovernmental organization specializing in basic research in the life sciences, funded by public research
monies from more than twenty member states, including much of
Europe plus Israel and two associate members, Argentina and Australia;
• the Max Planck institute for Medical Research;
• a biotechnology science park and a growing number of local biotech
startups;
• the BioMed X Innovation Center, a collaboration model at the interface
between academia and industry where interdisciplinary project teams
conduct biomedical research in an open-innovation lab facility on the
campus of the University of Heidelberg. Each team is typically sponsored
by a corporate pharmaceutical or biotech partner. At the end of a fully
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Table 5.11 Key characteristics of the three case study universities

Number of
academics
Number of
students

Fields of study

Heidelberg

Jena

Munich

444

384

747

30,300 (including
1,300 PhDs
completed
per year)
Humanities, social
sciences, law,
economics,
mathematics,
physics,
biotechnology
and other
natural
sciences; two
faculties of
medicine and
two hospitals;
computer
science

19,000

48,000

Humanities, social
sciences, law,
economics,
mathematics,
biology and
other natural
sciences,
medicine

Humanities, social
sciences, law,
economics,
mathematics,
physics,
biology,
biotechnology
and other
natural
sciences,
medicine,
computer
science

Source: Authors

funded project term, successful projects are either internalized into the
development pipeline of the respective pharmaceutical or biotech sponsor
or spun off into an independent startup company.
Furthermore, several large companies are also located near Heidelberg,
including BASF, SAP, Roche, AbbVie, Böhringer-Ingelheim, and Merck
Serono.
FSU Jena is also located in a region with a strong science base,
particularly in physics and optics. The Helmholtz institute at Jena hosts
a particle accelerator, while the main optics company is Jenoptik.
LMU Munich is located near the Technical University of Munich and
the Helmholtz Centre for Research on Environmental Health. Munich
also hosts the headquarters of the Max Planck Association and the
Fraunhofer Association plus a number of large companies such as BMW.
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The three universities’ KTOs share more or less the same tasks and
services, such as:
• information and support for researchers regarding funding opportunities;
• handling research contracts with other research organizations,
research funding organizations and the private sector;
• implementation of the university’s intellectual property policy and the
management of IP rights;
• management of research-based spinoff processes;
• identiﬁcation of transferable IP; and
• support for research conferences and research marketing.
Interviewees said they had beneﬁted from major public funding programs such as the Excellence Initiative and the Spitzencluster program.
As a result, their KTOs gained staff, at least temporarily, helping them
achieve their goals.
Furthermore, some new forms of university–industry collaboration
had been implemented, for example new types of startup such as
InnovationLab and the CarLa Catalytics Research Lab – laboratories
either run by industry with scientiﬁc support from universities or set
up as joint ventures between a ﬁrm and a university, and ideally located
within a technology park on campus. Also, more hybrid labs could be
established whereby industrial researchers collaborate with university
researchers and the latter are partly ﬁnanced by industrial partners.
While the interviewees were happy to report success stories, it became
apparent that a “cultural divide” between university and industry applies
to the vast majority of both university and industrial researchers, and that
the lion’s share of university research is largely irrelevant to the needs of
business. Interviewees also mentioned that sometimes national or local
businesses lack the capability to use relevant research results, but said this
is not necessarily the case at the global level.
Knowledge transfer ofﬁcers reported that they have inefﬁcient technology evaluation mechanisms and that their efforts to look for patentable inventions or other forms of IP to exploit were underdeveloped.
Interviewees felt that while recent German public funding initiatives
had focused on excellence, support was also necessary at the average level
to boost the volume of transfer activities. By deﬁnition, only a few
research units can aspire to meet the standard of scientiﬁc excellence.
Furthermore, the scientiﬁc excellence criterion leads to a focus on basic
rather than applied research, producing researchers with absolutely no
experience of working in the business sector. Examples mentioned
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included engineering faculties that were developing new ﬁelds of research
with less evident industry relevance than Germany’s traditionally strong
engineering education.
Relationships with the recently established PVAs were said to be
suboptimal, complicated by their for-proﬁt nature. However, it was also
reported that knowledge transfer ofﬁcers sometimes found it difﬁcult to
engage with ﬁrms as they typically had to follow strict university IP
policies. This was seen as negative political pressure – the imperative to
maximize license income in the short term undermined the chance to
develop long-run business relationships with company partners.
In summary, the interviews conﬁrm that efforts have been made to
foster systematic KTT from science to industry in the past decade.
However, a longstanding cultural divide between science and industry
still inhibits knowledge exchange between them. In addition, the relatively new phenomenon of rigorous IP management by universities may
have complicated bilateral agreements between universities and ﬁrms.

5.6 Conclusions
The German public science landscape is complex, with many different
actors undertaking diverse KTT activities. The different types of university and different public research institutes have different missions
regarding knowledge transfer.
We described the German knowledge transfer system using large-scale
survey evidence from both scientiﬁc institutions and for-proﬁt ﬁrms.
Primary data collection and the analysis of secondary data provide plenty
of evidence of KTT from public research organizations, ranging from
patenting and licensing of inventions through to joint research projects
between science and industry, contract research, exchange of personnel,
and more modern forms of public–private partnerships such as shared
research laboratories.
We also noted some changes in the German KTT system and considered analyses of their impact in the scholarly literature. While there is
evidence that some policy measures have improved conditions for KTT,
the story is not uniformly positive. The abolition of professor’s privilege
in the early 2000s may well have reduced academics’ incentives to
commercialize their inventions while the success of patent valorization
agencies is moot.
Case study evidence from interviews supports our overall conclusion
that policy has been trying to systematically improve the conditions for

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 54.177.185.247, on 15 Nov 2021 at 19:13:31, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/979C0AAA92B1200DCE513DAAE4894BE7

224

cz ar n itz k i & l ic ht

KTT in Germany in the last two decades, and several improvements have
been documented. However, policymakers need to balance the incentives
for basic and applied research to ensure that Germany’s science base is
not hollowed out in the long run.
The challenge for universities and public research institutes is to
deepen the understanding of IP and business-relevant research and
applications within their institutions and to further improve communication between their researchers and industry.
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6.1 Introduction
With the arrival of the knowledge-based economy, universities and
public research institutes have emerged as key components of the
national innovation system (NIS). According to Freeman (1987), the
NIS is “a network of institutions in the public and private sectors
whose activities and interactions initiate, import, modify, and diffuse
new technologies.” In the NIS literature, one role of universities and
public research institutes is to channel their knowledge into ﬁrms.
Universities also diffuse knowledge by producing quality students and
interacting with ﬁrms through cooperative programs.
One of the most important characteristics of the Republic of Korea’s
NIS is the “twin dominance” (Eom and Lee 2010) of big businesses
(chaebols) and the government. This implies a relatively weak role for
universities and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) (Kim 1993;
Lim 2006; Cho et al. 2007). For instance, universities and industry
employ around 70 percent and 20 percent, respectively, of all doctorates
in the Republic of Korea and yet, paradoxically, universities conduct only
10 percent of research activities in the country, while industry conducts
77 percent (OECD 2008). Additionally, as of 2005, 39.7 percent of
researchers and 52.2 percent of PhD researchers were employed by the
top twenty ﬁrms (Eom and Lee 2010).
While big business groups have dominated the Republic of Korea’s
NIS through their large in-house R&D since the mid-1980s, the government and public research institutes and universities initially led the
country’s NIS during its early takeoff period in the 1960s and 1970s. In
the 1970s, the Republic of Korea was in transition from light to heavy and
chemical industries, but its national R&D base was weak. The
226
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government developed its national R&D capacity by setting up public
research institutes and universities. Several were established based on the
Special Research Institute Promotion Law of 1973 in the ﬁelds of machinery, shipbuilding, chemical engineering, marine science, and electronics.
From the mid-1970s, chaebol ﬁrms started to grow rapidly and enter
heavy and chemical industry. Afterward, the government played
a signiﬁcant role by providing a selected number of big ﬁrms with
privileges such as concessional bank loans and exclusive access to foreign
exchange. Even in the 1980s and 1990s, big business groups were aided by
government-led public–private research consortia in achieving key R&D
goals, with examples such as the development of TDX (a system of
telephone switches), memory chips, and digital TV projects (Lee and
Lim 2001; Lee et al. 2005). According to a study by the OECD (2003), the
Republic of Korea is the only country in which public research institutes
play a more important role in national R&D than do the universities
themselves.
In contrast to public research institutes, universities have played
a minor role in boosting the R&D performance of the private sector in
the Republic of Korea. Big private ﬁrms relied more on foreign knowledge sources than local sources and universities, as they wanted to hire
quality scientists and engineers from abroad or acquire technology in
collaboration with foreign partners. Kim (1993) argues that the lack of
interaction between university and industry, due to the teaching-oriented
nature of Korean universities, is one of the greatest weaknesses of the
country’s NIS. Research has received increasing priority in universities in
the Republic of Korea only since the 1990s. For example, while Korea
ranked nineteenth overall in terms of the number of Science Citation
Index (SCI) papers in 1996, universities accounted for 83.0 percent of
contributions (Lee 1998).
From the late 1990s, the policy agenda shifted to encourage the
entrepreneurial role of universities in expanding national technological
capability. The Technology Transfer Promotion Act 2000 symbolizes this
growing interest in knowledge transfer from public science. The Act
stipulates that public universities should establish units or institutions,
such as knowledge transfer ofﬁces (KTOs), charged with knowledge
transfer and training specialists. Promotion of university–industry
cooperation gained further momentum with the Act on the Promotion
of Industrial Education and Industry–University Collaboration 2003.
While there were only seventeen KTOs in 2003, their number increased
rapidly after that, especially in 2004, when 263 more were created
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(KRF 2016). By 2014, 356 universities – about 84 percent of the country’s
total – had established KTOs.
The main aim of this research is to explore the progress of the
knowledge transfer system following these policy initiatives. Early assessments, such as that of Eom and Lee (2010), found that knowledge
industrialization in the Republic of Korea remained at an early stage
compared to advanced countries. Speciﬁcally, while government initiatives had had some nominal success (e.g., in generating more patents),
such generated knowledge had not been successfully commercialized.
Our research suggests that the situation has barely improved from the
situation described in Eom and Lee (2010). Further, we argue that one
source of the problem is the Republic of Korea’s legacy of success with the
twin dominance of big businesses and government dominating the
process of economic catch-up, which has meant that both the manner
and extent of knowledge commercialization have not fully accommodated or embraced the needs and speciﬁcities of SMEs and universities.
Thus, SMEs tend to complain that organizations and university technologies are unsuitable for their conditions. Conversely, university KTO
ofﬁces are very weak in terms of ﬁnancial and human resources, leading
to underutilization or under-commercialization of relatively good quality
research outcomes from university professors.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 reviews the
policy changes since 2000 that were designed to improve knowledge
transfer from public research institutes. Section 6.3 focuses on the overall
performance of knowledge transfer activities in public research institutes.
Section 6.4 identiﬁes the important knowledge transfer channels in the
Republic of Korea and presents some examples of them. Section 6.5
reviews the challenges that government policy and public research institutes face in achieving successful knowledge transfer. Section 6.6 provides conclusions.

6.2 New Policies to Improve Knowledge Transfer
from the Public Research Base
The Technology Transfer Promotion Act 2000 was the ﬁrst law to
encourage knowledge transfer from the public sector research base. It
required public research institutes and public universities to establish
KTOs and allowed the government to ﬁnancially support university
KTOs. The Act speciﬁed that public research institutes and university
researchers were eligible to obtain a portion of the income from
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knowledge transfer, providing researchers with an incentive for knowledge transfer and commercialization. This became possible because, as
with the Bayh-Dole Act in the United States of America (U.S.), it allowed
universities to retain ownership of IP from government-funded research.
In addition, Korea Technology Exchange was founded by the 2000 Act
to manage the knowledge transfer market and mediate knowledge transfer. It also provided various services such as technology evaluation and
support for technology transfer agents. The 2000 Act created a system of
technology transfer agents: a person who satisﬁes standard qualiﬁcations,
such as an experienced lawyer or a government ofﬁcial, can be authorized
as a technology transfer agent by the government if he or she completes
a speciﬁc curriculum.
The Act on the Promotion of Industrial Education and Industry–
University Collaboration 2003 deemed that most universities should
have KTOs and could establish and run a for-proﬁt “university company”
using technology that they had developed, thus enabling direct
commercialization.
The Technology Transfer and Commercialization Promotion Act 2006
focused more on commercialization than knowledge transfer. It required
the government to include a budget for commercialization in R&D
funding. Previous laws had provided that R&D funding was to be mainly
used for technology development rather than commercialization; the
new Act changed that. Accordingly, part of the expenses of KTOs were
to be provided by the government, equating to 29 percent in 2014. Public
research institutes received more government funding than did universities: 38 percent of the expenses of public research institute KTOs came
from government while the ﬁgure for universities amounted to only
14 percent.
The 2006 Act allowed public research institutes to establish technology
holding companies if they developed cutting-edge technology. These
holding companies were allowed, in turn, to establish subsidiaries using
their technology; such subsidiaries include incubating, business consulting, and funding to improve technology commercialization. Researchers
or staff could take leave to work at the technology holding companies.1
The law also speciﬁed that KTOs should receive more than 10 percent
of total license income. Public research institutes were allowed to invest
in forms of technology if authorized institutes such as the Korea Institute
1

Conversely, it is not easy for Korean researchers to take leave to work at spinoffs or
startups.
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for Advancement of Technology (KIAT) appraised and established the
value of the technology. The government also promoted the securitization of technology assets by using technology as collateral for loans; this
was designed to help SMEs borrow money using their technology.
To increase knowledge transfer from universities, the government also
provided money through several initiatives. First, 150 billion Won
(KRW) was spent on the Connect Korea project between 2006 and
2010, the main goal being to invigorate the regional economy by improving KTOs’ ability to support knowledge transfer and commercialization.
Second, the Hub University for Industrial Collaboration (HUNIC) project from 2004 to 2011 saw a budget of KRW 31 billion per year split
among seventeen to twenty-three universities and colleges chosen by the
government, with each receiving between KRW 0.8 and 4 billion per year.
Third, the Leaders in Industry–University Cooperation (LINC) project,
from 2012 to 2016 increased the number of supported universities and
colleges to eighty, while the project budget increased to approximately
KRW 250 billion per year.
Yoon (2013) estimates that from 2004 to 2012, the government provided 473 university companies with KRW 119 billion in total.
Accordingly, the number of university technology transfer contracts
increased from 1,615 in 2010 to 3,247 in 2014. Universities’ income
from licensing also increased from KRW 37.6 billion in 2010 to KRW
57.6 billion in 2014. The ratio of license income to R&D expenditure at
universities increased from 0.94 percent in 2010 to 1.23 percent in 2014
(KRF 2016).
A new Market-Driven IP and Technology Transfer Promotion Plan,
announced in April 2015, emphasized the maximization of market value
from knowledge transfer. First, protection of intellectual property rights
was strengthened. Previously, a specialized patent dispute court had been
available only for ﬁrst-instance legal disputes; this was extended to
cover second-round disputes, meaning rulings at both levels would be
based on more specialized expertise. The Plan also contemplated increasing the maximum punitive damages limit to three times the estimated
damage amount, as was the case in US practice (Presidential Council on
Intellectual Property 2015).
Second, the government relaxed some regulations that had resulted in
low efﬁciency of knowledge transfer. To encourage patent quality in
terms of commercialization, it changed the major performance evaluation yardstick to efﬁciency of knowledge transfer (calculated as license
income divided by the cost of R&D). However, the outcome of this
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change remains to be seen. Previously, knowledge transfer had focused
exclusively on domestic SMEs, but this restriction has been relaxed to
include large or foreign ﬁrms, which may now also beneﬁt from obtaining technologies from public research institutes (Presidential Council on
Intellectual Property 2015). Restrictions regarding exclusive licensing
were also relaxed, and public research institutes were given greater
autonomy in choosing between exclusive and nonexclusive licensing.
Regarding co-owned patents, the Plan allowed third parties to practice
such patents if ﬁrms with co-ownership were not practicing them.
The Plan encouraged technology transfer agents or KTOs to identify
ﬁrms’ technology needs, then help ﬁrms to connect with public research
institutes capable of developing the required technology. It also encouraged KTO staff to participate in R&D from the beginning so that R&D
projects reﬂected ﬁrms’ needs. To improve KTOs’ capabilities, the government started to allow several public research institutes and universities to share one joint KTO, especially where a public research institute
or university was unable to afford its own independent KTO. The
government also gradually increased spending on KTOs as a share of
total R&D expenditure from 1.3 percent in 2010 to 3.3 percent in 2015. It
provided ﬁfty KTOs with KRW 9 billion per year between 2011 and 2015
(Presidential Council on Intellectual Property 2015). However, as we
discuss later, the expected results of this have yet to be realized.

6.3 The Extent of Knowledge Transfer from Public Research
in the Republic of Korea
Public R&D expenditure increased from KRW 3.8 trillion (USD
3.37 billion) in 2000 to KRW 15.28 trillion (USD 14.5 billion) in 2014.
The ratio of public R&D expenditure to GDP also increased, from
0.63 percent in 2000 to 1.03 percent in 2014. The number of public
research institutes rose by 80 percent between 2000 and 2014. Table 6.1
shows the trend of public R&D expenditure and the number of public
research institutes and universities from 2000 to 2014. The R&D activities
of both universities and public research institutes are funded by the
government – in 2014, 91.2 percent of public research institutes’ R&D
expenditure and 86.6 percent of universities’ R&D expenditure was
government funded.2 R&D expenditure and the number of research
institutes has increased, as has R&D output activity. Thus, the share of
2

KIAT surveys.
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Table 6.1 Public R&D expenditure and number of Korean public research institutes and universities, 2000–14

Year

Public R&D
expenditure
(KRW million)

2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014

3,816,850
4,361,534
4,739,957
4,876,225
5,446,050
5,877,167
6,632,101
8,177,479
9,249,253
10,888,944
12,270,228
13,003,277
13,822,078
14,241,744
15,275,007

Public R&D
expenditure
(USD million)
3,375
3,378
3,789
4,091
4,756
5,739
6,945
8,802
8,393
8,527
10,614
11,736
12,275
13,006
14,506

Public R&D
expenditure as
a share of GDP (%)
0.63
0.67
0.66
0.64
0.66
0.68
0.73
0.84
0.9
1.02
1.05
1.05
1.09
1.00
1.03

Number of public
research institutes
164
152
141
154
159
150
151
193
202
236
237
237
245
269
296

Number of
universities
368
357
389
398
403
332
294
361
376
391
385
385
378
414
411

Source: Ministry of Science, ICT, and Future Planning, Survey of Research and Development in Korea, 2001–15
*
R&D expenditure includes expenditure on all subjects, including social sciences and humanities. It also includes expenditure on
administrative support staff.
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Korean-authored science and technology papers among world SCI
papers increased from 1.74 percent in 2000 to 3.64 percent in 2013
while the Republic of Korea’s share of granted patents among total US
utility patents grew from 2.1 percent in 2000 to 6.01 percent in 2015
(USPTO).
The enactment of the Technology Transfer Promotion Act in 2000
encouraged IP commercialization and as a result, 54.6 percent of public
research institutes and universities had KTOs by 2014. The rate of
knowledge transfer reached 31.7 percent in 2014, which is similar to
the rates in Europe (33.5 percent in 2008) and the U.S. (25.6 percent in
2008) (KIAT 2012).3 As shown in Table 6.2, there was a steep rise in the
number of domestic patent applications by public research institutes,
which increased thirteen-fold between 2000 and 2015. The number of
domestic patent applications by universities increased even faster, by
thirty-two times, during the same period.
Table 6.3 shows that other outputs of R&D activity from universities
and public research institutes also increased from 2007.4 The average
number of newly developed technologies per institute increased from
70.4 in 2007 to 107.1 in 2014. The average number of transferred technologies per institute rose from 13.4 in 2007 to 30.2 in 2014.
However, the efﬁciency of commercialization of research output from
public research institutes and universities did not improve, even though
outputs from R&D activity increased. The ratio of license income to R&D
expenditure in public research institutes and universities was 1.38 percent
in 2009; it remained at 1.35 percent in 2014. Korean public research
institutes and universities had over 190,000 technologies in 2012, but
154,000 of these were not commercialized (Lee and Kim 2015). One
explanation could be the short history of IP commercialization by licensing. Korean public research institutes and universities previously provided the country’s ﬁrms with many free new technologies and KTOs
were only established after 2000. Thus, the KTOs of Korean public
research institutes and universities have not acquired enough experience
in, or developed enough capacity for, IP commercialization. The average
number of KTO staff per institute was only 2.7 full-time equivalent in
3

4

The rate of technology transfer is deﬁned as the ratio of the number of transferred
technologies to the number of newly developed technologies.
Relevant data are available since 2007, when the government of the Republic of Korea
started conducting a survey of knowledge transfer by public research institutes and
universities.
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Table 6.2 Number of domestic patent applications by public research institutes and universities 2000–15
Total

Year

Number

2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015

2,302
2,735
3,613
4,877
5,441
6,862
11,612
14,936
16,704
19,490
21,057
23,781
25,906
27,395
28,408
29,991

Per 1,000
researchers
35.1
40.4
50.4
64.4
71.9
85.4
140.4
145.0
162.1
172.7
175.9
190.9
206.0
213.3
214.2
221.5

Public research institutes
Per USD
1 m R&D
expenditure
0.72
0.92
1.04
1.28
1.21
1.26
1.78
1.87
2.17
2.55
2.20
2.25
2.39
2.35
2.16
2.38

Number
1,675
2,024
2,656
3,185
3,479
4,292
6,051
6,857
6,892
8,334
9,109
10,220
11,211
11,356
10,398
10,078

Per 1,000
researchers
120.4
145.4
188.4
202.6
221.3
276.9
360.8
327.3
329.0
342.7
347.2
354.9
389.0
364.7
312.0
283.5

Per USD
1 m R&D
expenditure
0.93
1.21
1.30
1.45
1.34
1.38
1.65
1.55
1.63
1.91
1.67
1.70
1.82
1.71
1.35
1.38

Universities

Number
627
711
957
1,692
1,962
2,570
5,561
8,079
9,812
11,156
11,948
13,561
14,695
16,039
18,010
19,913

Per 1,000
researchers
12.1
13.2
16.6
28.2
32.7
39.6
84.4
98.4
119.5
126.0
127.8
141.6
151.6
164.8
181.3
199.4

Per USD
1 m R&D
expenditure
0.45
0.55
0.67
1.04
1.02
1.10
1.95
2.25
2.81
3.39
2.91
2.98
3.14
3.20
3.29
3.75

Source: Korean Intellectual Property Ofﬁce (KIPO), White Papers on Korean Intellectual Property, 2006, 2011, 2016
*
Domestic patent applications count unique patents applications at the Korean Intellectual Property Ofﬁce.
*
The ﬁgure for “researchers” includes those in all disciplines including social sciences and humanities. It also includes PhD students at
universities.
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Table 6.3 Output of R&D activities by Korean public research institutes
and universities – new technologies and knowledge transfer, 2007–14
Number of new technologies

Year

Per
institute

2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014

70.4
59.8
80.7
88.2
81.3
94.9
88.4
107.1

Per 1,000
researchers
139.89
152.12
140.78
180.48
155.08
205.21
258.83
256.97

Per USD
1 m R&D
expenditure
n.a.
n.a.
2.65
2.54
2.32
2.47
2.65
2.72

Number of transferred technologies
Per
institute
13.4
12.4
14.0
16.8
20.6
25.5
27.6
30.2

Per 1,000
researchers
38.38
33.62
32.02
41.69
40.28
55.55
80.64
81.51

Per USD
1 m R&D
expenditure
n.a.
n.a.
0.60
0.59
0.60
0.67
0.83
0.86

Source: Korea Institute for Advancement of Technology (KIAT), Survey of
knowledge transfer by public research institutes and universities

2014 with an average work experience within the KTO of just 2.6 years
(KIAT 2016).5
These average ﬁgures mask very different performance between the
best and worst public research institutes and universities. Licensing
incomes are highly concentrated among a small number of top public
research institutes, but less concentrated in the case of universities. The
ﬁve leading public research institutes received 64 percent of total public
research institute license income in 2014, whereas the top ﬁve universities
obtained 27.9 percent of total university license income in 2014. The
leading public research institutes6 had a ratio of license income to R&D
expenditure of 2.11 percent in 2014. In contrast, university knowledge
transfer was less efﬁcient, with a ratio of license income to R&D expenditure of 1.16 percent. Leading universities performed much worse than
the average – the ratio of license income to R&D expenditure of the ﬁve
leading universities was only 0.93 percent. As Ok and Kim (2009) note,
Korean universities focused on education rather than research until the
5
6

Other possible reasons for this low efﬁciency are dealt with in Section 6.5.
The top twenty-ﬁve public research institutes include ETRI and the Korea Institute of
Science and Technology (KIST).
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1980s, so their research capability and commercialization ability was
even lower than that of public research institutes.
The emphasis on knowledge transfer since 2000 has led public research
institutes and universities to develop more transferrable technologies at
the expense of technology quality. Further, universities and public
research institutes may have split technologies into many small patents
to help maximize their scores in performance evaluation. There are
several indicators of this. The share of transferred technology among
the total number of valid knowledge transfer contracts that resulted in
increased sales was 14.1 percent in 2009, but had fallen to 12.4 percent in
2014. License-based incomes per institute from knowledge transfer did
not increase. The average license income per institute was KRW
625.2 million (USD 0.67 million) in 2007, falling to KRW 561.3 million
(USD 0.53 million) in 2014. Since the average number of transferred
technologies per institute has increased since 2007 (see Table 6.3), we can
infer that the average license income per transferred new technology has
fallen. Average license income per transferred technology was KRW
40 million (USD 36,300) in 2008, but KRW 18 million (USD 16,440) in
2013. Table 6.4 presents these statistics.
If we compare leading Korean and US universities, the number of
transferred technologies (license agreements) is similar. The total knowledge transfers per year by the Seoul National University (SNU) is
seventy-nine, and the ﬁgure for Stanford University is 101. However,
average license income per transferred technology shows a huge gap.
Average license income per transferred technology for the SNU is KRW
58 million, but for Stanford it is KRW 734 million. One of the main
reasons is that Stanford has several patents, such as a Google-licensed
search patent, which earn lots of money. Three important patents earned
75 percent of Stanford’s license income from 2000 to 2010.
Another possible reason for this low efﬁciency is that the focus of
knowledge transfer in public research institutes in the Republic of Korea
switched from big businesses to SMEs. SMEs cannot usually pay high
license fees due to their limited ﬁnancial resources. Large ﬁrms and
foreign ﬁrms can pay higher license fees, but the government of the
Republic of Korea made the country’s public research institutes prioritize
knowledge transfer to domestic SMEs over large or foreign ﬁrms in an
attempt to reduce the huge productivity gap between large ﬁrms and
SMEs. Fully 90.7 percent of knowledge transfer contracts from public
research institutes were concluded with SMEs in 2014. License income
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Table 6.4 Output of R&D activities by Korean public research institutes and universities – license income, 2007–14
License income

Year

Per institute
(USD
million)

Per 1,000
researchers
(USD million)

Per transferred
technology
(USD
thousand)

License income
as a share of
R&D expenditure (%)

Knowledge transfers resulting
in sales as a share of the total
number of valid knowledge
transfer contracts (%)

2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014

0.67
0.45
0.33
0.49
0.59
0.74
0.45
0.53

1.24
1.22
0.74
1.05
0.88
1.22
1.33
1.27

n.a.
36.30
22.71
25.09
21.66
22.20
16.44
n.a.

n.a.
n.a.
1.38
1.48
1.32
1.47
1.36
1.35

n.a.
n.a.
14.1
18.3
23.6
33.6
15.9
12.4

Source: KIAT, Survey of knowledge transfer by public research institutes and universities, 2008–15
License incomes include both lump-sum payments and running royalties.
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per transferred technology was KRW 15.39 million from SMEs and KRW
52.51 million from large ﬁrms in 2014.
As regards the sectoral distribution of transfer activity from universities,
Kwon et al. (2014) analyzed 5,249 knowledge transfer contracts between
universities and ﬁrms from 2011 to 2013 to identify the number of contracts
by industry. Table 6.5 shows the top seven industries by the number of
knowledge transfer contracts. The electronic parts, video, sound, and communication equipment industry accounted for the largest share in terms of
both the number of knowledge transfer contracts and license income, which
is reasonable given that this is the major industry in the Republic of Korea.
The IT services and software industry also had a large number of knowledge
transfer contracts. The textile and food industries had a relatively large
number of contracts, but their license income was small. Thus, the size of
knowledge transfer contracts is small in these industries.
The Science and Technology Policy Institute (STEPI) conducts a survey
every two or three years to reveal the sources of innovation for Korean ﬁrms’
innovation activities. In this survey, STEPI asks ﬁrms about the major
sources of information/knowledge for their R&D activities. In their answers,
ﬁrms identify universities, research institutes (public or private) or other
sources such as in-house, suppliers and customers as their main source of
information. Table 6.6 summarizes the main ﬁndings in this regard.
Research institutes are used more in the electronic and chemical
industries, perhaps because these have been the major industries in the
Republic of Korea since the 1970s and have a long history of collaboration with public research institutes. Universities are used more in the
other machinery and medical and optical instruments industries. The
medical and optical instruments industry is science-based and depends
more on universities than other industries. The food and textiles industries depend on both universities and research institutes.
Korean universities interact with both local and foreign ﬁrms, but the
share of foreign ﬁrms is small. According to Kwon et al. (2014), only
1.4 percent of knowledge transfer contracts from Korean universities in
2012 were with foreign ﬁrms and they accounted for only 0.68 percent of
total license income. Most of the interaction occurs between universities and
local ﬁrms.

6.4 Knowledge Transfer Channels in the Republic of Korea
There are various knowledge transfer channels from public research
institutes to the private sector, including reading papers, attending
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Table 6.5 University knowledge transfer contracts by industry, 2011–13
Industry
Electronic parts, video, sound,
and communication equipment
IT services and software
Other machinery and equipment
Chemicals and chemical products
Textiles (excluding clothing)
Medical and optical instruments
and watches
Food and beverages
Source: Kwon et al. (2014)

Number of knowledge
transfer contracts

Share of knowledge
transfer contracts (%)

License income
(KRW million)

Share of license
income (%)

526

13

12,748

13

397
376
290
274
261

10
9
7
7
6

7,291
7,765
12,731
969
12,654

7
8
13
1
13

232

6

2,319

2
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Table 6.6 Firms reporting universities or research institutes as sources of
innovation information, 2011–13
Source of information for innovation activity

Industry
Electronic parts, video,
sound, and
communication
equipment
IT services and software
Other machinery and
equipment
Chemicals and chemical
products
Textiles (excluding
clothing)
Medical and optical
instruments and
watches
Food and beverages

Universities or other
higher education institutions (%)

Public or private research
institutes (%)

15.4

20.0

n.a.
14.8

n.a.
10.8

21.9

27.0

14.4

15.6

15.9

8.8

24.4

22.8

Source: Science and Technology Policy Institute (STEPI), Korean Innovation
Survey, 2014

conferences, IP licensing, employing researchers and graduate students,
startups, consulting by researchers, using public research institutes’
research facilities, collaborative R&D, and informal discussion between
ﬁrms and public research institutes. These can be classiﬁed into formal
and informal transfer channels, with formal channels being those based
on contracts.
Cho et al. (2007) surveyed 600 Korean ﬁrms to study how they
cooperate with public research organizations to transfer knowledge.
Table 6.7 summarizes their main results. The most common channel of
knowledge transfer in the Republic of Korea is collaborative R&D commissioned by ﬁrms. About 60 percent of the ﬁrms that cooperate with
public research organizations used this channel as the primary cooperation type. Cho et al. (2009) argue that this is because government

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 54.177.185.247, on 15 Nov 2021 at 19:13:31, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/979C0AAA92B1200DCE513DAAE4894BE7

r e pub l i c o f k o r ea

241

Table 6.7 Primary types of cooperation with public research organizations
among surveyed ﬁrms
Object of cooperation

Type of cooperation
Collaborative R&D or
commissioned research by
ﬁrms
IP licensing
Using public research
facilities
Dispatch of staff between
ﬁrms and public research
organizations
Startup or joint venture
between ﬁrms and public
research organizations
Commissioned education of
ﬁrms’ staff
Consulting or lectures by
public research
organization researchers
Activities of public research
organization researchers
as ofﬁcial consultants for
ﬁrms

University (percentage
share of each type of
cooperation)

Public research institute
(percentage share of each
type of cooperation)

62.9

58.0

2.9
16.1

4.8
22.7

3.4

1.2

0.3

2.7

2.1

0.0

8.8

8.2

3.6

2.4

Source: Cho et al. (2007)

supports collaboration between industry and public research organizations in the Republic of Korea. The second most common channel in
their survey was use of public research facilities. Twenty percent of ﬁrms
reported this channel as their primary method. There is no similar
category in the equivalent US survey (the 1994 Carnegie Mellon
Survey), so direct comparison between the U.S. and the Republic of
Korea is difﬁcult, but it is clear that using research facilities are more
important to Korean ﬁrms than IP licensing or establishing startups.
About 10 percent of Korean ﬁrms reported consulting and lectures by
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researchers in public research institutes as the primary channel, which
makes it less important than consulting in the US survey. Other types of
transfer, such as hiring, licensing, education of staff members, and startups are not very signiﬁcant in the Republic of Korea.
Table 6.7 also shows some differences between public research institutes and universities in the Republic of Korea. Interaction between
universities and ﬁrms is mostly consulting and training-based while
that between public research institutes and ﬁrms tends to involve IP
licensing, joint ventures, and laboratory infrastructure, seemingly reﬂecting the fact that universities are education-oriented whereas public
research institutes have better research capabilities and facilities.

6.4.1 Formal Channels in Public Research Institute and University
Knowledge Transfer Contracts
Drawing on the results of the various KIAT surveys of public research
organizations in the Republic of Korea (see Appendix for details), Table
6.8 shows the total number of knowledge transfer contracts in public
research organizations and the share of each knowledge transfer channel.
IP licensing is a more common (formal) knowledge transfer practice than
sales of technologies. The share of license contracts among the total
number of knowledge transfer contracts was 68.5 percent in 2014
whereas the share of technology sales was only 12 percent. However, freeof-charge licensing also accounts for a signiﬁcant share of knowledge
transfer contracts – 10.7 percent in 2014 – because one of the main goals
of Korean public research institutes and universities is to support SMEs
by providing them with free technology. As there is a large technology
gap between large ﬁrms and SMEs, the government has used public
research institutes and universities to improve the technological competitiveness of SMEs.
Within IP licensing, lump-sum payment dominates. While there are
presently no statistics to prove this, most of the respondents in this study
conﬁrm it anecdotally. In contrast, most IP licensing in leading US
universities involves running royalties. The low efﬁciency of the knowledge transfer market involving public research organizations in the
Republic of Korea, in the sense that there is a low level of trust on both
sides, makes negotiating long-term contracts involving running royalties
difﬁcult. This is bad for research organizations as running royalties,
proportional to increased sales, may generate a more stable income.
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Table 6.8 Knowledge transfer contracts and share of different types of
knowledge transfer, 2007–14

Year
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014

Number of
knowledge
transfer
contracts
2,593
2,641
2,918
2,940
3,420
4,312
4,358
5,981

Share of
technology
sales (%)
22.6
10.8
7.7
5.9
9.6
8.9
12.3
12.0

Share of
licensing (%)
65.0
74.2
75.7
86.3
80.7
82.5
79.3
68.5

Share of free
licensing (%)
6.7
10.0
14.8
6.1
5.2
6.5
6.0
10.7

Source: KIAT, Survey of technology transfer by public research institutes and
universities, 2008–15

Conversely, no ﬁrm was willing to pay a large lump sum because of the
uncertain sales potential of the transferred technology.
The total number of startups in 2014 created using technologies from
public research institutes and universities was 136; the number of startups by staff (spinoffs) was 108; the number of startups by other people
using public research IP was twenty-eight; and the average number of
startups per institute was 0.54, which is relatively small compared to rates
in the U.S. and other countries. However, several leading public research
institutes created more startups: twenty-four leading public research
institutes under the auspices of the National Research Council of
Science & Technology (NST) created forty-one startups, and the average
number per institute was 1.7 (KIAT 2016).
One special type of startup from public research institutes is the
“laboratory company,” which is deﬁned in the Special R&D Zone
Promotion Act 2005. If a startup from a public research institute is
located in a special R&D zone and the institute invests more than
20 percent of the capital, then it can be authorized as a laboratory
company and exempt from tax for three to seven years. The technology of public research institutes can be regarded as the startup’s
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Table 6.9 Laboratory companies – sales and employment, 2009–15
Year
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015

Sales (KRW billion)
28.3
43.0
72.4
120.8
164.3
236.5
288.1

Employment
237
272
310
524
639
850
1,194

Source: INNOPOLIS Foundation (www.innopolis.or.kr/sub0303)

capital, so it is not difﬁcult for such startups to be authorized as
laboratory companies.
In 2016, there were 219 laboratory companies in the ﬁve special R&D
zones (Daedeok, Daegu, Busan, Gwangju, and Jeonubuk). Due to government support and advanced technologies from public research organizations, their sales increased tenfold and their employment increased
ﬁvefold between 2009 and 2015, as shown in Table 6.9. The ﬁve-year
survival rate of laboratory companies was about 64.9 percent, more than
double the survival rate of normal startups (29.6 percent) (Ministry of
Science, ICT, and Future Planning 2014).

6.4.2 Qualitative Evidence of Successful Knowledge Transfer
IP licensing by ETRI represents a case study of successful licensing. ETRI
is the largest public research institute in terms of both R&D expenditure
and license income. It earned KRW 34.6 billion from licensing in 2014 –
about a quarter (24.7 percent) of the total license income of all Korean
public research organizations. Its ratio of license income to total R&D
expenditure is 8.4 percent – the highest ratio among Korean public
research organizations.
One example of successful IP licensing at ETRI involved a company
called Initech, an IT security system company that started in 1997 with
two employees. Its core technology is a user authentication solution
based on public-key infrastructure (PKI) which ETRI transferred to it
through IP licensing in December 1999. In the late 1990s, the number of
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users of Internet and e-commerce increased rapidly, and so IT security in
e-commerce became important. ETRI started research into authentication servers and systems in 1995, as a project for the Korean Ministry of
Information and Communication. At an early stage of R&D, ETRI
identiﬁed potential users of the technology, such as public ﬁnancial
institutions (e.g., the Korea Financial Telecommunications & Clearing
Institute). Within four years, ETRI had developed an “authentication
processing protocol and veriﬁcation technology,” and transferred this
technology to Initech.
Public-key infrastructure is the system relating to the generation,
authentication, distribution and management of public-key encryption,
a method of data encryption that uses different keys for encryption and
decryption. It is a more secure method than its predecessor, secret-key
encryption, and became widely adopted as demand from e-commerce
and Internet banking increased. Even after knowledge transfer,
researchers in ETRI frequently helped Initech to further develop its
own system and service.
Apart from the favorable demand conditions, government policy also
contributed to the success of Initech. The government recognized the
PKI-based technology as the industry standard in 1999, encouraging
more domestic users to adopt it. In turn, this helped the rapid growth
of Internet banking and e-commerce.
Although several hundreds of technology startups existed in 2014, most
remained small and did not develop a stable growth path. One of the
most successful cases of a startup from a public research institute comes
from the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI). KAERI is the
third-largest public research institute in the Republic of Korea. It started
to develop health-promoting functional foods focusing on boosting
immunity in 1997. Researchers at KAERI recombined medicinal herbs
such as dong quai, cnidium, and white woodland peony using radiation
technology. It took six years to develop the original technology7 and cost
KRW 1.2 billion in R&D. Researchers at KAERI were conﬁdent of the
quality of their product and decided to establish a company, reaching an
agreement with a private company, Kolmar Korea, in 2001. KAERI had
transferred other technologies to Kolmar Korea before 2001, and so
Kolmar Korea was interested in its new technology.

7

The Korean Economic Daily, “10 Billion Won in Royalties for Research,” May 23, 2015,
www.hankyung.com/news/app/newsview.php?aid=2015032265091.
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However, KAERI faced a difﬁculty as government-appointed directors
on its board opposed the agreement, arguing that public research institutes should not engage in income-generating businesses and that there
was no precedent for a public research institute providing funds to
establish a company.8 This is interesting because the government of the
Republic of Korea had already enacted the Technology Transfer
Promotion Act 2000 and mandated public research institutes to establish
KTOs.
No company was established for three years. However, ﬁnally KAERI
changed its strategy and chose technology investment, which meant that
the value of KAERI’s technology was regarded as capital and so it did not
have to invest any cash. This plan persuaded the government, so KAERI
and Kolmar Korea co-established a company, Sunbiotech, in 2004.
Sunbiotech can be classiﬁed as a joint venture, as the value of KAERI’s
technology was approved as KRW 378 million and Kolmar Korea
invested KRW 622 million as capital.
Sunbiotech’s sales were poor at ﬁrst because the product did not obtain
approval from the government as a functional health food. The company
achieved total sales of between KRW 0.8 and 1.2 billion between 2004 and
2006. Finally, in 2006, it obtained approval for the product as a functional
food from the Ministry of Food and Drug Safety. This was one of the ﬁrst
approvals in the Republic of Korea for a functional food that improves
immunity. It also obtained authorization from the government as the ﬁrst
laboratory company under the Special R&D Zone Promotion Act 2006.
Using that governmental authorization, it was able to sell its products as
health-promoting, functional foods that improve immunity. It grew rapidly, with sales increasing from KRW 3.8 billion in 2007 to KRW
9.9 billion in 2008 and KRW 20.1 billion in 2009 (Ham 2015). By 2013,
sales reached KRW 121.5 billion and the company’s name was changed to
Kolmar BNH. It was ﬂoated on the KOSDAQ stock market in 2015.
The sales and operating proﬁt of Kolmar BNH reached KRW
236.2 billion and KRW 34.4 billion respectively in 2015, by which time
the company had 156 employees. By July 2016, its market value stood at
around KRW 1 trillion. KAERI held 16.1 percent of Kolmar BNH’s stock
at the time of the IPO, and earned over USD 100 million, a sum greater
than the total license income of all Korean public research institutes in
2014. The case of Kolmar BNH thus shows the potential of startups and
8

In-soon Jang (former president of KAERI), EconomyTalk (Korean Press), September 2015,
www.econotalking.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=129290.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 54.177.185.247, on 15 Nov 2021 at 19:13:31, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/979C0AAA92B1200DCE513DAAE4894BE7

republic of ko rea

247

joint ventures in knowledge transfer and commercialization. Following
the success of Kolmar BNH, the government of the Republic of Korea
changed its attitude and started to actively support public research
organization startups.
The KAERI KTO played an important role in the success of Kolmar
BNH as it started to apply for Korean and international patents on the
core ingredients of the product between 2000 and 2003, just three years
after the start of its R&D activities. It applied for the trademark
“HEMOHIM” in relation to its products in 2002.
Another factor in Kolmar BNH’s success was reputation. KAERI has
a ﬁfty-year history and is well known as the third-largest Korean public
research institute, so Korean consumers trusted the product more than
products from other startups. The stability and safety of the product are
very important factors to consumers in the functional health food market, so the reputation of KAERI helped Kolmar BNH to survive in its
early stages.
As in the case of Initech, demand also helped Kolmar BNH to succeed.
As income levels in the Republic of Korea rose, people started to pay
more attention to their health and the market size for functional health
foods increased rapidly. Production of functional health foods in the
Republic of Korea increased from KRW 700.8 billion in 2006 to KRW
1.48 trillion in 2013, and the annual growth rate was 11.5 percent during
this period (Ham 2015).
A further factor explaining the company’s success was the management skill available from a private ﬁrm. A typical problem in public
research organization startups is the lack of sound management skills.
However, Kolmar BNH was a joint venture with the private sector, and
the managers and employees of Kolmar BNH had the beneﬁt of the
management knowhow of Kolmar Korea.

6.4.3 Informal Knowledge Transfer Channels
As seen in Table 6.7, the proportion of ﬁrms that actually use formal
channels is small. To detail other knowledge transfer channels, Cho et al.
(2009) cite examples that do not use IP licensing or startups. We summarize those examples here.
Company S9 is a leading Korean ICT ﬁrm that actively cooperates with
public research organizations, but it does not use IP licensing or startup
9

The discussion here is based on Cho et al. (2009).
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channels to transfer knowledge from them. Instead, its main knowledge
transfer channel is the participation of its staff in seminars or education
programs provided by public research organizations. For example, it
began research into optical materials in the early 2000s, attracted by the
thriving optical industry, but since it lacked basic knowledge about
optical materials, it sent researchers to participate in relevant university
seminars.
It also uses researchers from public research organizations as consultants. Company S has built a network of specialists, and consults them
about technology trends and information in their specialized ﬁelds. To do
this, it undertakes an annual program of twenty–thirty technology seminars with them. In addition, the CEO of the company holds periodic
meetings with key experts. It usually consults researchers in public
research organizations about the market or technology situation for
emerging technology. For instance, it consulted researchers at the
Korea Institute of Energy Research about the market prospects and
technology when solid oxide fuel cell technology was regarded as
promising.
A third knowledge transfer channel is collaborative R&D. As technological convergence/fusion has deepened, Company S has needed collaborative R&D because it does not have research capability in some
technology ﬁelds. For example, it needed ﬁlm-coloring technology for
PDP (plasma display panel) ﬁlters, but did not have research capability in
that ﬁeld. It therefore collaborated with SNU to develop the technology.
It obtained basic knowledge about the technology through a year of
collaborative research.
However, Company S has not used IP licensing for knowledge transfer.
There has been no case of licensing or joint venture with public research
institutes. It has previously concluded license contracts with ﬁrms in an
advanced country, but has not licensed technology from domestic public
research organizations. The main reason seems to be that as Company
S has recently become a leading ICT ﬁrm in the global market, it needs
world-class technology to compete, but domestic public research organizations do not offer research capability at a sufﬁciently high level.
Using research facilities is the second most used knowledge transfer
channel in the Republic of Korea, as shown in Table 6.7. However,
Company S has not used research facilities in public research organizations, presumably because it is a big ﬁrm and has most of the research
facilities that public research organizations have and so does not need to
use external facilities.
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Company S has barely used basic research outputs from public
research organizations such as reports, papers, and patents because
basic research is not relevant to the company’s technology roadmap.
In sum, leading companies such as Company S primarily use public
research organizations as consultants, trainers of their staff, and partners
in collaborative research. However, they barely use research outputs such
as papers, patents, and technologies produced by public research organizations, which might reﬂect the relatively low level of research capability
of such organizations.
Another example of knowledge transfer channels that shows the
importance of informal channels is ViroMed Inc. ViroMed was established by Professor Sun-Young Kim from SNU in 1996. Its main products
include DNA, protein, and cell-based biotherapeutics that can treat
incurable diseases such as diabetic peripheral neuropathy, peripheral
artery disease, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (Lou Gehrig’s disease), and
thrombocytopenia.
Professor Kim received KRW 150 million in government funding as
part of a leading technology development project in 1994. It was a joint
project with a ﬁrm. Professor Kim’s team achieved positive results concerning DNA-based biotherapeutics in 1996. They published their results
in Science in 1996 and applied for patents in 1997. After these results,
Professor Kim suggested that a ﬁrm participating in the project invest
and commercialize the product, but the ﬁrm refused due to the high risk
in the biotherapeutics sector. Following a presentation by Professor Kim
at an international conference, a UK venture capital company indicated
its intention to invest in his research. Using that investment, Professor
Kim established ViroMed in 1996.
ViroMed agreed to a technology export contract with Oxford
Biomedica, a UK ﬁrm, in 1997, and Takara Shuzo, a Japanese ﬁrm, in
1999. On the basis of this export agreement, ViroMed was able to
attract both domestic and foreign investment. It was ﬂoated on the
KOSDAQ stock market in 2005. Its market value reached KRW 1.64
trillion in October 2016, following sales of KRW 7.7 billion and
operating income of KRW 1.1 billion in 2015. Its market value is
high compared to its sales and operating income because clinical trials
of its major products have yet to be completed, even though those
products are regarded as high quality. As of October 2017, some of its
biotherapeutics are in phase III clinical trials (the ﬁnal step before
coming to market) and some are in phase II in the U.S., China, and the
Republic of Korea.
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Informal channels of knowledge transfer are important, as shown in
the ViroMed case, which was established because a UK venture capital
ﬁrm was interested in its work after learning about it at an international
conference.
Another important informal channel is the use of research facilities at
public research organizations. The initial capital of ViroMed was only
KRW 200 million and, as such, it did not have enough money to buy
research facilities. To solve this problem, SNU allowed Professor Kim
and ViroMed to use its research facilities. Without such support,
ViroMed would not have been able to continue its research.
A third informal knowledge transfer channel involves hiring graduate
students. ViroMed started in the form of a “university company,” so
Professor Kim could work with graduate students in his laboratory at
SNU, thus providing ViroMed with high-quality personnel.
One distinctive feature in ViroMed’s case is that knowledge transfer
to domestic ﬁrms is very hard. Unlike Korean ICT ﬁrms, Korean
pharmaceutical ﬁrms have been very reluctant to invest in high-risk
projects. They have been used to licensing-in foreign technology. This
case shows that domestic industrial capability can affect knowledge
transfer from public research organizations. Low industrial capability
means that domestic ﬁrms have insufﬁcient knowledge and are unable
to properly evaluate the potential and risks of new technology.
Professor Kim indicated that the most serious problem during the
growth process of ViroMed was technology evaluation (Cho et al.
2009).

6.4.4 The Government-Funded Nonpracticing Entity
One distinctive feature of knowledge transfer in the Republic of Korea is
the existence of a government-funded IP nonpracticing entity (NPE).
This approach began in 2010 to protect domestic ﬁrms against patent
infringement lawsuits by global NPEs or patent trolls. At that time, US
private NPEs started buying many Korean patents from public research
organizations, sparking public concern that they might use them to ﬁle
IP lawsuits against domestic ﬁrms, taking advantage of the fact that
most Korean ﬁrms did not seriously consider IP issues at that time. To
prevent this possibility, the government decided to set up an entity
serving as a pool of patents owned by Korean agents. Thus, the government and big businesses invested about KRW 58 billion and established
an IP NPE with the name of Intellectual Discovery (ID), one of the ﬁrst
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government-funded IP NPEs in the world; other countries such as
Japan, China, and France have since followed suit.
Intellectual Discovery, ranked sixth globally, buys domestic and foreign patents, and had a portfolio of about 5,000 patents by 2016. Its ﬁrst
objective is to protect domestic ﬁrms from patent infringement lawsuits.
Big ﬁrms that funded it initially and have paid license fees can use the
patents that it owns. SMEs can obtain membership and license patents by
paying a relatively small fee. If foreign ﬁrms or NPEs ﬁle a lawsuit against
domestic member ﬁrms, ID provides them with professional help and
even some patents which can be used defensively for cross-licensing. If
foreign ﬁrms or NPEs violate patents that ID holds, ID can charge them
with patent infringement and, on behalf of any domestic ﬁrm, negotiate
for settlement and for legal process.

6.4.5 Important Factors in Knowledge Transfer
The cases cited earlier show the important factors in each type of knowledge transfer channel. The cases of Initech and Kolmar BNH show the
importance of follow-on/adaptive R&D by public research institutes after
initial knowledge transfer, which is consistent with the results of the
qualitative analyses of Kim (2012) and Lee et al. (2015). Furthermore,
the case of Kolmar BNH shows the beneﬁts of having a joint venture with
existing ﬁrms, allowing it to draw on the management skills of the parent
companies. Nevertheless, the fact that both were supported by favorable
demand conditions suggests it might not be easy to obtain successful
results by IP licensing or through a startup if demand conditions are poor.
The cases of Company S and ViroMed show the importance of contract/collaborative research and using facilities in the public sector for
knowledge transfer from the public science base. Company S relies on
collaborative R&D and consulting, whereas ViroMed relies on using
research facilities in public research institutes. The Company S case
suggests that the level of research capability of public research institutes
may be an important success factor for knowledge transfer, as we argued
in Section 6.2. The ViroMed case shows the importance of informal
transfer channels such as conferences, even though ﬁrm survey data
usually rank these as unimportant. It also shows that knowledge transfer
from public research institutes can be more difﬁcult in sectors where the
country has relatively weak industrial capacity. This may be related to
knowledge transfer from ETRI in the ICT sector being more efﬁcient
than that of public research institutes in other sectors.
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Last, the establishment of ID is an institutional innovation, driven by
the government of the Republic of Korea to protect domestic ﬁrms
against patent infringement by hostile foreign actors.

6.5 Public Policies and Knowledge Transfer Challenges
The government of the Republic of Korea started focusing on knowledge
transfer in 2000 and tried to “create” knowledge transfer markets using
various policies and projects. In other words, the major player in the
knowledge transfer system was the government itself rather than private
agents. However, the country’s institutional system for knowledge transfer
remains immature, and some of the legacy of the developmental state of the
past hinders the realization of a knowledge transfer market. This section will
discuss important institutional challenges encountered in the Republic of
Korea.

6.5.1 Institutional Challenges
One of the ﬁrst and fundamental challenges is that legal protection of IPR
remains weak in the Republic of Korea. Although the country was ranked
twenty-ninth among 128 countries for IPR protection in 2016 in the
International Property Rights Index (IPRI), actual protection by the
courts is weak compared to advanced countries. For example, the probability of the plaintiff winning a patent infringement lawsuit was 20 percent in 2011, far lower than that in the U.S. (60 percent). Furthermore,
when the plaintiff did win, average damages from 2009 to 2011 were just
KRW 78 million – a mere 0.77 percent of the US ﬁgure (Presidential
Council on Intellectual Property 2015). The expected payout to the
plaintiff was only KRW 15.6 million compared to legal costs of approximately KRW 200 million, severely decreasing the incentive to ﬁle a patent
infringement lawsuit. In consequence, ﬁrms have little incentive to buy
licenses or patents from public research institutes if they can obtain
technology in other ways, reducing the efﬁciency of knowledge transfer
from public research institutes and depressing the knowledge transfer
market.
Weak IPR protection is a legacy of the developmental state during the
catch-up period. The major knowledge transfer channel in this period
was copying technology from ﬁrms in advanced countries. Korean ﬁrms
did not hesitate to copy good domestic or foreign technology.
Furthermore, patent lawsuits were dealt with by the ordinary courts,
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where judges lacked the technological expertise to analyze the issues at
stake. While dozens of private knowledge transfer agents exist, their IP
business is mainly geared to foreign countries; they do not usually ﬁle
domestic lawsuits for patent infringement even when the IPRs of their
domestic clients are violated.

6.5.2 Immature Capabilities of Government and the SMEs Sector
A second set of challenges relate to the government’s immature policies
for knowledge transfer. One of the clearest examples is co-ownership of
patents from publicly funded research. It is often difﬁcult for co-owners
to reach consensus about whether to license and, if so, to whom, and as
a result co-owned patents tend to be underutilized or under-licensed.
Thus, while co-owned patents accounted for around 10 percent of total
patents in the Republic of Korea in 2013, only 2.8 percent of patent
transactions involved co-owned patents. This problem is especially
severe when public research institutes and private ﬁrms share a patent.
As public research institutes do not have production facilities, they
cannot make money directly using shared patents.
A second or related problem concerns types of license. The government has tended to encourage nonexclusive licensing to promote more
and wider uses of technologies developed by public research institutes.
However, this can undermine the interests of licensee ﬁrms, which will
generally want to use the technology exclusively to increase their potential proﬁts, and it also fails to offer any extra reward to ﬁrst-licensee ﬁrms,
which take a bigger commercial risk than follow-on ﬁrms in acquiring
technology before its value has been proved in the market. Firms have
therefore avoided nonexclusive licensing, reducing licensing income for
the public research institutes.
The preferred form of licensing payment is a lump sum. This contrasts
with the situation in the U.S., where running royalties make up around
70–80 percent of total license income for the leading universities. And
even when a running royalty clause is included in the contract, ﬁrms do
not usually reveal their true sales from the technology to public research
institutes – a serious implementation issue and a possible case of market
failure.
Other challenges for knowledge transfer in the Republic of Korea stem
from the short history of its knowledge transfer system and the primary
role of the government in developing that system. The R&D process in
public research organizations does not ﬁt the needs of SMEs. Until the
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1990s, the major partners of public research institutes included big ﬁrms
such as Samsung and LG, because their R&D capability remained weak.
However, as their R&D capability has improved due to large in-house
R&D investment, big ﬁrms can conduct their own R&D without the
support of public research institutes. As a result, SMEs have become
the major partners of public research institutes, accounting for 90.7 percent of knowledge transfer contracts with public research institutes in
2014 (KIAT 2016).
As the R&D capability of SMEs is weak, public research institutes have
to develop technology to an advanced stage, until it is ready for commercialization. However, many government-supported R&D projects do not
consider this issue. The normal R&D project duration is two to three
years, and public research institutes usually have only completed laboratory-stage development within this period. In terms of technology readiness level (TRL),10 SMEs need at least TRL level 7 technologies
(technology demonstrated by prototypes in operational environments),
but public research organizations usually tend to provide only TRL level
4 technologies (technology validated in labs). Thus, there is a serious gap
in of the technology level demanded and supplied, which hinders effective commercialization of R&D conducted in public laboratories.
SMEs cannot successfully commercialize the transferred technology
due to their weak R&D capability. As a result, the technology is not
utilized successfully and public research organizations and SMEs tend to
blame one another for this failure. It also decreases future private
demand for technology from public research organizations.
Government therefore needs to provide public research organizations
with enough time and funds to complete the technology to a sufﬁcient
level. Otherwise, a short-termist reluctance to commit to extra spending
decreases the efﬁciency of public R&D projects. An interviewee from
ETRI said that this is a major barrier in knowledge transfer, which is
consistent with the ﬁndings of several qualitative studies and case studies
that emphasize the importance of follow-on/adaptive (or after-transfer)
10

TRL is an indicator of the completeness of technology development. It has nine levels; the
higher the level, the readier the technology is to be implemented in factories. The TRL
scale was developed by NASA in the 1970s and is widely used in many ﬁelds. The
European Commission (2014) describes each level as follows: TRL1 – basic principles
observed; TRL2 – technology concept formulated; TRL3 – experimental proof of concept;
TRL4 – technology validated in laboratory; TRL5 – technology validated in industrially
relevant environment; TRL6 – technology demonstrated in relevant industrial environment; TRL7 – system prototype demonstration in operational environment; TRL8 –
system complete and qualiﬁed; TRL9 – actual system proved in operational environment.
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R&D being provided by public research organizations to ensure successful knowledge transfer.

6.5.3 Issues with Public Research Institutes and Universities
One problem is due in part to the speciﬁc nature of the project imposed
on public research institutes in the Republic of Korea. In the projectbased system, the government allocates R&D expenses, including the
researchers’ salaries and overhead costs for each R&D project. The
main goal of the project-based system is to increase the cost efﬁciency
of R&D, but it generates some side effects. Researchers at public
research institutes have to undertake as many R&D projects as possible
to generate their own income, because the majority of R&D funding is
determined by the number of R&D projects executed and the
researchers’ salaries are part of the acquired R&D budget.
Furthermore, given that each public research institute’s budgetary
resources are proportional to the size of the R&D funding it receives,
public research institutes incentivize researchers who obtain more
R&D projects. Such a system induces researchers to try to obtain as
many public R&D projects as possible. Thus, the average number of
R&D projects per researcher per year reached as high as 4.8 in 2011
(Kim and Shim 2013), reducing the amount of time that researchers
could spend on each project and diminishing the quality and TRL of
R&D results.
Public research organizations also face problems relating to the low
capability of KTOs. Despite support from various government laws and
projects, KTOs employ small numbers of staff and lack many important
skills for successful commercialization. Furthermore, many KTOs implement a staff rotation system, making it difﬁcult for them to accumulate
the necessary skills. Incentives for KTO staff to commercialize technologies are weak – 61.8 percent of public research organizations gave no
license income to any KTO staff in 2014 even if they played a role in the
commercialization of technologies (KIAT 2016). The average share of
license income going to KTO staff that played a role in successful
commercialization in 2014 was just 3.8 percent, discouraging highperforming staff from working in KTOs. The average annual wage of
KTO staff in 2014 was about KRW 34 million (less than USD 30,000),
close to the national average wage and clearly insufﬁcient to attract highquality workers. Only 20 percent of KTOs hire professional staff such as
patent lawyers.
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Weak incentives for staff at KTOs are related to strong incentives for
researchers. The Technology Transfer and Commercialization
Promotion Act requires a minimum share of license income for
researchers of 50 percent. The actual average share of license income
going to researchers across public research institutes was 40.8 percent in
2014 (KIAT 2016), but this is greater than in advanced countries such as
the U.S. and Germany. It seems that the government is trying to compensate researchers generously because the system for knowledge transfer remains immature, but one consequence is that little or no license
income is available for KTO staff and so they have few incentives to
conclude licensing deals.
The problem of weak KTO capability is exacerbated by the fact that few
public research organizations are willing to provide the knowledge transfer market with high-quality technologies. Instead they prefer to commercialize their best technologies directly using their KTOs.
Nevertheless, the capability of most KTOs at public research organizations is weak, except at ETRI and some leading public research institutes.
Thus, public research organizations are not in a good position to fully
utilize or commercialize high-quality technologies generated in-house,
which decreases the efﬁciency of the knowledge transfer market. One
private knowledge transfer agent identiﬁed this as a major problem in the
Republic of Korea.11
The weak capability of KTOs is mainly due to the Republic of Korea’s
short history12 of knowledge transfer and commercialization. The government mandated many public research organizations to establish
KTOs in the early 2000s, but it takes time for these KTOs to build
capability. During this period, the government should have set up systems whereby private agents could use and commercialize high-quality
technologies developed by public research organizations, but these policies are yet to be realized. Thus, this problem is one side effect of the
government-driven character of the knowledge transfer system.
Weak KTO capability is related to a third challenge, which concerns
the quality of patents. As KTO capability is weak, it is difﬁcult to generate
high-quality patents even when high-quality technologies exist. In particular, professionals such as patent lawyers make up only a small
11

12

This information is based on interviews conducted for the research project report that
preceded this chapter.
Friedman and Silberman (2003) argue that there is a strong relationship between the age
of a KTO and its performance in technology transfer because developing a high-quality
portfolio of inventions takes time.
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proportion of KTO staff, so public research organizations cannot obtain
high-quality services during the patent application process. Even when
public research organizations sign contracts with external professional
staff for patent applications, their budget is very small compared to R&D
expenses and, as such, it is difﬁcult to obtain good services. Most interviewees said the budget per patent draft has stagnated – it has remained at
about KRW 0.5–1 million (less than USD 1,000) per patent for the last
twenty years. This is a very small budget compared to that in the leading
global ﬁrms, which is about KRW 10 million. One interviewee argued
that the budget for drafting each patent application should increase to as
much as KRW 5 million – ﬁve to ten times the current level.13

6.6 Summary and Concluding Remarks
Public research institutes played a signiﬁcant role in economic catch-up
in the Republic of Korea by importing and assimilating foreign technologies and knowledge in the 1970s and early 1980s, and by initiating
public–private joint R&D since the late 1980s and 1990s. Universities
remained less active in this catch-up process until the 2000s. One of the
reasons the Republic of Korea was late in enacting its own version of the
Bayh-Dole Act, in comparison to South Africa or Brazil, was the dominance of businesses possessing higher levels of technological capabilities
and thus demanding and expecting less from universities. Moreover,
these big ﬁrms used to collaborate more with government research
institutes than with universities.
Since the 2000s, knowledge transfer from universities and public
research institutes and its commercialization have become a top policy
issue in the Republic of Korea, as the country’s technology level converges with that of advanced countries and its economy tries to switch to
more science-based or long-cycle-based technology ﬁelds (Lee 2013).
The Technology Transfer Promotion Act 2000 led to an increase in
some quantitative measures of knowledge transfer such as patent applications, and the number of knowledge transfer contracts with public
research institutes increased markedly. However, other measures such
as the ratio of license income to R&D expenses did not increase, and
average license income per transferred technology fell. The government’s
emphasis, until recently, on quantitative measures such as patent

13

This point was noted in interviews with private agents.
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applications led to a rapid increase in patent applications by public
research organizations, but also caused the quality of patents to fall.
The main channels for knowledge transfer in the Republic of Korea
still show some differences from those in advanced countries. The major
channels are collaborative/contract-based R&D between ﬁrms and public
research organizations funded by ﬁrms, which implies no change from
the situation in the 1990s as described in Eom and Lee (2010). Informal
channels, IP licensing and startups are all minor channels. Our research
identiﬁes as one of the most serious problems the fact that the research
outputs of public research organizations do not meet the needs of ﬁrms,
especially SMEs, which have low levels of absorptive capacity.
Furthermore, the typical Korean ﬁrm still prefers in-house R&D to
licensing from public research organizations. When ﬁrms work with
public research organizations, they prefer joint/collaborative R&D to IP
licensing.
Since 2000, the government has tried to “create” a knowledge transfer
market and initiated various polices and projects. The government forced
many public research organizations to have their own KTOs in the early
2000s, but their capability remains weak and the incentive system for
them is not strong. In particular, the fees paid to patent attorneys for
writing and preparing patent application documents have generally been
too low at just KRW 0.5–1 million per patent for the last two decades,
making it very difﬁcult to produce high-quality patents. This problem
means that even high-quality inventions and technologies tend to be
either undersold or not sold at all in IP markets. As such, and given the
abundance of low-quality patents from universities, the typical perception of private ﬁrms is that patents and technologies from universities are
of low quality and not easily commercialized. Thus, domestic ﬁrms have
little interest in obtaining licenses or patents from universities and public
research institutes. A low level of domestic IPR protection is another
reason for this attitude; damages in IP disputes tend to be far lower than
in advanced countries. The knowledge transfer system remains immature
and some of the legacies from the early “developmental state regime”
hinders further development of the knowledge transfer market.
Government policy mandating all public research organizations to
have a KTO had several adverse effects. The KTOs ended up being
small and lacking sufﬁcient resources. Although they had initial monopoly rights in the research outcomes of their organization, these were often
underutilized. This problem of monopoly and related underutilization is
more serious in universities than in research institutes. If the patenting
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and marketing activities for university research outcomes were more
open to capable private agents, rather than being monopolized by university KTOs, there could have been more successful knowledge transfer.
Instead, the KTOs’ monopoly has depressed the private knowledge
transfer market. The government responded by giving higher shares of
license-related income to individual researchers, to strengthen their
incentives to commercialize their work, but this reduced the incentives
available to KTO staff.
In sum, it can be said that the national innovation system in the
Republic of Korea has found it difﬁcult to change from the old catchup mode characterized by the twin dominance of big businesses and the
government. Several important factors for successful knowledge transfer
from public research organizations, as identiﬁed in the literature, are
undeveloped in the Republic of Korea: the importance of demandoriented research, monetary incentives for researchers in terms of license
income, sufﬁcient weight on knowledge transfer outcomes in the performance evaluation of researchers, and high-quality personnel for
KTOs. These are all areas where the Korean system should try to improve
to move beyond the catch-up stage.
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Appendix: Data Sources Used in this Chapter
Nature of the Survey
We conducted an email survey of thirty-one KTO managers at public
research organizations, thirteen at public research institutes and eighteen
at universities (ﬁve of which are technical universities). Ten organizations
are located in Seoul and seven in Daejeon, the two main innovation centers
in Korea. Most leading universities are located in Seoul, while most leading
public research institutes are located in Daedeok special R&D zone (part of
Daejeon). Other locations include Chungcheong province, Gyeongsang
province, Gyeonggi province, Gangwon province, and Jeju island. We
divided the thirty-one organizations into ﬁfteen leading and sixteen
other organizations according to R&D expenditure in 2014. The average
R&D expense was KRW 170,961 million at the leading organizations and
KRW 22,117 million at the others in 2014. The average number of full-time
researchers was 868 at the leading organizations and 249 at the others. Full
details of the responses to our survey are available at www.keunlee.com.

In-Depth Interviews
We also conducted seven interviews between August and October 2016:
three with staff from public research organizations, two with government
ofﬁcials, and two with knowledge transfer experts in the private sector.
These interviews were used to detail the typical knowledge transfer channels.

KIAT Surveys
Another source of data utilized in this paper is the annual national survey
of public research organizations conducted by KIAT (Korea Institute for
Advancement of Technology). Most Korean public research organizations are included in the survey, which had a response rate of 94 percent
in 2014. The survey was ﬁrst conducted in 2007 and focuses on a limited
number of channels for knowledge transfer (technology contracts, startups, and license income), but not the number of research agreements and
use of research facilities of public research organizations by ﬁrms. In
addition, it only covers knowledge transfer to domestic ﬁrms.
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Brazil
f e r n a n d a d e n e g r i an d c r i s t i a n e v i a n n a r a u e n

7.1 Introduction
It is widely recognized that the knowledge production of universities and
research institutions is one of the foundations of economic development.
The experiences of countries such as Japan, the Republic of Korea, the
United States of America (U.S.), and, more recently, China have shown
that successful development results from a combination of good policies,
a sound research and education infrastructure, and productive interaction between that infrastructure and enterprises.
Brazil does not have a strong tradition of interaction between universities/public research institutes and businesses, but the situation has
changed greatly in recent years. The lack of interaction used to be one
of the most frequently noted characteristics of the Brazilian innovation
system. Sutz (2000), for instance, observed a very low level of contact
between the country’s universities and companies. Data consolidated by
De Negri et al. (2009) show that only 14 percent of all research projects
supported by the main source of public funding for science and technology (S&T) in Brazil, the so-called Sectoral Funds, counted companies
among the beneﬁciaries. Although these projects represent around
35 percent of the resources invested by the Sectoral Funds, that is
probably not enough since the aim of the Funds is to support innovation.
However, there has been a notable increase in efforts to support
innovation and facilitate interaction among universities, researchers,
research institutions, and companies in Brazil in recent years. The
2000s witnessed the creation of several policies that transformed the
scenario for innovation in Brazil. From new policies to support R&D
investments by companies to a new regulatory framework for university–
industry interaction, several initiatives were implemented during this
263

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 54.177.185.247, on 15 Nov 2021 at 19:13:31, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/979C0AAA92B1200DCE513DAAE4894BE7

264

de negri & vianna rauen

period. And several new pieces of evidence suggest that these policies
probably did increase the level of interaction between universities and
companies.
This chapter aims to analyze the conditions and policies framing the
interaction between public research institutes and universities and the
business sector in Brazil. Our analysis is based on: (1) a review of the
scholarly literature and Brazilian legislation regarding innovation policies and university–industry interactions; (2) data on IP and related
indicators in ofﬁcial Brazilian government reports; (3) information gathered through questionnaires sent to eighteen Brazilian universities and
research institutions; and (4) in-depth interviews with four selected
Brazilian knowledge transfer ofﬁces (KTOs).
The chapter is composed of ﬁve sections including this introduction.
The second section brieﬂy reviews the key literature on knowledge
transfer in Brazil. The third section gives an overview of the historical
role of universities and public research institutes in the Brazilian innovation system as well as the main policy instruments and mechanisms in
relation to science, technology, and innovation. Section 7.4 analyzes the
main policies and practices adopted by institutions and companies for
knowledge transfer in the country, while the ﬁfth and ﬁnal section
presents our concluding remarks.

7.2 The Literature on University–Industry Relations in Brazil
University–industry interactions are considered an important element of
any national innovation system (NIS) as they are one of the engines of
technological progress and of competence building at the regional and
national levels (Chaves et al. 2015). In Brazil, the view is often advanced
that academia is too remote from the needs of industry.
Albuquerque (1999), for instance, argues that the channels of knowledge transfer are weak in Brazil, impairing the frequency and quality of
university–industry interactions in the country. A combination of two
main factors may explain the weakness of knowledge transfer mechanisms in Brazil: the historical backwardness of Brazilian industrialization
and the relatively late creation of universities and research institutes in
comparison with developed countries (Suzigan and Albuquerque 2011).
Several authors have sought to explain the low level of interaction
between universities/public research institutes and business. Rapini et al.
(2009) argue that it reﬂects a poor pattern of demand from industry.
Indeed, Britto et al. (2015) show that, in comparison with other
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countries, the majority of Brazilian companies – especially the internationalized ones – still do not look to universities to establish any
kind of knowledge transfer in order to promote their innovative
activities.
Dutrénit and Arza (2015) argue that although linkages between universities and ﬁrms in Brazil are fragile, there have been successful cases of
knowledge transfer, including in the steel, petrochemicals, aircraft, and
agro-industry sectors. But despite these success stories, Brazilian NIS is
lagging behind other countries, since there remains a mismatch between
the scientiﬁc side of the system and its productive structure.
Recently, several authors have argued that the level of university–
industry partnership has increased, based on new data from several
sources. Brito Cruz (2015), for instance, found that the volume of
research revenues ﬂowing from companies to some universities in São
Paulo was similar to the average for US universities (around 5 percent of
their research revenues). De Negri and Squeff (2016) also found that
around 43 percent of Brazilian laboratories and research facilities among
a sample of almost 2,000 said they provided some sort of services to
companies.
Several studies have focused on other aspects of university–industry
interactions, such as the main channels and kinds of knowledge transfer,
the main technology areas of transfer, patent statistics, ﬁrm proﬁles, and
the overall incentives and barriers to cooperation.
Póvoa (2008) identiﬁed that the vast majority of Brazilian knowledge
transfer occurs in areas related to engineering and agrarian sciences
(70 percent), and that the companies that received most of the technology
generated by universities and public research institutes belong to what he
called the “processing industry” sector (47.1 percent) – mainly the
manufacturing of food products, chemical products, and machinery
and equipment.
A survey by Chaves et al. (2015) of 1,005 research group leaders at
Brazilian universities showed that ﬁrms do not usually seek interactions
with these institutions in order to obtain high-level research and experimental development. According to them, the most common channels of
knowledge transfer from universities to ﬁrms are training of human
resources, consulting activities, and the provision of routine services
such as measuring, testing, and quality control. Patents and other institutional knowledge exchange channels such as incubators and technology parks still seem to feature rarely in knowledge exchange between
universities/public research institutes and ﬁrms.
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In fact, as observed by Livesey (2014), the belief that patenting is the
best way to transfer new knowledge from universities to companies is no
longer dominant in Brazil, since other routes including spinouts and
consultancy are also now highly regarded.
Based on a survey of 178 leaders of research groups afﬁliated to
Brazilian universities and public research institutes, Póvoa (2008) also
established that the main channels for knowledge transfer in Brazil are
informal. In fact, more than 70 percent of knowledge transfers are based
on “publications and reports,” 46.5 percent are based on “informal
exchange of information,” 43.5 percent on “training and consulting,”
and only 13.7 percent on “patents and licensing.” This emphasis on
informal channels has also been observed in many developed countries
(Mowery et al. 2004).
The same results were reached by de Castro et al. (2014) through
a survey applied to 314 Brazilian ﬁrms that had already established
channels for knowledge transfer with universities and public research
institutes. The majority of respondent ﬁrms said that the most important
knowledge transfer channels for their innovation activities were informal, including publications and reports (68.9 percent), informal information exchanges (62.4 percent), and conferences and seminars
(61.1 percent). Fewer companies (33 percent) considered licensing an
important channel to foster innovation.
Póvoa and Rapini (2010) have shown that, as might be expected, the
type of transfer channel varies according to the type of knowledge
transferred. Patents showed a high correlation with the transfer of
knowledge aimed at obtaining new products, equipment, prototypes,
and materials. However, mechanisms such as consulting and hiring of
personnel were more correlated with new processes and techniques.
This analysis corroborates the conclusions of Póvoa (2008), who
found that the main kinds of technology transferred by universities
and public research institutes to companies were new processes
(44.6 percent), new techniques (43.5 percent), and new products
(28.4 percent).
The results of the studies presented here conﬁrm that, in Brazil,
patenting is not the most relevant type of knowledge transfer between
universities/public research institutes and enterprises, and that informal
channels as well as the regular forms of “open science” are more important than formal ones. Póvoa (2008) showed that the only enterprises able
to manage formal mechanisms of knowledge transfer such as patents
were those with a pre-established capacity to absorb these technologies,
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for example R&D departments and well-trained personnel, and most
Brazilian companies lack such capacity.
De Castro et al. (2014) also argue that patenting is not an important
knowledge transfer channel in Brazil due to ﬁrms’ low capacity to absorb
this kind of knowledge. They believe that ﬁrms prefer to access cheaper
kinds of knowledge such as knowledge in the public domain (e.g.,
seminars and reports) as well as forms of collaborative research that
could complement their relatively weak R&D.
By way of contrast, Dos Santos et al. (2009) emphasize the importance
of KTOs associated with universities and public research institute in
guaranteeing the professionalization and success of the transfer of knowledge and technologies between these organizations and interested
companies.
The Brazilian literature on knowledge transfer also emphasizes the
importance of implementing policies to encourage a strong patenting
culture in universities and public research institutes. Póvoa (2008), for
instance, showed that between 1999 and 2003, the top ﬁfty patent applicants in Brazil included eight Brazilian universities and four Brazilian
public research institutes – accounting for nearly one-quarter of those
top applicants. The main technological domains in which universities
and public research institutes patented during this period were measurement and control (14.2 percent), organic chemistry (9.3 percent), and
biotechnology (7.5 percent), which Póvoa saw as demonstrating
a signiﬁcant contribution of universities to “science-based” sectors.
Póvoa also showed that between 1996 and 2004, the total number of
university patent applications increased by about 700 percent. He thinks
this rise is in large part attributable to the introduction of the Industrial
Property Law in 1996 (Brasil 1996), which brought signiﬁcant changes to
patenting activities in Brazil. In addition to expanding the range of
patentable inventions, the Law allowed researchers to share in the economic gains derived from the exploitation of university patents.
Some scholars believe that the Brazilian Innovation Act 2004 (Brasil
2004) also spurred the increase in patenting activities by universities and
public research institutes, especially by formalizing the KTOs associated
with these institutions, charged, among other things, with managing
patenting activities. According to Pereira and Mello (2015), the main
reason for the increase in the number of patenting activities by universities in recent decades is the professionalization of the industrial property management carried out by the KTOs.
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On the other hand, a survey of thirty-three Brazilian KTOs by Livesey
(2014) revealed that they tended to be small structures with just seven
staff on average, only two of whom have advanced degrees and one of
whom is an IP specialist. Less than one-third (29 percent) of the KTOs
surveyed believed they had the technical skills required to manage knowledge transfer, compared to nearly half (45 percent) who did not. The
largest deﬁcit was found in commercial skills, with only 13 percent of
respondents saying they had the necessary skills in this area to be
effective.
Livesey (2014) considers that KTOs should be more integrated into
universities in order to better perform knowledge transfer to enterprises.
In fact, his study showed that KTOs felt marginalized and disconnected
from the organizations they were trying to serve. Over half of respondents (54 percent) did not believe they had the necessary support and
funding, and nearly two-thirds (63 percent) did not believe that knowledge transfer was an established part of their university’s strategy.
The conﬁdence of KTOs that they had the skills required to manage
technology varied by region. Livesey’s survey revealed that, while only
20 percent of KTOs in the northeast of the country believed they had the
necessary legal skills, this ﬁgure reached 60 percent among KTOs in the
southeast and almost 40 percent among those in the south. In relation to
technical skills, none of the northeastern respondents thought they had
the necessary skills to manage knowledge transfer, whereas almost 40 percent of their southern counterparts and 20 percent of those in the
southeast expressed conﬁdence. Finally, regarding commercial skills,
KTOs from the southeast showed the lowest level of conﬁdence (10 percent), followed by those from the south (over 10 percent), and the
northeast (20 percent).
Regional differences are also noticeable as regards KTOs’ preferred
knowledge transfer routes. Broadening the discussion on knowledge
transfer from licensing and consulting, Livesey (2014) found that half
the KTOs in the south agreed that spinouts were the best way to transfer
a technology, whereas those from the northeast and southeast were less
likely to endorse this view (20 percent and 30 percent, respectively).
Livesey noted that his survey showed that the south was also the region
with the largest number of links to venture capital.
Regarding patenting activity, Pinheiro-Machado and Oliveira (2004)
revealed that patenting by Brazilian universities increased twice as
quickly as in US universities in the period 1990–2001. However, they
argued that the performance of Brazil’s universities was impaired by poor

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 54.177.185.247, on 15 Nov 2021 at 19:13:31, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/979C0AAA92B1200DCE513DAAE4894BE7

b raz il

269

performance on the part of the KTOs: “[A] signiﬁcant fraction of
Brazilian academic patent applications remains abandoned due to the
lack of specialized staff to help in writing and to shepherd the application
through the patenting process in universities.”
Along with the launch of the Industrial Property Law (1996) and the
Innovation Act (2004), Chaves et al. (2015) consider that the Brazilian
government has implemented other important measures to stimulate
university–industry interactions since the mid-1990s, including the
establishment of new lines of S&T funding such as the abovementioned Sectoral Funds and the use of tax breaks for ﬁrms that
propose joint R&D projects with universities and public research
institutes.
Undeniably, these institutional changes have become important mechanisms to encourage patenting activities by Brazilian universities, as
observed in statistics for recent decades and in the results of the interviews presented in Section 7.4. But while the performance of universities
and public research institutes in recent years represents a remarkable
achievement of Brazilian S&T and industrial policies, Albuquerque
(2003) argues that the relative strength of these institutions in patenting
activities exposes the comparative fragility of Brazil’s industrial structure,
especially as regards business investment in R&D activities.
According to Póvoa (2008), patents owned jointly by universities and
companies represented around 6 percent of patent applications by universities in the period 1979–2004. While this proportion may seem small,
it is close to that observed in several European countries in the period
1978–2002: 11.5 percent in the case of German universities, 10.2 percent
in the case of French universities, and 9.4 percent in the case of UK
universities (Ruiz 2005, cited in Póvoa 2008).
Póvoa (2008) also showed that most of the patents jointly owned by
Brazilian universities in this period were deposited by three universities
based in São Paulo State: USP (thirteen joint-ownership patents),
Unicamp (twelve), and Universidade Federal de São Carlos (UFSCar)
(eleven). The main technological ﬁelds for joint patenting were optical
technologies and telecommunications. Petrobrás was the company with
the largest number of patent applications made jointly with universities
in the period.
An analysis of patent ﬁlings by public universities in São Paulo State
from 1995 to 2006 by Amadei and Torkomian (2009) conﬁrms that the
number of joint ﬁlings was not signiﬁcant. According to them, during
this period the universities were the sole patent holders of more than
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80 percent of their total ﬁlings. They argue that given the considerable
contribution made by the patent indicators in the construction of
national innovation policy, there is a need for a more user-friendly
national patent database with the possibility to consult more up-to-date
indicators integrated with existing ones to help interested ﬁrms identify
the technologies available at universities.
These statistics represent the evolution of an important formal channel of knowledge transfer in the last decades, but as noted earlier, not all
kinds of knowledge transfer from universities to companies result in an
attempt to obtain a new invention. According to Rapini (2007), such
formal transfers represent only a small portion of the possible university–industry interaction: “[N]ot every invention is patentable or
patented.”
Curiously, in spite of what is traditionally expected from this kind of
interaction, Póvoa (2008) showed that in Brazil, a signiﬁcant number of
the knowledge transfers analyzed (slightly more than one-third) were
motivated by the leaders of universities’ research groups interested in
private funding opportunities for new lines of research.
Póvoa (2008) also showed that universities, as opposed to public
research institutes, were responsible for 88.1 percent of the total number
of technologies transferred to enterprises. The only area in which the
public research institutes stood out was agronomy, which accounted for
24 percent of all knowledge transfers, especially due to the prominent
role of Embrapa in national agronomy research.
Telles (2011) identiﬁed that public research institutes were responsible
for presenting new applied research to companies. In the cases he analyzed, it was public research institutes that proposed new technological
projects to companies as well as ﬁnancing many project expenses using
their own resources. Public research institutes thus also emerge as institutions inducing knowledge transfer in Brazil. Telles attributes the proactivity of the public research institutes in their interactions with ﬁrms to
the fact that governments usually use these institutes as an instrument to
promote the development of speciﬁc national sectors.
But while universities and public research institutes are responsible for
determining the research agenda for cooperation with companies,
according to Porto et al. (2011), most university–business interaction in
Brazil is focused on short- and medium-term technological development
aimed at solving ﬁrms’ technological problems.
In fact, university and industry partners express divergent interests
and perceptions about their interaction and relationship. Bearing this
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in mind, Closs and Ferreira (2012) aimed to identify the factors that
facilitate university–industry interactions in Brazil and those that jeopardize them. From a review of the literature on knowledge transfer in
Brazil from 2005 to 2009, they concluded that among the motivations
for university–industry cooperation, the ones related to ﬁnancial
resources stand out. On the one hand, universities increasingly need
private resources to ﬁnance new areas of research in the face of
a reduction of public resources in recent decades. On the other hand,
ﬁrms want to save costs in implementing new technologies by accessing infrastructure and professional consultancy provided by
universities.
The importance of cost concerns in motivating university–industry
cooperation is also corroborated by Porto et al. (2011), who analyzed
information from 2,623 Brazilian companies and 1,663 research groups –
distributed in 193 research organizations (universities and public
research institutes) – that carried out joint technology projects in 2003
and 2004. According to the authors: “[T]he increase in R&D spending by
companies and research institutes leads to the search for cost dilution
instruments and, consequently, encourages cooperation between companies and universities.”
Rauen and Turchi (2017) found that access to public funding is
important to stimulate companies to look for university cooperation.
As will be discussed in Section 7.4, they found that there is a seasonal
component in the companies’ demand for support from public research
organizations which correlates with the periods in which development
agencies publish funding notices.
As regards barriers to the promotion of university–industry interactions, Rapini et al. (2009) emphasize some noted above, such as excessive bureaucracy and legal uncertainty, difﬁculties in establishing
contractual agreements with ﬁrms, and a lack of staff with specialized
knowledge transfer skills.
The studies analyzed by Closs and Ferreira (2012) highlighted a range
of problem factors from the ﬁrms’ point of view, such as legal uncertainty
and excessive bureaucracy, noncompliance with project deadlines, a lack
of information security, and a lack of project management skills. From
the universities’ point of view, challenges included the need to establish
reward mechanisms for researchers and teachers to engage in projects
with ﬁrms, excessive university bureaucracy, backwardness in the execution of contracts or the registration of patents, and the fact that the
evaluation of researchers and teachers is still based on their record of
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scientiﬁc publication, not on patents or any other kind of knowledge
transfer to ﬁrms.

7.3 The Role of Universities and Public Research Institutes in the
Brazilian Innovation System
As noted earlier, Brazil has undertaken several actions and introduced
new policies to reinforce its scientiﬁc and innovative capacity over the
last two decades. One of the most important policies was the creation of
the Sectoral Funds in 1999, to be operated and managed by the innovation agency Finep. The Sectoral Funds were designed to have several
different revenue sources in order to ensure stable long-term public
funding for S&T. These revenues included a share of royalties from the
oil sector, a special levy on gas and other sector-speciﬁc taxes. At the time
they were introduced, instability was considered one of the most serious
problems in S&T funding in Brazil, and the creation of the Sectoral Funds
was seen as a promising attempt to overcome this challenge.
Besides assuring stable S&T funding, the Funds were also intended to
foster innovation in the Brazilian economy, focusing on research projects
related to technological challenges in speciﬁc sectors. This objective was
prompted by the low level of interaction between universities, research
institutions, and the country’s productive industry. The revenues of each
fund were intended to support R&D related to the sector for which that
fund was created. These sectors include oil, mining, health, infrastructure, agriculture, aeronautics, biotechnology, information, and communication, and there are also funds designed to foster cross-sectional
projects and research facilities.
In the early 2000s, growing recognition of the economic importance of
innovation resulted in a series of new policies intended to create incentives for R&D investments and a more up-to-date framework for S&T
and innovation. The Innovation Act (Law no. 10,973 of 2004) was
introduced to improve the innovation system and empower linkages
between different actors. One of the major breakthroughs of the Act
was the possibility for the government to provide grants1 to companies
for investments in innovation, which was not previously allowed under
Brazilian law. The Act also established a clear regulatory framework for
1

Grants are nonrepayable money given by the government to a recipient to perform
a speciﬁc research project. The recipient may be a nonproﬁt entity, an educational
institution, a business, or an individual. To receive a grant, it is often necessary to submit
a proposal or application in a competitive process.
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the interaction between universities/public research institutes and companies, and for the IP rights arising from such interaction.
Finally, in 2005 the so-called Good Law (Lei do Bem, Law no. 11.196, of
2005) implemented tax breaks for ﬁrms that invest in R&D in the
country. Such tax incentives could reach up to half the total amount
invested in R&D by companies.
Both the Innovation Act and the Good Law were implemented in the
context of the ﬁrst industrial policy of President Lula’s government in
2003: the PITCE (Industrial, Technological, and Foreign Trade Policy).
After the PITCE, two new editions of this industrial policy were
launched: the Productive Development Policy in 2008 and the Greater
Brazil Plan in 2010, right after the global ﬁnancial crisis. In these two last
versions, the main measure adopted to encourage innovation was the
Innovate Company Program (Programa Inova Empresa), introduced
within the Greater Brazil Plan (Plano Brasil Maior), taking advantage
of a small share of the resources meant for the Investment Maintenance
Program (PSI).
These various new policies together created a relatively comprehensive
framework of innovation policies in terms of the diversity of instruments
(see Table 7.1). Currently, the country can count on many of the instruments used in most of the developed world to foster innovation, such as
subsidized credit/loans,2 tax incentives, grants for companies, and grants
for research projects and individuals at universities and research centers,
among others.
Regarding direct public investments in S&T, according to the Brazilian
Ministry of Science, Technology, and Innovation,3 in 2012 the Brazilian
public sector (federal and subnational governments) spent around BRL
40 billion (around USD 20 billion) on science and technology. About
40 percent of the S&T public investment is attached at maintaining
postgraduate courses and institutions at federal and state levels. Of the
remaining BRL 25 billion (USD 13 billion), about BRL 18 billion (or USD
9.4 billion) was invested by the federal government.
An important share of public S&T investment is devoted to building
and maintaining the country’s research infrastructure and facilities. In
the last few years, Brazil’s S&T infrastructure has received substantial
resources from several sources, notably the Infrastructure Sectoral Fund,
2

3

Loans for innovation at below market interest rates are provided by both the National
Development Bank (BNDES) and by the Brazilian Innovation Agency (Finep).
Indicators available at www.mctic.gov.br/mctic/opencms/indicadores/indicadores_cti
.html (only in Portuguese).
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Table 7.1 Main policies and instruments for S&T funding in Brazil in
2012
Policies and
instruments
Tax incentives for
innovation
Public credit/loans for
innovation
(disbursements in
the year)

Public investments
in S&T

Finep
BNDES
Total (public
credit)
States (excluding
postgraduate
programs)
Federal
government
(excluding
postgraduate
programs)
Total (excluding
postgraduate
programs)
Total (with
postgraduate
programs)

Value in 2012
(current BRL)

Current USD
(USD 1 = R$1.95)

6,423

3,294

1,800
2,200
4,000

923
1,128
2,051

7,034

3,607

18,388

9,430

25,422

13,037

40,045

20,536

Sources: Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation (MCTI) – www
.mctic.gov.br/mctic/opencms/indicadores/indicadores_cti.html; National Bank
for Social and Economic Development (BNDES) – Annual Report/2013; Brazilian
Innovation Agency (Finep); Electricity Regulatory Agency (ANEEL); National
Petroleum Agency (ANP) – Statistical Yearbook/2013. Extracted and adapted from
Zuniga et al. (2016)

also known as CT-Infra.4 Signiﬁcant resources have also been provided
under the Coordination for the Improvement of Higher Education
Personnel (Capes) program of the Ministry of Education (MEC), by
4

CT-Infra was created to enable the modernization and expansion of the infrastructure and
support services of all the Brazilian higher education and research institutions. Its
resources are earmarked for the construction and renovation of laboratories, and the
purchase of equipment, among other actions.
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Table 7.2 Number of research infrastructures in Brazil by launch period

Period
Pre-1970
1970–9
1980–9
1990–9
2000–9
2010–12
Total

Number of infrastructures launched
50
110
193
410
654
343
1,760

Number of infrastructures launched as a share
of all infrastructures (%)
2.8
6.3
11.0
23.3
37.2
19.5
100

Source: IPEA/CNPq/MCTI – Research Infrastructure Mapping in Brazil (2013).
Extracted from De Negri and Squeff (2016)

state foundations that support research, and by companies such as
Petrobrás (De Negri, Cavalcante, and Alves 2015).
In fact, it is safe to say that the country’s research infrastructure5 is now
much more up to date than it was few years ago. De Negri and Squeff
(2016) show that most laboratories and research facilities (56.7 percent)
began operation since 2000 (Table 7.2) and argue that this fact could be
related to an increase in investments in science, technology, and innovation from the middle of the 2000s until 2014.6 The authors conducted
a survey with around 2,000 researchers in charge of research laboratories
at Brazilian universities and research institutions in 2012. More than
70 percent of respondents said they had received signiﬁcant investments
in the ﬁve years preceding the survey, and many reported signiﬁcant
investment within the past year.
However, according to De Negri and Squeff (2016), most of the
research facilities in Brazil are small laboratories scattered across the
5

6

For the purposes of this chapter, the concept of research “infrastructure” refers to “the set
of physical facilities and material conditions of support (equipment and resources) used by
researchers to carry out R&D activities.” The term thus covers everything from laboratories to biotools, high-performance computer networks, specialized libraries, observatories,
telescopes, research vessels, experimental stations, and so on (De Negri and Squeff
2016: 17).
De Negri and Squeff (2016) is based on a pioneering survey carried out in 2013 by Ipea,
CNPq, and the MCTI which collected information about 2,000 research facilities in more
than 130 universities and research institutions in Brazil.
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Table 7.3 Number of universities, research universities, and federal
technological institutions in Brazil in 2015
Research
universities*
Federal institutions
State institutions
Municipal
institutions
Private institutions
Total

Universities
(university
centers)

63
38
6

1
8

88
195

140
149

Federal
technological
institutions
40

40

Total
103
39
14
228
384

Source: National Institute for Educational Studies and Research – INEP (2016)
*
Research universities are universities obliged to perform research and some sort
of social activities as well as teaching. The universities (in Portuguese, “university
centers”) are not obliged to perform research, and there are also 1,980 colleges in
Brazil (not listed in the table) which teach but do not research. The federal
technological institutions focus on professional and technological education.

departments of the big Brazilian universities. Although the country has
some important research institutions, they are few and most of them are
small when compared to the national laboratories or similar large scientiﬁc facilities of some other countries. There are 7,090 researchers working in Brazil’s 1,760 research infrastructures, an average of just four per
laboratory.
Brazil has more than 2,300 higher education institutions, including
universities, schools, and federal institutes, as well as several research
centers. While there are roughly as many private education institutes as
public ones, the importance of the latter in science and technology
production is much greater than that of the former.
The number of higher education institutions has grown sharply over
the last decade, from fewer than 1,400 in 2000. Between 2000 and 2013,
the Brazilian federal government and the states created eighty-nine new
higher education institutions, mostly research or technical universities –
growth of more than 150 percent in the number of public institutions
within ﬁfteen years.
It is widely recognized in Brazil that the most relevant research universities in the country are public, although the number of good private
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universities is believed to have grown in recent decades. Among the
country’s higher education institutions, 193 can be considered research
universities, most of which are federal or state ones. The private sector is
mostly present in colleges and in so-called university centers, where there
is no obligation to perform scientiﬁc research.
To identify the biggest public research universities in the country,
Table 7.4 shows the amount of R&D investments performed by these
institutions. The three biggest universities in São Paulo are responsible
alone for more than half of all R&D investment by the country’s ﬁfteen
biggest public research universities. The University of São Paulo, besides
being Brazil’s biggest university in terms of budget, is also its main
university in terms of academic publications as well as the best placed
in several national and world rankings.
Public research institutes also play a very important role in the
Brazilian S&T system and the biggest ones, based on their budget information in 2014, are shown in Table 7.5. The two biggest are also the most
important public research institutes in the country. The Oswaldo Cruz
Foundation is a public research institution attached to the Ministry of
Health and is responsible for a range of activities such as R&D, production of vaccines and drugs, education and training, hospital care services, and quality control of products and services. The institution was
created in 1900 and today has over 11,000 employees and health
professionals.
The Brazilian Agriculture Research Corporation (Embrapa) is also
very important within the Brazilian innovation system. Embrapa is
a public company created in 1973 under the stewardship of the
Ministry of Agriculture with the objective of developing science and
technology applied to the Brazilian farming sector. Today, it has more
than 9,000 employees and about 2,400 researchers working in more than
sixty units around the country.
The Butantan Institute (Instituto Butantan), created in 1901, is linked
to the State of São Paulo. Today, the Institute is the main producer of
immunobiologicals in Brazil and responsible for a big share of the
national production of vaccines and hyperimmune serums used by the
Brazilian Ministry of Health. Besides producing immunobiologicals, the
Butantan Institute also maintains zoological scientiﬁc collections and
performs basic and applied research on venomous animals and pathogenic agents, and the production and control of immunobiological products. The Institute is currently involved in the research and development
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Table 7.4 R&D investment by the main public universities in Brazil in
2012

Name
USP
UNICAMP
UNESP

UFRJ
UFMG
UNB
UFRGS
UFSC
UNIFESP
UFC
UFPE
UERJ
UFPR
UFF
UFBA

Universidade de São Paulo
Universidade Estadual de
Campinas
Universidade Estadual
Paulista “Júlio de
Mesquita Filho”
Universidade Federal do
Rio de Janeiro
Universidade Federal de
Minas Gerais
Universidade de Brasília
Universidade Federal do
Rio Grande do Sul
Universidade Federal de
Santa Catarina
Universidade Federal de
São Paulo
Universidade Federal do
Ceará
Universidade Federal de
Pernambuco
Universidade do Estado do
Rio de Janeiro
Universidade Federal do
Paraná
Universidade Federal
Fluminense
Universidade Federal da
Bahia

R&D investments (USD
million)*

Ownership

State

1,715.71
634.59

State
State

SP
SP

415.31

State

SP

371.48

Federal

RJ

251.58

Federal

MG

235.89
224.63

Federal
Federal

DF
RS

191.23

Federal

SC

177.42

Federal

SP

136.05

Federal

CE

126.79

Federal

PE

125.97

State

RJ

125.30

Federal

PR

116.93

Federal

RJ

103.27

Federal

BA

Source: Ministry of Science, Technology, Innovation and Communications www
.mctic.gov.br/mctic/opencms/indicadores/indicadores_cti.html, accessed
September 2016
*
Exchange rate: R$/USD = 2.04, 31/12/2012.
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Table 7.5 Budget or revenues of the main public research institutes in
Brazil in 2014
Public research institute

Budget/revenues (USD thousands)

Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (Fiocruz) (1)
Brazilian Agriculture Research
Corporation (Embrapa)
Butantan Institute
Brazilian Center for Research in Energy
and Materials (CNPEM)(2)
IPT – Institute for Technological
Research(3)
National Institute for Pure and Applied
Mathematics (IMPA)
National Institute for Space Research
(INPE)
Center for Natural Disaster Monitoring
and Alert (CEMADEN)
National Institute for Amazonian
Research (INPA)

1,609,803
1,076,427
411,370
78,631
63,712
42,580
40,909
31,420
13,989

Source: http://odimpact.org/case-brazils-open-budget-transparency-portal.html
Brazil’s Open Budget Transparency Portal (www.portaltransparencia.gov.br/) and
Ministry of Science, Technology, Innovation and Communications (MCTIC),
accessed September 2016
About half this budget is not spent on R&D.
(1)

Includes not only research but also teaching and manufacturing of medicines.
Data from 2015 (exchange rate BRL/USD = 2.65). Includes the budget for
investment in a new synchrotron light source (around USD 31 million in 2015) and
other special projects. The normal budget for the institution is around USD
30 million.
(3)
Includes the baseline public budget (about 35 percent) and revenues from
technological services (65 percent).
(2)

of a vaccine for Dengue fever and the Zika virus. Last, it offers graduate
courses in its areas of expertise.
The Brazilian Center for Research in Energy and Materials (CNPEM) is
a quasi-public organization, very similar to the federally owned and privately
operated National Laboratories in the U.S. It is linked to the Ministry of
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Science, Technology, Innovation, and Communications7 (MCTIC) and has
seventy-ﬁve in-house researchers. The facilities of CNPEM were used by
almost 2,000 researchers in 2014. Probably the most used facility is the
synchrotron light source, which is used by researchers from all over the
country as well as other countries. MCTIC has other quasi-public research
organizations attached to it, for instance the National Institute for Pure and
Applied Mathematics (IMPA) and the National Education and Research
Network (RNP).
The organizations mentioned above – universities and public research
institutes – are the most important research institutions in the country
and are responsible for a large share of Brazilian scientiﬁc publications, as
one can see in the Scimago ranking of Brazilian universities and research
institutions.
The public universities and research institutions are also very relevant
in terms of patenting. By way of context, in Brazil, as in other middleincome countries, most patent applications come from non-residents
(80 percent).8 Applications from residents are distributed almost equally
among private individuals – independent inventors, university
researchers, and professors, and so on – and institutions, comprising
companies including foreign-owned subsidiaries, universities, public and
private research institutions, nonproﬁt organizations, and so on.
The institutions account for around 10 percent of total patent applications, of which around 30 percent are ﬁled by the public sector or by
teaching or research institutions. Indeed, Brazilian universities and
research institutions have increased their share of patent applications to
the National Institute of Industrial Property (INPI) sharply, from 0.6 percent in 2000 to 2.7 percent in 2012 (Table 7.6).
As we noted earlier, some authors argue that this growth was encouraged by the Industrial Property Law in 1996 (Póvoa 2008), particularly
the possibilities it offered for researchers to share in the economic gains
from patents. Others believe that the Innovation Act of 2004 is mainly
responsible. Most likely, both laws as well as other, more minor
7

8

Since May 2016, when the Ministry of Science, Technology, and Innovation was merged
with the Ministry of Communications.
The concept of non-resident and resident application is as used by the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) and available at www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/statistics/gloss
ary.html. According to WIPO, a resident application is “an application ﬁled with an IP
ofﬁce by an applicant residing in the country/region in which that ofﬁce has jurisdiction.”
In that sense, an application to the Brazilian patent ofﬁce by a foreign subsidiary installed
in Brazil would be considered a resident application and an application from its headquarters would be a nonresident one.
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Table 7.6 Number of patents ﬁled by Brazilian universities and research institutions at the National Institute of
Industrial Property, 2000–12
University/institution
Universidade Estadual de Campinas – UNICAMP
Universidade de São Paulo – USP
Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais – UFMG
Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro – UFRJ
Universidade Federal do Paraná – UFPR
Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul – UFRGS
Serviço Nacional de Aprendizagem Industrial – SENAI
Fundação Universidade de Brasília – UNB
Universidade Federal da Bahia – UFBA
Universidade Federal de Pelotas – UFPEL
Total patent applications by universities and research
institutions (A)
Total patents ﬁled at INPI by residents (B)
Total patents ﬁled at INPI (C)
Universities and public research institute ﬁlings as a share of
total ﬁlings (A/C) (%)
Resident ﬁlings as a share of total ﬁings (B/C) (%)
Universities and public research institute ﬁlings as a share of
resident ﬁlings (A/B) (%)

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

36
6
6
2
1
5
1
2
0
0
115

55
11
21
23
1
11
0
0
0
0
219

49
15
18
24
7
10
2
4
0
1
264

53
26
30
14
12
4
1
4
0
1
318

48
53
38
29
17
9
3
7
4
1
440

45
47
59
27
21
23
20
6
16
0
590

67
58
64
16
68
30
20
21
22
17
904

6,449
20,854
0.6

7,052
20,334
1.1

7,701
20,431
1.3

7,194
23,152
1.4

7,711
26,641
1.7

7,244
28,099
2.1

7808
33,569
2.7

31
2

35
3

38
3

31
4

29
6

26
8

23
12

Source: National Institute of Industrial Property (INPI): http://www.inpi.gov.br/estatisticas/anuario-estatistico-de-propriedadeindustrial-2000–2012-patente1#patente
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institutional improvements are important in explaining the increasing
role of universities and public research institutes in patenting.
In any case, one of the consequences of this growth is that the list of the
twenty leading patent applicants in Brazil in 2015 featured ﬁfteen public
universities, only four companies, and one private research institution:
the Telecom Research and Development Center (CPqD in the
Portuguese acronym).
This once again highlights the importance of public institutions in the
Brazilian innovation system. Indeed, in Table 7.6 one can see that among
the ten leading universities and research institutions applying for patents
in Brazil between 2000 and 2012, there is only one private research
institution. The Brazilian National Service for Industrial Training
(SENAI) is a nonproﬁt organization funded by industry organizations
that originally aimed to train workers for industry. In recent years, it has
become increasingly concerned with innovation, having established several research institutions across the country. As a result, it increased its
number of patents ﬁlings from around two per year to around twenty
per year between 2010 and 2012. According to Table 7.6, the most
prominent universities in terms of patent ﬁlings are UNICAMP, USP,
UFMG, UFRJ, and, more recently, UFPR. Pereira and Mello (2015),
analyzing the period from 1979 to 2011, reached the same conclusions.
However, a large number of patents registered by universities and
research institutions does not in itself prove the market value or relevance
of the knowledge they produce. Many of the patents ﬁled and registered
by universities may never be transferred to companies. For instance,
although Unicamp is one of the country’s major patent applicants, it
has licensed only eighty-seven of its 1,000+ patents in the past two
decades. At MIT, by contrast, around 40 percent of the patents obtained
are licensed every year (Reynolds and De Negri, 2017).
The latest Brazilian Innovation Survey (PINTEC/IBGE 2014) reveals that
only 2.3 percent of innovative ﬁrms consider interaction with universities
and public research institutes, and, in particular, the existence of cooperation agreements with them, to be highly important for innovation (Table
7.7).9 The industries that are the leading users of knowledge produced by
universities and research institutions according to the Survey are: research
and development (44 percent), electricity and gas services (33 percent),
9

Wunsch-Vincent (2012: Figure 3) provides data on collaboration between private companies and universities or public research institutes in several countries. Brazil emerges as
one of the countries with the lowest rates of collaboration.
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Table 7.7 Firms that innovated using a cooperation agreement with
a university or public research institute in 2014

Sector
Total
Research and
development
Electricity and gas
services
Manufacture of
computer
equipment
Manufacture of
chemical
products
Manufacture of
pharmaceutical
products
Manufacture of
computer,
electronic and
optical
products

Innovative
ﬁrms

Firms with
cooperation
agreements
with other
organizations

Firms that rate cooperation
with universities/PROs as
highly important

47,693
18

7,300
15

1,098
8

2.3 percent
44 percent

137

75

45

33 percent

156

72

38

24 percent

196

80

37

19 percent

204

91

36

18 percent

1,053

317

117

11 percent

Source: Brazilian Innovation Survey (PINTEC – 2014). Brazilian Institute of
Geography and Statistics (IBGE)

manufacture of computer equipment (24 percent), manufacture of chemical
products (19 percent), manufacture of pharmaceutical products (18 percent), and manufacture of computer, electronic, and optical products
(11 percent). Importantly, most ﬁrms that consider interaction with universities and public research institutes to be highly important belong to sectors
with a medium or high technology intensity. In addition, ﬁrms from
regulated sectors such as electricity and gas services must comply with
rules established in the concession agreements, for example contractual
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R&D clauses,10 which oblige them to invest a percentage of their revenues in
R&D activities in partnership with universities and research institutes in
Brazil.

7.4 Policies and Institutional Practices for Knowledge
Transfer in Brazil
This section is based on several interviews with researchers and KTOs
and on questionnaires sent to more than ten KTOs in Brazil. The
interviews and questionnaires were intended to collect information in
order to identify the types of procedure and practice used by the institutions and KTOs to transfer knowledge.

7.4.1 Legal Framework
The main regulation regarding the relationship between public research
institutes, universities and companies in Brazil is provided by the
Innovation Act (Law no. 10,973 of 2004). This law aims to promote
partnerships between such institutions and companies in order to foster
innovation in the country. As regards IP rights speciﬁcally, prior to the
Innovation Act, the Brazilian Intellectual Property Law approved in 1996
guaranteed that universities and public research institutes would own
patents generated inside the institution.
However, the Innovation Act goes much further in regulating and
fostering knowledge transfer between universities, public research institutes, and companies. For the ﬁrst time in Brazil, this law allowed public
institutions – public research institutes or universities – to sign knowledge transfer contracts with companies, and established some basic rules
for such contracts. These include rules regarding exclusive licenses,
which the original version of the Act required be preceded by an open
call. Recently, the Science and Technology Act (Law no. 13.243 of 2016)
has changed some of the requirements for public research institutes and
universities signing exclusive agreements with companies. Exclusive
agreements originating from a prior partnership with a speciﬁc company
10

By way of example, the Resolution of the Oil National Agency (ANP 2005) establishes that
oil and gas concessionaires must invest in Brazil the equivalent of 1 percent of their gross
revenue in carrying out R&D, and at least half this amount must be expenses incurred in
R&D partnerships with universities and research institutes previously accredited by the
ANP for this purpose. A similar Resolution established by the National Electric Energy
Agency (Aneel) applies to concessionaires of the electrical sector.
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have been simpliﬁed. However, this law has also introduced a series of
new requirements that reduce the autonomy of a public research institute
or university in negotiating such contracts.
The emphasis of the Innovation Act on fostering knowledge transfer
is revealed by seven chapters dedicated to promoting the so-called
“cooperative environments of innovation.” A special role is accorded
to public-based research organizations – universities and public
research institutes – in the cooperative production of new technologies
with ﬁrms.
To ensure such engagement, the Act sets out the speciﬁc formal
channels through which universities and public research institutes are
expected to support ﬁrms in the production of new technologies:
• Article 4 provides for (a) sharing university and public research institute laboratories and facilities with SMEs in incubation activities, and
(b) granting private companies access to laboratories, equipment and
facilities for R&D activities.
• Article 6 allows universities and public research institutes to sign
knowledge transfer and IP licensing contracts based on technologies
developed by the institution or in partnership and establishes the basic
rules for those contracts.
• Article 8 foresees the provision of technical services by universities and
public research institutes to private ﬁrms engaged in R&D activities,
such as tests, trials and calibrations, as well as technical reports.
• Article 9 allows universities and public research institutes to enter into
partnership agreements with ﬁrms aimed at developing new technologies together.
To encourage university and public research institute staff (mostly
government researchers) to engage in such interactions, the Innovation
Act states that these institutions may be ﬁnancially compensated by ﬁrms
for such activities, and any of their staff involved may also be ﬁnancially
compensated through an additional variable payment or an “innovation
stimulus scholarship.”
The Act also stipulates that each research organization should establish
its own knowledge transfer and innovation policies creating guidelines
for entrepreneurship, innovation, knowledge transfer, and so on. Indeed,
the existence of a KTO in each public research institute or university is
a requirement of the Act and it sets out the basic competences of a KTO.
This was controversial, since even universities with a low technology
focus were obliged to establish a KTO. The requirement was relaxed
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recently and the law was modiﬁed to allow KTOs to be created in
association with other universities or public research institutes.
The Innovation Act represented a major change in the Brazilian
landscape for innovation. However, there are still a lot of improvements
to be made and a lot of uncertainty regarding its application. Prompted
by concerns about uncertainty, excessive bureaucracy and overlapping
laws in the Brazilian legal framework for innovation, the New Science
and Technology Act (Law no. 13.243 of 2016) was recently enacted to
consolidate several different pieces of legislation affecting innovation.
This new act aimed to promote the modernization of the legal framework
as well as reducing constraints on the implementation of university–
industry partnerships.
The possibilities and stimulus mechanisms established by the Innovation
Act in 2004 notwithstanding, university–industry interaction remains low in
Brazil. One oft-cited barrier is the legal uncertainty that surrounds the
Brazilian innovation legal framework (Rapini et al. 2009; Closs and Ferreira
2012; Rauen 2016). Three particular aspects of legal uncertainty in the
Innovation Act should be highlighted: (1) the management of private
resources received by universities and public research institutes as compensation for their involvement in innovation activities (since they are part of
central government administration, universities and public research institutes do not enjoy autonomy in managing private resources); (2) the difﬁculty of implementing ﬁnancial compensation for university and public
research institute researchers involved in innovation activities, since
the law does not clearly state how such beneﬁts should be granted; and
(3) the still-limited role of KTOs – a situation that undermines their
capacity to generate and implement new university and public research
institute partnerships.
Recognizing the legal uncertainty in these areas, the 2016 Science and
Technology Act introduced signiﬁcant reforms to the Innovation Act. As
regards university/public research institute–enterprise interaction, it
aimed to strengthen and empower KTOs and establish clearer processes
for managing private resources to reward institutions engaging in innovation activities. However, it has not clariﬁed the law on compensation for
public researchers, and so it seems unlikely to succeed in reducing the
difﬁculties faced by universities and public research institutes in managing rewards for researchers involved in such activities.
In sum, there is still scope to improve the Brazilian Innovation Act and
complementary laws and practices in order to further reduce legal uncertainty within the Brazilian innovation legal framework as regards

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 54.177.185.247, on 15 Nov 2021 at 19:13:31, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/979C0AAA92B1200DCE513DAAE4894BE7

br az il

287

university–industry interaction. But in any case, fostering public–private
partnerships in Brazil requires changes that go beyond the modernization of innovation legislation. The solutions needed are many, but all of
them are connected – at least in some way – with the creation, diffusion,
and application of protocols, internal processes, and rules of conduct in
government organizations, and with the capacity of government agencies
to deal with conﬂicts of interest and risk.

7.4.2 The Main Channels of Knowledge Transfer
The most common channels for knowledge transfer are probably informal
ones such as technology fairs, workshops, conferences, and seminars. Based
on informal networks and contacts, these channels play an important role in
the innovation landscape in many countries, not only Brazil. However, our
analysis here focuses mainly on formal mechanisms for knowledge transfer,
even though these are likely to be preceded by an informal approach.
The Innovation Act established the formal channels for knowledge
transfer. One of the obligations of universities and public research institutes in this context is to inform the Ministry of Science, Technology, and
Innovation about licensing contracts and the overall intellectual property
policies of the institution. This information is collected by the Ministry
every year and published in a report that contains basic information
about knowledge transfer in Brazilian public research institutes and
universities – the so-called FORMICT11 reports. For instance, these
reports contain the number and type of knowledge transfer contracts
undertaken by public organizations in the country.
Based on this information, Table 7.8 shows the most common formal
channels for knowledge transfer used by the 264 public research institutes and public universities that responded to the MCTIC survey in
2014. Licensing contracts seem to be the most common knowledge
transfer channel among the sample, representing more than 42 percent
of total contracts signed by respondent institutions, followed by R&D
agreements (25 percent) and know-how contracts (9 percent).
According to the MCTIC data, most of the licensing contracts were
made with companies from Brazilian manufacturing, which represented
around 30 percent of total contracts. Within manufacturing, the

11

Acronym for “Form for Information on the Intellectual Property Policy of the Brazilian
Scientiﬁc, Technological and Innovation Institutions.”
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Table 7.8 Knowledge transfer contracts undertaken by Brazilian public research institutes and public universities by type
of contract in 2014

Type of contract for knowledge
transfer
Licensing contract
R&D collaboration agreement /
collaborative R&D
Contracts for knowhow, technical
assistance and other services
Conﬁdentiality agreement
Co-ownership agreement
Contract or agreement for access
to research facilities
Contract or agreement for the use
of intellectual human capital in
R&D projects

Number of universities
and public research
institutes that reported
having this kind of
contract

Number of
contracts

Contracts as a share of
all knowledge transfer
contracts (%)

Total amount
(BRL million)

Total amount
(USD million)

30
34

823
485

42
25

34.40
221.70

10.62
68.43

15

159

8

108.00

33.33

12
13
4

133
84
76

7
4
4

–
2.60
2.10

–
0.80
0.65

5

45

2

58.00

17.90
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Contract or agreement to share
research facilities with small
companies in incubation
activities
Biological material transfer
agreement
Contract to assign IP rights
Other
Total

5

27

1

6.90

2.13

6

19

1

–

–

2
13

2
104
1,957

0
5
100

–
3.90
437.60

–
1.20
135.06

Source: FORMICT Report 2016 (MCTIC 2017)
Note: Data from 2016 (exchange rate USD/BRL = 3.24).
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pharmaceutical and chemical industries were the sectors with the largest
number of knowledge transfer contracts.
It is important to note, however, that the ﬁgures are distorted by the
fact that the information comes from KTOs. KTOs are most likely only
reporting on those contracts and agreements for which they are responsible. Since the involvement of a KTO is only mandatory in the case of
licensing contracts, this channel is probably overestimated in the ofﬁcial
data.
For the same reason, our own interview data from KTOs also probably
overstate the importance of licensing. Four interviews were undertaken
with major KTOs in Brazil as part of the research project for this book.
We identiﬁed three main formal channels of knowledge transfer: licensing and commercialization of IP, software, and knowhow; non-disclosure
agreements; and technological partnership agreements. Of these, licensing emerged as the KTOs’ main activity.
This contrasts with the results of the interviews we conducted with
researchers, which identiﬁed consultancy performed by academics personally rather than agreements on the part of their universities as the main
knowledge transfer channel, followed by research agreements (sponsored
research) between universities and companies. The literature on knowledge
transfer also emphasizes the importance of academic consultancy.
All the interviewees – KTOs and individual researchers – agreed that
data management was crucial to control and improve KTOs’ activities
and knowledge transfer processes. They also noted the importance of
data management in enabling KTOs to comply with their obligations
under the Brazilian Innovation Act, which requires them to “monitor the
processing of applications and the maintenance of the institution’s intellectual property rights” and “promote and monitor the University/PRI
relationship with companies.”
Despite the importance of their data management function, KTOs may
hold incomplete information about universities’ knowledge transfer
activities. For instance, at Unicamp the KTO (called Inova) may support
the process of signing a new sponsored research contract with
a company, but this is not necessary or mandatory. In fact, the internal
regulations on this process do not foresee a role for the ofﬁce. As a result,
in 2016 Inova had information about fewer than thirty research contracts
with companies undertaken by Unicamp, according its annual report.
The same thing happens in several other universities, explaining why
licensing contracts appear in the ofﬁcial statistics as the main formal
channel for knowledge transfer. But all the other evidence suggests that
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consultancy and research contracts are the most important channels,
although there are no consolidated data to conﬁrm this.

7.4.3 Institutional Knowledge Transfer Practices
In general, the knowledge transfer activities of the institutions whose
personnel were interviewed are based on: (1) the innovation policy of the
universities to which they are linked, (2) their university’s internal
regulations on research and graduate activities, (3) the Brazilian
Innovation Act and related regulations, (4) federal law on supporting
agencies, (5) laws on academic employment, and (6) implicit policies of
innovation (the “culture”) adopted by researchers and university
academics.
In order to stimulate university/public research institute–enterprise
interactions, the Brazilian Innovation Act obliged all public research
institutes and public universities to establish their own innovation policies covering, among other things: (1) strategic objectives and guidelines
for innovation; (2) entrepreneurship; (3) technological services; (4)
laboratory-sharing procedures; and (5) IP rights and knowledge transfer.
The Act also stipulated that universities and public research institutes
should have their own KTOs fulﬁlling the role of intermediate agents
responsible for managing the institution’s innovation policies (Brasil
2004: art. 16).
All the institutions answering our research questionnaire said they had
an IP policy. The requirements of the Innovation Act are probably
responsible for that in many cases, but some institutions had already
established their IP policies or created KTOs before the Act. For instance,
Inova, the KTO at Unicamp, was created in 2003, and UFMG has had an
IP policy since 1998.
While every public university and public research institute in the
country is required to have a KTO, the Innovation Act allowed institutions to share a KTO. This is probably a unique feature of the Brazilian
KTOs: several of them serve more than one research organization.12
It is rare for Brazilian universities and public research institutes to use
other kinds of agency to support knowledge transfer or entrepreneurship.
For example, liaison ofﬁces to promote partnerships with companies are
not common in Brazilian institutions, and neither are funds or speciﬁc
agencies geared to supporting entrepreneurship. Therefore, the KTOs
12

NIT Mantiqueira and NIT Rio are examples.
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sometimes take on these kinds of responsibility. For instance, some
interviewees mentioned actions taken to stimulate faculty and graduate
students to get involved in technology partnerships with companies and
entrepreneurship, and at Unicamp the incubator and technology park
come under the umbrella of Inova.
However, several authors argue that the role of Brazilian KTOs is still
very limited, and, in certain cases, research institutions do not include
them in the management of innovation activities (Pinheiro-Machado
and Oliveira 2004; Dos Santos et al. 2009; Closs and Ferreira 2012;
Pereira and Mello 2015; Rauen and Turchi 2017).
The explanation for the limited role of Brazilian KTOs may in part lie
in their staff proﬁle. According to the MCTI (2017), more than 50 percent
of KTO staff are public servants with no previous experience in the
private sector, which might be of great help in evaluating the commercial
potential of or market interest in a given technology. The others are
fellows, students or support employees (interns constitute almost 10 percent of all KTO staff).
Regarding KTOs’ intended role as a contact point for companies at
public research institutes, this is also not so relevant since companies’
approaches to public research institutes tend to be informal or motivated
by other concerns. Rauen and Turchi (2017) consulted thirteen public
research institutes and over sixty public specialists in the management of
public–private R&D interaction to identify, among other things, common business practices in accessing public research institutes’ knowledge
transfer channels. Their interviewees reported that companies tend to
approach public research institutes in four different ways to seek their
R&D support:
• spontaneous demand (motivated by previous informal contacts with
public research institutes’ technicians and researchers);
• response to public funding notices (especially those notices that prioritize research activities and technological development through public–private partnerships);
• contact with public research institute alumni; and
• response to support advertised by public research institutes themselves, which occurs mainly in the case of institutions that provide
open-access laboratories for many different users.
In fact, several studies (Porto et al. 2011; Closs and Ferreira 2012;
Rauen and Turchi 2017) have shown that public funding announcements
aimed at building partnerships between business and universities/public
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research institutes are very important in fostering interest among companies in formalizing partnership agreements.
Nevertheless, KTOs undertake several activities to promote university–industry interaction. All the KTOs at larger universities, for
instance, release a list of their institution’s technologies that are available
for licensing so that companies can ﬁnd the most suitable ones for their
interests.
Other activities, such as pricing technical services, agreeing the number of public research organization staff who will consult on R&D
projects or the number of hours of private access to laboratories, tend
to be led by public research organization researchers and technicians
themselves. The role of the KTO at this negotiation stage is minimal or
nonexistent.
While KTOs have limited participation in most of the public research
institutes’ innovation management activities, they do make an important
contribution to managing IP activities, especially drafting, registering,
and ﬁling patents. Rauen and Turchi (2017) reached this conclusion from
interviews with specialists in knowledge transfer and researchers at
several public research institutes in Brazil in which they asked about
the role of KTOs, among other things. The identiﬁed two main reasons
why KTOs have little participation in and limited inﬂuence over public
research institutes’ innovation management activities. First, KTOs have
limited managerial and budgetary autonomy, as they depend largely on
fund transfers from and strategic decisions by public research institutes.
Second, they suffer from high staff turnover and a dearth of qualiﬁed or
specialized staff, because their link to government institutions obliges
them to rely on public tenders in hiring new staff and they do not offer
competitive salaries.
In sum, although the KTOs were expected to play an important role in
mediating innovation activities with the private sector, they lack the
recognition and operational ﬂexibility necessary to carry out their tasks.
As regards incentives, the Innovation Act and subsequent legislation
did provide ﬁnancial incentives for universities and academics to work
with companies, and, in consequence, it is now very common for both
institution and individual staff to receive ﬁnancial and nonﬁnancial
compensation for their participation in innovation activities.
All the institutions we surveyed reported that professors and
researchers can undertake consultancy activities for companies and can
also receive additional remuneration for participating in research contracts between universities and companies. Finally, they can also receive
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one-third of any royalties received from licensing technologies that they
helped to develop.13
Regarding nonﬁnancial compensations, interviewees afﬁrm that, in
collaborative projects, the standard procedure is that any remaining
research assets such as equipment tend to be donated to the university.
In spite of all the difﬁculties faced, in particular by public universities,
the institutions were unanimous in reporting that these compensation
mechanisms are important in stimulating engagement among teachers
and researchers in developing technologies in partnership with companies. Interviewees believe that KTOs helped to empower researchers to
seek new innovation projects with companies, because they felt there was
a support structure in place for identifying, negotiating and managing
projects.

7.5 Final Remarks
There has been increasing concern among researchers, specialists, and
policymakers about the need to narrow the gap between the scientiﬁc
knowledge production in universities and the requirements of the business sector. To some extent, such concern lay behind the development of
a brand-new framework of public policies fostering university–industry
interaction in Brazil in the last ﬁfteen years.
Thanks to these new policies, a lack of interaction between companies and universities is no longer the main bottleneck in the Brazilian
innovation system. Today, most of Brazil’s major universities and
research institutes have a knowledge transfer ofﬁce to support knowledge transfer to the business sector. Furthermore, there are ﬁnancial
incentives for universities and for academics personally to work in
partnership with companies, through sponsored research at the university or consultancy.
Brazilian legislation is now much more akin to the rules in place in
several developed countries in terms of managing intellectual property
rights. The KTOs have primary responsibility for ﬁling patents on behalf
of Brazilian universities, and universities are now the main institutional
applicants at the National Institute of Industrial Property.
However, some problems clearly remain unsolved. Excessive bureaucracy is always mentioned as a concern when it comes to the
13

One-third of the royalties goes to the university and the remaining third covers laboratory
costs.
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relationship between universities and research institutes and the business sector. Bureaucracy is a big issue in the public sector, and most of
Brazil’s universities and public research institutes are part of the public
sector.
When it comes to patenting, although the share of universities and
research institutes in Brazilian patenting activity has increased, few of the
patents they own are, in fact, licensed to companies. This underlines the
importance of informal knowledge transfer channels in university–
industry interaction in Brazil. So one of the main conclusions in terms
of future policy is that it should aim to reinforce such channels.
Of course, it is also necessary to look at the demand side. The overall
business environment is also important in explaining why university–
industry interaction is not stronger in Brazil. This chapter has not
examined the private sector as such in detail, but a lack of competition
should be acknowledged as an important reason why Brazilian companies show little interest in the knowledge produced by the country’s
universities. Brazil is one of the most closed economies in the world,
and so the motivation to innovate is low.
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China
b a o m i n g ch e n , c a n h u a n g , c h u n y a n p e n g , mi n g l e i
d i n g , n i n g h u a n g , xi a l i u , a n d j u a n ya n g *

8.1 Introduction
China is an emerging economy with a rapidly growing technology market.
Both the central and provincial governments have supported knowledge
transfer activities and directed technology development, initiating regional
innovation collaboration and promoting entrepreneurship, innovation, and
economic growth. As in other countries, many of these activities are geographically concentrated. For example, ﬁve provinces (Beijing, Guangdong,
Shanghai, Shandong, and Jiangsu) accounted for half of total R&D expenditure in China in 2011, while the top ten provinces accounted for 70 percent
of total R&D expenditure that year (Wang et al. 2015a).
In recent decades, Chinese universities and public research institutes have
made tremendous progress in the ﬁelds of research and education. This
progress is reﬂected in the increasing number of scientiﬁc publications and
patent applications originating in the country. The technology market,
spinoff companies from universities and public research institutes, cooperation between academy and industry, and patent transfer and licensing have
all developed rapidly in China. Yet several issues have resulted in lower than
possible rates of knowledge transfer from universities and public research
institutes to ﬁrms, resulting in substantial amendments in 2015 to the Law
on Promoting the Transformation of Scientiﬁc and Technological
Achievements (PTSTA). These amendments removed legal barriers to
knowledge transfer and provided incentives for universities and public
research institutes to engage more actively in knowledge transfer activities.
*

Can Huang and Xia Liu acknowledge the ﬁnancial support provided by the National
Natural Science Foundation of China through grant nos. 71874152, 71732008 and
71402161, the Soft Science Research Program of Zhejiang Province through grant no.
2019C25038, and the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities.
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However, several factors are likely to continue to hinder the growth of
knowledge transfer from universities and public research institutes to
ﬁrms. Challenges include the immaturity of technology markets, the
inadequate R&D capabilities and investments of Chinese companies,
the historical legacy of past policies that failed to provide sufﬁcient
incentives for patenting and transfer activities, ambiguous corporate
governance and regulations, and underdeveloped intermediary agencies
such as knowledge transfer ofﬁces.
This chapter looks at these issues in detail. Section 8.2 describes how
the role of Chinese universities and public research institutes has evolved
in recent decades with the transition to a market economy. Section 8.3
outlines changes in the main laws and policies governing knowledge
transfer activities. Section 8.4 examines the knowledge transfer activities
of Chinese universities and public research institutes, while Section 8.5
analyzes ongoing barriers to knowledge transfer. Last, a short concluding
section summarizes our main ﬁndings.

8.2 The Role of Universities and Public Research Institutes
in China
Since the 1980s, China’s universities and public research institutes have
undergone fundamental changes as part of the country’s economic transformation from a centrally planned system to a market-based economy.
In March 1985, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of
China issued a Decision on Reforming the Science and Technology
System (CCCPC 1985), which emphasized the economic orientation of
the science and technology (S&T) system by introducing elements of
competition and market discipline. Research institutions formally under
the administration of central or local governments were encouraged to
join large and medium-sized enterprises and become responsible for
their own proﬁts and losses (Baark 2001; Huang et al. 2004; OECD 2008).
R&D investment made up approximately one-third of total S&T
expenditures in the 1990s. Government R&D expenditures have
increased steadily since then (Baark 2001). However, as Huang et al.
(2004) note, compared to the European Union member states and other
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
countries, China’s innovation system was underdeveloped in the 1990s,
partly as a consequence of insufﬁcient support from legislative actions,
inadequate policies to support innovation, human resources and ﬁnance,
and low levels of business innovation.
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In 1993, the State Council promulgated the National Outline for
Educational Reform and Development (CCCPC 1993), with the goal of
raising the quality of teaching and research at Chinese universities to
among the world’s best through funding to create an elite group of
universities and to support key disciplines. Subsequently, the Ministry
of Education launched the “211 Project” to support the development of
100 leading universities. In 1995, China announced the Strategy of
Invigorating China through Science and Education, emphasizing the
role of science and education in economic and social development. The
country’s higher education sector developed rapidly thereafter. The 1998
Law of Higher Education established three basic functions for Chinese
universities: cultivating talent, scientiﬁc research, and social services.
In 1999, the Ministry of Education initiated the “985 Project” supporting the development of world-class research universities. By 2015, China
had 2,852 universities, 1.57 million faculty members, 9.75 million undergraduate students and 6.45 million graduate students, of whom 74,000
were PhD students. Today, China has 112 universities supported by the
211 Project and thirty-seven supported by the 985 Project.
In 2006, the government issued its National Plan for Medium and
Long-Term S&T Development (CCCPC 2006), which further deﬁned the
functions of universities and public research institutes in the national
innovation system. The Plan states that universities are “important bases
for cultivating high-level innovation talents,” “one of the most important
forces for basic research and high-technology innovations,” and “an
emerging force for solving important science and technology problems,
promoting technology transfer.” The roles of public research institutes
were to conduct basic research, cutting-edge technological research and
social science research.
Due to recent efforts, China’s innovation activities have intensiﬁed
substantially and attracted the return of highly skilled workers from
overseas. Combined with a growth in R&D investments, this has led to
increased scientiﬁc publications and patent applications, as shown in the
following section.

8.2.1 Investment, Scientiﬁc Publications and Patent Applications
R&D Investment
China has become a powerhouse in R&D spending since the 2000s. In
2012, its gross expenditure on R&D (GERD) passed 1 trillion renminbi
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Figure 8.1 Share of total R&D expenditures by enterprises, public research institutes,
and universities in China, 2000–16
Source: China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology (2017)

(CNY) (USD 163 billion), third behind only the U.S. and the European
Union. In 2017, this number rose to a record CNY 1.76 trillion (USD
254 billion), ranking China as second in the world in terms of R&D
spending after the U.S. (National Bureau of Statistics 2018). R&D intensity, the ratio of R&D expenditure divided by gross domestic product
(GDP), hit a record high of 2.12 percent – a rise of 0.01 percentage points
compared to 2016.
As Figure 8.1 demonstrates, the share of business R&D spending out of
total R&D expenditures has kept increasing throughout the past twenty
years, rising from 60 percent in 2000 to 77 percent in 2016 (China
Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology 2017).
All types of organizations devote most of their R&D investment
to experimental development or applied research (Figure 8.2), but
universities are the primary performer of basic research, accounting
for 49.3 percent of total basic research expenditures of CNY
82.3 billion.1
1

R&D includes basic research, applied research and experimental development. Basic
research is experimental or theoretical work undertaken primarily to acquire new knowledge of the underlying foundation of phenomena and observable facts, without any
particular application or use in view. Applied research is also original investigation
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Figure 8.2 Share of 2016 R&D expenditures in China by application
Source: China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology (2017)

Scientiﬁc Publications
China has become the world’s second largest producer of scientiﬁc
publications (Institute of Scientiﬁc and Technical Information of China
2018). In 1989, the number of Science Citation Index (SCI) papers by
Chinese authors was only 3 percent of the number of papers written by
US authors. By 2008, this proportion had risen to 30 percent. Based on
the data in Table 8.1, universities and public research institutes
accounted for 85.9 percent and 10.2 percent respectively of all SCIindexed papers published by Chinese researchers in 2017.
Patent Applications
Since the 2000s, China has experienced a surge of patent applications.
The total number of invention patent applications2 ﬁled with China’s
State Intellectual Property Ofﬁce (SIPO) increased from 51,747 in 2000 to

2

undertaken to acquire new knowledge, but directed primarily toward a speciﬁc practical
aim or objective. Experimental development is systematic work, drawing on existing
knowledge gained from research and/or practical experience, which is directed toward
producing new materials, products or devices, performing new processes, systems and
services, or substantially improving those already produced or installed.
An invention patent is granted for new technical solutions for a product, process or the
improvement thereof, provided that the technical solutions have a practical applicability.
A utility model patent is granted for new and practical technical solutions relating to the
shape and/or structure of a product. In general, the inventive step required for a utility
model patent is less than that required for invention patents. On average, invention
patents can require three to ﬁve years from application to grant, while utility patents
require one year.
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Table 8.1 Number of SCI-indexed papers by different organizations in
China, 2003–17
Quantity/year
Universities
PRIs
Medical institutions
Enterprises
Total

2003

2005

2010

2015

2017

63,672
15,840
455
550
80,517

125,814
25,010
1250
756
152,830

100,772
18,941
342
1,340
121,395

219,957
29,749
8,973
744
259,423

273,337
32,370
11,208
1,149
318,064

Source: Various issues of Statistical Data of Chinese S&T Papers Compiled by the
Institute of Scientiﬁc and Technical Information of China

1,338,503 in 2016. In 2017, more patent applications were ﬁled with SIPO
than the ﬁlings for the United States of America (U.S.), Japan, Republic of
Korea, and Europe combined. Figure 8.3 shows domestic invention
patent applications by type of entity. Enterprises have the most rapid
growth in patent ﬁlings. The share of university and public research
institutes in total invention patent applications increased from 14.4 percent in 1995 to 22.9 percent in 2005, before declining to approximately
19 percent from 2014. Zhang and Wan (2008) analyzed the ownership of
Chinese patents and found that public research institutes have a higher
efﬁciency (measured by the number of patents per unit of R&D expenditure) in generating invention patents, while enterprises have higher
efﬁciency in generating utility model patents.

8.3 Laws and Policies Relevant to Knowledge Transfer
8.3.1 The Legal Framework for Knowledge Transfer in China
One of the most important laws governing knowledge transfer activities
in China is the 2007 Science and Technology Progress Law, which
provides the legal framework for the management of scientiﬁc and
technological achievements. According to Article 20 of the Science and
Technology Progress Law, intellectual property rights (IPRs) that are
generated from government funding by a university or public research
institute belong to the institution, except when the IP rights involve
national security, the national interest, or other major social and public
interests. IPRs include patents, copyrighted software, integrated circuit
designs, and new plant variety rights.
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While the concept of patents dates to the ﬁfteenth century in Europe,
the introduction of a system of intellectual property laws in China is very
recent (Kafouros et al. 2015). China joined the World Intellectual
Property Organization in 1980, paving the way for the creation of an IP
system that complies with international standards (Bosworth and Yang
2000). Five years later, in 1985, China signed the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property and established a Patent Ofﬁce, the
predecessor of the current SIPO. The Chinese Patent Law was enacted in
1984 and is the governing legislation for the protection of technological
inventions in China. The Patent Law came into effect in 1985 and has
been amended three times, in 1993, 2001, and 2009.
Article 6 of the 2009 Patent Law regulates the ownership of inventions
created by academics and researchers at universities and public research
institutes during their work, or when they use materials, facilities, or
equipment provided by a university or public research institute.
According to the Patent Law, the inventor of inventions created as part
of their work or using workplace assets has the right to be acknowledged
on the patent document and receive a reward or compensation from their
employer, but the employer owns the invention.
Another essential law governing knowledge transfer in China is the
Law on Promoting the Transformation of Scientiﬁc and Technological
Achievements (PTSTA), promulgated in 1996 and amended in 2015. The
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Law covers rights to scientiﬁc and technological achievements, rewards
for R&D and knowledge transfer personnel, and requires universities and
public research institutes to establish or obtain access to knowledge
transfer agencies.
Contract law and company law also regulate knowledge transfer in
China, as the relationship between the parties to a knowledge transfer
agreement reﬂects basic contractual relations and knowledge transfer
often involves enterprises as technology buyers or collaborating
partners.

8.3.2 Amendments to the PTSTA Law in 2015
The PTSTA Law of 1996 was amended in 2015 for three reasons. First,
several articles of the Law were outdated as a result of signiﬁcant changes
in the Chinese economy. Second, many provinces had experimented with
various policies to stimulate knowledge transfer and the amendments
were designed to enact the most effective policies into law. Third, universities and public research institutes in China lacked adequate incentives to transfer technology because of the institutional setting and rules
deﬁned in the 1996 Law.
Under the 1996 Law, a university or public research institute was
required to report to and obtain approval from the Ministry of Finance
or the State-Owned Asset Supervision and Administration Commission
in order to license or otherwise dispose of IP. Universities and public
research institutes did not have full owner’s rights, and consequently
were less motivated to promote knowledge transfer. Furthermore, after
they transferred IP assets, any revenue they earned from the transfer had
to be paid to the Ministry of Finance.
The amendment dealt with these issues. Under Article 18 of the
amended PTSTA Law, universities and public research institutes established by the state have the right to dispose of their scientiﬁc and
technological achievements, including the right to transfer technologies.
However, the price agreed on by both parties in negotiation or auction
and the name of the scientiﬁc and technological achievements must be
disclosed to the public. Furthermore, universities and public research
institutes can keep the revenue from knowledge transfer and are not
required to pay it to the Ministry of Finance.
Before the amendment, knowledge transfer was not used as
a performance measure for universities and public research institutes.
In contrast, the amendment has made knowledge transfer a legal
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obligation for Chinese universities and public research institutes. Article
17 of the amended Law stipulates that public research institutes and
universities established by the state are required to strengthen the management, organization and coordination of the transformation of scientiﬁc and technological achievements, prepare an annual report on their
achievements in transforming science and technology, and set up
a knowledge transfer organization and process.
In May 2016, the State Council announced implementation details for
the PTSTA Law in a Program on Promoting Scientiﬁc and Technological
Achievements, Transfer and Transformation to promote the disclosure
and exchange of information on scientiﬁc and technological achievements. Speciﬁc actions under this program included:
• Setting up a coordination mechanism for industry, universities and
public research institutes so they can cooperate fully to promote
knowledge transfer.
• Creating a commercialization base for scientiﬁc and technological
achievements.
• Strengthening the transfer of scientiﬁc and technological achievements
into market-oriented services, including building a national technology trading network platform and offering knowledge transfer services
at the regional level.
• Promoting scientiﬁc and technological innovation and entrepreneurship through the development of “maker spaces” to open up the
scientiﬁc and technological resources of universities and public
research institutes to the public.
• Training professional knowledge transfer personnel.
Almost every provincial government has enacted regulations to implement the provisions of the amended PTSTA Law. For example, several
provinces increased the proportion of knowledge transfer revenue that
can be used to reward R&D and knowledge transfer or set up special
scientiﬁc and technological achievement funds. In Jiangsu Province the
fund was valued at CNY 2 billion in 2014. Provincial governments were
often bolder than the central government in promoting knowledge
transfer because they considered knowledge transfer to be an important
driver of local economic growth.
To fulﬁll the legal obligations stipulated in the amended PTSTA Law,
China’s universities and public research institutes adopted up to seven
actions to facilitate knowledge transfer, although some universities and
public research institutes implemented some of these actions before the
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amended Law, for instance, to reﬂect provincial policies or known best
practice.
1. Increasing rewards and compensation for inventors and knowledge
transfer contributors. Article 45 of the amended Law requires that
no less than 50 percent of the net proﬁt from knowledge transfer
should be given as a reward or compensation by universities and
public research institutes to the inventors and others who made
signiﬁcant contributions to the transfer, including knowledge transfer
ofﬁcers. This provision greatly incentivized knowledge transfer by
universities and public research institutes. Nearly all universities and
public research institutes have reformed their reward regulations
since 2015. Many now give up to 70 percent of net proﬁts from
successful transfer to the inventors and related contributors. In
2015, the Drug Research Institution of the Chinese Science
Academy paid nearly CNY 12 million to inventors and knowledge
transfer contributors.
2. Setting up knowledge transfer organizations. China’s public research
institutes have set up knowledge transfer organizations that are either
associated with several national-level organizations, such as the
National Technology Transfer Center or the National Technology
Transfer Demonstration Institution, or cofounded with local governments or enterprises. Successful examples include the Hunan
University of Chinese Medicine, which transferred its newly developed
Chinese traditional medicine to pharmaceutical enterprises and earned
revenue of CNY 68 million. The transfer eventually resulted in the
development of enterprises with annual revenues of several
hundred million renminbi and created several leading brands of biomedical products in Hunan Province. Another example is the Central
South University of Forestry and Technology. The University provided
a feasibility study of bamboo plywood production, factory planning,
process design for workshops, technical training, preproduction technical guidance and many other technical services to more than 400
bamboo plywood enterprises which together achieved total output
valued at more than CNY 20 billion. A third example is Changzhou
University, which signed twenty-two knowledge transfer agreements
with twenty major manufacturers of phosphorus chemical products
and obtained a total income of over CNY 20 million.
3. Implementing performance evaluation systems. Many universities
and public research institutes have established performance
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evaluation systems to motivate knowledge transfer staff. By contributing to knowledge transfer, staff can be promoted to senior management positions and have the opportunity to pursue a promising
career path.
Marketing of information on scientiﬁc and technological achievements.
Universities and public research institutes participate in exhibitions
organized by governments and other commercial organizations to
exchange information with enterprises and investors, introduce
their scientiﬁc and technological achievements, negotiate with potential buyers, and disseminate information about their scientiﬁc and
technological achievements on their websites to attract potential
partners.
Permission for academics to take a leave of absence to start a business.
Before the 2015 amendment to the PTSTA Law, universities and
public research institutes did not encourage academics to work parttime to assist a ﬁrm to transfer licensed university technology or take
a leave of absence to start their own businesses. However, the 2016
implementation details to the PTSTA Law allow academics to do so.
The policy requires universities and public research institutes to
establish their own systems to manage academics while they are on
leave, and should keep the faculty position of academics for up to
three years for those who take a leave of absence to create new
businesses.
Policies on spinoffs. Many universities and public research institutes
have introduced new initiatives to permit and encourage students to
start their own businesses. On-the-job and off-the-job entrepreneurship by professionals and technicians in universities and public
research institutes are also encouraged. For example, according to
the Knowledge Transfer Regulation of Zhejiang University, faculty
and students can invest in companies, using their scientiﬁc and
technological achievements and proprietary technology.
Strengthening cooperation between universities, public research institutes
and local industry. In addition to the policies identiﬁed above to provide
incentives for academics to engage in knowledge transfer, policy has
also encouraged knowledge transfer via university–industry collaboration. A common channel is to establish a joint research institute that
offers technology services to local industries. In this collaborative
model, local governments offer land, funds, and buildings while universities and public research institutes offer their scientiﬁc and technological achievements, R&D capabilities, management teams, and
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equipment. Local governments are eager to support this model due to
expectations that collaboration will promote local economic growth.
China has formulated four other types of policy to promote university–industry research linkages. One consists of policies to establish
strategic alliances for industrial technology innovation. The ﬁrst ﬁftysix alliances were set up in 2010 and focused primarily on promoting
industrial technology innovation. Many were led by universities and
public research institutes. Once scientiﬁc and technological progress
was made, new technologies could be transferred smoothly from universities and public research institutes to industry through the alliances.
The second policy type relates to the reform of the National Science
and Technology Plan. Industrial development projects that are funded
under the Plan are required to include enterprises in the research and in
the development of research agendas. Currently, enterprises participate
in nearly 90 percent of projects under the Plan and lead nearly 50 percent
of science and technology projects.
The third policy category establishes national technology innovation
platforms or Innovation Centers to promote university–industry
research cooperation on nationally strategic industrial technologies.
The ﬁrst center, the National High-Speed Train Technology Innovation
Center, located at Qingdao City in Shandong Province, was established in
September 2016. In the same year, the Ministry of Industry and
Information began creating other National Manufacturing Innovation
Centers to advance industrial innovation capacity. Nearly ﬁfteen such
centers were planned to be established by 2020.
The fourth policy category consists of science parks, which are an
important tool for Chinese innovation policy (Lai and Shyu 2005;
Jongwanich et al. 2014). In 1991, the State Council established the
Torch Program, which accelerated the establishment of science and
industry parks across China. The number of university science parks
increased from forty-two in 2004 to 115 in 2014 (Torch Report 2016).
These science parks offer various incentives to encourage investment and
the formation of new ﬁrms:
• New ﬁrms are exempt from corporate income tax for two years.
• Licenses are waived for the importation of materials and parts used in
producing products for export.
• Revenue from knowledge transfer is only taxable after the ﬁrst CNY
300,000.
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• Intangible assets such as intellectual property can be factored into
a company’s registered capital.
• The science parks can provide professional intermediary services such as
legal services, human resource management services, and marketing
support.
Several studies have conﬁrmed the contribution of university–industry
research cooperation in China to universities’ revenue, ﬁrms’ innovative
capacity and regional economic development (Liu and Shi 2009; Ng and
Li 2009; Yang and Ling 2009; Li et al. 2010; Kafouros et al. 2015; Fu and Li
2016; Hao et al. 2016).
Quan (2010) surveyed R&D laboratories in companies that interact with
universities in Beijing. His results show that ﬁrms have different motivations
that prompt different collaboration activities. The most frequently cited
incentive for ﬁrms to collaborate with universities is to build a positive
public image. In addition, companies sponsor research projects as a costeffective way of keeping abreast of relevant new discoveries in China.
Companies will outsource R&D to a university to reduce costs. But the
most attractive factor for cooperation, according to the survey, is access to
high-quality graduates. A large proportion of employees and interns in
corporate R&D laboratories are graduates of partner universities. Wang
et al. (2015a) conducted a survey on the factors that affect the success of
academic–industry collaborations. They found that collaboration output
was affected by not only the university’s reputation and research capability,
but also by the breadth and depth of the collaboration.

8.4 Data and Research on Knowledge Transfer from Universities
and Public Research Institutes
Other than making new knowledge publicly available at no cost, universities and public research institutes can transfer technology through
cooperative arrangements, including contract research and collaboration, licensing, and establishing spinoff enterprises. Many of these
transfers occur through the technology market.

8.4.1 The Technology Market
Recently, China has made great progress in developing its technology
market. Based on information from the technology trading information
service platform and Innovation Relay Center networks, China has

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 54.177.185.247, on 15 Nov 2021 at 19:13:31, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/979C0AAA92B1200DCE513DAAE4894BE7

312

chen, huang, peng, ding, huang, liu, & yang

Table 8.2 Share of transaction value of knowledge transfer contracts by
seller types, 2009–16 (%)

PRIs
Universities
Enterprises
Others

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

6.3
4.4
86.4
2.8

5.1
5.0
85.5
4.3

5.5
5.2
86.5
2.8

6.3
4.6
86.5
2.6

6.7
4.4
86.2
2.7

5.3
3.7
87.6
3.3

5.7
3.2
86.2
4.9

6.2
3.2
86.6
4.0

Source: China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology (2017)
PRI = public research institute.

established a uniﬁed and open platform to publish information about
resources for knowledge transfer. In 2016, universities and public research
institutes signed 90,573 contracts for knowledge transfer and research
cooperation. The total value of these contracts was CNY 106.52 billion.
Between 2009 and 2016, universities and public research institutes combined
accounted for approximately 10 percent of the total value of knowledge
transfer contracts (see Table 8.2).
There are several successful examples of the development of technology
markets. The Xi’an S&T Market opened in 2011 and has facilitated knowledge transfer transactions worth more than CNY 110 billion, organized
information exchange activities, and served more than 25,000 enterprises.
The Zhejiang Online Technology Market, opened in 2002, uses network
information technology and e-commerce technology to disseminate information on the supply of and demand for technologies. By the end of
November 2013, Zhejiang Online Technology Market had 94,319 members,
including enterprises, universities, and public research institutes; listed
63,944 technical problems from enterprises, and published 153,771 scientiﬁc
and technological achievements. The number of signed contracts from the
period of 2002–2013 amounted to 28,929, worth CNY 25.245 billion. The
Online Technology Market has become an important platform for technology trading in Zhejiang Province.

8.4.2 University–Industry Research Cooperation
Brehm and Lundin (2012) explored university–industry collaboration
activities and innovation outputs in China between 1998 and 2004
involving 20,000 large and medium-sized companies. They found that

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 54.177.185.247, on 15 Nov 2021 at 19:13:31, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/979C0AAA92B1200DCE513DAAE4894BE7

c h in a

313

Chinese universities’ revenue from knowledge commercialization activities has increased over time.
Lan (2006) categorizes research contracts between universities and public
research institutes and companies in China into four types: contracts for
technology development, knowledge transfer, technology consulting, and
technology services. Among the four types of contract, technology development was the most common, accounting for more than 30 percent of the
total contract value. Liu and Jiang (2001) discuss the methods obtained by
Tsinghua University to pursue knowledge transfer since 1995, which include
establishing a university–industry cooperation committee to provide services for member companies, setting up funding for collaborative research,
and building an online information system to update research ﬁndings and
enterprise requests. Wang and Ma (2007) researched how Tsinghua
University dealt with the IPRs created through collaborative R&D projects
with multinational companies. They describe four types of contract: (1)
commissioned projects, in which an enterprise provides the research funding and the university conducts the research using its own equipment and
manpower; (2) joint research projects, in which senior researchers from the
university participate in the research and the enterprise provides research
funding, equipment and engineers; (3) joint development projects, in which
the university provides researchers and an enterprise provides equipment
and engineers, with development funding coming from a third party; and (4)
joint research organizations, in which both parties provide funds, equipment, and researchers.
The most recent data for 2015 show that universities and enterprises in
China jointly performed more than 88,000 R&D projects for a total value of
CNY 66.65 billion (Ministry of Science and Technology 2017). The universities and enterprises established 2,276 post-doctoral fellowships and 10,191
joint research institutions between them. According to the Ministry of
Commerce (2015), by 2015, foreign ﬁrms had established more than 2,400
R&D laboratories in China. Many foreign ﬁrms established joint R&D
programs, laboratories, training centers, technical innovation alliances, and
so on with universities and public research institutes. These institutions play
an increasingly important role in the Chinese innovation system, and an
indispensable role in knowledge transfer.

8.4.3 Patent Transfer and Licensing
Scholarly studies have identiﬁed a positive correlation between government expenditures on science and technology at the provincial level and
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the number of patent licensing contracts held by local universities in the
same region (Rao et al. 2013). This supports the efforts of provincial
governments to fund local research capabilities and suggests that proximity may inﬂuence knowledge transfer in China, as found in the U.S.
and Europe.
Wang et al. (2015b) argue that licensing universities’ technologies can
contribute substantially to the subsequent innovation performance of
licensee ﬁrms. The more licensing activities a licensee ﬁrm performs, the
greater its subsequent innovative performance.
The sale (assignment) and licensing of patents owned by Chinese
universities has increased steadily. The number of patent ownership
transfers and licenses grew from 1,810 in 2010 to 4,839 in 2016
(Figure 8.4), with a notable increase between 2014 and 2016 that could
be due to the implementation of the 2015 PTSTA Law. The total value of
transactions increased from CNY 359 million in 2010 to CNY
1215.43 million in 2016 (Figure 8.5), and the average transaction value
increased from CNY 198,000 to CNY 251,000.
The total number of knowledge transfer agreements (including the sale
or assignment of patents, patent licensing, and other non-patent-related
knowledge transfer activities) showed a similar upward trend (Figures 8.6
and 8.7). The total number of knowledge transfer agreements by universities increased from 8,408 in 2008 to 10,517 in 2014 and the total annual
value of transactions in the same period grew from CNY 3.05 billion to
CNY 4.01 billion, with the average transaction value increasing from
CNY 3.63 million to CNY 3.82 million (Figure 8.7). A comparison
between Figures 8.4 and 8.6 suggests that non-patented knowledge transfer accounts for the majority of the agreements, which include contract
research and consulting services. In addition, a comparison of Figures 8.5
and 8.7 indicates that non-patent-related knowledge transfer is
a considerably larger income source for universities than patent-related
knowledge transfer.
Table 8.3 shows the patenting activities of the most important 1,497
universities in China in 2015. These universities applied for 109,445
invention patents, were granted 54,868 invention patents and signed
2,695 contracts involving patent transfer with a total value of CNY
2.77 billion. Over the period 2011–15, the total value of all types of
knowledge transfer transactions exceeded CNY 19.6 billion.
Although universities and public research institutes have made tremendous progress in terms of knowledge transfer, they are still challenged by relatively low efﬁciency in terms of the amount of knowledge
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Figure 8.4 Number of patent transfers and licenses by universities, 2010–16
Source: China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology (2017)
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Figure 8.5 Value of patent ownership transfers and licenses by universities, 2010–16
(million CNY)
Source: China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology (2017)

transferred per unit of R&D expenditure, understafﬁng and a lack of
knowledge transfer professionals. The Patent Investigation Report (2015)
surveyed 7,424 enterprises, 436 universities and 455 public research
institutes in China. More than half of the surveyed universities and public
research institutes categorized themselves as “carrying out basic research,
obtaining a few patents” and that “patent licensing is limited” (Table 8.4).
Approximately 25.4 percent of universities and 32.4 percent of public
research institutes surveyed responded that they “carry out applied
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Figure 8.6 Total annual knowledge transfer agreements by universities, 2008–14
Source: Statistical Data of Science and Technology Activities in Colleges and
Universities
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Figure 8.7 Total annual value of knowledge transfer agreements by universities,
2008–14 (million CNY)
Source: Statistical Data of Science and Technology Activities in Colleges and
Universities

research, obtain many patents, and obtain revenue from patent
licensing.”
Table 8.5 gives the “exploitation rate” for patents owned by enterprises, universities, public research institutes, and individuals, which is
deﬁned as the number of patents used to make, use, offer to sell, sell, or
import patented innovations or being sold to others divided by the total
number of patents. Table 8.5 shows a clear difference between universities, public research institutes, and enterprises. In 2014, the average
exploitation rate of patents in force was 57.9 percent, but the rate among
enterprises exceeded that average by approximately 10 percentage points.
The exploitation rate of public research institutes was 16 percentage
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Table 8.3 Patent applications, grants, and transfers by 1,497 universities in 2015
Patent applications
University type
Comprehensive
Engineering
Agricultural and forestry
Medicine
Normal
Others
Total

All
54,977
99,185
11,071
5,202
11,737
2,231
184,423

Invention
34,530
59,802
6,248
2,683
5,182
1,000
109,445

Patents granted
All
35,723
65,272
7,800
3,625
7,971
1,590
121,981

Patents transferred1

Invention

Contract
(item)

Amount
(CNY 1,000)

17,302
30,701
3,079
1,249
2,011
526
54,868

858
1,410
252
46
102
27
2,695

627,056
1,911,766
61,363
147,108
21,176
6,270
2,774,739

Source: Statistical Data of Science and Technology Activities in Colleges and Universities (2016)
Includes sales (assignments) and licenses.
2
Other IP rights include new plant varieties, software copyright, and layout design of integrated circuits.
1

Number of
other types of
IP rights2
4,143
5,682
1,045
75
799
208
11,952
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points lower than the average at 41.6 percent, while the rate for universities was only 9.9 percent. The low exploitation rate by universities
(which includes patents that are only offered for sale) may be due to
the low quality of patents, a lack of professionals specialized in knowledge
transfer, and/or the lack of incentives to transfer technology before the
2015 amendments to the PTSTA Law.
The same study also provides data on the rate of patent sales and
licensing (Tables 8.6 and 8.7), deﬁned respectively as the number of
patents sold or licensed divided by the total number of patents. This
may be a better indicator of the use of university patents because it
excludes patents that are only offered for sale and possibly never taken
up. The results demonstrate the relatively low efﬁciency of knowledge
transfer through patents by universities and public research institutes. In
2014, the average rate of patent sales was 5.5 percent. The rate of patent
sales by enterprises and individuals exceeded 5 percent, while the rate of
sales was 3.5 percent for public research institutes and 1.5 percent for
universities. The average rate of patent licensing was 9.9 percent. The
rates of licensing by enterprises and individuals were equal to or slightly
higher than the national average, compared to 5.9 percent for public
research institutes and just 2.1 percent for universities. The total of patent
sales and licensing rates is only 3.5 percent for universities (suggesting

Table 8.4 R&D and licensing modes of universities and public research
institutes (%)

Develop better technical solutions in scientiﬁc research
projects, obtain patents and set up new enterprises.
Cooperate actively with enterprises, commissioned by
enterprises to carry out speciﬁc research, cooperate
with enterprises to produce products.
Carry out applied research, obtain a lot of patents,
obtain revenues from patent licensing
Carry out basic research, obtain a few patents, patent
licensing is limited

Universities

PRIs

31.1

38.8

60.9

34.4

25.4

32.4

58.2

50.4

Source: Patent Investigation Report of China (2015)
Note: Multiple responses were possible so the percentages sum to more than
100 percent.
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Table 8.5 Patent exploitation rates in 2014 (%)
Enterprises

Universities

PRIs

Individuals

Total

67.5

13.5

28.2

40.0

50.9

68.2

9.3

43.3

36.5

59.0

70.3

9.0

46.7

47.4

60.1

68.6

9.9

41.6

40.0

57.9

Invention patents in
force
Utility model patents
in force
Design patents in
force
Total

Source: Patent Investigation Report of China (2015)

Table 8.6 Patent sales (assignments) rates in 2014 (%)
Type of patent1

Enterprises

Universities

PRIs

Individuals

Total

Invention
patents
Utility model
patents
Design patents
Total (all
patents)

6.7

1.9

3.2

4.8

5.2

5.6

1.4

3.4

4.7

5.2

5.8
5.9

1.2
1.5

3.8
3.5

7.5
5.4

6.4
5.5

Source: Patent Investigation Report of China (2015)
1
Limited to valid patent rights in force in 2014.

that only 3.5 percent of university patents were taken up by companies),
but considerably higher for public research institutes, at 9.4 percent.
Tan et al. (2013) studied patent licensing contracts signed by Chinese
universities in 2011. There were 1,359 licensing contracts involving 1,352
university patents, of which 1,202 (88.4 percent) were invention patents.
Most licensing contracts were exclusive, and licensed patents were mostly
for inventions in the ﬁeld of chemistry (organic chemistry, polymers),
physics and instruments. Additionally, only 10 percent of Chinese universities had licensing activities, and most were afﬁliated with the 211 Project.
Other universities, which received less government ﬁnancing and support,
cannot be compared to 211 Project universities in terms of patenting
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Table 8.7 Patent licensing rates in 2014 (%)
Type of patent1
Invention patents
Utility model patents
Design patents
Total (all patents)

Enterprises

Universities

PRIs

Individuals

Total

9.6
9.7
10.7
9.9

3.3
1.9
2.0
2.1

5.5
5.4
7.2
5.9

13.0
10.3
14.7
11.9

8.2
9.3
12.1
9.9

Source: Patent Investigation Report of China (2015)
1
Limited to valid patent rights in force in 2014.

activities. Most licensees were enterprises and were located in the eastern
regions, including Shanghai, Jiangsu, and Guangdong provinces.

8.4.4 Science Parks
In 1988, the ﬁrst Chinese national-level science park was established in
Beijing, which is the predecessor of the Zhongguancun Science Park.
After thirty years’ development, the number of national-level science
parks had increased to 168 by the end of 2018. By the end of 2017, the
gross domestic product produced within the national-level science parks
amounted to CNY 9.52 trillion, accounting for 11.5 percent of the
Chinese total GDP. In 2017, there were 52,000 high-tech companies
operating in the 168 national-level science parks, 38.2 percent of the
national total. Half of the incubators and “maker spaces” are located in
national-level science parks (Zhang 2018).
Zou and Zhao (2014) discuss a typical university science park in China,
TusPark, which is tied to the top university in China, Tsinghua University.
TusPark is considered to be part of the Zhongguancun High-Tech Science
Park (the ﬁrst and largest cluster of semiconductor, computer, and telecommunications ﬁrms in China) and therefore enjoys many preferential
policies thanks to the established relationship between Zhongguancun
High-Tech Science Park and the government. However, TusPark has its
own strategy and preferences. For example, bolstered by the university’s
reputation and research capacity, TusPark is home to joint R&D laboratories between Tsinghua University and world-renowned enterprises.
Tan (2006) and Todo et al. (2011) studied the evolution and achievements of Zhongguancun Science Park. Tan (2006) argues that the
Zhongguancun Science Park has been an example of innovation driven
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by knowledge transfer from leading research institutions to companies.
Groups of professionals acted as risk takers and were involved in an early
experiment to establish non-state-owned ﬁrms in the region. Todo et al.
(2011) emphasize the role of science parks as an efﬁcient channel to
promote technology diffusion from multinational enterprises to domestic ﬁrms in China. As Todo et al. (2011) note, Zhongguancun Science
Park has become a cluster of R&D centers for multinational enterprises.
By the end of 2005, forty-three of the top 500 corporations worldwide
had located their R&D centers in the Zhongguancun Science Park, and
most of them had a collaborative R&D laboratory with local universities.
Cai and Liu (2015) discuss another successful university science park,
Tongji University Creative Cluster. It is separate from Zhangjiang HiTech Park in Shanghai, which is the state-level high-tech park in
Shanghai, hosting many high-tech manufacturing ﬁrms just as
Zhongguancun Science Park does in Beijing. Playing to the advantages
of Tongji University and the characteristics of the enterprises in the
cluster, Tongji Creative Cluster targets startups active in knowledgeintensive services. Once these startups become larger and mature, they
may be integrated into the Zhangjiang Hi-Tech Park.
A few studies provide evidence regarding the contribution of science
parks to knowledge ﬂow and regional innovation capacity. For example,
Jongwanich et al. (2014) used a provincial-level panel data set over the
1997–2009 period to study links among ﬁrms, public research institutes,
and science parks. They found that science parks had a signiﬁcantly
positive impact on regional innovation capacity in terms of various
measures, including a positive innovation-enhancing effect from R&D
cooperation between industries and universities.

8.5 Barriers to Knowledge Transfer from Universities and Public
Research Institutes to Firms
Four barriers to the technology and transfer activities of universities and
public research institutes in China have been identiﬁed in the scholarly
literature.
First, on the demand side, the technology market is not mature, so
there have been few licensing opportunities for leading technologies.
Most licensing contracts have involved traditional industries, with only
a few involving emerging industries such as new energy and biological
technologies (Wang et al. 2015a; Zhang 2016). Additionally, experienced
licensees have been limited in number. Most state-owned enterprises
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were required to complete a complicated approval process before signing
a licensing agreement. Even if they licensed a patent, they lacked the
research capabilities to effectively use a patent and realize its market value
quickly. A representative example is the licensing agreement between
Fudan University and Huya Bioscience International regarding IDO
(indoleamine 2,3-dioxygenase) inhibitors. Since domestic drug ﬁrms
had little incentive to innovate due to high risk, a long development
cycle, and the complex approval processes for new medicines, Fudan
University licensed its patents to a US bioscience company using international capital (Zhang 2016), earning USD 65 million. Since many
Chinese ﬁrms lack research capabilities to effectively use patents, more
than half of all university patent licenses in China have been granted to
foreign investors (Tan et al. 2013).
The limited R&D capacity of Chinese domestic enterprises is
a signiﬁcant barrier for knowledge transfer to domestic ﬁrms. Many
industries in China are still at the middle or low end of global value
chains, and the R&D intensity of Chinese enterprises is low, with an
average of only 0.9 percent for industrial enterprises with annual revenue
over CNY 20 million. In several provinces in the central and western
regions, approximately 90 percent of industrial enterprises with revenue
more than CNY 20 million have no R&D activities. Without R&D, these
enterprises lack the ability to create and absorb the scientiﬁc and technological achievements generated by universities and public research
institutes.
The second barrier is a lack of long-term ﬁnancial support. As Tan
et al. (2013) observe, most government patent subsidy programs provide
funding to patent owners for under ﬁve years, which is not long enough
to develop and commercialize an invention. Thus, many patents owned
by universities, even potentially valuable ones, expire quickly after being
granted. Additionally, although many university spinoffs have sufﬁcient
initial capital, they lack sustained investment for continuing operations.
The third barrier is ambiguous corporate governance and regulations.
Kroll and Liefner (2008) studied knowledge transfer activities in three
major research universities in China: Tsinghua University, Zhejiang
University, and Wuhan University. They found that universities were
only moderately oriented toward the needs of the market. In much of
China, the absorptive capacity of spinoff enterprises was low.
Although the 2015 amendment to the PTSTA Law has removed the
major legal barriers to knowledge transfer, implementation of the Law
has not been without challenges. If academics and researchers from
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universities and public research institutes receive a share of a newly
founded company in return for contributing their technologies, this
knowledge transfer is subject to additional approvals because the technology would be considered as state-owned assets. Another challenge is
that the calculation of “net proﬁt” in the transformation of scientiﬁc and
technological achievements is not clearly deﬁned in the Law, and this
hinders the provision of rewards and remuneration to inventors and
knowledge transfer contributors.
The ﬁnal barrier is that an underdeveloped intermediary agency sector
results in high transaction costs. Zhang (2016) found that many university professors do not license their technology because they do not have
the time and experience necessary to conduct business negotiations and
perform marketing tasks. There are a limited number of intermediary
agencies capable of providing such services to academics.

8.6 Conclusion
Since the 1980s, Chinese universities and public research institutes have
been dramatically transformed in order to meet government policy goals
of producing cutting-edge scientiﬁc and technological developments to
support economic and social advancement. In 1985, the Chinese government emphasized the economic orientation of the S&T system by introducing competition and market discipline. In the 1990s, investment in
R&D was made a priority in the central and local government budget
appropriation and outlays. In 1993, the Chinese government announced
a plan to build and develop approximately 100 world-class universities
and key academic disciplines through the 211 Project. In 1998, the
Chinese government intensiﬁed the development of world-class universities by starting the 985 Project. With continuous and strengthened
funding, Chinese universities and public research institutes were able to
make progress in knowledge and technology production, reﬂected in an
increasing number of scientiﬁc publications and patent applications.
The basic legal framework governing knowledge transfer from universities and public research institutes to industry in China includes
the Science and Technology Progress Law, Patent Law, the PTSTA
Law, Contract Law, and Company Law. The PTSTA Law was enacted
in 1996 and substantially amended in 2015. The amendment is seen as
an important development of the legal system governing knowledge
transfer in China. It has made knowledge transfer a legal obligation for
Chinese universities and public research institutes. Additionally, it
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gives universities and public research institutes established by the state
the right to dispose of their scientiﬁc and technological achievements,
including transferring technologies, as long as the price agreed on by
both parties in negotiation or auction and the name of the scientiﬁc
and technological achievements are disclosed to the public. The Law
states that no less than 50 percent of the net proﬁt from the knowledge
transfer should be given as a reward or compensation to the university
or public research institutes inventors and knowledge transfer contributors. These new regulations remove the legal barrier to knowledge
transfer in China and provide incentives for inventors within universities and public research institutes to engage more actively in knowledge transfer activities. The full impact of the amendment will be seen
in years to come and will deserve further evaluation and study.
With several reforms since the 1980s, the technology market,
cooperation between universities and public research institutes with
industry, patent transfer and licensing, and spinoff companies from
universities and public research institutes have developed rapidly in
China. This rapid development was aided by government funding of
and support for knowledge transfer and policy measures, such as
establishing science parks. However, remaining challenges lie in areas
such as the immaturity of technology markets, inadequate research
capabilities and R&D investment by Chinese companies, a lack of longterm ﬁnancial support for patenting and transfer activities, ambiguous
corporate governance and regulations, and underdeveloped intermediary agencies.
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9.1 Introduction
South Africa is the thirty-ﬁfth largest economy in the world with
a population of 57 million and an estimated per capita income in 2016
of USD 13,500 in purchasing power parity (PPP). It is rich in natural
resources and has well-established industries, including mining, manufacturing, and agriculture with a strong ﬁnancial, transport, and communication infrastructure. However, it faces substantial economic
challenges, including a low rate of economic growth, one of the world’s
highest levels of income inequality, deep structural unemployment, and
high mortality rates during the 2000s among the working-age population
due to epidemic HIV and tuberculosis.
South Africa’s unique history of apartheid between 1948 and the early
1990s inﬂuenced the structure of the public science system and consequently knowledge transfer. During the apartheid period, individuals
who were classiﬁed as “African,” “Indian,” or “Coloured” (essentially
those regarded as being of mixed ethnicity) had limited access to tertiary
education and were restricted to attending higher education institutions
(HEIs) in predetermined disciplines such as technical training, healthcare, education, administration, and teaching. Only one institution
offered medical training. In contrast, the HEIs for the white population,
including a network of public research institutions with advanced
research capabilities, enabled the early careers of four Nobel Laureates
in science and medicine, and supported innovation to circumvent sanctions (Van Vuuren 2017).
Sanctions during the apartheid years drove a need for self-sufﬁciency,
which was met through government-owned enterprises in key sectors,
including water, energy, transport, iron and steel, and timber, and major
328
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public research institutes known as science councils (Basson 1996). The
apartheid-era public research system of HEIs and public research institutes operated according to an implicit social contract of “walking on two
legs” (Kahn 2013): one leg encouraged “own” science, where research
programs were determined by academics and resulted in internationally
recognized research papers, while the other provided science and technology for the state, including military equipment and nuclear weapons
(Kahn 2006; Maharajh 2011). Sanctions-induced innovation pressure
was met through a mixture of adaptation and reverse engineering involving close collaboration between government, public research, and industry. In this period, the ratio of gross expenditure on R&D (GERD) to
GDP reached a peak of 1.04 percent in 1992.
After the adoption of constitutional democracy in 1994, the public
research system entered a period of transition in which existing universities were desegregated and new universities established, while research
priorities shifted due to the end of economic sanctions. However, the
distinction in research capabilities between the historically white institutions (referred to as “traditional universities”) and the historically disadvantaged institutions continues, although efforts are underway to remedy
this disparity. This context remains relevant for knowledge transfer in
South Africa.
After 1994, there were both new opportunities and challenges. On the
plus side, South African services ﬁrms were able to take advantage of new
opportunities in neighboring African countries. Among the challenges
was a decline in domestic manufacturing and mining, a rise in rural–
urban migration, a large inﬂux of foreign economic and political
migrants, and strains on infrastructure. Various interventions have failed
to signiﬁcantly increase economic growth (Hausmann 2017).
South Africa’s National Development Plan (NDP; Vision for 2030) was
developed over the period 2009–11 to tackle the three challenges of
unemployment, inequality, and poverty. The plan recognizes science,
technology, and innovation as a means of economic development and
the necessity for “public funding to help ﬁnance research and development in critical areas.” To date, its implementation has been inconsistent.

9.2 The National Innovation System
Over the period of South Africa’s industrialization, a modest-sized,
effective national innovation system with sectoral subsystems emerged,
notably in viticulture, fruits, cereals, mining and metallurgy, forestry,
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chemicals, military equipment, health, and telemetry. These sectoral
innovation systems survive into the present and have been joined by
sectoral systems for automobiles and ﬁnancial services.
Prior to 1994, the public science system consisted of thirty-six HEIs,
including universities and technikons (polytechnic institutes), and several public research institutes, including seven science council research
institutes, four national research facilities, over twenty departmental
research institutes, and R&D divisions in state-owned enterprises. The
technikons had close ties with industry, reﬂecting their origins in technical and vocational education and training colleges. In addition to
public research, the national innovation system was supplemented with
private sector research, regulatory bodies, industry associations, and the
South African Patent Ofﬁce (SAPO).
After 1994 the higher education system restructured and merged into
a unitary system of twenty-six institutions comprising twelve “traditional” universities, six comprehensive universities, and eight universities of technology (Nongxa and Carelse 2014). One medical school and
two of the comprehensive universities were founded after 2009. For ease
of reference, the term “university” is used in this chapter for all of these
higher education institutes.
Five of the universities are research intensive, while another seven are
emerging research universities. The higher education system is the strongest in Africa, with two universities among the top 200 in the Times Higher
Education World University Rankings 2016–17.1 All ﬁve researchintensive universities (the University of Cape Town, the University of the
Witwatersrand, Stellenbosch University, the University of Johannesburg,
and the University of KwaZulu-Natal) are listed in the ARWU top 500
rankings.2 However, the changes to the higher education system weakened
the previous linkages between the technikons and industry (Kruss et al.
2015). Institutes that had focused on teaching during the apartheid era
largely retained this focus, except when merged with institutes that had
prior research competences.
Government is the main source of research funding to the public
science sector, via budget allocations from the Ministry of Higher
Education and Training and the National Research Foundation. The
public research institutes (science councils) include the Medical
1

2

www.timeshighereducation.com/world-university-rankings/2017/world-ranking#!/page/
0/length/25/sort_by/rank/sort_order/asc/cols/stats.
www.shanghairanking.com/World-University-Rankings/Shanghai-Jiao-TongUniversity.html.
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Research Council, the Council for Scientiﬁc and Industrial Research
(CSIR), the Agricultural Research Council (ARC), the Council for
Geosciences, the Human Sciences Research Council, the Council for
Mineral Technology, and the South Africa Bureau of Standards (SABS).
Most public research institutes are sector-speciﬁc, with the exceptions of
the CSIR and SABS.
State-owned enterprises are an important component of the innovation system and include Eskom (power), Transnet (communications),
Telkom (telecommunications), Denel (defense industries), Armscor
(defense industries), NECSA (nuclear engineering and products), and
Onderstepoort Biological Products (veterinary medicines).
The R&D expenditures of the leading research universities, science
councils, and state-owned enterprises are given in Table 9.1. In 2013–14
the “big ﬁve” research universities accounted for 70 percent of total
higher education R&D expenditure, of which 52 percent was for basic
research. The two leading science councils accounted for 65 percent of
R&D expenditure, of which 23 percent was for basic research, 49 percent
for applied research, and the balance for experimental development. This
ranking, led as it is by the older institutions, has barely changed in the last
ﬁfteen years. Such historic path dependence is true of many other
innovation systems.
In addition to the universities, public research institutes, and stateowned enterprises, the government research and innovation infrastructure includes national facilities (nuclear research, optical, and radio
astronomy) managed by the National Research Foundation and
research units in environmental science, geomagnetism, and seismology, military R&D, metrology, forensics, biotechnology, and public
health.
A unique characteristic of the South African innovation system is that
SAPO was and remains a non-examining patent authority that does not
assess the novelty of patent applications. Although the cost of obtaining
a patent is low, the patent system leads to a proliferation of low-value
domestic patents, provides protection to foreign intellectual property,
and creates extra costs for ﬁrms that need to monitor non-novel patents
(Pouris and Pouris 2011). The system is also likely to reduce the domestic
use of formal knowledge transfer based on patents.
The potential economic value of South African patents is therefore best
assessed through patents granted in foreign jurisdictions with a patent
examination system. Unless otherwise speciﬁed, this chapter limits all
evaluations of patents to patents ﬁled through the Patent Cooperation
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Table 9.1 R&D expenditure of leading universities, public research
institutes, and state-owned enterprises, 2013–14
Universities

ZAR ’000s

USD ’000s*

Science Councils (public research institutes)
University of Cape Town 1,178,888
111,122
University of
896,566
84,510
Witwatersrand
University of
827,137
77,966
Stellenbosch
University of Kwazulu648,942
61,169
Natal
University of Pretoria
644,215
60,724
University of South
605,001
57,027
Africa
North West University
585,124
55,154
Free State University
330,182
31,123
University of
252,049
23,758
Johannesburg
Nelson Mandela
216,191
20,378
Metropolitan
University
Rhodes University
211,956
19,979
University of the Western
171,979
16,211
Cape
State-owned enterprises (SoEs)
CSIR
2,095,576
197,529
Agricultural Research
1,008,401
95,052
Council
480,000
45,245
National laboratories†
Medical Research
390,820
36,839
Council
Council for Mineral
281,883
26,570
Technology (Mintek)
Human Science Research
244,938
23,088
Council
Council for Geoscience
109,577
10,329
Denel
507,000
47,790
Eskom
130,200
12,273
Transnet
83,200
7,842
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Table 9.1 (cont.)
Universities
NECSA*
Onderstepoort Biological
Products

ZAR ’000s
74,800
32,000

USD ’000s
7,051
3,016

Sources: Universities and public research institutes (DST 2015a); SoEs (annual
reports)
*
Exchange rate as at 29 June, 2014 of 1 ZAR = USD 0.9426.
†
Author estimate.

Treaty (PCT) system or other foreign registries such as the US Patent and
Trademark Ofﬁce (USPTO).
Financing for innovation in the private sector comes primarily from
cash reserves, but also through equity and loan ﬁnancing from the
market, the modest-sized venture capital sector, the state Industrial
Development Corporation, and the Public Investment Corporation.
More risky innovation activities may be funded from the incentive
programs of the Department of Trade and Industry. An estimate of
total private sector expenditure on innovation (including R&D and
other innovation activities) can be obtained from the Innovation
Survey 2005–7 (DST 2011). Adjusted forward, the value would be
approximately 100 billion South African rand (ZAR) (USD 8.1 billion)
in 2017, with most expenditure on purchases of equipment, technology,
and software.

9.3 Post-1994 Science, Technology, and Innovation Policy
Policy on science and technology is vested in the Department of Science
and Technology (DST), while industrial policy resides with the
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI).
The 1996 White Paper on Science and Technology (DACST 1996)
introduced innovation system thinking to shape and manage science and
technology policy for economic, sociopolitical, and intellectual beneﬁt.
Subsequent policy acts or programs included the National R&D Strategy
(DST 2002), the Innovation Fund, the Ten-Year Innovation Plan (DST
2008), an enhanced R&D Tax Incentive (RSA 2008a), and the Intellectual
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Figure 9.1 Major STI policy documents or acts
Source: Authors

Property Rights from Publicly Funded Research and Development Act
(hereafter “the Public Research IP Act”) (RSA 2008b) (see Figure 9.1).
New organizations that were established as a result of policy changes
included the National Research Foundation as the major grant funder,
the National Advisory Council on Innovation, the Technology
Innovation Agency (TIA), and the National Intellectual Property
Management Ofﬁce (NIPMO).
The R&D Strategy and its successor, the Ten-Year Innovation Plan,
outlined objectives and targets that were taken up in other government
policy statements, notably the New Growth Path (EDD 2010) and the
seminal National Development Plan (Presidency 2012). Constrained by
shortfalls of funding, skilled labor and coordination, the goals achieved
varying degrees of success. They continue to inform policy, but are not
highly directed, with the exception of megascience astronomy projects.
The R&D Strategy shifted from the innovation systems approach
advocated in the White Paper to that of a linear, research-led system,
whereby investment in R&D was understood to be a precursor to socioeconomic development. This emphasis on R&D inﬂuenced the Ten-Year
Innovation Plan, the strategy of the National Advisory Council on
Innovation, the TIA, and NIPMO.
The next three sections describe South African policies to support the
supply of public research, consisting of the outputs of universities and
public research institutes, policies to support the innovative capabilities
of ﬁrms, and policies to support linkages and knowledge transfer between
public research and ﬁrms.
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9.3.1 Policies for Public Research
The public research sector in all countries has multiple goals, commonly
consisting of training individuals in useful skills, including the ability to
absorb, understand and replicate leading-edge knowledge produced
abroad, providing assistance to industry, and producing new discoveries,
some of which may have commercial applications.
The DST is not directly responsible for higher education, but has developed mechanisms to boost university research capacity, including the
Researcher Rating Scheme, the 200-strong SA Research Chair Initiative,
sixteen Centres of Excellence and ﬁve Centres of Competence. These receive
generous funding and entail a mix of open and directed selection. The
National Research Foundation implements these programs, and, in the
case of the last three, requires beneﬁciaries to report on industry and
community impacts. In addition, there are a large number of industryendowed professorial positions (chairs) in mining, engineering, and agricultural sciences as well as chairs funded by state-owned enterprises in roads,
water, and telecommunications.
To provide necessary skills, the DST invested heavily in the universities, as well as in the CSIR, the National Facilities and the National
Research Foundation. Between 2010–11 and 2014–15, the number of
researchers at universities increased by 36.5 percent, from 32,571 to
44,457, compared to a small decline at public research institutes.3
The CSIR had a history of “knowledge transfer” through organizational development and transfer (Basson 1996), but its effectiveness
declined in the 1980s, leading to a restructuring during the 1990s around
strategic business units.
The Higher Education National Funding Formula allocates baseline
funding to universities and includes a “publication output” variable that
supports science (essential for understanding advances in knowledge)
through funding for approved types of publication. This provided funding of ZAR 3 billion (approximately USD 250 million) in 2016.
The Innovation Fund provided competitive funding for research with
commercial applications. It initially allocated three-year grants for predeﬁned research areas and encouraged knowledge sharing by prioritizing
awards to consortia of universities, science councils, and industry. This
restriction was subsequently eased so that any research proposal with
3

National Survey of Research and Experimental Development, 2010/11–2014/15. In comparison, the number of researchers in the business sector increased 25.6 percent, from
14,933 to 18,743.
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commercial applications could be supported. As of 2009, the Innovation
Fund was merged into the new Technology Innovation Agency.
Innovation Fund projects that resulted in successful commercialization include microwave technology for egg sterilization and the
SmartboltTM rock stress detection device. A costly but unsuccessful
project was the Joule electric vehicle, abandoned after the prototype
failed to elicit funds for production.
Other publicly funded ventures included four Biotechnology Regional
Innovation Centres, structured as single-purpose not-for-proﬁt companies. The combined funding for the Innovation Fund and the
Biotechnology Research Centres was approximately ZAR 300 million
(± USD 30 million) per year. No evaluative study is available on the
contribution of the Innovation Fund or the Biotechnology Research
Centres to measures of potential commercial outputs such as IP, startups,
or job creation.
The South African Research Chairs Initiative was established in 2006
by the DST and the National Research Foundation with the goal of
expanding the research and innovation capabilities of South African
universities by attracting and retaining high-quality researchers and
increasing the output of master’s and doctoral graduates. The initiative
has been successful in fostering cutting-edge research, retaining skills in
the country and contributing to the stock of doctoral graduates
(Fedderke and Velez 2013).

9.3.2 Policies for the Business Sector
From a systems perspective, policy should improve the innovative capabilities of ﬁrms. This often takes the form of subsides to encourage ﬁrms
to invest in capability-building activities such as R&D or to provide skills
that would otherwise not be provided by the market. To support ﬁrm
capabilities, the South African government provides an R&D tax incentive that is designed to boost private sector R&D spending (DST 2015b).
Firms initially ﬁled a post hoc claim that would be veriﬁed by the DST,
but this system was open to misuse. After four rounds, it was replaced
with a preapproval model that required detailed submission of the
intentions and expected outcomes of corporate R&D. This process
appears to have deterred many would-be applicants, particularly
SMMEs (small, medium, and micro-enterprises), reﬂecting a tension
between a user-friendly incentive regime and company willingness or
capacity to engage in a detailed submission process.
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The government has used industrial policy to correct market failure,
such as the National Foundry Technology Network to provide skills
training, knowledge transfer, and diffusion of state-of-the-art technologies. The 2015–17 iteration of the industrial policy aims to strengthen
“linkages between knowledge production, utilisation and innovation and
industrial growth” (DTI 2015: 69). The Industrial Policy Action Plan
supports R&D-led industry development programs for titanium metal
powder manufacturing, fuel cell development, and additive manufacturing. All three are focal areas of the Ten-Year Innovation Plan (DST 2008).
An agency of the DTI, the South Africa Bureau of Standards Design
Institute, seeks to use “the broad nature and bridging capacity of design
to address the existing innovation chasm by linking R&D with the user,
the market, the social environment for the beneﬁt of the country’s socioeconomic growth.” To this end, support is given to SMMEs and individuals to move from idea to prototype. The Institute has set up the Transnet
Design, Innovation, and Research Centre for SMMEs to research and
develop innovative and commercially viable ideas. This is largely
a private-to-private knowledge development channel that partially
involves universities and public research institutes, for instance, for
micro-satellite development.

9.3.3 Policies to Support Linkages between
Public Research and Businesses
A common assumption is that the public research sector in South Africa
is failing to transfer knowledge with commercial value to the business
sector. For example, the annual surveys of the Global Entrepreneurship
Monitor (GEMS 2016) ﬁnd that South African experts believe that
universities are not playing a sufﬁciently constructive role in facilitating
knowledge transfer and stimulating innovation. This next section examines the possible causes of low rates of knowledge transfer from the public
research sector to ﬁrms and then describes policies aimed at addressing
those causes.

Failures in Knowledge Transfer
There are two main potential causes of failure. First, the public research
sector could be producing very few discoveries with commercial applications. This could occur as a result of a failure in the design of the public
research sector, for instance, if there are few incentives for academics to
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conduct research of potential commercial value (Zhang et al. 2011) or to
take part in knowledge transfer activities. Sibanda (2009) identiﬁed an
absence of an entrepreneurial culture among researchers at public
research institutes, while Goldberg and Kuriakose (2011) found that
insufﬁcient attention was given to the needs of startups, especially business services and IP management. In a study of university research
centers, Cooper (2011) argued that knowledge transfer was problematic
as long as universities focus on “own” research, rather than committing
to use-inspired basic research, even though there was strong evidence
that research group survival and use-inspired research (on the MIT and
Stanford models) went hand in hand. In other words, the nature of the
research was a strong determinant of its future commercial value, resonating with similar results in studies by Fedderke and Velez (2013) and the
National Research Foundation (2016) . Kruss et al. (2015) claim that
a policy emphasis on “Big Science, knowledge transfer and the growth of
niche competences and capabilities” has created “islands of innovation,”
but prevented the widespread diffusion of public research knowledge to
industry. The consequence is large variation by sector in the relevance of
public research to industry.
Second, the public sector could be producing commercially valuable
outputs that are not taken up by ﬁrms for a number of reasons: lack of
communication between the public and private sectors (network failure),
a shortage of funding to support the activities of ﬁrms to develop
discoveries into commercial products or processes (ﬁnance failure), or
public research discoveries not meeting the requirements of ﬁrms, particularly if ﬁrms lack the internal capabilities to exploit them (demand
failure).
Kruss (2008a) found very few new knowledge networks in evidence in
South Africa’s research-oriented universities. The capacity and desire on
the part of industry to forge research and innovation partnerships were
generally limited. In a subsequent study, Kruss (2008b) argues that the
lack of commercialization of research arises from a combination of
network failure and a lack of “interactive capability” with industry.
Kahn (2006, 2013, 2016) identiﬁed the inﬂuence of the linear innovation model on policy (instead of an innovation system model) as
underlying poor performance in knowledge transfer. Ideographic
research based on case studies in South Africa found that poor performance is partly due to a lack of two-way communication between public
research and ﬁrms. Instead, there is implicit adherence to a linear model
of innovation whereby scientists follow their own research interests, often
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in basic research such as the Square Kilometre Array radio telescope. This is
reﬂected in the high proportion of South African gross expenditures on
R&D (GERD) for basic research, currently standing at 26.7 percent.
Although “blue sky” research can, over time, result in commercial products
or processes, such research is rarely of short-term value to ﬁrms. Zhang et al.
(2011: 14) noted that the inﬂuence of the linear model was made worse by
the fact that the DST was a science-driven organization whose staff had little
knowledge of industrial practice.
De Wet (2001) introduced the idea of the “technology colony” to explain
low rates of knowledge transfer in South Africa. This idea became known as
the “innovation chasm” due to a lack of funding (ﬁnance failure) for earlystage commercialization. Zhang et al. (2011) question the reality and utility
of the construct of an innovation chasm and suggest that the problem could
be due to demand failure, arguing that policy gave insufﬁcient attention to
strengthening the absorptive capacity of ﬁrms. Kaplan (2011) used patent
data to show that mining equipment was the only industry where local
expertise was at the technology frontier. Phaho and Pouris (2008), in a study
of original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) in the automotive sector,
determined that most OEMs failed to take steps to improve their capabilities.
They did not conduct in-house R&D, did not engage in innovation activities
that were new to the market, and did not use government incentives to
improve their competitiveness through technology diffusion or intelligence.
Fongwa and Marais (2016) studied knowledge transfer in a developing
region of South Africa and found that the rate at which knowledge was
transferred through the available channels was strongly inﬂuenced by the
absorptive capacity of ﬁrms.

Policies to Address Design, Network, Finance,
and Demand Failures
The South African government has implemented policies to address all of
these factors affecting knowledge transfer, although their execution has
been fragmented and is focused on a linear model of innovation that
emphasizes the role of public research in supplying new knowledge.
The Ten-Year Plan for Innovation declared bridging the “innovation
chasm” (addressing ﬁnance failure) as a key goal, alongside the need to
support human resource development, R&D, and knowledge infrastructure (DST 2008: 23).
The Department of Science and Technology’s Sector Innovation Fund
and Sector Innovation Programme are responses to a Ministerial Review
(DST 2012) to promote networking between researchers, innovators,
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businesses, and business associations. The Sector Innovation Programme
brings together public ministries, industry, industry associations, and
public research institutions around common innovation needs. The
Programme has been extended to nine sectors, including forestry,
sugar, aquaculture, and boatbuilding (DST 2015c: 11).
Both networking and demand failure are targeted through the longstanding Technology and Human Resources for Industry Programme
(THRIP) of the DTI. THRIP supports partnerships between industry and
public research on a cost-sharing basis. It promotes use-oriented R&D and
offers associated high-level training and education for technology development. THRIP supports the mobility of researchers and students between
universities, public research institutes, and industry, and improves the
competitiveness of the participating business organizations. External evaluation (DPME 2015) found it to be cost-efﬁcient in terms of technology
development, with an estimated average commercial revenue of ZAR
24 million (USD 2.4 million) ﬁve years after the conclusion of projects.
Other programs to address network and demand failure include the
DST’s regional innovation forums, four of which remain functional, and
the Bio-economy Strategy. Several regional innovation strategies to promote
knowledge transfer and commercialization were also developed. These
moves reﬂect a shift in thinking toward “innovation-enabling ecosystems.”
The Bio-economy Strategy seeks to harmonize R&D among various actors
in agriculture, health, industry, and environment (DST 2013). In comparison to the earlier linear Biotechnology Strategy (DACST 2001), the new
strategy argues for a demand-led, incentive-based approach to build absorptive capacity and stimulate knowledge transfer.
Design failure is partly addressed through changes to the management of
IP produced in the public research sector. The 1996 White Paper proposed
harmonizing South Africa’s IP regime with international good practice. The
2002 R&D Strategy argued that a version of the US Bayh-Dole Act could
promote patent activity in the public sector (DST 2002: 67; DNSH 2017).
The subsequent Public Research IP Act instituted beneﬁt-sharing obligations for license income earned by speciﬁed public research institutions4 and
other policies of relevance to the generation, disclosure, exploitation, and
transfer of IP toward small enterprises and BBBEE5 entities. The Act
required universities and public research institutes to establish knowledge
transfer ofﬁces, with part of the costs funded by the NIPMO. The Southern
4
5

Public universities, Science Councils, the Water Research Commission, and NECSA.
Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment.
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African Research and Innovation Managers Association (SARIMA) supports the training of innovation managers and the establishment of KTOs,
and works with NIPMO and regional equivalents to advance the commercialization of research discoveries.

9.4 Literature on Knowledge Transfer Channels
How knowledge transfer occurs in South Africa has been examined in
a number of studies (Kaplan 2004, 2008, 2011; Goldberg and Kuriakose
2011; Kuriakose et al. 2011; Morris et al. 2011; Zhang et al. 2011). Most of
this research is based on case studies, in part due to a lack of representative data on knowledge transfer activities.

9.4.1 Informal and Contractual Knowledge Transfer
South African automotive OEMs mainly rely on universities as providers,
where needed, of highly qualiﬁed personnel, rather than as partners in
use-oriented research collaboration that could upgrade their technological capabilities (Kruss 2008b).
In the “low” technology wine sector, Cusmano et al. (2010) found that
the relationships between industry and public research were based on
a mix of informal contacts and industry-commissioned research. Kruss
et al. (2012) reported that most academics interact with the outside
community through traditional mechanisms such as training and capacity development, conferences and workshops, action research, contract
research, demonstration projects, and services. Consultancy and entrepreneurial engagement was less common, informal, indirect, and not
knowledge-intensive. From the industry side, there was low demand for
knowledge from, or direct cooperation with, universities on the part of
larger innovating ﬁrms, but stronger demand from a smaller number of
R&D-performing ﬁrms.

9.4.2 IP-Mediated Knowledge Transfer
In the six years prior to the promulgation of the Public Research IP Act in
2008, Kaplan (2009) found that there was a dearth of economic studies on
the IP system and low awareness of the value of knowledge transfer to the
resource industries. IP activity between 2001 and 2007 was low, with only
twenty-one patent-based startups produced by the public research sector.
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Alessandrini et al. (2013) note that formalized knowledge transfer is still
emerging in local universities and public research institutes.
A case study of three ﬁrms active in the southern node of the telemetry
sectoral system of innovation (Kahn 2014) found that two ﬁrms made
extensive use of government innovation incentives, while one maintained independence. The case studies show the initial importance of
mentorship and academic research to the startup pioneers. As the companies matured they shifted their search for knowledge exchange toward
their own value chains. This autonomous behavior accords with the
international pattern revealed through innovation surveys.
In a study of the patenting activity of academics, Lubango and Pouris
(2007) concluded that most academic inventors or co-inventors had
prior experience with ﬁrms or state-owned enterprises. Rorwana and
Tengeh (2015) surveyed thirty-six academics with research projects with
industry and employed at a single university of technology to identify the
effect of different factors on their participation in commercialization
activities. They report that the personal interest of the academics in
innovation had the largest effect on their participation in commercialization activities. No results were reported on the use of IP.

9.4.3 Case Studies
Four case studies (see Box 9.1) of sectoral innovation systems show that
the main channels for knowledge transfer in South Africa are informal
methods and research agreements. The case studies are based on desk
research and interviews.
The four case studies fall into two groups. The ﬁrst two, on oil and gas and
platinum group metals, display similar hub-and-spoke models with universities, with the main companies (Sasol and Anglo-American Platinum)
forming the hubs. Interviews revealed that neither company relied on the
ﬂow of research information from universities for its core business. The
other two cases, for pulp and paper and viticulture, resemble triple helixes,
with universities, companies, and government contributing to research of
commercial value. None of the cases exhibits demand-led characteristics; all
are supply-side driven, although capacity development is an important goal.
Breschi and Malerba (2005) stress the importance of networking and
other forms of knowledge exchange in sectoral innovation systems. They
note that these systems evolve organically and cannot easily be developed
through government ﬁat. Sasol was a state initiative, although its evolution into a research-led organization was driven internally. Including the
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BOX 9.1 CASE STUDIES OF SECTORAL INNOVATION SYSTEMS

Oil and Gas The South African government established Sasol in 1950 to address
uncertainty in fuel supplies. Sasol developed proprietary technologies and is currently
a world leader in hydrocarbon synthesis and the largest private sector R&D performer in South Africa. Working with the CSIR, the University of Witwatersrand,
and other universities, Sasol developed a gas-to-liquid process that has been implemented internationally. Sasol has a portfolio of 200 product lines. It had 262 copublications with universities in the period 2011–015. Knowledge transfer to Sasol
occurs through formal research projects, the THRIP channel, staff and student
mobility, conferences, and seminars. Sasol sees itself as a coordinator of activities
across universities to develop expertise rather than speciﬁc technologies (Morgan
2006). Its technical success is a demonstration of the importance of early-stage
government support.
Pulp and Paper The two main ﬁrms in this sector are Sappi and Mondi. Sappi is the
largest South African R&D performer in pulp and paper and the biggest producer of
ﬁne paper in the world. Sappi is part of the Gauteng Province Innovation Hub, where
it has a pulp R&D laboratory. Its research center in Kwazulu-Natal specializes in
genetically improved planting stock. Sappi and Mondi sponsor chairs in forest
genomics and tree pathology at Pretoria University. The Tree Protection
Cooperative Programme brings together all forestry companies, Forestry South
Africa and the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries. Sappi collaborates
on genetically modiﬁed breeding with the Forest Molecular Genetics Programme of
the University of Pretoria. The independent, “quasi-public” Institute for Commercial
Forestry Research is supported by contributions from its members and hosts its own
forty-ﬁve-person R&D lab.
Platinum Group Metals This sectoral system is among the oldest in the country.
The leading producer and researcher is Anglo Platinum, followed by Impala
Platinum. To boost demand for platinum metal, Anglo-American Platinum
constructed a hydrogen fuel cell technology demonstrator for off-grid electricity
generation using platinum catalyst fuel cells from the Canadian ﬁrm Ballard. The
hydrogen Centre of Competence developed local fuel cell technology including
the necessary catalysts, membrane technology, casings, and control systems, and
has collaborated with Impala Platinum to trial the fuel cell prototype in a forklift
vehicle. A Web of Science search shows ﬁfteen co-publications with AngloAmerican Platinum, one public research institute, and South African universities.
Knowledge transfer occurs through formal research projects, the THRIP channel,
staff and student mobility, conferencing, and seminars.
Viticulture Centers of viticulture research include Stellenbosch University, the
Distell Group, the Agricultural Research Council, and the Elsenburg Agricultural
Training Institute. Distell is among the top ten producers of wine worldwide. Its
in-house R&D is supported by science and technology service ﬁrms, specialist
manufacturing, yeast providers, and irrigation ﬁrms. Cusmano et al. (2010)
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BOX 9.1 (cont.)
identify post-1994 deregulation and engagement with world markets as the driver
of wine quality improvement. Industry players founded the South African Wine
and Brandy Company with both industry and public research participants to
provide open-access generic research. Stellenbosch University works closely with
industry players and makes ongoing use of the THRIP channel. Informal contacts
and industry-commissioned research are an important part of this sectoral
innovation system (Cusmano et al. 2010).

Centres of Competence within a sectoral system seems to be left to an
evolutionary process.

9.5 Evidence and Metrics of Knowledge Transfer
A major challenge in evaluating knowledge transfer in South Africa is
a lack of metrics. Basic metrics are available for innovation activities in
South Africa (see Table 9.2) and show a modest level of foreign patents
and a low level of high-technology exports. Some metrics are available on
the IP-mediated knowledge transfer activities of universities and public
research institutes, but there are little comparable data over time.
However, the main drawback is a lack of data on informal and contractual forms of knowledge transfer.
South Africa has sought to develop a regular series of innovation surveys
similar to the EU Community Innovation Survey (CIS). The best quality
data are from the 2005 survey, which achieved a satisfactory response rate.
The question on knowledge sources in that survey is relevant to knowledge
transfer. The most widely cited important sources of information for innovation are suppliers and customers, cited by 43.9 percent of industrial ﬁrms
and 26.2 percent of ﬁrms in the services sectors (see Table 9.3). Universities
and public research institutes are less commonly cited as important sources,
with only 9.9 percent of industrial ﬁrms citing higher education institutes
and 6.1 percent citing public research institutes. Within industry, a higher
share of manufacturing than mining ﬁrms give a rating of high importance
to higher education and public research institutes, while ﬁrms in transport
and communications and scientiﬁc and technological services (STS) are
more likely to report linkages with public research than ﬁrms in trade or
ﬁnancial services.
The results in Table 9.3 indicate that the South African public research
sector is less important than several other sources of information for
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Table 9.2 Innovation outputs in 2015
High-technology exports as a share of total exports (UN
Comtrade)
US patent awards (USPTO)
Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) applications
Trademark applications (ZA resident) (WIPO)*
Trademark applications (ZA abroad) (WIPO)*
Plant cultivars in force; world share (%; global rank)
(UOPV)
Sales of innovative products, billions (Innovation
Survey 2005–7)

6
144
442
19,522
5,694
2,710; 2.6; 8
ZAR 370 (USD 30)

Sources: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/TX.VAL.TECH.MF.ZS?page=4

innovation, but this is a common pattern in many countries. Comparable
data are available from Eurostat for the CIS 2008 survey, covering the three
years from 2006 to 2008.6 Limited to innovative manufacturing ﬁrms in six
high-income countries (Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, and the
Netherlands), an average of 22 percent of ﬁrms gave high importance to
suppliers and 29 percent to customers as sources of knowledge for innovation. The comparable share of innovative European manufacturing ﬁrms
that gave high importance to universities and public research institutes is
much lower, at 2.7 percent and 1.6 percent. Note that this is considerably
lower than the percentages for South African manufacturing ﬁrms of
10.2 percent for universities and 6.3 percent for public research institutes,
indicating that the public research sector plays a greater role in private sector
innovation in South Africa than in high-income European countries.7 One
explanation could be a continuing tradition in South Africa of greater state
involvement in economic activity.
The results in Table 9.3 indicate that there are ample linkages between the
public and business sectors in South Africa compared to Europe. The
common assumption that this is not the case could be due to the lack of
6

7

Eurostat, Innovation Statistics, “Highly important source of information for innovation
during 2006–2008” [inn_cis6_sou]. Results for the 2006 survey covering years 2004–6 are
comparable, but data are available for fewer high-income countries.
The average share of innovative manufacturing ﬁrms in ten lower-income European
countries that accorded high importance to knowledge sourced from universities was
slightly higher than in the high-income countries, at 3.5 percent for universities and
2.5 percent for PROs.
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Table 9.3 Share of innovative ﬁrms rating sources of information for innovation as “highly important”

Within the ﬁrm
Suppliers
Clients/customers
Competitors
Consultants, labs or
private R&D
Higher education
Govt. and public research
institutes
Conferences, trade fairs,
exhibitions
Journals/trade
publications
Professional assoc.

All
industry

Mining

Manuf

All
services

Trade

Transport
and comms

Financial
services

STS*

54.3
25.7
43.9
15.9
6.2

56.1
14.0
45.2
33.0
10.2

54.3
25.9
43.7
15.5
6.1

44.9
23.1
26.2
9.7
1.8

44.8
23.0
27.3
9.8
0.7

41.2
18.9
18.0
9.3
6.4

75.0
12.5
8.3
4.2
4.2

47.8
29.3
26.4
9.5
7.2

9.9
6.1

0.0
0.8

10.2
6.3

1.1
0.9

0.1
0.1

4.5
4.3

0.0
0.0

6.2
4.8

3.5

0.0

3.6

1.1

0.8

2.3

0.0

2.6

5.7

1.4

5.8

2.2

0.5

9.6

0.0

9.4

0.8

2.0

0.8

15.5

16.1

12.2

0.0

14.8

Source: Innovation Survey 2005
*
STS = scientiﬁc and technological services.
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representative metrics on informal and contract-based knowledge ﬂows,
with the available data on IP-mediated knowledge transfer not capturing
the main knowledge ﬂow channels in South Africa.
There are several other sources of data on knowledge transfer from
public research to ﬁrms, including bibliometric data on co-publications
between public research and industry partners, R&D survey data, data
published by universities and public research institutes, and a recent
survey of KTOs on IP-mediated knowledge transfer.
The major research universities publish annual reports that include the
number of research contracts, rated researchers, research chair holders,
publication units, invention disclosures, patent applications, patent
grants, and outbound transfer agreements. Even so, these reports do
not follow a standard format, so comparable data are not readily available. In addition, some ﬁnancial data are provided for total research
income, the value of research contracts, equity held in spinout companies, and income from the exploitation of IP.
In general, the universities provide little information on their formal
involvement in promoting new businesses and jobs. One exception is the
University of Cape Town (2015), whose annual research report provides
details of earnings, licensing, patent activity, and spinouts. Table 9.4
provides results for four research-intensive universities. Little is known
about the performance of the various private companies established by
universities, since private companies are not required to place such
information in the public domain.
Three of the public research institutes, Mintek, the ARC, and the CSIR,
use sector-speciﬁc metrics to demonstrate socioeconomic impacts, knowledge transfer, and commercialization success. The ARC collects data on the
number of registrations for plant breeders’ rights for plant cultivars. The
CSIR provides metrics on “demonstrator” implementation such as the
Technology Readiness Level, characterized by protocols for rolling out
a demonstration project. These “metrics” of knowledge transfer are certiﬁed
for validity and reliability through the Ofﬁce of the Auditor General prior to
their submission to Parliament.

9.5.1 Metrics of Non-IP-Mediated Knowledge Transfer
Non-IP-mediated knowledge transfer includes informal methods such as
hiring university graduates and contacts with university staff that are not
based on a payment to the university, plus formal methods such as
collaborative research, consulting, and contracting.
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Table 9.4 R&D expenditure and knowledge transfer metrics for four leading universities in 2014

University of Cape
Town
Witwatersrand
University of
Kwazulu-Natal
University of
Johannesburg

Total R&D expenditures (ZAR billion)

IP cost
(ZAR
million)

KTO cost
(ZAR
million)

Number of
invention
disclosures

Number of
technologies*

Number of
licenses

Number of
patent
families

1.18

4.8

3.3

41

108

17

104

0.89
0.65

9.2
0.5

4.6
1.0

37
10

126
18

0.25

0.8

4.2

14

8

111
7

Source: Author’s enquiry to NIPMO
*
A technology is the embodiment of a single innovative idea. Multiple technologies can arise from a single invention disclosure or a single
technology can result from a combination of disclosures.
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South Africa’s total publication output rose from 0.39 percent of world
publications between 1996 and 2000 to 0.63 percent between 2011 and
2015 (NACI 2016). There is also extensive co-authorship between South
African and foreign academics, creating opportunities for inward knowledge transfer. However, a search on the Web of Science for the period
2005–15 did not ﬁnd any co-publications between the major foreign
patentee ﬁrms active in South Africa and South African universities.
The South African R&D Surveys record a greater number of R&D
collaborations between local ﬁrms and universities than with public
research institutes, supporting the results of the innovation survey. The
ﬂow of funds from ﬁrms to universities amounts to 8 percent of higher
education R&D (HERD), while that to public research institutes is 10 percent of their expenditure on R&D (DST 2015a). Given that universities use
some of these funds for studentships, this suggests more extensive R&D
collaboration with public research institutes. In addition, industry R&D
collaboration with public research is highly concentrated, with only onesixth of 600 ﬁrms that received an R&D tax incentive reporting collaboration with either universities or public research institutes.

9.5.2 Metrics of IP-Mediated Knowledge Transfer
The 2008 Public Research IP Act gave incentives to public sector
researchers to patent and commercialize their inventions, while funding
to defray patent application costs was also provided. The preferred patenting route is the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), to which South Africa
acceded in 1999. The output of commercially valuable knowledge from
universities and public research institutes can be tracked via PCT ﬁlings
and USPTO assignments. South African patent applications via the PCT
nearly tripled between 2000 and 2013 in three stages – up to 2004, from
2005 to 2012, and from 2013 onward. The post-2004 increase could be due
to the support of the Innovation Fund for IP activity and subsidization of
the costs of PCT ﬁling. The distribution of PCT ﬁlings over the period
2009–15 shows a shift from the private sector and public research institutes
toward universities, with Stellenbosch University the most proliﬁc, followed by industry giant Sasol and the University of Cape Town. The ﬁve
universities with the most patents are Stellenbosch, Cape Town,
Witwatersrand, North West, and Pretoria. The top two public research
institutes are the CSIR and the ARC.
The number of USPTO patent awards by South African organizations
has increased slightly from 2011 onward, with Sasol in ﬁrst place followed
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by the CSIR and United States of America (U.S.)’s company Amazon.
There has been a signiﬁcant shift away from the mineral resources sector –
hardly surprising in that gold production has declined by 83 percent from
its 1970s’ peak, while platinum exports have remained static. Gold and
PGM miners have restructured and in some cases moved their primary
listings abroad. Eskom, Denel, and Mintek (previously important patentees) recorded no USPTO patents in the period 2011–15. Another signiﬁcant change in the identity of assignees is the participation of local
universities, namely Witwatersrand, Cape Town, and Northwest.
A survey by the DST, NIPMO, SARIMA and HSRC (DNSH 2017) (the
inaugural South African National Survey of Intellectual Property and
Technology Transfer at Publicly Funded Research Institutions) collected
data on formal knowledge transfer activities of up to twenty-ﬁve universities and eleven public research institutes for ﬁscal year 2013–14. The
questionnaire followed that of the Association of University Technology
Managers (AUTM) in the U.S. Most of the questions collected data on
inputs (research expenditures) or outputs (invention disclosures, patents,
startups, etc.).
The results, given in Table 9.5, identiﬁed ﬁfteen startups in the
2013–14 ﬁscal year and 315 international patent applications, which is
almost 50 percent higher than the number of domestic patent applications. The survey also found that there were twenty-eight licenses in
2013–14. License revenues totaled ZAR 35.6 million (USD 3.4 million)
compared with aggregate expenditures of ZAR 86 million (USD
8.1 million) for knowledge transfer costs such as maintaining a KTO.
Based on the experience in Europe and the U.S., some institutions are
likely to have earned revenues that more than covered their costs while
the majority were likely to have revenues below costs.
Of particular interest is the ﬁnding that 79 percent of licenses were
given to foreign-owned ﬁrms, suggesting that there is very little IPmediated knowledge transfer to domestic ﬁrms. This could also explain
the higher number of international patents. With data for only one year,
it is not known whether the large role of foreign-owned ﬁrms as recipients of formal knowledge transfer is a one-year anomaly or a long-term
characteristic of the South African innovation system.
With greater experience, it is likely that knowledge transfer outcomes will
increase in the future. During 2013–14, 52 percent of the 100 staff employed
by KTOs had under four years’ experience. Many are on contract, with their
salaries paid by NIPMO. This intervention has been critical to establish
capacity and build experience, which is mostly obtained on the job.
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Table 9.5 Metrics of the knowledge transfer activities of South African
universities and public research institutes, ﬁscal year 2013–14

KTOs
Share of universities/PROs with a KTO
KTO budget (ZAR) for all reporting KTOs (ZAR)*
Total expenditure on patent applications (ZAR)
Non-patent IP metrics
Number of invention disclosures
Plant cultivars ﬁled
Designs ﬁled
Number of startups established
Patenting
Number of international patent applications
Number of domestic patent applications
Number of international patent grants
Number of domestic patent grants
Licensing
Number of licenses with ﬁrms (including startups)
Share of licenses with internationally owned ﬁrms
Percentage of licenses based on a patent
Percentage of licenses earning revenue
Total license income earned (ZAR)
Share of license agreements with startups or SMEs
Share of exclusive license agreements
Amount of research funding provided by
businesses (ZAR)
Share of license revenue in total business research
funding

N

Metric

36
24
24

92 percent
86 million
36 million

22
21
22
22

306
19
10
15

22
22
21
21

315
216
76
32

22
22
20
19
22
21
23
-

28
79 percent
69 percent
35 percent
35.6 million
88 percent
54 percent
1.08 billion

-

3.3 percent

Sources: NIPMO
N: number of reporting universities and public research institutes.
*
Excludes expenditures for patent applications.

Unfortunately, the study did not collect data on non-mediated forms
of knowledge transfer such as through research agreements, but it did
collect data from twenty-four KTOs on the level of impact (high,
moderate, or no impact) of four obstacles to knowledge transfer: (1)
inadequate awareness on the part of research staff of the need to
disclose and manage IP, (2) inadequate funding for the KTO,
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(3) inadequate funding for IP registration costs, and, (4) a lack of
specialist resources. Two obstacles were given a high impact rating by
42 percent of respondents: inadequate KTO funding and a lack of
specialist resources, while the other two (inadequate awareness and
lack of funds for IP registration) were given a high impact rating by
25 percent of respondents. In addition, 75 percent of respondents cited
a lack of awareness among research staff of the need to disclose their
inventions as a medium-impact obstacle. This indicates that formal
methods of knowledge transfer are in a state of infancy.

9.5.3 Impacts of Knowledge Transfer
The Technology Innovation Agency commissioned an Economic Impact
Assessment for the period 2011–16 (Urban-Econ 2016) which estimated
that expenditures of ZAR 6.0 billion (USD 600 million) contributed to
ZAR 1.7 billion (USD 170 million) of economic activity with an aggregate
employment multiplier of 4.66. Speciﬁc cases of knowledge transfer were
not studied in this evaluation.
The largest science council, the CSIR, has not provided an impact
assessment of all its activities, although individual CSIR divisions have
published occasional impact studies.
In contrast, the ARC publishes impact assessments of a range of its
activities.8 For example, an assessment of grain crop activities (involving
the ARC, Grain SA, the University of Pretoria, seed companies and its
parent government department) reports that the knowledge transferred
through new cultivars between 1997 and 2012 resulted in a massive
3,700 percent return on investment to maize production. ARC research
on peach and nectarine cultivars released to local producers demonstrated
a rate of return of 56 percent, while that for plums was lower at 14 percent.
Until recently, there was a poor track record of independent evaluations of public research institution activities, let alone use of their
ﬁndings. The establishment of the Department for Planning,
Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME) and a Centre of Excellence in
Scientometrics and Science Policy at Stellenbosch University signal new
capabilities for conducting evaluations to advance policy learning.
The above discussion points to signiﬁcant gaps regarding knowledge
transfer from universities and public research institutes to businesses that
may lead to economic or social impact. There appear to be no studies of
8

See www.arc.agric.za/Pages/Economic-Analysis.aspx.
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the links between university/public research institute activity and the
formation of new enterprises and job creation. Impact assessment post
hoc – let alone ex ante – is also thin on the ground. The fact that
a compliance culture is in place may serve as the starting point to
engender more routine impact assessment with associated data collection. An evaluation culture is emerging, although organizations tend to
prioritize compliance with Auditor General reporting requirements over
engaging in evaluation to serve as corrective and learning devices.

9.6 Conclusions
A number of factors have limited the ﬂow of knowledge from public
research to businesses in South Africa. These include high levels of basic
R&D that support the “own science” agenda of skilled researchers.
Without top-down steering toward national imperatives, a shift toward
use-inspired basic research, built on close interactions between public
research and businesses, will not occur in the foreseeable future. In any
case, a change toward use-inspired research will also require actions to
improve the demand for university research, which requires greater
capabilities on the part of a broad spectrum of South African ﬁrms.
Otherwise, the national innovation system will continue to consist of
“islands” of expertise in research and innovation through which
researchers advance their professional and commercial interests.
South African universities have adjusted to the requirements of the
2008 Public Research IP Act by establishing KTOs and implementing
practices to support knowledge transfer. All universities had already set
up or were in the process of setting up a trading entity to house startups
or IP, and to put a stop to academics acting as commercial service
providers. This was balanced with a range of staff incentive schemes to
promote commercialization.
Those universities that had experience in IP management before the
Public Research IP Act were well-equipped to adapt to its introduction.
Some universities developed full-cost business models to encourage ﬁrms
to contract R&D while retaining full IP rights. This would appear to have
induced some new contracts, yet there were concerns that the substantial
business funding of university research would decline. Interviews found
that universities were generally positive as to the role of NIPMO and
ﬁnancial support for the cost of patenting, although in one case it was
argued that serving the broad community should trump the acquisition
of IP rights, which was considered to be “a prestige activity.”
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All research universities and public research institutes currently have
internal IP management policies. In many instances, these predate the
Public Research IP Act. Moreover, “getting close to customers/communities” has been part of the general ethos of universities and public research
institutes over the last two decades, in part because of the widespread
adoption of “value for money” thinking, but also because of postapartheid development imperatives. University interviewees noted that
pressure to address public and commercial needs comes from institutional
boards, communities, and public representatives. This does not mean that
public institutions have abandoned their traditional mandates of teaching
and research. Actual promotion of the generation of IPR varies considerably.
Detecting latent IP does not come easily, and, to this end, some organizations have brought in IP scouts who work with researchers to identify
potential invention disclosures. In some cases, staff with commercially
valuable IP are allowed to place their students in a business incubator and
are given time out to support commercialization.
In contrast, interviews with managers from public research institutes
showed that they were less enthusiastic about the Public Research IP Act,
arguing that the requirements to share beneﬁts with inventors would put
further stress on their bottom line in an already constrained operating
environment. This stress is evidenced through a comparison of government funding for R&D. From 2005 to 2014, funding to public research
institutes (unadjusted for inﬂation) rose 3.4 times compared to a 3.8-fold
increase for universities. Yet not all public research institutes were
concerned about beneﬁt sharing in all circumstances. A major public
research institute experimented with giving equity stakes to its
researchers and introduced the idea of the “entrepreneur in residence”
to promote practical approaches to commercialization.
The interviewees from public research institutes and government also
expressed concerns over a lack of policy coherence between the DTI and the
DST and believed that differences in mandates hindered knowledge transfer
rather than helping it. Policy confusion and mandate creep also limited the
effectiveness of incentive schemes that often failed to attract high-quality
proposals supported by well-crafted business cases.
More broadly, the underlying and continuing “two legs” social contract characterizes the innovation system and ensures the persistence of
supply-side thinking. This in turn creates barriers to knowledge transfer
outside the islands of excellence, since the needs of clients or users are of
little immediate concern.
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The present period in South Africa may be characterized as transitional,
as the old order yields to new interests. To support this transition, considerable policy experimentation has taken place since the 1996 White Paper.
One of the overarching goals of the government’s National Development
Plan was to deploy science, technology, and innovation for economic
development. This would necessarily demand effective knowledge transfer.
Subsequent policies such as the Innovation Fund, the R&D Tax Incentive,
the Public Research IP Act, the Technology Innovation Agency, and the
Sectoral Innovation Programmes were designed to support this goal.
The current Presidency of Cyril Ramaphosa is actively soliciting foreign
direct investment to modernize and expand infrastructure and equipment in
South Africa. The long-term beneﬁts of new investment and modernization
will in turn depend on domestic capability to absorb and learn how to use
the associated technologies. This is another form of knowledge transfer in
which the public research system can play an important role.
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10
Policies and Practices for Supporting Successful
Knowledge Transfer from Public Research
to Firms
a n t h o n y ar u n d e l

10.1 Introduction
In the last decades, governments in many countries have added a third
goal of community engagement to the university goals of teaching and
research. Although there are many types of engagement, a primary focus
is to encourage universities to support the commercialization of university-produced knowledge by private sector ﬁrms, with the expectation
that this will improve competitiveness, living standards, and employment. This also requires universities to adopt some of the goals of public
research institutes such as the Fraunhofer Institutes in Germany, which
were established to fulﬁll this role. The combination of universities and
publicly funded research institutes are referred to in this chapter as
“public research” or “public research organizations.”
Multiple types of policy and practice are involved in successful knowledge transfer and commercialization. Successful transfer results in products or processes, derived in part on discoveries or inventions made by
researchers in the public research sector, that are either introduced onto
the market and acquired by users or implemented in the business processes or functions of ﬁrms or government organizations. Successful
transfer is difﬁcult to identify (see Chapter 12) and consequently many
pre-commercial metrics are used as a proxy, such as the licensing of
public research inventions or the establishment of startups.
The discussion of policies and practices in this chapter draws on the
published literature and six national case studies, three of which are for
high-income countries (Germany, the Republic of Korea, and the United
Kingdom) and three from middle-income countries (Brazil, China, and
361
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South Africa). These six countries show a range of policies and practices
for knowledge transfer and a variety of contextual conditions that inﬂuence success, including different industrial structures and levels of
technological competence within the public research sector and the
business sector. In the last few decades, all six countries have undergone
major changes in national policies with the goal of improving rates of
knowledge transfer and commercialization.
Section 10.2 evaluates the context for successful knowledge transfer
and commercialization, exploring the effects of linear and nonlinear
models of innovation and how these models inﬂuence our understanding
of the demand-side requirements for knowledge transfer. Section 10.3
draws on the literature and the case studies to identify “what works” and
uses the case studies to illuminate the contextual factors that inﬂuence
outcomes. Section 10.4 provides brief descriptions of changes in knowledge transfer policy practices in each of the six case countries and an
evaluation of the causes of the changes. Section 10.5 draws conclusions
and recommendations for supporting knowledge transfer.

10.2 Models of Knowledge Transfer
Knowledge transfer can occur via multiple channels, as discussed in
Chapter 2. Different methods for knowledge transfer can result in equally
successful results, indicating equiﬁnality, in which multiple causal paths
can lead to the same desired outcome (Ordanini et al., 2014). The
probability of a successful outcome is affected by many contextual factors
that are not the direct target of knowledge transfer practices, such as the
national industrial structure, the ﬁrm’s main sector of activity, the
national or regional level of economic development, the type of research
conducted by public research organizations, and the technological and
innovation capabilities of both the public research sector and private
sector ﬁrms.
The type of research varies by the domain or ﬁeld of science, but also
between basic and applied research. Basic research is expected to have
long time lags between discovery and commercialization, whereas
applied research is closer to the market and therefore has shorter time
lags. The widely disparaged but still powerful “linear model” of innovation assumes that basic research, conducted by universities and some
public research institutes, is followed by applied research, either by public
research organizations or ﬁrms, that results in commercial products and
processes. The linear model, or the “mode 1” conception of knowledge
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transfer (Gibbons et al. 1994), underpins the American Bayh-Dole Act of
1980.
The linear model has two assumptions. First, it views knowledge ﬂows
as unidirectional, ﬂowing from public research organizations to ﬁrms.
Second, it assumes that there is an ample supply of ﬁrms that are capable
of taking university discoveries and further developing them into commercial products and processes, but unwilling to invest in further
research because of a lack of patent protection on inventions. The BayhDole Act permits universities to provide the necessary patent protection.
The assumption of an ample supply of ﬁrms with the absorptive
capacity to develop university inventions into products and processes
probably reaches its closest approximation to reality in the United States
of America (U.S.), where there is a larger pool of ﬁrms that are close to the
technological frontier than in many other countries. Firms in sciencebased industries are also more likely to successfully use university inventions within a mode 1 linear model because they have the necessary
capabilities to work within this model. However, this model does not
hold in many countries and is also unlikely to be true in some regions of
the U.S., in sectors where innovation is not based on science, or among
speciﬁc types of ﬁrm, such as SMEs that lack advanced technological or
scientiﬁc capabilities.
The mode 1 linear model of innovation assumes that there is always
sufﬁcient demand from national ﬁrms that are capable of using knowledge produced by universities. This has led to national policy reports in
almost every developed country lamenting that excellent research results
produced by national universities fail to be picked up and developed by
national ﬁrms, with the blame placed on the universities or on the lack of
programs to transfer knowledge from universities to capable ﬁrms. An
example is a South African White Paper that states:
Whilst South Africa has many examples of good R&D work, it has only
managed to commercialise and exploit the research results in a few
instances. Part of the problem is undoubtedly the absence of mechanisms
to ensure that industry beneﬁts maximally from the [output of public
research] and other basic and/or applied research performers. (cited in
Kahn 2017: 12).

The “mode 2” model (Gibbons et al. 1994) revises the original linear
model based on technology push by introducing the need for universities
to conduct applied research and consequently provide ﬁrms with inventions that are closer to the market. Market proximity has been measured
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through “technology readiness levels” or “proof of concept” (Heder 2017;
Munari et al. 2017). Yet the mode 2 model is still insufﬁcient because it
fails to integrate the other half of the knowledge transfer process: the
absorptive capacity of ﬁrms. Caryannis and Campbell (2009) and Miller
et al. (2016) extend the mode 2 model by recognizing the need for
demand pull from ﬁrms to the public research system, such that public
research scientists are aware of industry needs and are able to act on this
knowledge by altering their research programs. In the South African case,
Kaplan (2008) argues that this occurs infrequently because there are few
incentives for researchers to change or adjust their research programs to
meet domestic needs. Furthermore, government ofﬁcials in South Africa
have understood a failure to transfer knowledge as a network failure,
where there is a lack of bilateral communication between university
academics and the managers of ﬁrms, or as a ﬁnancial problem, with
insufﬁcient early-stage funding for startups or incentives for university
researchers, instead of a possible “mismatch between demand and supply” (Kahn 2017: 28).
This is not only a problem for South Africa – in many countries,
academics are comfortable within a technology-push model because it
requires less involvement and provides more independence, permitting
academics to conduct the type of research that they want to do and in the
way they want to do it. This model does not require academics to conduct
research that meets the needs of industry. This goes deeper than arguments over the “different cultures” of academics and ﬁrms, which often
revolve around deadlines and conﬁdentiality and arise when academics
are involved in a collaborative research project with industry. The greater
issue is the willingness of public researchers to engage with industry in
the ﬁrst place. O’Shea et al. (2008) note that there are large differences
among academic researchers in their interest in engaging with a variety of
stakeholders, while Arque-Castells et al. (2016) ﬁnd that approximately
one-third of Spanish and Portuguese academics that hold a patent for an
invention are not interested in working with ﬁrms, even with ﬁnancial
incentives from a possible share of future royalty income.
The “mode 3” model for knowledge transfer assumes that effective
transfer requires a pool of ﬁrms with sufﬁcient absorptive capabilities
(Hallam et al., 2014) and that there is a reverse knowledge ﬂow whereby
ﬁrms provide public research scientists with information on their needs
and that this information inﬂuences the research projects of public
research scientists. Miller et al. (2016) argue that this “demand pull” is
the dominant factor in the process of effective knowledge transfer. It is
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likely to be of critical importance to collaborative research between the
public research sector and ﬁrms. Mode 3 therefore follows a nonlinear
model that is aligned with theories of national innovation systems
(Lundvall 1992; Hallam et al. 2014).
In many countries, an awareness of demand pull has existed for
decades and was met through public research institutes that conducted
applied research for local industries, but universities were often outside
this system. An example is Germany, which maintains a clearly deﬁned
basic research infrastructure, including universities, the Max Planck
Institutes, and, to a certain extent, the Helmholtz Institute. Researchers
at Max Planck do not see knowledge transfer as part of their role and have
been largely unaffected by the trend, in many countries, to introduce
third-pillar “community engagement” into public research organizations
(see Chapter 5). Conversely, other public research institutes such as the
Fraunhofer Institutes and the Leibnitz Institute view knowledge transfer
as an important part of their role.
Out of the six country case studies, the United Kingdom has probably
experimented the most with policies to encourage demand pull. Since the
early 2000s, UK policy identiﬁed the disadvantages of too much focus on
IP as part of a technology-push model and encouraged universities to
become active players within a complex ecosystem of innovation characterized by collaboration and knowledge exchange (see Chapter 4). This
was supported by ﬁnancial incentives that allocated 9 percent of total
government research funding on the basis of the income universities
obtained from knowledge transfer activities, along with research subsidies to ﬁrms to participate in collaborative research with universities.
A “mode 3” model based on an understanding of national innovation
systems recognizes the roles of both technology push and demand pull,
with a focus on both public research and the capabilities and needs of
national ﬁrms. Both public science and the private sector play strong
roles, such that the failure to transfer knowledge could be due to a range
of deﬁciencies on each side. Furthermore, mode 3 includes knowledge
transfer intermediaries, such as university “technology transfer” and
“knowledge transfer” ofﬁces, that play a greater role than simply preparing patent applications and licensing contracts. Instead, effective knowledge intermediaries need to actively ﬁnd ﬁrms that could beneﬁt from
public research and encourage informal and formal contacts and collaborations between public research scientists and ﬁrms (Garengo 2019).
The terminology for knowledge intermediaries reﬂects the different
conceptions of how knowledge ﬂows. The original concept of
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a “technology transfer” ofﬁce is based on the linear model, whereby
knowledge ﬂows in one direction from public research to ﬁrms. The
update to “knowledge transfer” ofﬁces remains within this paradigm,
with the exception that “knowledge” includes nontechnical knowledge
such as works protected by copyright. The most recent term, although
still rarely used for practical purposes, is “knowledge exchange,” which
views the process as involving a bidirectional ﬂow of knowledge. This
also includes cocreation as part of “open innovation” (Chesbrough 2003;
Miller et al. 2016), where researchers from ﬁrms and public research
organizations jointly develop inventions, often through collaborative
research projects.

10.2.1 The Knowledge Capabilities Gap
While the linear model assumes that there is a pool of capable ﬁrms that
can make use of results ﬂowing out of a “public research pipeline,” mode
3 models assume that a pool of capable ﬁrms may not exist: national ﬁrms
might lack the absorptive capacity to use the outputs of the public
research sector. This can be captured through the concept of
a knowledge (or technological) capability gap between ﬁrms and public
research.
The effect of a knowledge capability gap has been identiﬁed in several
contexts. Haas et al. (2015), in an analysis of 952 problems posted on an
online forum, ﬁnd that knowledge providers are more likely to allocate
time to solving a posted problem if the problem matches their expertise.
In addition, they ﬁnd an inverse “U” relationship between the novelty of
a problem and the probability that solution providers will respond. Chan
et al. (2018) examine the adoption of novel ideas obtained from a ﬁrm’s
customers through crowdsourcing and ﬁnd that the adoption of the idea
by the ﬁrm declines with the novelty of the idea, as measured through
newness, distinctiveness, and originality. Criscuolo et al. (2017) also ﬁnd
an inverse “U” relationship between the novelty of 556 research proposals
for R&D funding and the share of requested funding received.
A study by Kotha et al. (2013) provides an empirical example of the
effect of a knowledge gap on the licensing of invention disclosures from
an unidentiﬁed American university between 2001 and 2006. Out of
3,776 invention disclosures, 874 inventions were patented, of which
38 percent (339) were licensed, while 14 percent (416) of the nonpatented inventions were also licensed, giving a total of 755 licensed
inventions. Of note, more licenses were given to non-patented inventions
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than to patented inventions. The authors calculate the scientiﬁc “distance” or technological complexity of each invention disclosure, measured by the number of knowledge domains used for the invention and the
prevalence of cross-disciplinary research between the domains.
Inventions with low technological complexity are likely to provide
minor increments to existing knowledge, while very technologically
complex inventions are likely to represent major inventions. The authors
use survival analysis to determine the probability of each invention being
licensed. Similar to Criscuolo et al. (2017) and Chan et al. (2018), Kotha
et al. (2013) ﬁnd an inverse “U”-shaped relationship between the probability of licensing and scientiﬁc distance. Inventions of medium complexity are more likely to be licensed than inventions of both low and
high complexity. This effect is mediated by the inventor team’s experience with licensing. Greater experience increases the probability of
licensing all types of invention, while low experience decreases the
probability of licensing more technologically complex inventions.
The implication of this research is that a large gap between the
technological complexity or novelty of an invention or idea and the
capabilities of potential users decreases the probability that an invention
or idea will be taken up, probably because potential users lack the
absorptive capacity to understand and adapt an invention or idea for
their own uses. Conversely, inventions or ideas with low complexity or
novelty are also less likely to be taken up, possibly because ﬁrms are
capable of developing similar solutions. In the Kotha et al. study, university inventions with low complexity may be less likely to be licensed
because ﬁrms can work around the patent, saving the cost of taking out
a license. The positive effect of the previous licensing experience of the
inventors could increase the probability of licensing complex inventions
because it signals to ﬁrms that the inventors are willing to assist ﬁrms in
understanding and further developing complex inventions into commercially useful products or processes.
The gap in capabilities between university inventors and a ﬁrm is likely
to vary between countries. For instance, the average absorptive capacity
of the potential pool of licensees in a technologically leading economy
such as the U.S. is likely to be greater than in a middle-income economy
such as Brazil. In addition, inventions by universities in middle-income
economies are also likely to be less novel or complex than they are in the
U.S. Nevertheless, the literature suggests that what matters is the gap in
technological capabilities between university academics and domestic ﬁrms, rather than the absolute level of complexity of the
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university invention. The gap needs to be sufﬁciently large to
provide inventions that ﬁrms could not develop themselves, but
not so large that ﬁrms are unable to understand and commercialize
them. Of course, there may be islands of competence where the
technological gap between public research and ﬁrms is within
a “sweet spot” for licensing, as shown by the high technological
capabilities and close linkages with public research of aircraft
manufacturers in Brazil (De Negri and Rauen 2017) or petrochemical ﬁrms such as Sasol in South Africa (Kahn 2017).
The technological gap can also occur in the other direction, with
universities operating at a lower level of technological competence than
ﬁrms. In this case, ﬁrms have little interest in licensing inventions from
universities. One example is large ﬁrms in the Republic of Korea, which
beneﬁted from public research from the 1970s until the 1990s. However,
after the late 1990s, the capabilities of large ﬁrms in the Republic of Korea
exceeded the capabilities of the public research sector (see Chapter 6),
with one consequence being a shift in policy to encourage public research
institutions to support technologically lagging SMEs.
The concept of a knowledge gap applies not only to licensing IP, but
also to involvement in collaborative research. When the knowledge is gap
is high, ﬁrms might resort instead to contracting out research to public
research organizations.
Out of the six country case studies, four identify barriers to knowledge
transfer as a result of a knowledge gap where the capacities of universities
exceed those of ﬁrms (Brazil, China, South Africa, and the United
Kingdom), and the Republic of Korea identiﬁes a knowledge gap where
the capacities of ﬁrms gradually exceeded those of universities. Germany
is the only case study where a knowledge gap does not appear to be
a signiﬁcant issue, either because of the well-developed infrastructure of
public research institutes that serves the requirement for applied research
by German ﬁrms, or because of a lack of comprehensive data for
Germany on knowledge transfer channels other than those based on
patents (see Chapter 5).
The technological gap between universities and ﬁrms can be imagined
as a situation where knowledge must be “pumped uphill” to overcome
the deﬁcit in the absorptive capacities of ﬁrms. The “pump” can consist of
demand-side activities such as investments by ﬁrms in absorptive capacity, the active assistance of academics in helping ﬁrms to understand
their inventions, or closer collaboration between ﬁrms and academics so
that the last are more knowledgeable about the problems that ﬁrms face.
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Policy can contribute to the pump by subsidizing the R&D activities of
ﬁrms, providing subsidies for collaborative research between ﬁrms and
universities, or supporting university practices that encourage inventors
to assist ﬁrms, for instance, by taking up short-term contracts with ﬁrms
to assist with knowledge transfer.

10.3 Appropriate Policies and Practices
Successful knowledge transfer from public research depends on context:
the technological and related capabilities of ﬁrms and public research
organizations, the gap between these capabilities, and the industrial
structure of a country, among other factors.
From the perspective of the mode 3 model, there are three main actors
in knowledge transfer: the public research organization (a university or
public research institute), intermediaries, particularly knowledge transfer
ofﬁces, and ﬁrms. Figure 10.1 charts the relationships between these three
nodes and identiﬁes the main factors for each actor that can inﬂuence
successful knowledge transfer.
The set of factors that promote knowledge transfer are likely to differ
depending on the knowledge transfer channel (startups, contract
research, collaboration, or IP licensing), interactions between policies,
and interactions with other knowledge transfer channels. The systems
perspective underlying the mode 3 model of knowledge transfer emphasizes the need for policies and practices to bridge the knowledge gap

Linkages
Public research
organizations
Capabilities
Incentives for
researchers
Researcher interest
Written, flexible policies
Linkages with firms
Exclusive
licensing rules

Knowledge
intermediaries
(KTOs)
Experience
Incentives
Skill sets
Size
Proximity

Firms
Sector
Absorptive capacity
Capabilities
Linkages with public
research

Figure 10.1 Factors that inﬂuence knowledge transfer
Source: Authors
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between public research and ﬁrms and to support knowledge exchange in
addition to knowledge ﬂows from academia to ﬁrms.
The question for policy is which factors need to be further developed
and which factors are functioning adequately? Table 10.1 provides a basic
framework for answering this question, based on the concept of
a knowledge gap between public research and ﬁrms. Table 10.1 should
be interpreted in respect to speciﬁc knowledge domains, for instance it
could refer to knowledge on food manufacturing (safety, shelf life, processing, packaging, etc.) or to pharmaceutical manufacturing.
Successful knowledge ﬂows require motivating all three partners
(researchers, KTO intermediaries, and ﬁrms) to participate in knowledge
Table 10.1 Policies to support knowledge transfer for differing capabilities
of public research organizations and ﬁrms
High
Level of public
research
capabilities

High

Low

Level of ﬁrm capabilities
Low

A Ensure
knowledge
ﬂows through
ﬂexible
licensing and
contracting
rules; incentives
for public
research
scientists to
disclose
inventions and
assist ﬁrms
C Bridge the gap
through
policies to build
public research
capabilities and
incentives for
ﬁrms to interact
with the public
research sector

B Bridge the gap
through polices
to build ﬁrm
capabilities and
incentives for
the public
research sector
to interact with
ﬁrms

D Improve public
research
capabilities
(supply), ﬁrm
capabilities
(demand), and
knowledge
exchange
between them

Source: Authors
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transfer. In cell A of Table 10.1, where the capabilities of both public research
and ﬁrms are high (and with a suitable knowledge gap somewhere near the
top of the inverse “U” distribution), the role of policy is to ensure that there
are appropriate incentives for interactions and capabilities in place for the
three main actors in knowledge transfer. For cells B, C, and D, additional
policies to either build supply capabilities in the public research sector or
demand capabilities in ﬁrms are likely to be required in addition to the
policies identiﬁed in cell A. For example, when public research capabilities
are high but ﬁrm capabilities are low (cell B), incentives are required to
encourage public research academics to interact with ﬁrms, in addition to
R&D or other types of subsidy to build ﬁrm capabilities. Cell C provides the
opposite case where ﬁrm capabilities are high but public research capabilities
are low. Here, incentives could be required to encourage ﬁrms to interact
with the public research sector, in addition to supply-side policies to
improve the capabilities of public research academics.
Policies and practices can be usefully divided into two groups: those
that directly address knowledge transfer, such as incentives, funding for
KTOs, etc., and those that affect contextual factors such as the technical
capabilities of ﬁrms or the industrial structure. Most of the existing
literature on policies and practices to support knowledge transfer is
relevant to cell A in Table 10.1 and concerns direct methods to improve
knowledge transfer. Nevertheless, this literature is of use to all other
conditions because it identiﬁes practices that support interactions
between public research and ﬁrms. These direct policies and practices
are discussed below for each of the three main actors: public research
organizations, knowledge intermediaries, and ﬁrms.

10.3.1 Policies, Practices, and Characteristics of Public Research
Organizations
A history of previous linkages between a public research organization
and ﬁrms increases the interest of researchers in knowledge transfer
activities and consequently the probability of knowledge transfer
(D’Este and Patel 2007; Libaers 2012; Padilla-Meléndez and GarridoMoreno 2012; Grimpe and Hussinger 2013; Agiar-Diaz et al. 2016). In
addition, academics can be motivated to collaborate with ﬁrms by previous involvement in applied research and the importance of applied
research to career advancement (Abreu and Grinevich 2013; Abreu
et al. 2016; Zhang et al. 2016). In contrast, practices such as
a requirement to disclose inventions with commercial potential have
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only a small effect on the involvement of academics in knowledge
transfer (Abreu et al. 2016).
Combining informal and formal knowledge transfer channels can have
a positive effect on the innovation activities of ﬁrms (Siegel et al. 2003;
Grimpe and Hussinger 2013). Informal channels build up relationships
and trust between academic researchers and ﬁrms that can lead, over
time, to research relationships that produce IP (Weckowska 2015). The
use of both informal and formal channels could be especially important
to spinoffs (Hayer 2016).
Another type of linkage is when public research organizations and
ﬁrms coinvent through a collaborative research agreement. This can
result in corporate patents that include university inventors as
a contributor through formal or informal channels. Walsh (2016) reports
that 4 percent of corporate triad patents held by American ﬁrms between
2001 and 2004 included formal or informal input from universities.
An important factor for encouraging knowledge transfer via IP-mediated
methods is ﬁnancial incentives for academic staff to disclose inventions and
participate in the knowledge transfer process (Walter et al. 2013). The size of
the ﬁnancial reward has a positive effect, either through a one-off lump sum
or a share of ongoing royalties (Friedman and Silberman 2003; Siegel et al.
2003; Lach and Schankerman 2004; Debackere and Veugelers 2005; Walter
et al. 2013), although in Brazil an increase in status and recognition has also
been a driver for increased academic interest in knowledge transfer activities
(Closs et al. 2013).
Studies of academics ﬁnd that their interest in participating in knowledge
transfer can also be increased by including knowledge transfer activities in
performance measures (Siegel et al. 2003; Closs et al. 2013; Ranga et al. 2016)
and permitting academics to take time off to work with a ﬁrm.
Barriers to researcher interest in knowledge transfer include personal
characteristics that create a lack of interest in knowledge transfer or in
ﬁnancial incentives, teaching and other responsibilities that reduce the
time available for academics to engage in knowledge transfer (Closs et al.
2013), concern over delays in publishing knowledge linked to IP, a lack of
ﬁnancial support (for instance, when the academic must cover the patenting
costs, which can be an issue in middle-income countries), a lack of research
ideas with commercial potential, limited experience with interactions with
ﬁrms (D’Este and Patel 2007), and differences between academic and
business cultures, although this may be less important than commonly
believed. In a UK survey of both businesses and academics, less than
7 percent of both groups cited cultural differences as an important barrier
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to interactions. In comparison, the most commonly cited barrier was “insufﬁcient internal resources,” cited by 42 percent of businesses and 28 percent
of academics (Hughes and Kitson 2012).
Bureaucratic and inﬂexible rules for knowledge transfer activities can
act as a barrier to the participation of both academics and ﬁrms in
knowledge transfer (Muscio et al. 2016). Knowledge transfer via licensing
is supported by clear IP regulations that provide guidance to staff (Baldini
et al. 2006) and a ﬂexible approach on the part of the public research
organization to licensing (Lerner 2005; Okamuro and Nishimura 2013;
Barjak et al. 2015; Shen 2016).
Policies that contribute to knowledge transfer via the establishment of
startups include dedicated programs (support for developing business
plans, etc.) and facilities (such as an incubator) (Berbegal-Mirabent et al.
2015; Muscio et al. 2016) and employment conditions that permit academics to take leave to work with startups. High licensing income for
inventors has been found to reduce the number of startups, possibly
because it provides a less demanding source of income (Markman et al.
2004; Barjak et al. 2015). However, a European study that evaluated
the effect of multiple policies on the establishment of startups found
that the share of license income retained by inventors had a positive effect
on the number of startups (Barjak et al. 2015).

10.3.2 Policies, Practices, and Characteristics of KTOs
The experience of the KTO, often estimated by the number of years that
the KTO has been active, has a signiﬁcant positive effect on many
knowledge transfer outcomes (Friedman and Silberman 2003; Conti
and Gaule 2011; WIPO 2011; Berbegal-Mirabent and Sabate 2015). The
effect is due to a positive relationship between KTO age and institutional
experience with knowledge transfer activities.
To be effective at knowledge transfer tasks, KTOs require highly skilled
staff. Relatively low salaries, as noted in the case studies for Brazil and the
Republic of Korea, can result in a failure to attract skilled employees. In
addition, policies that do not permit KTOs to retain a percentage of license
revenues can limit the ability of KTOs to offer beneﬁts to staff.
Several of the case study countries provide regional or national KTOs
or technology exchanges that can serve multiple public research organizations (China, Brazil, Germany). However, the preference of larger
public research organizations is to retain their own KTO instead of
using the services of a regional KTO. This suggests that proximity
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between a KTO and its institution is a strong advantage (see Chapter 4).
This could be due to the ability of proximate KTOs to develop close
working relationships with researchers and local ﬁrms.

10.3.3 Policies, Practices, and Characteristics of Firms
Two consistent results from the literature are that ﬁrms dislike rigid rules
over IP and ﬁrm involvement in knowledge transfer from public research
organizations increases with the ﬁrm’s R&D intensity (an indicator of
technological capabilities) (Okamuro and Nishimura 2013; Maria et al.
2014; Kafouros et al. 2015). Okamuro and Nishimura (2013) also ﬁnd
that ﬁrm involvement with universities increases with the number of
universities in a region, possibly because it improves the probability of
a good match between the needs of ﬁrms and what universities can offer,
or because greater competition between universities increases the ﬂexibility of academic and KTO staff.
A major policy challenge is to create demand pull from ﬁrms, which
requires ﬁrms with sufﬁcient absorptive capacity to take an interest in
public research inventions. Demand pull can be created through subsidies for R&D and innovation activities within ﬁrms, subsidies to permit
ﬁrms to hire trained graduates from public research organizations and to
thereby interact with these institutes, such as the THRIPS program in
South Africa, or subsidies for consulting, contract research, or collaboration with universities or public research institutes.
A second issue related to demand is ensuring that ﬁrms are aware of
research projects and inventions developed in the public research sector.
Several countries have established national technology exchanges for this
purpose (e.g., China and Brazil), but the effectiveness of these exchanges
appears to be limited. This could be because ﬁrms have many other
methods of identifying interesting projects or capabilities, such as reading the scientiﬁc literature or searching patent databases. Alternatively,
KTOs can publish relevant information that is oriented to the needs of
local ﬁrms. Due to the importance of proximity in ﬁrm–university
contacts, this could be an important complement to other sources of
information used by ﬁrms.

10.3.4 National versus Institutional Policies and Practices
Knowledge transfer programs can be supported at the national level and
at the institutional level. Munari et al. (2016), in an analysis of European
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programs at 125 KTOs to fund the gap between invention and the
development of a commercially viable prototype, report a shift over
time in national centralized programs to decentralized activities at the
level of the institution or region, which then shifts back again to
a centralized program. The authors suggest that centralization is high
at the start of policies to initiate and encourage knowledge transfer
activities, which are then replaced by local experimentation that builds
on in-depth knowledge of the needs of local ﬁrms. Over time this is then
replaced by further centralization to “reﬁne and complement local initiatives with measures promoting critical mass and selectivity.”
A similar pattern appears to have occurred in the United Kingdom
(see Chapter 4). The 2009 UK survey of university academics found
that academics in regional areas were more intensively involved in
university–industry linkages than academics in the metropolitan
regions and that teaching-oriented universities were also very active
in these linkages (Zhang et al. 2016). However, a policy of using
knowledge transfer for local economic development (supported by
regional development authorities) was abandoned in 2010. This was
followed by a shift to ﬁnding the highest bidder for university IP, no
matter where located.
In many countries there is an unavoidable tension between a national goal
to maximize income from IP and goals to use knowledge transfer to improve
the competitiveness of domestic or regional ﬁrms (Kassicieh 2012; Rosli and
Rossi. 2014). Until recently, the Republic of Korea explicitly followed
a policy of encouraging universities to support the local economic development of SMEs, at the cost of reduced IP income (Lee and Shin 2017).
SMART specialization platforms can help to overcome these problems by
focusing on promoting regional strengths and providing mechanisms
whereby ﬁrms can inﬂuence public sector research through demand pull.
This can require an open knowledge exchange environment to assist in
building effective relationships and for KTOs to actively support cocreation
(Miller et al. 2016).

10.4 Policies and Practices for Knowledge Transfer:
Case Study Results
Several of the case studies identify a common pattern: direct policies to
support knowledge transfer were implemented to address one of the players
in the knowledge transfer system without sufﬁcient steps to ensure that all
players could participate, including a failure to adequately address
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a knowledge gap between public research and ﬁrms. As a result, direct
policies that increased the output of patented inventions in Brazil, the
Republic of Korea, China, and South Africa were not matched by an
equivalent increase in patent licensing. Over time, the mix of policies and
practices were changed to address inadequacies in existing policies (China,
Brazil, South Africa, and the United Kingdom), changing circumstances
(Republic of Korea) and changes in political goals (United Kingdom).

10.4.1 Brazil (Chapter 7)
The Innovation Act of 2004 addressed the knowledge gap, a lack of
incentives for public researchers to work with ﬁrms, and the need for
knowledge intermediaries. It allowed the government to provide grants
to ﬁrms to invest in innovation (thereby building capabilities) and
created a framework for university–ﬁrm interactions, including the
right for universities to sign exclusive licensing agreements with ﬁrms
and provide staff with ﬁnancial compensation. The Act also required all
universities and public research organizations to have a KTO or use the
services of a shared KTO. The Act appears to have increased university
patenting. Between 2000 and 2012, Brazilian universities increased their
share of total patents tenfold, from 0.38 percent to 3 percent. However,
the Act had several ﬂaws: it failed to provide sufﬁcient funding to KTOs,
required KTO staff to be public servants, and did not specify the speciﬁc
mechanisms by which researchers could receive a share of license income
for their patents. In 2016 the Act was replaced by a new Act that
addressed many of the shortcomings of the 2004 Act, but it did not
resolve the issue of ﬁnancial incentives for university researchers.

10.4.2 Republic of Korea (Chapter 6)
The Government of the Republic of Korea established public research
institutes in 1973. Since then, public research institutes have played
a greater role than universities in public R&D and knowledge transfer.
In the late 1990s, policies were introduced to improve the role of universities in knowledge transfer, culminating in the Technology Promotion
Act of 2000, which required universities to have KTOs and shifted
ownership of IP from the government or individual professors to
KTOs. The number of KTOs increased from seventeen in 2003 to 263
by the mid-2010s. This generated a large increase in university patents,
but little additional commercialization. The government has also tried to
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engineer a shift in the role of universities and public research institutes
from supporting large ﬁrms to supporting knowledge transfer to SMEs.
Large ﬁrms no longer required public research support because their own
internal capabilities exceeded those of public research institutes.
The shift in the role of public research institutes to support SMEs and
regional economic development has not succeeded due to the funding
model for salaries of researchers. Financing is linked to the number of
projects, which compels researchers to conduct many projects within
a short period of time. The result is that projects are completed before
a discovery reaches a level of development that is appropriate for SMEs.
Given a large knowledge gap between public research institutes and
SMEs, there is a need to make sure that new technologies are developed
to the level of demonstrated prototypes in operational environments
(technology readiness level 7).
In the late 2000s, the government made several further changes to the
knowledge transfer system, by providing funding for universities to revitalize
regional economies and by relaxing restrictions on exclusive licensing and
permitting universities to license to foreign ﬁrms. KTOs were also instructed
to obtain more information on the needs of ﬁrms in order to create demand
pull. The government also increased the rate of funding for KTOs from
1.3 percent of research expenditures in 2010 to 3.3 percent in 2015, with the
expectation of improving the skills and quality of KTO staff. To date there is
little evidence that the policy revisions have paid off in an increase in
commercialization via licensing. The share of total license income out of
total R&D expenditures for public research institutes and universities combined was 1.38 percent in 2009 and 1.35 percent in 2014.
The example of the Republic of Korea suggests that government policy
has lagged behind the needs of industry (public research institutes failed
to maintain an optimal knowledge gap with both large ﬁrms and SMEs).
Policy also appears to have dropped the focus on domestic industry in
favor of increasing the amount of license income earned by public
research institutes. This is an imperfect measure of successful knowledge
transfer in a country where most licenses are based on lump sum
payments instead of running royalties on the actual sales of products
based on licensed inventions.

10.4.3 China (Chapter 8)
The patenting activity of Chinese public research organizations has
increased substantially, but both patent applications and licensing are
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concentrated in a small number of research universities. The main barrier
to licensing is low demand from domestic ﬁrms, suggesting a continuing
knowledge capability gap. Half of licenses go to foreign-owned ﬁrms.
To address these issues, the 1996 law on knowledge transfer for
universities and public research institutes was amended in 2015 to
support the knowledge transfer capabilities of public research organizations and the technological capabilities of ﬁrms. Before 2015 the transfer
of university IP had to obtain the approval of the Ministry of Finance, and
income from knowledge transfer also went to the Ministry of Finance.
The 2015 amendment gave full control of IP and related income to
universities and public research institutes and allowed these organizations to give much larger ﬁnancial incentives to researchers and KTO
personnel. Other Chinese policies supported demand pull by involving
ﬁrms in research cooperation with universities. Firms participate in
90 percent of national R&D projects and lead approximately half of
science and technology projects.

10.4.4 South Africa (Chapter 9)
South Africa has world-class universities that focus on leading-edge
research. A substantial share of all research expenditures (24.5 percent)
is for basic research as part of “Big Science.” Research programs are
primarily driven by academic interest. With the important exception of
several industry-focused public research institutes that serve the petrochemical, pulp and paper, wine, and mining sectors and excellent linkages between university agricultural research and the agricultural sector,
the South African research system is not designed to produce applied
research of relevance to the majority of South African ﬁrms. A major
challenge for knowledge transfer in South Africa is to improve the
technological capabilities of South African ﬁrms outside of several sectors
of excellence. Other challenges include shifting from a mode 1 to a mode
3 model for knowledge exchange on the part of public research organizations, for instance, by building closer relationships between ﬁrms and
academics so that demand-pull inﬂuences are incorporated into research
programs.

10.4.5 United Kingdom (Chapter 4)
The public research sector in the United Kingdom is dominated by
universities, with 80 percent of research expenditures conducted by
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universities compared to a 20 percent share for public research institutes.
Policies and practices for knowledge transfer in the United Kingdom
have tracked academic research on how knowledge transfer occurs. Up
until the early 2000s, practices followed the mode 1 model of a linear ﬂow
of knowledge from public research organizations to ﬁrms, with an
emphasis on IP-mediated licensing. Currently, knowledge transfer is
viewed as part of a “complex ecosystem of innovation characterized by
collaboration and knowledge exchange among many actors” (Chapter 4).
The importance of ﬂexibility in negotiations between ﬁrms and universities is also recognized, with ﬂexible policies on IP licensing, including
the amount received by the inventor.
Policy for universities recognizes four types of knowledge transfer
activities: commercialization (patenting, licensing, consulting, spinoffs),
problem solving (collaborative research, contractual research, access to
university facilities), people-based (conferences, invited lectures, enterprise education, etc.) and community-based (social enterprises,
museums, public exhibits, open lectures, etc.). With the possible exception of community-based activities, all are relevant to the economic
activities of ﬁrms. Universities vary in the depth of their activities in
each of the four knowledge transfer activities, with teaching and regional
universities more active in people-based and community-based activities
and research-intensive universities more active in commercialization.
This partly explains the high concentration of IP licensing. In
ﬁscal year 2014–15, twenty-ﬁve universities produced 80 percent of
university patent applications and twenty-seven universities earned
80 percent of contract income. In the late 2000s, IP income was approximately 3–4 percent of total income from all knowledge transfer activities.
KTO experience and learning over time has improved efﬁciency, with
a decline in the number of patent applications since the mid-2000s to
patents with a higher commercial potential. The quality of spinoffs has
also improved, with an increase in the share that survive for three or more
years. Demand-side policies include R&D tax credits, Smart Programme
grants to ﬁrms, the Small Business Research Initiative (SBRI) and support
for venture capital.

10.4.6 Germany (Chapter 5)
Germany has a well-developed knowledge transfer system with clear
delineations between public research institutes that specialize in basic
research and public research institutes and universities of applied
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sciences that specialize in applied research of commercial interest to
ﬁrms. Surveys of researchers from institutes that conduct applied
research show that they give a high level of importance to knowledge
transfer activities.
The German case emphasizes how knowledge transfer can form
a functioning innovation system that can be difﬁcult to change, due to
the many actors and networks involved. Ownership of IP was changed in
2002 from the inventor to the inventor’s institution to emulate the U.S.
Bayh-Dole model. The switch was expected to increase the number of
startups and patent applications by academics. Instead, up to 2008 the
change in policy reduced the number of patents by university academics
by 17 percent and had no effect on the number of startups (Czarnitzki
and Licht 2017). These poor outcomes could be temporary effects that
may dissipate after sufﬁcient time to adjust to the new model.1

10.5 Conclusions
Over time, the conceptual model behind policies to support knowledge
transfer has shifted from a mode 1 linear pipeline model to a mode 3
model that involves multiple actors in an innovation system, including
different types of public research organization, knowledge intermediaries
such as knowledge transfer ofﬁces, and private businesses. The mode 3
model recognizes the role of both supply-side activities on the part of
public research and demand-side activities on the part of ﬁrms.
A knowledge capability gap between public research and ﬁrms is required
for public research results to be useful to ﬁrms, but too much of a gap will
prevent ﬁrms from being able to acquire public research results, closing
off demand. Current best practice recognizes that all actors in the system
must have sufﬁcient capabilities and incentives to participate in knowledge transfer activities including consulting, contractual research, collaborative research, and IP licensing.
Research ﬁnds that activities that create demand for knowledge produced
by public research organizations, including both informal contacts and the
participation of ﬁrms in contractual relationships with public research
organizations, increases the probability of knowledge transfer and IP licensing. In addition, IP licensing can occur without any previous linkages
1

The inventor–owner model produced more spinoffs at Cambridge University, with
a decline noted in spinoffs after Cambridge switched to university ownership of IP in
2005 (Chapter 4).
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between public research and ﬁrms. Nevertheless, knowledge transfer systems can beneﬁt considerably from incorporating demand pull, for instance,
by building close relationships between ﬁrms and research institutes to
ensure that the needs of ﬁrms are included in applied research.
Best practice for public research organizations includes providing
sufﬁcient ﬁnancial incentives and time for researchers to participate in
knowledge transfer and to include knowledge transfer activities in career
evaluations. Successful knowledge transfer can require researchers to
expend considerable time on the process, from developing a patent
application to working with ﬁrms or spinoffs to ensure follow-on development of an invention. KTOs need adequate ﬁnancing to ensure that
they develop sufﬁcient expertise, the ability to hire and retain staff with
a variety of necessary skills, incentives for successful transfer, and freedom to pursue a range of knowledge transfer activities, in addition to IP
licensing. Firms must have the absorptive capacity to adapt and use
knowledge and inventions to create product and process innovations.
Best practice includes policy support for R&D and other innovationrelated activities and incentives for ﬁrms to work closely with public
sector researchers for problem solving and commercialization.
A signiﬁcant barrier to knowledge transfer in middle-income countries is the knowledge gap between the public research sector and ﬁrms.
Overcoming this gap can require public research organizations to take
inventions to the prototype stage or for public sector researchers to work
closely with ﬁrms to assist follow-on development.
IP licensing is a minor but not unimportant part of knowledge exchange
between public research and ﬁrms that facilitates knowledge transfer by
protecting investments in follow-on research from imitation. It can also
provide an additional funding stream for public research organizations,
although this is likely to be a small share of total research expenditures.
Best practice for IP licensing includes ﬂexibility in drawing up IP contracts,
negotiating skills on the part of KTO staff, and outreach activities to identify
potential licensees. However, in many contexts, successful IP licensing is
dependent on other good practices that support demand pull and research
outputs that are relevant to the needs of ﬁrms.
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henri j.m. theunissen

The current chapter studies how to successfully transfer knowledge from
public research organizations to companies. Clearly, this depends,
among other things, on the technological and related capabilities of
ﬁrms and public research organizations, the gap between these capabilities, and the industrial structure of a country.
In this commentary I would like to provide some insight on the basis
of my experience in the past in science, business and valorization at the
University of Maastricht and the Brightlands Maastricht Health
Campus.
Valorization is a term that is used in the Netherlands and some other
countries to indicate the process through which knowledge from academic institutions is made available and relevant to society. In our
practice, we attempt to translate this knowledge in the form of licenses,
spinoffs and alliances with companies, or a combination of these. In fact,
a license is always provided to the company, be it a spinoff of the
university itself or a third party (i.e., a company not afﬁliated to the
university). In this respect, licensing is crucial to the knowledge transfer
process. It may be given either as a “standalone” asset in the form of
a licensing agreement or in the context of a broader collaboration
agreement.
The decision whether to grant a license to an already existing company
or to a yet-to-be-established spinoff of the university is taken based on
many factors, such as the mere availability of a licensee, bargaining
power, match between the parties, preferences of stakeholders at the
university and the valorization ofﬁce, the nature and maturity of the
technology, etc. The overriding argument is, however, the estimated
overall probability of success that the technology will actually get to
market in favor of customers or – in our case – patients. Hence, in
principle, we would prefer to license our IP to ﬁrmly established companies that would develop the technology to maturity and bring it to
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market, while we receive a reasonable return on our investment in the
research and the IP ensuing from it.
However, the chance of ﬁnding such a perfect licensee is slim, and, in
practice, we have seen only a few such examples. This may be related to
the subject of the science and the licensing opportunities that emerge
from our knowledge institution. Indeed, we have in the past generated
relatively few technology platforms, let alone ones that are able to generate products, such as monoclonal antibodies for therapy. That situation is
gradually changing and hence may result in more straightforward licensing deals. Instead, the most frequent form of valorization of IP occurs via
licensing to our own spinoff companies.
Having said this, we would very much like to increase our performance
in terms of licensing to companies. There are many activities one might
undertake to enhance the probability that companies would license our
IP, such as putting even more effort into showcasing our opportunities,
e.g., via websites, portals, and other marketing tools.
One aspect that makes straightforward licensing difﬁcult is tacit knowledge. It often occurs that there is a long scientiﬁc and maybe even
business history behind an emerging licensing opportunity. The moment
the company is asked to have a look at the opportunity there is a huge
lack in knowledge, understanding, and experience with the matter at
hand. This seriously hampers the closing of a deal based on just one piece
of information (i.e., the IP or the patent). In my daily practice at the
company I worked for, I never licensed any isolated piece of IP from an
academic partner outside the realm of an established collaboration. Also,
besides the tacit knowledge issue there is yet another very practical
problem: if a company scientist tells management that the IP at hand is
interesting and should be licensed, it implies a risk that external technology may be better than their own and that the latter may be abandoned!
Based on my previous experience in the pharma industry, I believe that
establishing an alliance with an industrial partner is the preferred route
toward effective IP licensing. This would then be a separate paragraph in
the collaboration agreement in which the company has an option to
license or even acquire IP emerging from the collaboration. This would
enable the company to develop and sell products covered by that IP. This
should give the company sufﬁcient comfort to use the results from the
collaboration for their beneﬁt.
It goes without saying that such an arrangement would require
a reasonable return for the knowledge institution. Depending on the
nature and value of the IP and the preference of the partners, this could
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be in the form of (additional) sponsored research or upfront, milestone,
or royalty payments. In practice, it turns out that royalties are sometimes
a no-go for companies. This is the most cumbersome part of the negotiation, as it directly affects product margins. However, it is reasonable as
well as realistic to address this issue during negotiations. Both parties
should make an effort to discuss this matter in good faith. Also, they
should keep in mind that IP is a means, not a goal, and therefore should
be treated with proportionate priority, especially when it comes to early
IP emerging from an academic collaboration.
It is important that the inventor of the IP and their department gets
a fair share of the return made on IP revenues. In our institution we split
any revenues from IP in three equal parts, i.e., a third each for the
inventor(s), department(s) and the valorization organization itself.
Such an incentive is important to motivate scientists to go the extra
mile, often after daily work or at the weekend. At the same time, it is
a great deal for the department as well, as revenues are spent on new
research that, once again, could generate novel IP.
Even though I have described the experiences and practices that we
have at our institution in the Netherlands, I believe that the main issues
that I have mentioned are similar in many other developed countries. The
operational implementation of these issues and policies will, however, be
different from one country to another. In any case, the overall guiding
principle is that IP is a major driving force for valorization, knowledge
transfer, and innovation across the globe!
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kerry faul

South Africa (the “Rainbow Nation”) is a vibrant dynamic country of
57 million people speaking at least one of the eleven ofﬁcial languages,
spread across nine provinces. It is a country rich in natural resources with
a number of well-established industries, including mining, manufacturing, and agriculture, with strong ﬁnancial, transport, and communication
infrastructure but with signiﬁcant weaknesses in areas of labor, health,
and primary education. South Africa is strongly characterized in our
National Development Plan (NDP; Vision for 2030) by the three permeating challenges of unemployment, inequality, and poverty. The NDP
acknowledges that science and technology, and, indeed, innovation are
a means to “fundamentally alter the way people live, connect, communicate, and transact, with profound effects on economic development,”
with “the ability to innovate and learn by doing by investing public
funding to help ﬁnance research and development in critical areas”
being required. Public research institutes and universities are integral
in the approach to address a number of the challenges experienced, not
just as a third stream of income for the public research institute or
university but also as a combination of commercialization and utilization
of research results for societal beneﬁt. South Africa experienced the same
global trend in that it required a policy intervention to shift the focus at
our public research institutes and universities from pure academia and
teaching to knowledge transfer. In South Africa, it was the impetus of the
Intellectual Property Rights from Publicly Financed Research and
Development Act (IPR Act; No. 51 of 2008) that mandated the shift
from “publications” to “innovations.”
There is no doubt that a critical intervention that can be classiﬁed as
a direct means of facilitating knowledge transfer was the legislative
provision for support, including in ﬁnancial terms, for the establishment
of Ofﬁces of Technology Transfer. Through the “Ofﬁce of Technology
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Transfer (OTT) Support Fund” the salaries of individuals within the
ofﬁces are paid for by the South African government, through the
National Intellectual Property Management Ofﬁce, for a three-year period,
giving the institution an opportunity to motivate staff for these positions to
be included on their payroll thereafter. Should they not succeed, the government steps in again to ensure that capacity is not lost and provides funding
for a further three-year period, but this time on a sliding scale. The funding
under the OTT Support Fund also provides a ring-fenced budget for training
such as licensing, technology evaluation, and later valuation, as well as
marketing techniques and tips, and most recently has been expanded to
now support knowledge transfer-related activities, such as IP audits, business case development, techno-economic feasibility analyses, etc. A survey
conducted in 2014 and to be run every ﬁve years revealed that the South
African system has just over 100 full-time equivalents and that the level of
outcomes from each OTT was directly proportional to the experience of the
individuals within the ofﬁce.
The growing capacity at institutions has, however, been overshadowed
by the “pushback” received from both academia and, in particular,
industry, due to the fundamental changes the legislation brought about.
For the ﬁrst time, academics are now being held, to some extent, accountable for the outputs of publicly ﬁnanced research and development. The
impact of new legislative framework on formal knowledge transfer
between academia and industry was signiﬁcant as the IPR Act prescribes
who owns the intellectual property. As such, industry is no longer able to
instruct an institution and pay a portion of the costs and walk away with
the intellectual property. The so-called default position is “s/he who
creates shall own” as opposed to having the option to contractually
own all IP created. This shift necessitated an effective changemanagement strategy as industry balked at instructing institutions to
do research on their behalf amid the uncertainty of who would own and
have access to the resulting intellectual property, and worries over
whether industry would be held to “ransom,” so to speak. Informal
communications have revealed that the more experienced the knowledge
transfer professionals, the more willing researchers are to work with
them and the more productive the relationships with industry partners
are. In addition, these relationships are often made or broken depending
on how nimble the institution is in processing disclosures and concluding research collaboration agreements, for example. A reputation for
“doing the deal” versus “making as much money as possible” also appears
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to strongly impact on the success of an OTT and the strength of the
relationships built with the industry partner. This is evident in that one
might put all the right direct support into the system, but if the indirect
knowledge transfer channels are not operational or optimal, the ability to
move the technology into the market or public space is negatively
impacted.
Nine years later, the implementing ofﬁce, NIPMO, continues to
“demystify” the IPR Act to players across the triple helix as a critical
intervention to assisting everyone to understand the clear framework that
the IPR Act establishes.
In spite of these challenges, which are typically anecdotal, hence
subjective, and can only be measured qualitatively, a quantitative analysis
of the inputs, outputs, outcomes, and early impacts of the publicly
ﬁnanced research and development system in South Africa, a subset of
the National System of Innovation, shows some positive upward trends.
Over the period 2008 to 2014 there has been an increase in the outputs in
the form of the number of disclosures received by knowledge transfer
ofﬁces at institutions and an increase in the number of patent applications ﬁled. When normalized against research and development expenditure, the increase in the outputs outstrips the growth in the inputs,
namely, research and development funding. Furthermore, the conversion of these outputs into outcomes, namely, licensing arrangements or
spinoff companies also increased over the period, albeit from a low base.
In line with the vision of the NDP, employment is being realized with
a doubling in the number of full-time equivalents employed by these
SMMEs between 2008 and 2014.
As with any partnership or collaboration (or any other synonym), the
core determinant of the success and longevity of the relationship
depends, almost solely, on trust and a sound almost watertight contract.
It is clear that over time, increases are observed in a number of formal
knowledge transfer metrics, but it is the informal knowledge transfer
metrics that are at the core. What is encouraging is the increase
observed in the level of awareness and understanding about intellectual
property and the associated rights among academia, industry, and
within government. As we are enveloped by the so-called fourth industrial revolution, the role of government to fund highly risky technologies in our public research organizations will come to the fore again,
providing the platform for, when they are ready, industry partners to
step in and, in the words of Professor Mariana Mazzucato, “roar”! With
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the baseline now established in South Africa, time will tell whether we
are indeed able to achieve critical mass in the system and thereby
harness the public research system to bring innovation solutions to
local problems in an emerging economy sitting at the end of the African
continent.
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11
Policy Recommendations
Aiming for Effective Knowledge Transfer Policies
in High- and Middle-Income Countries

s u m a a t h r e y e an d f e d e r i c a r o s s i

11.1 Introduction
Policy interventions supporting the transfer of knowledge from public
research organizations, including universities and public research institutes, to industry, have been adopted in many countries around the world
since the 1980s. This has led to a marked convergence in policies supporting knowledge transfer from the public science base in different
countries. However, implementing similar policies in different innovation systems is full of pitfalls. Drawing on the six case studies in this
book, which range from high- (United Kingdom, Germany, Republic of
Korea) to middle-income countries (China, Brazil, South Africa), we
show that, because the innovation systems in these countries were different, the implementation of similar knowledge transfer policies was supported by different sets of complementary polices. In fact, many middleincome countries were forced to compensate for institutional deﬁciencies
with supporting policies that differed from those adopted by highincome countries.
In this chapter, we identify the different sets of complementary knowledge transfer policies implemented in high- and middle-income countries, evaluate their implications for the success of knowledge transfer
processes, and develop policy recommendations. Brieﬂy, we show that in
high-income countries with mature national innovation systems, patterns of interaction between university and industry already existed, and
the policy convergence merely incentivized the rearrangement of outcomes in the vector of possible outcomes that was outlined in Chapter 2.
Thus, commercialization through patent licensing in Germany and the
393
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United Kingdom often replaced other established knowledge transfer
channels. The policy challenge in these economies is to ensure all channels of knowledge transfer are appropriately nurtured. In middle-income
economies, where patterns of interaction with industry are still developing, policy convergence needs a different set of complementary measures
to succeed, which include incentives to researchers, changing the legal
structure of university incomes to allow academics to earn income from
consultancy and the use of public research institutes. These measures
compensate for structural differences/deﬁciencies in national innovation
systems. Identifying the appropriate complementary measures is therefore crucial for the success of knowledge transfer policy in both high- and
middle-income economies.
As the international convergence of policies in support of university
patenting and licensing through the allocation of intellectual property (IP)
rights to universities was strongly inspired by US policy, we ﬁrst revisit the
case of the United States of America (U.S.) We then use the six case studies
in this book to describe the process of convergence of knowledge transfer
policies and the reasons for the substantial differences between the paths
followed by the high- and middle-income countries. We highlight the
different innovation systems in which these interventions were implemented, the different shapes that these interventions took, and why convergence in policy outcomes and in the overall knowledge transfer systems
of these countries has not yet been reached. Finally, we conclude with
implications for policy and further research.

11.2 New Policies in Support of Knowledge Transfer from Public
Science
11.2.1 The U.S. as a Model for Policy
One of the most visible policy interventions in support of knowledge
transfer to industry was the US Federal Government’s implementation of
the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980 (Mowery and Sampat 2005). As noted in
Chapter 1, although this piece of legislation was not the ﬁrst attempt by
governments to regulate university IP – Israel had introduced university
IP policies in the 1960s and the US government had already experimented with giving seventy universities the right to patent federal government-funded inventions since 1968 – the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 was
the most inﬂuential. The Act granted universities ownership of the IP
emerging from their staff’s federally funded research, which previously
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used to lie with the US Federal Government. The rationale for this move
was to improve the commercialization of research ﬁndings by moving the
ownership of the IP closer to the researchers and institutions involved
and away from distant government ofﬁces. Sampat (2009) notes that the
most commonly cited justiﬁcation by proponents of Bayh-Dole-type
legislation worldwide is that very few government-owned inventions
were commercialized in the U.S. before 1981. For example, in a letter to
the prime minister, arguing for an Indian Bayh-Dole act, the National
Knowledge Commission noted:
In the United States, before the Bayh-Dole Act was enacted, the country’s
federal agencies owned about 28,000 patents, out of which only 5% were
licensed to industry to develop commercial products (Pitroda 2007, as
cited in Sampat 2009)

Policymakers were also concerned that unpatented university discoveries
at an early stage of development would not be taken up by industry unless
a patent provided ﬁrms with an incentive to invest in additional research
for their commercialization (Berman 2008; Kenney and Patton 2009).
Hence, Bayh-Dole was designed to encourage commercialization, particularly through permitting exclusive licensing and preferential access to
public science for SMEs (Schacht 2005). However, the requirement to
give preference to small businesses does not seem to have had much of an
effect and may have been revised at a later date.
The years following the implementation of the Bayh-Dole Act saw the
emergence of several blockbuster patents bringing very high economic
returns to the institutions that owned them. One of these was the CohenBoyer patent (1980–97) for recombinant DNA, which during its seventeen-year term earned Stanford University USD 254 million (90 percent
of which came from royalties on product sales), was licensed to 468
companies and used in 2,400 products (Feldman et al. 2005). Another
example was the Axel patent for rDNA in mammalian cells, which earned
Columbia University and its inventors USD 790 million (Colaianni and
Cook Degan 2009). Yet another was the exclusive license for the drug
Taxol given by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and Florida State
University to Bristol-Myers-Squibb (BMS). Florida State University
earned more than USD 200 million in royalties from BMS (Powers 2006).
It is very likely that these very high-proﬁle examples, combined with
the general perception of the US national innovation system as being
particularly successful in the development of advanced technology,
inspired policymakers in other countries to implement similar policies.
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Graff (2007) notes that several countries, including India, Brazil, South
Africa, Malaysia, and Jordan, debated or passed legislation modeled on
the US Bayh-Dole Act.
The success of the Bayh-Dole legislation in the U.S. masks the fact that
Bayh-Dole did not happen in isolation but was nested in a broader policy
mix that aimed to transfer knowledge from the science base to industry.
Block (2008) argues that the U.S. has been engaged since the 1970s in the
creation of a “developmental network state” whose aim is to facilitate the
translation of fundamental research into cutting-edge technologies. It has
done so through the deployment of a broad range of interventions
supporting the transfer of knowledge between university and industry,
both on the “supply side” and also, very importantly, on the “demand
side” (see also Bozeman 1994). Supply-side policies encouraged federal
laboratories to engage with state and local government, universities,
and private industry (Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act,
1980; Federal Technology Transfer Act, 1988). These policies also
supported the formation of university research centers focused on
translational research (Engineering Research Centers, 1985) as well as
centers diffusing technologies developed by the Department of Defense
to small ﬁrms (Defense Industrial and Technology Base Initiative,
1991). Complementary demand-side policies, by contrast, provided
matching grants to ﬁrms investing in the commercialization of new
technologies (Advanced Technology Program, 1988), earmarked
a share of the budget of federal laboratories to support the research
efforts of small ﬁrms (Small Business Innovation Development Act,
1982), encouraged collaborations between small ﬁrms and universities
(Small Business Research and Development Enhancement Act, 1982),
and incentivized ﬁrms’ adoption of advanced technologies
(Manufacturing Extension Program, 1988). Nevertheless, these additional interventions have not ﬁgured prominently in the mainstream
policy discourse (Block 2008).
Equally important to note is the lack of any consensus on what created
successful knowledge transfer in areas such as Silicon Valley. Along with
the importance of particular universities, attention has also focused on
other aspects of the innovation system, namely, the presence of superstar
scientists who drew ﬁrms into their regions (Zucker et al. 1998), the
presence of knowledge networks and conducive regional systems of
innovation (Storper and Walker 1983; Saxenian 1994), and the role of
diasporic labor and their transnational links (Saxenian 2007) that allowed
nascent small-scale technological experiments in multiple locations and
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the smooth scale-up of successful innovations without running into labor
and material shortages. These factors lurk in the background of the
explanations of US Bayh-Dole successes, but are notable by their absence
in other parts of the world.

11.2.2 Convergence of Knowledge Transfer Policies
Bayh-Dole-inspired legislation has been progressively implemented around
the world since the early 1990s and particularly during the 2000s. In
continental Europe – where there was a diversity of ownership arrangements
for public sector science – most countries switched to university ownership
between the mid-1990s and 2010 (Geuna and Rossi 2011). Early adopters of
the university ownership system, such as Switzerland, the United Kingdom,
France, and Spain, began to enforce it stringently from the 1990s. In other
countries – Germany, Austria, and most of Scandinavia – the switch in
university ownership was from a previous system of “professor’s privilege,”
where academics owned the IP rights to their inventions and were able to
dispose of them freely. Cambridge University, which had maintained
a professor’s privilege system, ﬁnally switched to university ownership in
2005. Currently, in Europe, only a few cases of inventor ownership systems
remain – Sweden being the clearest example. Italy has a system combining
aspects of both. Countries in the former Eastern bloc – Hungary, the Czech
Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Poland – also switched to university ownership
from a previous system of government ownership. The Republic of Korea,
having broken into the group of high-income countries in the 1990s, has
implemented Bayh-Dole-type policies since 2000.
Despite the overarching convergence to Bayh-Dole, university ownership
systems have been implemented in different ways. For example, there are
differences in the vesting of IP rights in the university: in some countries, the
university is the ﬁrst owner of the IP, while, in others, the IP is owned by the
inventor, and the university has the right to claim it if it is not used within
a certain period, or vice versa, the university has a time limit within which it
has the right to claim ownership of IP, after which it reverts to the inventor.
The scope of the policy also differs: in some countries, all inventions
produced by academics fall under university ownership, while, in others,
there are distinctions depending on whether the invention was developed in
the course of their normal employment or outside it (see DLA Piper 2007,
for a detailed analysis of the different systems).
The three middle-income countries considered in this book also followed the pattern of convergence to Bayh-Dole popular in Europe.
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However, as shown in Table 11.1, policy changes were implemented
beyond the vesting of IP ownership rights in the university. Laws were
passed to allow universities to license IP and to proﬁt from it by allowing
them to receive incomes from royalties. Universities were also obliged to
compensate the inventor with a share of royalties. Brazil, China, and
South Africa, which had previously limited the extent to which universities and public research institutes were permitted to engage with industry, began to relax these rules to allow universities much greater freedom
of action. Laws were also passed so that public universities were given
greater freedom to contract with industry, to establish spinoffs, and to
allow academics to take leave of absence in order to engage in commercialization activities in their own or another ﬁrm.
More detail on the regulations that underpinned these changes in other
middle-income countries is presented in WIPO (2011: Chapter 4) and in
Zuniga (2011). This shows that the Bayh-Dole-inspired legislative reforms
implemented in each country were usually a distinct package (e.g., in
terms of the speciﬁc rules on the scope of university patenting, invention
disclosure, incentives for researchers, and whether certain safeguards
were instituted to counteract the potentially negative effects of patenting).
Therefore, as argued in Chapter 1, what we term convergence to BayhDole was never a process of countries making simple binary choices with
respect to institutional or individual patent ownership, but one with
signiﬁcant differences in the features of the whole package of policies.
Yet, in all cases, this new policy framework was justiﬁed by a “lack of
commercialization of public research” argument: the idea that national
universities in all countries produced good-quality research, which
stayed locked up in ivory towers and which they failed to commercialize
sufﬁciently. In other words, the problem was framed as one of lack of
interaction between university and industry, which needed to be corrected by implementing changes in legal ownership rights and in incentives to encourage interaction between the actors in the system. As
Arundel points out in Chapter 10, an absence of interactions between
university and industry could also be caused by the failure of industry to
“demand” knowledge from universities.

11.3 Different Innovation Systems and Different Policy Mixes
Chapter 2 detailed six different types of knowledge transfer channel from
the public science base to industry. These ranged through research
publications; conferences seminars and meetings with industry;
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Table 11.1 Convergence of knowledge transfer policies

UK
Germany
Republic of
Korea
China
Brazil
South Africa

University
must compensate
inventor
for IP

Universities
can contract
with industry

University
can establish
spinoffs

Academics
can take leave
of absence to
work in
spinoffs

University
can own IP

University
has right to
license IP

University
can retain
royalties
from IP

Yes (1948)
Yes (2000)
Yes (2000)

Yes
Yes
Yes (2000)

Yes
Yes
Yes (2000)

Yes
Yes
Yes (2000)

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes (2003)

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes (2002)
Yes (1996)
Yes (2008)

Yes (2015)
Yes (1996)
Yes (2008)

Yes (2015)
Yes (2004)
Yes (2008)

Yes (2002)
Yes (1996)
Yes (2008)

Yes
Yes (2004)
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes (2016)
Yes
Yes

Source: Authors
Note: In parenthesis, we report the year in which the law allowing the activity above was enacted (in cases without a date, this means
that there was no previous prohibition against the activity).
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education and training of students/researchers recruited by the private
sector; consultancies and contract innovation research (including university–industry joint research projects, joint research centers, and PhD
projects); creation of IP for licensing; and creation of spinoff companies.
A striking feature of knowledge transfer from the science base in middleincome countries lies in the fact that the last two forms of knowledge
transfer are negligible and occur very rarely. This is clear from the
country studies. One could, of course, argue that IP licensing and spinoff
companies account for very small shares of overall university incomes
even in high-income economies (see, for example, Chapter 4 and the
evidence in WIPO 2011). This suggests in turn that the proportion of
formal to informal knowledge transfer may not be the main indicator
that sets high- and middle-income countries apart.
It is, of course, apparent that the institutional frameworks within the
six country case studies (where Bayh-Dole-type measures were implemented) were very different. Further, none of these contexts (and set of
packages) was similar to that of the U.S., the model that they appeared to
be inspired by and aspired to. Some of the key differences between the six
countries’ innovation systems are summarized in Table 11.2, based on
the country chapters and data in Chapter 1. The ﬁrst key difference is that
ﬁrms’ R&D engagement is higher in high-income countries than in
middle-income countries, as noted in Chapter 10. Interactions between
public research and industry, and universities’ research intensity, are also
higher in high-income countries than in middle-income countries. The
importance of public research institutes versus universities is variable.
The Republic of Korea is a fascinating case as it presents some features
that are intermediate between the two groups. Here, collaborative R&D
between public research institutes and private ﬁrms has been the most
important and effective form of breaking into the higher-end segment of
the industry (Lee et al. 2005; Lee 2013), whereas interactions between
universities and industry have been low, although this has been changing
since the 1990s.
The detailed case studies in this book, situated in a historical perspective, help us to appreciate the often overlooked point that what sets highand middle-income countries apart are that their innovation systems,
and, more particularly, the system of production and transfer of knowledge between university and industry are quite different. In wellfunctioning high-income economies there are two-way ﬂows of ideas
and people between the university and industrial sectors. In middleincome economies, there is a healthy ﬂow of people between universities
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Table 11.2 Differences between the national systems of innovation of six
high- and middle-income countries

UK
Germany
Republic of
Korea
China
Brazil
South Africa

Firms’ R&D
engagement

Interactions
between public research
and industry

Importance of
research from
public
research institutes vs
universities

Universities’
research
intensity

High
High
High

High
High
High

Low
Medium
High

High
High
Medium

Low
Low
Low

Low
Low
Low

High
Medium
High

Low
Low
Low

Source: Authors
Note: The table builds on information provided in Chapter 1 and in the six country
studies presented in this book and refers to the period considered in them. In most
cases, ﬁrms’ R&D engagement is measured in terms of R&D expenditure or R&D
and patenting intensity of domestic ﬁrms. Interactions between public research
and industry are measured in terms of ﬁrms’ licensing of university patents and
business funding of university research. Publications per academic are the most
commonly used indicator of a university’s research intensity.

and industry, but channels to establish a ﬂow of ideas are very underdeveloped, and public research institutes are prominent as they bridge
the gap between frontier science and its application to domestic industrial conditions. Thus, the success of Bayh-Dole-type policies in these
economies needs to be judged not only by the vector of knowledge
transfer outputs but also by the impetus that the legislation provided
for establishing channels through which new ideas, emerging in universities, could ﬁnd direct application in the industrial sector, without
necessarily involving public research institutes in an intermediate role.
The stress in this chapter on links for people and ideas is thus complementary to the discussion of formal and informal channels of knowledge
exchange outlined in Chapter 2. Formal methods of knowledge transfer
and commercialization identiﬁed in that chapter are likely to require the
institution of legal arrangements that favor the movement of ideas, while

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 54.177.185.247, on 15 Nov 2021 at 19:13:31, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/979C0AAA92B1200DCE513DAAE4894BE7

402

at h re y e & ross i

the movement of people is likely to favor more informal methods of
knowledge exchange.

11.3.1 High-Income Countries
As noted in Chapter 1, high-income countries are characterized by high
private expenditure in R&D, with numerous large ﬁrms that employ
R&D staff and possess a high absorptive capacity for new technological
knowledge and thus are able to interact with universities. In these
countries, the university system is also highly developed, with many
research-intensive universities. Although public research institutes are
more (e.g., Germany, Republic of Korea) or less (e.g., United Kingdom)
present in the system, in all cases, they are not the only source of research
in the country: universities also play a prominent role. The Republic of
Korea is slightly different from Germany, as public research institutes,
although highly research-intensive, deal exclusively with large domestic
ﬁrms and have struggled to establish links with smaller companies.
When the knowledge ecosystem is well developed we see two-way links
between public research institutes, universities, and ﬁrms, as shown in
Figure 11.1. The ﬁrst link is through the movement of people, shown by
the solid lines. Students may move to placements in ﬁrms and continue to
collaborate with their former professors. Equally, managers of ﬁrms may
draw on expertise in their alma mater to solve technical problems in the
ﬁrms they are employed in. Similarly, public research institutes may
invite secondments, allow the use of their R&D labs, and develop joint
R&D projects. These people links, based on both institutionalized and
interpersonal links, are distinct from arms’ length transactions in technology and ideas through formal knowledge transfer.
The formal links, shown by the dashed lines in Figure 11.1, are likely to
be based on the issue of patents, technology contracts, or equity investments. Patents are likely to be preferred in the case of mature, codiﬁable
technologies, where licensing is a viable option because buyers can
understand the technology quite readily (although evidence suggests
that very often scientists who develop patented inventions continue to
collaborate with licensing ﬁrms through consulting contracts, in order to
support the implementation of the licensed technology; Thursby et al.
2001). Equity investment in spinoffs may make sense in the context of
early-stage technologies, which cannot be easily codiﬁed and may need
joint development with ﬁrms.
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basic and applied research focus

Established firms
High absorptive capacity
Domestic firms and MNCs have
strong research capability

Figure 11.1

The knowledge ecosystem in high-income economies

In high-income economies, due to the presence of R&D-intensive
domestic ﬁrms and multinational corporations (MNCs) and of researchintensive universities and public research institutes (see also Chapter 10),
both people and ideas circulate relatively frequently, through both institutionalized channels and well-established interpersonal relations.
Indeed, for these countries, the assumption that a lack of interactions
required new institutions was probably misleading. Certainly in
Germany (see Chapter 5), there was not a lot of university patenting,
and universities were not generating income from IP licensing, but a lot
of knowledge transfer was happening without requiring university
patents. Professors often collaborated directly with industry, either informally or through research contracts, and ceded their IP rights to their
collaborating ﬁrms, which then patented the resulting inventions. Hence,
although German universities owned few patents, professors often ﬁgured as inventors of industrially owned patents, a pattern that was
present in most of continental Europe (Lissoni et al. 2008; Geuna and
Rossi 2011).
The United Kingdom was an intermediate case, since it never had the
professor’s privilege and the IP rights to academic inventions belonged to
the university, which initially ceded them to a central agency tasked with
research commercialization, the British Technology Group. In spite of
some successes (e.g., successful commercialization of the technology
behind hovercrafts and magnetic resonance imaging), this approach
did not lead to a large amount of commercialization: outside the medical
sector, academics’ interactions with industry were mostly either informal
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or focused on research contracting. Cambridge, which maintained
a system of professor’s privilege until 2005, saw intense involvement of
professors in the development of spinoff companies, some of which
spawned very large ﬁrms, particularly in ICT, which eventually generated
a local high-technology cluster (Athreye 2004).
In the Republic of Korea, large ﬁrms were strong investors in R&D and
had a very strong relationship with the government (chaebol system).
Public research institutes played a greater role than universities in public
R&D and knowledge transfer in the process of catch-up.
In these countries, characterized by preexisting strong interactions
between universities, public research institutes, and ﬁrms, the introduction
of Bayh-Dole-type legislation could disrupt as well as enhance interactions.
In German-speaking and Scandinavian countries, as well as in Cambridge
pre-2005, patents were owned by inventors, so the introduction of BayhDole-type legislation brought the patenting process further away from
inventors; exactly the opposite of what had happened in the U.S., where
patents were already owned by the Federal Government so the change
brought the patenting process closer to inventors (Mowery and Sampat
2005). As a result, this process could disrupt existing relationships – which
had developed in harmony with a system where inventors held IP rights –
rather than enhance them. Indeed, Chapter 5 argues that this is what
happened in Germany, where, up to 2008, the change in policy reduced
the number of patents by university academics by 17 percent and had no
effect on the number of startups.
In the United Kingdom, which already had a system of university ownership for many universities, universities’ obligation to commercialize their
patents through the British Technology Group was removed in 1985. Since
then, most universities have set up internal knowledge transfer ofﬁces
(KTOs) dealing with commercialization activities. Given that in the
United Kingdom individual academics could not dispose of their IP freely,
most collaborations with industry already occurred with some involvement
of the university institution, and there is little evidence of displacement
effects. However, there is evidence that the increase in university patenting
did not lead to the expected increase in licensing income, with licensing
income concentrated in a few universities (see Chapter 4).1 There are signs
of a decline in university patenting in recent years as universities are
becoming more selective in which patents they pursue (Tang et al. 2010).
1

Cross-country evidence in WIPO (2011) shows that in many countries only a handful of
universities accounted for the bulk of the commercialization activities.
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11.3.2 Middle-Income Countries
In contrast to high-income countries, middle-income countries are characterized by a low number of R&D-intensive ﬁrms, with the majority of
domestic companies performing very little research and possessing low
absorptive capacity, as discussed in Chapter 1. The few companies that
perform R&D tend to be MNCs, or companies that are partly government owned (e.g., the Brazil country study noted that 80 percent of
patents generated in the country have nonresident applicants). These
countries also tend to have a strong division of labor in knowledge
production, with universities concentrating on basic research and the
training of students, while public research institutes are tasked with
adapting frontier research to the needs of industry and government.
The data in Chapter 1 also show that in middle-income countries most
research is performed in public research institutes funded by and
responding to the government.
Figure 11.2 sketches the knowledge ecosystem in middle-income
countries. The people links work well, and there are institutionalized
links between public research institutes and ﬁrms. However, public
research institutes tend to be strongly specialized by sector (very often,
agriculture, engineering, and health), therefore interactions with ﬁrms
are concentrated in particular industries and involve large ﬁrms.
Furthermore, as the country studies of China, Brazil, and South Africa
note, the links between public research institutes and industry are still
limited outside of particular sectors or technology areas. One reason for
this limitation may be the small size of many public research laboratories,
which, with a few exceptions, do not produce world-leading research.
This limited interaction may also be due to contractual laws that limit the
employment of university researchers by other employers: for example,
public research institutes in Brazil have only been allowed to sign knowledge transfer contracts with companies since 2004. The cultural chasm
between scientists working in labs and industry staff may also be a factor.
In many countries, pursuit of science and learning may be seen as
a “pure” goal and one that should not be contaminated by commercial
considerations.2
Our case studies suggest that in middle-income countries, the main
difference when compared to Figure 11.1 for high-income countries is
2

In India, for example, Saraswati (the goddess of learning) is said to leave the room when
Lakshmi (the goddess of wealth) enters it. See https://devdutt.com/articles/battle-oflakshmi-and-sarawati.html.
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PRIs:
State of the art labs
well funded by government
applied research focus

Ideas
People

Universities:
Human capital training and
placement
basic research focus

Established firms
Low absorptive capacity
only MNCs have strong research
capacity

Figure 11.2

The public research ecosystem in middle-income economies

the presence of only weak linkages (and sometimes their complete
absence) for transferring research ideas, knowledge, and technology
from the university science base to industry. Universities in middleincome countries mainly engage in training and provide the human
capital for both industry and public research institutes. These training
links have resulted in informal people-mediated channels of knowledge
transfer, but formal channels are largely limited – where present, they
usually take the form of contract research and consulting. Interestingly,
the Republic of Korea shows these features as well, despite being a highincome country.
The absence of linkages between university and industry poses two
challenges for the implementation of knowledge transfer policies. As
already noted in Chapter 10, universities have not yet developed a way
to bridge the gap between the basic scientiﬁc research they produce and
the prototype level of development of an innovative idea. Many ﬁrms
require the latter to readily absorb and use to scale up production.
The second challenge comes from the legal and contractual obligations
surrounding university researchers, which are often not conducive to
engagement with industry on research issues. Our case studies provide
evidence of the full range of such challenges.
In all the middle-income countries studied in this book, the implementation of Bayh-Dole-inspired knowledge transfer policies encountered problems created by the missing (ideas) links between universities
and industry and further rounds of policy changes were required to
overcome the problems. Thus each of our country chapters also outlines
a policy-induced process of adaptation of institutional frameworks that
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share some important similarities, but that also differ in several details.
While the general policy discourse around the implementation of BayhDole-type legislation seemed to suggest that these changes in formal rules
would, in themselves, be sufﬁcient to achieve the hoped-for increases in
commercialization activities, in practice, most countries have also implemented a range of supporting measures aimed at stimulating the creation
of the infrastructures and competences that are required to connect
university actors to industry. This includes rules to support exploiting
the new IP rights framework, as well as measures to stimulate ﬁrms’
demand for university IP (e.g., funds for joint research projects).

11.3.3 Policy Mixes Adopted
Analysis of the policy interventions enacted in the six country case
studies can be subsumed under two major categories and related subcategories. The ﬁrst category of complementary interventions aims to introduce supply-side incentives for universities to supply technology more
readily and frequently to industry. These include institutional-level
incentives for universities to patent and license IP and to interact with
industry in different ways, for example, by establishing KTOs and other
intermediaries encouraging interactions between universities and industry. These intermediaries manage research contracts, the creation of
spinoffs, the establishment of joint research centers, and other related
activities. In some cases, KTOs were established at local, regional or
national levels, with or without the involvement of universities, and
several universities “shared” KTO services.
As technology transactions are plagued by asymmetric information
about the nature of technology and potential applications, individual
researchers are in the best position to alleviate these concerns. In addition, the interpersonal networks of researchers can often be used to kickstart links with industry when none exists. Therefore, in all cases, supplyside measures also included incentives for individual academics to
engage in knowledge transfer. Examples include monetary incentives
that allow academics to receive income from royalties and consulting
activities in addition to their salaries; career development incentives that
include knowledge transfer performance as a criterion for academic
promotion; incentives for academics to engage in entrepreneurial and
other business activities, including permissions to take leave of absence in
order to work for university spinoffs or for other companies, and to earn
income from these activities.
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The second category of interventions consists of demand-side incentives for ﬁrms to engage with industry. These incentives range from
general incentives for ﬁrms to invest in R&D (such as R&D tax credits,
grants, innovation vouchers) and more speciﬁc incentives for ﬁrms to
collaborate with universities and public research institutes (such as joint
project grants, subsidies for the establishment of joint research centers,
and mandatory investment in university research). All these incentives
can be created purely through legal requirements, or they can involve the
use of government funds, either in the form of government subsidies for
certain activities or in the form of rewards for universities’ good performance in certain activities.
Table 11.3 summarizes the extent to which the six countries implemented supply-side and demand-side incentives of the kinds just
described. As can be seen, most countries implemented a combination
of incentives. All of them focused on supply-side incentives, consistent
with the argument that they saw the problem primarily as one of getting
universities to reach out to industry.
Middle-income countries have mainly issued legal requirements for
universities to engage with industry (although individual universities can
enact their own internal policies providing academics with monetary
incentives, for example, to develop spinoff companies or engage in
consulting activities), while high-income countries have also dedicated
government funds to supporting universities in these activities. All countries have invested public funds in the setup of KTOs (either within
universities, or at local, regional, or national levels). In Brazil, while
every public university and public research institute in the country is
required to have a KTO, the Innovation Act allowed institutions to share
a KTO, so that several of them serve more than one research institution.
On the demand side, all countries enacted speciﬁc monetary incentives
for companies to interact with public research, mainly in the form of
R&D tax breaks and opportunities to bid for joint R&D projects. In
Brazil, companies in some sectors such as energy are required to invest
a share of their revenue in R&D in partnership with universities and
public research institutes. This has been successful in stimulating university–industry interactions. However, this requirement applies to companies that are large, often multinationals headquartered outside Brazil,
and beneﬁts only a few research-intensive universities and public
research institutes. The majority of public research institutes in Brazil
continue to be too small and insufﬁciently research-intensive to beneﬁt
from these incentives.
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Table 11.3 Differences in range of supporting policies
Supply-side incentives

UK
Germany
Republic of Korea
China
Brazil
South Africa

Incentives for
formation of
KTOs

Incentives for
universities to
patent and
license IP

M
M
L/M
L/M
L/M
M

E
L
L
L/E
L
L

Incentives for
universities to
engage with
industry
through contracts, spinoffs etc.
M/E
M
L
L/E
L

Demand-side incentives

Incentives for
individual academics to
engage with
industry
L
M
L
L
L
L

Incentives for
industry to
invest in R&D
M
M
M
L/M
M

Incentives for
industry to
engage with
universities
M
M
M
M
L/M
M

Source: Authors.
Note: L = legal requirement to implement the activity; E = the activity is part of performance evaluation; M = direct government support
provided to the activity, including tax breaks.
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In addition, the case studies provide interesting insights into the
timing and sequence of the policy changes. Almost all countries started
by implementing legal changes but had to follow them up with a mixture
of carrot (monetary incentives) and stick (performance evaluation) policies, to encourage take-up of these activities.
In Brazil, policy interventions implemented in 1996 allowed universities to own and license IP as well as compensating individual inventors.
In 2004, the policy changed to allow universities to retain some income
from licensing and to contract with industry. Universities and public
research institutes were also required to have a KTO or use the services of
a shared KTO, and were provided with some funding for this.3
Despite some increases in university patenting and licensing activities
in Brazil, these supply-side incentives have had limited effectiveness in
stimulating universities’ interactions with industry, due to several problems, including lack of clarity, insufﬁcient ﬁnancial incentives for individual researchers, and limited resources and competences of KTOs,
whose staff consist entirely of public servants. KTOs suffer from high
staff turnover and a dearth of qualiﬁed or specialized staff, because their
link to government institutions obliges them to rely on public tenders in
hiring new staff and they do not offer competitive salaries. According to
the MCTIC (2017), more than 50 percent of KTO staff had no previous
experience in the private sector.
China started in 2002 by enacting laws that allowed university ownership of IP and compensation of inventors for their IP. More than a decade
later (2015–16), it enacted a raft of measures allowing universities to
proﬁt from their IP (retain royalties, set up spinoff ﬁrms), and permitting
academics to work for companies by taking leave of absence. One way of
interpreting this lag is that the early experiments with researchers initiating links were ready to be institutionalized only a decade later.
A remarkable feature of the Chinese case is the combination of monetary
incentives and performance monitoring to achieve the objective of
knowledge exchange. In this respect, the country’s overall policy is
similar to the case of the United Kingdom.
South Africa is the most recent country in our sample to have enacted
knowledge transfer policies, and, in contrast to the other countries, they
immediately allowed both individuals and universities to retain proﬁts
3

There were a few open calls to grant fellowships for hiring people to work in KTOs in
Brazilian universities in recent years. In 2006, there was a funding program from CNPq
and FINEP to support the creation and implementation of KTOs.
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from their IP. In South Africa, the Council for Scientiﬁc and Industrial
Research (CSIR) dominates the public research institute landscape and
has highly specialized labs in the area of petrochemicals. CSIR also has
extensive links with universities. The government has not provided direct
funding to support universities’ engagement with industry, but it has
enacted some demand-side measures in the form of monetary incentives,
which include the provision of funding for companies’ R&D, often in
partnership with universities or public research institutes.
In the Republic of Korea, the government’s promotion efforts were
focused on encouraging interactions between domestic public research
institutes and universities and ﬁrms, particularly SMEs, whose role in the
economy the government intended to strengthen. They did so through
incentives for commercialization but particularly through strengthening
the KTO system through numerous measures. So far, efforts have not
been as successful as was hoped (see Chapter 6). Large ﬁrms do interact
with universities by establishing R&D centers on the campuses of major
universities,4 although they have tended to invite and hire star professors
(mostly Korean) from universities located abroad. SMEs lack absorptive
capacity and consequently need technologies to be provided at a higher
level of technological readiness. This has been stymied by a research
funding model that provides funds on a project basis, with funding
often terminated before a discovery is developed sufﬁciently.

11.4 An Ideal Policy Mix?
If one form of legislation cannot ﬁt all circumstances, how should
policymakers decide which polices to adopt? Clearly the objectives of
policies to support knowledge transfer from universities will be different
in high- and middle-income countries and may even differ among
universities within the country.
In high-income countries, the main challenge facing knowledge transfer
policies is the need to avoid displacement. As patent-mediated commercialization processes can produce very high ﬁnancial rewards, it may be
important to ensure that ﬁnancial constraints do not push universities to
prefer any one kind of commercialization. Thus, ﬁrst, funding to universities should be increased so that different channels of commercialization
are not substituted for one another. Second, universities should try to
4

For instance, Samsung Electronics and Hyundai Motors have R&D centers on the campus
of Seoul National University.
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promote a broad range of interactions outside formal channels, such as
through the involvement of alumni active in research − often in other
countries. In recent years, the United Kingdom has sought to redress the
imbalance in perceptions of value by inclusion of research impact as an
important evaluation criterion on a par with patents and publications in
research-active universities. Last, the policy focus on rewarding IP ownership should subtly shift to encourage and reward IP use by universities or
ﬁrms rather than ownership per se. This could take the form of recognizing
impact (as in United Kingdom universities) or take the form of a subsidy
that could be used by the department or inventor as income for further
research.
In middle-income countries, interactions between university and
industry face greater challenges and may need more policy intervention.
In these countries, the knowledge ecosystem is relatively immature and
research interactions between universities and industries are generally
lacking (except for a few interactions involving large, multinational ﬁrms
and a few highly research-intensive universities and public research
institutes) due to weaknesses on both sides.
A ﬁrst problem confronting middle-income country governments is
the overall limited research intensity of their universities due to
a traditional focus on teaching. Several additional factors reinforce this
low research intensity. Universities have traditional incentive structures
that reward teaching over commercialization and industry engagement.
Additionally, universities ﬁnd it difﬁcult to retain their brightest and
their best. Policies to correct these problems include allowing the university and inventor to proﬁt from knowledge transfer and research, in part,
by ensuring that extra proﬁts are not taxed away as higher income – that
is, ensuring that there is a ﬁnancial incentive to use scientiﬁc knowledge
and plow back the investments from it.
A second problem confronting policymakers in middle-income countries is the small volume of (or nonexistent) industry interactions. When
such interactions are nonexistent because the contractual obligations of
university researchers do not allow self-employment or employment by
others (e.g., through research contracts), then legal changes may be
needed to permit such interactions to take place. If there are no legal
barriers, then establishing contacts may require the active involvement of
the researcher and direction by knowledge transfer specialists with
knowledge of industry needs and an understanding of university
researcher contexts. In high-income economies such roles are usually
played by KTOs, which is warranted when there is a large volume of
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technology transactions. In middle-income economies, the small volume
of transactions may not warrant a specialist centralized intermediary to
aid and advise the university. In the short term, universities may also gain
by interacting more closely with public research institutes, which were
historically set up to translate frontier technology into applicable technology for local industries. There is some evidence that South African
and Indian CSIR laboratories are doing this for particular sectors, and
utilizing existing public research institutes may offer a more resourceefﬁcient method of knowledge exchange than establishing new KTOs.
The third problem facing middle-income countries is the lack of
a culture of interaction with industry and lack of awareness of commercialization possibilities. KTO staff are usually career civil servants, governed by civil service rules and promotion policies. Stafﬁng KTOs with
scientists familiar with industrial R&D is extremely important to changing the culture of interaction between university and industry. Policies
that target the recruitment into management positions of scientists who
had some training abroad could also help to change the research culture
in universities. This has been done extremely successfully in China and
Singapore.
Chapter 10 has offered a number of suggestions for improving ﬁrms’
uptake of technology produced in universities and we will not repeat
them here except to note that offering joint funds for exploitation with
university partners may both alleviate the low research intensity of
existing ﬁrms and encourage them to search for the best university
partners and so make it mutually beneﬁcial for universities and ﬁrms to
establish links around research and the commercialization of research.
We summarize our arguments in Figure 11.3, which outlines ﬁve
questions that governments and universities must ask themselves before
deciding on the appropriate policy mix.

11.5 Summary
Our concern in this chapter has been to look more closely at the policyinduced convergence of the knowledge ecosystem that the Bayh-Doletype legislation in various countries attempted, drawing on the extensive
material of the country case studies. Our analysis suggests that in highincome countries, such as the United Kingdom and Germany, where the
knowledge ecosystems were already well developed and mature, the
adoption of Bayh-Dole-type legislation while simultaneously cutting
back on government funding of research in universities and public
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Are the academic staff
of the university
research active?

No

Raise the research quality of
academics by offering appropriate
incentives for conducting research

Do they have contact with
firms?

No

Incentivize academics and KTOs to
search for industrial users and
consider appointing industry
representatives to the university’s
governing body

Set up a university KTO and ensure
appointed staff of the KTO have
industrial experience

Yes

Is the frequency of contact
high?

No

Consider setting up a shared KTO
with another university or twin the
university with a relevant public
research institute

Use dedicated funds to encourage
joint bidding with firms for industrial
R&D projects

Yes

Are firms able to use
university produced
technology without
follow-up R&D?

No

Use help of PRI (through
secondments) to perform the
developmental R&D

Encourage secondments of
university staff in firms and
firms ‘R&D staff in universities

Yes

Do university academics
find the work culture of
firms difficult?

Figure 11.3
universities

Five questions to guide policy toward knowledge exchange from

research institutes created the risk of “displacement effects.” By displacement effects, we mean research expected to produce patents being incentivized and preferred (due to its higher expected value) over other types
of commercialization, such as more informal and risky codeveloped
research (in spinoff ﬁrms or with domestic ﬁrms). Despite this, the data
show that non-IP methods such as contract research are a much bigger
income earner, even in the United Kingdom, than research-producing
patents for licensing, while overall income from knowledge transfer has
remained steady as a proportion of university incomes. This could be
because patent use was harder to achieve than patent ownership and/or
in many research ﬁelds, contract research, or the development of applications in spinoff ﬁrms were simply better avenues of commercialization.
In middle-income economies, where knowledge ecosystems were less
mature, with missing links in the knowledge ecosystem, the Bayh-Dole
legislation kick-started a process of institutional reform. Middle-income
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countries often needed to adopt a complementary set of policies (in
stages) in addition to permitting university ownership of IP. In most
countries in our study, the requirement that universities undertake
research that beneﬁts industry was supported by a generous allocation
of ﬁnancial resources to enable such a transformation. The role that
policy played in plugging institutional gaps is interesting (although it
differs from country to country) and may, in time, deliver the desired
outcome of an increase in the value of university research for the innovation activities of national ﬁrms.
The chapter concludes by noting that there cannot be a one-size-ﬁts-all
policy and enumerates a number of university-level factors that should be
taken account of in middle- and low-income economies in order to
deliver an effective knowledge transfer policy.
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a n t e n o r ce s a r v a n d e r l e i c o r r ê a a nd f er na nd a
m a ga l h ã es

The chapter put into perspective the implementation of policies to
support the transfer of knowledge from public research organizations
to industry in high- and middle-income countries, drawing on the
experience of six countries (Germany, Republic of Korea, the United
Kingdom, Brazil, China, and South Africa). Some common traits are
identiﬁed, although it is made clear that each country requires an individualized analysis of what is needed to build effective knowledge transfer channels between universities and public research institutes and
industry.
Our experience in dealing with these issues in Brazil suggests that a set
of measures aimed at increasing the “two-way ﬂow” of ideas and people,
as identiﬁed by the authors, between universities and public research
institutes and industry should address three different layers of the problem: cultural, institutional, and ﬁnancial.
The cultural layer is the most crucial because it deals with the
foundation of the system. The limited interaction between the aforementioned actors in middle-income countries is somewhat difﬁcult to
overcome. Publishing papers and contributing to the dissemination of
knowledge are the main tasks that have been historically associated with
universities. Commercial considerations are often seen as a deviation
from the purpose of academia. In this context, the relationship with
industry is often neglected and sometimes seen as undesirable. One of
the problems of not being used to dealing with the industry is related to
the protection of knowledge. It is not uncommon for professors
involved in applied research to be so keen to show the results of their
work that they end up revealing secrets that should be protected.
Another element that can add difﬁculty is the ﬁnancial incentives
normally associated with industry collaboration. Sectors of the university that do not beneﬁt from these incentives in a situation of scarce
public funding can produce an environment that is not conducive to
commercial dealings. Timing and excessive bureaucracy are other
418
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issues often mentioned by industry when identifying difﬁculties in
dealing with public research organizations.
The second layer, institutional, is addressed in depth by the authors
when they mention the impact of the Bayh-Dole-type legislation on
worldwide policies to support the transfer of knowledge from public
science. Indeed, the Bayh-Dole Act strongly inﬂuenced Brazilian legislation on the matter. The Brazilian Innovation Act from 2004 was the ﬁrst
step toward establishing institutional and legal frameworks to facilitate
the process of change in the interplay between universities and public
research institutes and industry. Some of the key aspects of this initiative
were: (i) it consolidated the legislation in order to provide a more coherent and unambiguous basis on which this interaction could happen, thus
helping to positively affect the ﬁrst layer mentioned in the previous
paragraph; (ii) the ownership rights attributed to universities and public
research institutes placed greater emphasis on the results of research
conducted within these institutions; and (iii) the incentives provided to
the institution and researchers involved in projects with industry were
important in assisting the establishment of a new pattern of relationships.
The Innovation Act has been fully revised and a revamped version was
approved in 2016. In fact, there was a thorough and overall revision of all
aspects of the national science, technology, and innovation policy in the
country, even involving changes in the Brazilian National Constitution,
which is referred to as the New Science, Technology, and Innovation
Legal Framework. The key aspect of the new legislation in regard to the
process of knowledge transfer discussed here is the mandatory requirement for all public research organizations to establish their own innovation policies, whose main focus is exactly knowledge transfer to
industry.
The third layer, ﬁnancial, refers to the lack of funding, not only by
the government but mainly by the private sector, to support engagement of universities and public research institutes with industry in
R&D projects. This layer is considerably inﬂuenced by the previous
ones, particularly in middle-income countries where the national
innovation systems are less mature. For example, in Brazil, most of
the investment in R&D is made by the public sector (56 percent,
according to data from the Brazilian Ministry of Science,
Technology, Innovations, and Communications), which emphasizes
the need for stronger cooperation between public research organizations and industry in order to accrue more economic beneﬁts for
society as whole from this type of investment. Due to the lack of
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tradition of investing in high-risk technology-based ventures, such as
startup and spinoff companies, there is a low ﬂow of ﬁnancial resources
between industries and universities and public research institutes. It is
also worth mentioning that regulations related to the attribution of
responsibilities in case of business failure are harsh in relation to all
parties involved, including the investors, which is not particularly
encouraging for venture capitalists.
These factors, added to budget constraints, do not create a motivating
environment for strong partnerships between industry and public
research organizations. One measure that could be taken to foster collaboration would be the provision of additional monetary incentives for
companies to interact with public research organizations on top of those
that provide general incentives for ﬁrms to invest in R&D.
During the analysis, the authors explore the policy interventions
adopted by countries to promote an effective knowledge exchange
policy. They divide policy interventions into two categories: the supply
side, which includes incentives for universities to provide technology to
industry, and the demand side, which includes incentives for ﬁrms to
engage with industry. Regarding these incentives, it is interesting to
note in Table 11.3, which shows the types of supporting policy among
the selected countries, a trend in high-income countries to provide
direct government support and a tendency in middle-income countries
to enact legal requirements to implement the activity. In Brazil, both
legal measures and governmental funding were used to support the
interaction.
Although the current institutional framework in Brazil has evolved
signiﬁcantly in order to bridge the gap between public science and
industry, there are still considerable challenges to be overcome. The
report produced by the Brazilian government with data from universities
and research institutes on the implementation of the Innovation Act
shows that some progress has been achieved. Over the years, there has
been an increase in knowledge transfer ofﬁces, protection of intellectual
assets, contracts with industry, and revenue from these contracts.
Nevertheless, it is difﬁcult to say that it is a harmonized movement,
because the country is vast and full of particularities. Most contracts
and revenues from these contracts are concentrated within a small number of institutions. Some factors can be mentioned that favor these
institutions: location, type of research developed, tradition in the relationship with industry, good laboratory infrastructure, and open-minded
researchers to relate to industry.
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From the institutional point of view, we believe that Brazil has established a comprehensive legal framework on innovation policy. But is that
enough? As we have tried to point out, there are barriers that can only be
overcome with continuous assessment and adjustment of the policies in
place. In this context, the authors provide a good guide to assist in these
tasks.
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Comment 11.2
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In 2000, Korea established the Technology Transfer and Commercialization
Promotion Act, a Korean Bayh-Dole Act, and the ownership of public
research results became able to be transferred to universities and public
research institutes. The next year, the ownership of public research results
was transferred to universities and public research institutes in compliance
with the new regulation on the management of government-funded R&D
projects.
In the last ﬁve years, there have been three major blockbuster public
knowledge transfers in Korea. In this chapter, these cases are introduced,
along with the detailed concerns of the Korean Intellectual Property
Ofﬁce.
The ﬁrst was the case in which a startup established by a public
research organization grew successfully and a large amount of inventor
compensation (more than USD 10 million) was awarded to each of two
researchers. The Korean Bayh-Dole Act and the regulation on the management of government-funded R&D projects both stipulate that public
researchers must be compensated for more than 50 percent of the royalty
income of their research products. This case gave rise to the argument to
alleviate the compensation gap between researchers. As a result, the
government introduced a regulation to reduce the percentage of inventor
compensation for the royalty gradually if the compensation exceeds USD
2 million a year.
The second case is one in which a university gave up ﬁling a patent
application for an invention (Bulk ﬁn-FET), where the professor ﬁled
a patent application in United States of America (U.S.) in his own name
and with his own money, and, ten to ﬁfteen years later, received USD
10 million and USD 400 million royalty from foreign and Korean companies, respectively. In Korea, the market size is about one-tenth smaller than
that of the U.S., and the compensation for patent infringement is as low as
one-hundredth of the U.S compensation. Therefore, inventions that only
422
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have a Korean patent cannot make a good license contract. Unlike the BayhDole Act and the German employee invention law, the Korean Act did not
stipulate the return of ownership to the inventor when the university gave up
ﬁling or sustaining a patent application. Therefore, academic inventions are
often left idle unless the university applies for overseas patents. For reference,
Korean universities ﬁle patent applications in foreign countries for only
4.5 percent of their domestic patent applications.
The third case is where a professor transferred his invention (CRISPR
genetic scissors) to his own startup three days after disclosing it to his
university, using a cheap upfront payment (about USD 20,000) and
appropriate running royalty rate, and the company grew to about USD
$800 million in value last year. Since public technology in Korea can be
transferred exclusively only when there is no demand for a nonexclusive
license, the professor and the KTO are being accused of concealing the
valuable patent and selling it off to the company concerned at a low price.
The reason for these problems is that ownership of public research
results has been transferred institutionally to universities and public
enterprises, but they are still regarded as public goods rather than private
property. The purpose of ownership transfer in the Bayh-Dole Act is to
ensure that the patents are widely used while public research organizations maximize their own proﬁts. By the same token, the Korean BayhDole Act aims for public research results to be widely used but disapproves of a public research organization maximizing its proﬁts. During
the last ﬁfty years of rapid economic growth, the purpose of public
research in Korea was to help domestic companies to catch up quickly,
and the research results were to be shared rather than be owned exclusively. Even after the establishment of the Korean Bayh-Dole Act, this
perception has not changed, and Koreans still consider it unfair for
someone to monopolize the proﬁts from the results of tax-based research.
It is clear that they do not want the invention to be returned to the
inventor even if it is not going to be ﬁled, and they consider it to be
monopolization for a patent to be assigned to a startup and make
a success.
We would like to add a few more details to the institutional incentives
suggested by the authors of this chapter.
First, a patent should be recognized as the private property of the
university and the public research institute. This means that the public
research institute should be able to decide autonomously on the selection
criteria for the company to transfer its results, the license type (exclusive/
nonexclusive), and the royalty distribution so that the public research
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institute can actively maximize its proﬁts. When knowledge transfer can
make money, universities and public research institutes, as well as
researchers, will make efforts to get valuable patents and transfer
technologies.
Second, the purpose of the knowledge transfer policy should be that
the invention is used more rather than making the invention used by
more companies. The ultimate goal of the patent system is to make more
utilization of inventions in the long run, even if transitory monopolies are
allowed. In fact, this is consistent with the public interest of public
research policy, and is consistent with why researchers prefer knowledge
sharing rather than knowledge transfer.
According to the second objective, it is better to choose a company that
has the ability and willingness to commercialize the patent rather than
the company that pays the highest upfront lump sum fee. Unfortunately,
the running royalty income of Korean universities was only 8 percent of
their total royalty incomes in 2017, while that of the U.S. was as high as
55 percent. If universities and public research institutes are pushed to
raise the immediate ﬁnancial achievements with R&D, they cannot but
license their knowledge focusing on the upfront fee, regardless of
commercialization.
There’s no need to worry that SMEs and startups may have no opportunities if technologies are transferred institutionally to the companies
that will utilize them more. Technologies transferred to large companies
often go to the warehouse and lie dormant until a patent dispute arises.
Rather, SMEs and startups are often eager to commercialize the patent
for their survival. In particular, a company founded by the inventor
him(her)self is very competitive in terms of technical expertise. If full
authority over the proﬁts is given to universities and public research
institutes, they will make reasonable choices.
Although the purpose of public research policy may vary from country
to country, the purpose behind granting ownership of research results to
public research organizations must be the promotion of utilization of the
results. For patent utilization, public research organizations pursuing
proﬁts are much better than bureaucracy. Policies that are applied to
the knowledge transfer process should limit the private property rights of
institutes only if they are clearly against the public interest. In the future,
Korea intends to improve the system in this direction.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 54.177.185.247, on 15 Nov 2021 at 19:13:31, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/979C0AAA92B1200DCE513DAAE4894BE7

12
Toward a Comprehensive Set of Metrics
for Knowledge Transfer
a n t h o n y a r u n d e l a n d no r d i n e e s - s a d k i

12.1 Introduction
The commercialization of knowledge produced by public research
organizations, consisting of universities and public research institutes,
requires the transfer of knowledge to ﬁrms, government entities, or
nonproﬁt organizations and the application of this knowledge to products and processes. This transfer process occurs through a number of
channels, but, as noted in Chapter 2, most research on knowledge
transfer from public research organizations to other organizations uses
metrics for IP-mediated forms of knowledge transfer, for instance,
licenses for codiﬁed intellectual property such as patents. This is partly
because research on IP-mediated knowledge transfer is facilitated by the
electronic “trail” left by IP. This ensures that the activities and outputs of
IP are easier to identify than other methods of knowledge transfer.
Six metrics for IP-mediated knowledge transfer are often collected by
private or public sector organizations in high-income countries from
surveys of knowledge transfer ofﬁces (KTOs): the number of invention
disclosures, patent applications, patent grants, licenses, and startups
established, plus the total amount of license revenue earned by the public
research organization. In addition, many of these surveys also collect data
on the number of research agreements with ﬁrms, which can result in
knowledge transferred by IP or through other channels.
Table 12.1 identiﬁes the collection of data on these knowledge transfer
metrics by each of the six case study countries covered in this book. The
only metrics that have been collected for a large sample of public research
organizations in all six countries are the number of patent applications
and patent grants. In most countries, the collection of data for other
metrics has been sporadic, with only the United Kingdom collecting
425
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Table 12.1 Data collected for IP-mediated knowledge transfer plus
research agreements at the institutional level (results for six countries)
China
Number of invention
disclosures
Number of patent
applications
Number of patent
grants
Number of licenses with
ﬁrms
Total license income
earned
Number of startups
using institutional IP
Number of research
agreements with
ﬁrms

Brazil

South
Africa

UK

Korea

✓

✓

✓

Germany1

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

Source: National experts responding to a WIPO survey on data collection
1
Data have been collected by private-sector organizations for all seven metrics for
a selected number of leading public research organizations.

these data for all universities over the long term.1 Additionally, privatesector organizations that represent knowledge transfer professionals such
as RedOTRI (Spain), NetVal (Italy), and the umbrella organization ASTP
(formerly ASTP-ProTon) collect relevant data for these metrics in
Germany and other high-income countries, but with the exception of
Spain and Italy, less than 50 percent of universities and public research
institutes are covered (Finne et al. 2009). Since these metrics are of high
value for benchmarking outcome performance and monitoring the use of
IP to transfer knowledge, all countries should ideally collect these metrics
on a regular basis for all public research organizations, or at the
1

The Danish Agency for Science, Technology and Innovation (DASTI), currently part of
the Ministry of Higher Education in Science in Denmark, collected knowledge transfer
data for all Danish universities between 2000 and 2013. Réseau SATT in France, an
umbrella organization of regional networks that provide support on knowledge transfer
for universities in their region, has collected relevant data, but not consistently.
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minimum for research-intensive public research organizations, as done
by the Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM) in the
United States of America (U.S.) and in Canada (AUTM 2016, 2017).
A major issue is the international comparability of knowledge transfer
metrics. Comparable metrics are of value for benchmarking performance
and for policy learning through the use of econometric analysis to
evaluate the effects of inputs and outputs on knowledge transfer. For
instance, policymakers in one country or region can learn from evaluations of the effects of knowledge transfer activities on outcomes in
countries or regions with similar levels of economic development or
similar industrial structures. As discussed in Chapter 2, the de facto
deﬁnitions of IP-mediated knowledge transfer have been set by the
AUTM. China collects data on activities such as “knowledge transfer”
and university enterprises that are not fully comparable with the AUTM
deﬁnitions. As some of these metrics are useful for Chinese policy,
international comparability would require China to collect additional
metrics using the AUTM deﬁnitions.
A reliance on metrics for IP-mediated knowledge transfer creates two
substantial issues. First, measurement implies that the measured activity
is of high value, while unmeasured activities are of low value.
Consequently, the act of measuring IP sends a strong signal to university
managers (and policymakers) that more university IP is desirable, while
other activities to transfer knowledge are erroneously viewed as unimportant. One consequence is that the types of metrics that are collected
can affect the distribution of public funding and the ranking of universities. In the United Kingdom this resulted in a dispute over the types of
knowledge transfer metrics to be collected between the Russel Group of
research universities, which beneﬁted from a narrow focus on IP metrics,
and a group of younger universities, established after 1992, that wanted
knowledge transfer metrics to cover a broader number of activities
(Lockett et al. 2015).
Second, policies and practices to promote knowledge transfer must
ensure that all aspects of a knowledge transfer system are functioning.
There is a large and diverse variety of channels for transferring knowledge that are not covered by the seven commonly used metrics and
which have been identiﬁed as important conduits for knowledge transfer
in Chapter 11 and other research (Walshok and Shapiro 2014). Bekkers
et al. (2008) identify twenty-one channels, ranging from publications to
personal contacts. In particular, metrics for IP-mediated knowledge
transfer do not capture the transfer of tacit knowledge, which requires
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direct, personal contact between the provider and the recipient of the
knowledge. These personal contacts, for instance, through staff
exchanges between ﬁrms and public research organizations, play a vital
role in the transfer of knowledge for breakthrough discoveries (Bekkers
et al. 2008). One concern is that a policy focus on supporting IP-mediated
channels can unintentionally interfere with the use of other knowledge
transfer channels (Rosli and Rossi 2014; Czarnitzki et al. 2016; Veugelers
2016). The combination of informal and formal channels has been found
to have a positive effect on innovation outcomes (Link et al. 2007; Siegel
et al. 2003; Grimpe and Hussinger 2013) and could be especially important to the performance of spinoffs (Hayer 2016).
The economic relevance of a broader set of knowledge transfer metrics
is well established, with research from both the United Kingdom and
China (see Chapters 4 and 8), showing that non-IP-mediated knowledge
transfer activities are considerably more important than IP-mediated
channels, as proxied by the amount of income earned by public research
organizations from IP versus other knowledge transfer methods. For
example, in 2015–16 all universities in the United Kingdom combined
earned £4.2 billion from all knowledge transfer activities, of which only
£176 million (4.2 percent) was due to IP licensing (HEFCE 2017).
These limitations with metrics for IP-mediated knowledge transfer
have been recognized for some time (Holi et al. 2008; Jensen et al.
2009; Lockett et al. 2015). They may be particularly important for middle-income countries that have enacted policies to replicate the American
Bayh-Dole Act for IP (see Chapter 11), while neglecting policies to
support other forms of knowledge transfer. Based on the country case
studies and other research, Chapter 10 argues that middle-income countries would beneﬁt from knowledge transfer policies to increase incentives for public research organizations to interact with ﬁrms and policies
to increase the absorptive capacities of ﬁrms to use and apply knowledge
produced by public research organizations. Both of these goals can be
enhanced by policies that support the full range of knowledge transfer
channels, based on evidence showing that the optimal channel varies by
ﬁrm capabilities and the characteristics of the knowledge to be transferred (Bekkers et al. 2008; Belitski et al. 2019).
In addition to data on IP-mediated knowledge transfer, surveys of
KTOs or other administrative units within a public research organization
can collect data on other formal channels such as contract and collaborative research with ﬁrms or government organizations. However, other
knowledge transfer metrics need to be collected from academics and
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ﬁrms in order to overcome a lack of knowledge on the part of KTO staff.
Large-scale surveys in Europe show that KTO managers are not always
able to report research agreements with ﬁrms, as some of these are
managed outside KTO administration (Barjak et al. 2015).
Furthermore, KTO staff can be unaware of important knowledge transfer
activities via publications or through informal channels. Freitas et al.
(2013) estimates that approximately 50 percent of knowledge transfer
from public research organizations in a province of Northern Italy
occurred through personal interactions.
There can also be large differences in the perceptions of KTO managers,
academics, and ﬁrm managers on the factors that support or act as barriers
to knowledge transfer. Siegel et al. (2003) surveyed KTO managers, academics, and ﬁrm managers to obtain their opinions on barriers to knowledge
transfer. They found large and statistically signiﬁcant differences among
these three groups that were often self-serving. For example, KTO managers
did not ﬁnd university bureaucracy and inﬂexibility to be important barriers,
but both academics and ﬁrm managers did. Relying on the perceptions of
only one of these three key actors could result in misleading recommendations for how to improve knowledge transfer.
This chapter discusses and identiﬁes data for measuring non-IPmediated methods of knowledge transfer, as well as metrics for the use
of policies and practices to support knowledge transfer. The latter are
required to be able to assess policy effectiveness. The purpose is to
provide data for all major channels of knowledge transfer in addition to
IP-mediated channels, as covered in Chapter 2. Many of the types of data
discussed in this chapter also meet statistical requirements to be speciﬁc,
measurable, reliable, timely, and cost-effective (Jensen et al. 2009). In
addition, the chapter discusses a limited number of metrics that can be
used to assess the systemic impacts of knowledge transfer, including
impacts from IP licensing. Metrics for impacts are, unfortunately, considerably more difﬁcult and costly to obtain than metrics for activities.
In addition to collecting data from KTOs (or university administrations
responsible for knowledge transfer), data on knowledge transfer activities
need to be collected through surveys of scientists and other academics
employed by public research organizations that create knowledge, and the
ﬁrms that are the intended recipient of knowledge. Surveys of academics and
ﬁrms are the best method for collecting data on informal knowledge transfer
channels (Sigurdson et al. 2015). A fourth method is to use publicly available
data, for instance, on patenting or publications or through web-scraping
techniques. The types of data that can be collected through each of these
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methods and their limitations are discussed below. Of note, this chapter
follows the Oslo Manual (OECD/Eurostat 2018) by identifying lists of topics
to be covered by data collection instead of providing speciﬁc questions for
surveys, with the exception of questions for policies and practices to promote
knowledge transfer.2

12.2 Data from KTOs and University Administrations
The AUTM licensing activity surveys have served as the baseline model
for data collection from KTOs, but the questions are largely limited to IPmediated knowledge transfer outcomes and activities.3 The British
Higher Education-Business and Community Interaction (HE-BCI) survey, sent to KTOs or other responsible administrative units within British
universities, covers a broader range of formal knowledge transfer activities that are not always part of IP licensing, although some of these
activities can contribute to IP licensing (Holi et al. 2008; Rossi and Rosli
2015). Part A of the survey collects data on policies and practices for
knowledge transfer, including the strategic goals for these activities,
priorities by region, staff incentives, in-house capabilities for managing
IP, and practices for supporting spinoffs and startups. Part B of the survey
collects ﬁnancial data on income earned by universities for ﬁve formal
knowledge transfer activities: collaborative research, contract research,
consultancies, facilities and equipment-related services, and professional
development and continuing education.4 Income data are obtained by
the source of funding: government, businesses, and third-sector organizations. In addition, business funding is separated into SMEs and large
businesses for all activities other than collaborative research.5 KTO data
are useful for benchmarking and monitoring formal knowledge transfer

2

3
4

5

Speciﬁc questions are not provided because questions need to be carefully developed
following agreed international deﬁnitions and to undergo cognitive testing through faceto-face interviews with potential survey respondents. First drafts of questions usually go
through substantial changes before they are ready for use. The examples of questions for
policy practice should not be used without further testing.
See https://autm.net/surveys-and-tools.
The questions used in Part A are available at www.hesa.ac.uk/collection/c18032/heb
ci_a_questions. The questions for Part B are available as downloadable templates for
individual years, with the templates for the 2017–18 survey available here: www
.hesa.ac.uk/collection/c17032.
A sixth category of regeneration and development programs is not included here because it
is not relevant to many countries.
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outcomes such as different forms of income earned by universities and
public research institutes and for policy evaluation.
The HE-BCI survey is a useful model for collecting data on a full range of
formal knowledge activities for all countries and was proposed for implementation by Australia (Jensen et al. 2009). To succeed, public research
organizations need to invest in accounting systems to collect ﬁnancial data
for speciﬁc income sources. As this can be costly, a governmental authority
may need to provide an incentive to compel universities to collect these data.
The United Kingdom is able to collect these data for almost all universities
because compliance with the HE-BCI reporting requirements is necessary
for eligibility for one of the UK government’s funding programs. A similar
approach could be useful in other countries that provide publicly funded
research grants to public research organizations.

12.2.1 Measuring the Beneﬁts of Knowledge Transfer to Public
Research Organizations
The ﬁnancial beneﬁt to public research organizations is usually measured
through license revenue from IP licensing and income from industryfunded research, including contracts, research collaboration, consultancy, renting of equipment and facilities, and professional development
and education programs (HEFCE 2017). Other beneﬁts that are difﬁcult
to measure in ﬁnancial terms have not been measured on a consistent
basis, although they have been examined in the academic literature
(Perkman et al. 2011). They include knowledge ﬂows from ﬁrms to
universities, information on interesting opportunities for research,
including research of value for commercial applications, and job placements for graduates and PhD candidates. Potential costs include the costs
of funding KTO activities, such as marketing and managing IP, evaluating the commercial potential of inventions, and patenting and other legal
costs. Nonﬁnancial costs include disruptions to the research function of
universities, such as delays in publication, a decline in academic involvement in basic research, or the diversion of academic time to patenting
and licensing activities (Thursby and Thursby 2007).

12.2.2 Data on Policies and Practices to Support
Knowledge Transfer
Data on the policies and practices that public research organizations
use to support knowledge transfer can be used to evaluate and identify

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 54.177.185.247, on 15 Nov 2021 at 19:13:31, subject to the Cambridge Core terms
of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/979C0AAA92B1200DCE513DAAE4894BE7

432

arundel and es -s adki

the factors that support or hamper knowledge transfer activities.
These include both policies at the national level and policies and
practices that are implemented at the institutional level for each
university or public research institute. Useful data on policies and
practices implemented by national or regional governments or the
institution itself can be obtained from surveying KTOs. International
comparability in data for policies and practices is required for multicountry analyses of the factors that inﬂuence knowledge transfer
performance.
Many countries have introduced legislation on the ownership of IP
produced by public research organizations, the establishment of KTOs,
whether or not researchers should be provided ﬁnancial incentives if
a discovery is licensed, and, in some countries, the percentage of license
income that researchers should receive; and whether or not academics at
universities must ﬁle invention disclosure reports. For Europe, Geuna
and Rossi (2011) found that it is difﬁcult to disentangle the effects of
changes in IP ownership on academic patenting activities from the effects
of concurrent transformations in the institutional, cultural, and organization landscape surrounding knowledge transfer. National policies that
are directed toward businesses can also encourage knowledge transfer,
such as subsidies for ﬁrms to collaborate on innovation with university or
public research institute partners, or government reimbursement “vouchers” that ﬁrms can give to researchers in return for assistance with
practical problems. Information on national policies is valuable for
understanding the factors that shape national knowledge transfer
activities.
Practices are often based on written regulations or guidelines, but are
either not legally required (in the case of a guideline), or, if based on
regulation, not enforced. For example, policies on the ownership of IP are
usually established at the national level and universities are legally
required to follow them. In contrast, a national or institutional regulation
requiring academics to ﬁle an invention disclosure report for a discovery
with potential commercial value is often closer to a practice, with few or
any penalties for academics that fail to ﬁle.
Data collection for policies and practices is less developed than for
knowledge transfer activities, as shown in Table 12.2 for the six case study
countries. China only provides data on national regulations on the
assumption that these are implemented by all public research organizations. Neither Brazil nor Germany collects data on policies and practices
for large samples of public research organizations.
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Table 12.2 Data collected for IP policies at the national (✓) or
institutional (✓✓) level (results for six countries)
China
Incentives for
academics to disclose
inventions to support
knowledge transfer
Promotion of
knowledge transfer
opportunities to the
business sector
Written rules or
guidelines for
knowledge transfer
Written rules or
guidelines made
publicly available
Rules for publication
delays to support IP
licensing
Academics permitted to
take leave to work at
a ﬁrm or startup
Goals of KTOs for
knowledge transfer

Brazil

South
Africa

✓

UK

Korea

✓✓

✓✓

Germany1

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓✓

✓✓
✓
✓

✓✓
✓✓

✓✓

✓✓

Source: National experts responding to a WIPO survey on data collection
1
Some data have been collected on a sporadic basis by private-sector organizations
or academics for a selected number of leading public research organizations.

Most of the research on policies and practices has primarily focused on
IP-mediated knowledge transfer, although some has also evaluated
research contracts and consulting. Knowledge transfer via licensing is
inﬂuenced by IP regulations (Baldini et al. 2006), rules for exclusive
licensing, licensing practices (Okamuro and Nishimura 2013; Shen
2016), the involvement of academics in contract or consulting research
(Weckowska 2015), and ﬁnancial and nonﬁnancial incentives (Chatterjee
and Sankaran 2015) for academics to participate in knowledge transfer.
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Policies that contribute to the establishment of startups include dedicated
programs (support for developing business plans, etc.) and facilities
(such as an incubator) to support startups (Berbegal-Mirabent et al.
2015; Muscio et al. 2016), and employment conditions that permit
academics to take leave to work with startups. The share of license
revenue allotted to inventors acts as an alternative source of income for
startups and can reduce the interest of academics in participating in them
(Markman et al. 2004; Barjak et al. 2015).
Table 12.3 summarizes useful metrics on policies and practices for data
collection at the level of the university or public research institute. The
Table 12.3 Metrics at the institutional level for policies and practices to
support knowledge transfer
Measurement level
Metric
Key policy metrics
Importance of goals for knowledge
transfer (earn income, support
regional development, marketing
university capabilities, etc.)
Ownership rules for IP developed by
public research organizations,
including ownership of IP resulting
from public research organization–
ﬁrm research agreements
Financial incentives for researchers to
support knowledge transfer:
(incentives for invention disclosure,
share of revenue from licenses,
research contracts, etc.)
Rules for consulting (time limits on
consulting, how income is
distributed between the academic,
research group, etc.)
Nonﬁnancial incentives for researchers
for different types of knowledge
transfer (reputation, job
promotion, etc.)

Nominal

Ordinal/interval
✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓
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Table 12.3 (cont.)
Measurement level
Metric

Nominal

Ordinal/interval

Researcher permitted to temporarily
work with a licensee/spinoff, ﬁrm
involved in collaborative research
(including maximum length)
Presence and amount of supporting
infrastructure for startups and
spinoffs (incubator, science
park, etc.)
Presence of different types of ﬁnancial
support (funding for KTOs, seed
funding, etc.)
Supplementary policy metrics
Requirement or incentives for
researchers to assist
commercialization (i.e., work with
a licensee, research contract partner)
Requirement for researchers to report
invention disclosures
Presence of written rules or guidelines
for licensing, including publicly
available model contracts
Presence of ﬂexible rules for licensing
Presence of written rules for the
conditions for an exclusive or
nonexclusive license
Policy for publication delays (including
maximum length) to support
patenting, licensing, or collaborative
research
KTO or other public research
organization activities to promote IP
or staff capabilities to the business
sector

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

✓

✓

Source: Authors
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main purpose of these metrics is for monitoring and policy evaluation.
Some of the data need only be collected at the nominal level (yes or no),
whereas other data can be collected on an interval level (percent of
royalties provided to inventors or length of academic leave to work
with a ﬁrm) or ordinal level (importance of different goals for knowledge
transfer). The table is divided into key and supplementary metrics, based
on the importance, as identiﬁed in the literature, of each policy or
practice. Sample questions for measuring many of these policies, derived
from a 2016 WIPO survey, are provided in the Technical Annex.

12.3 Surveys of Academics (Researchers) at Public Research
Organizations
Surveys of academics can provide several types of data that cannot be
obtained through surveys of KTOs or university administrations: the use
and importance of informal knowledge channels compared to other
channels and the inﬂuence on knowledge transfer activities and outcomes of the personal characteristics of academics and organizational
factors at the departmental or research group level. The main purpose of
collecting data from academics is for monitoring and policy evaluation.
Compared to research using data obtained from KTOs, there are
considerably fewer empirical studies on the engagement of academics
in activities to transfer knowledge to ﬁrms. A 2013 systematic literature
review of studies on academic engagement published between 1980 and
2011 identiﬁed twenty-ﬁve separate surveys of academics in thirteen
countries: ten surveys in the U.S., four in the United Kingdom, two
surveys in each of the Netherlands and Germany, and one survey in
each of Spain, Chile, South Africa, Italy, Norway, Ireland, Sweden,
Belgium, and Japan (Perkman et al. 2013). In addition, the study reported
on two studies with over thirty interviews. The studies focused on
engagement through contractual, collaborative, and consulting agreements and collected data on four types of factor, as summarized in
Table 12.4. The ﬁrst three factors inﬂuence knowledge transfer activities
while the fourth measures the effects of knowledge transfer.
Relevant data to collect in surveys of academics include the number or
percentage of different types of academic staff involved in knowledge
transfer through informal, contractual, and IP-mediated channels; barriers
to interactions, including “cost” factors such as secrecy and concern over
academic freedom (see Table 12.5); and the goals for participation in each
type of channel. In addition, academic surveys can provide relevant
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Table 12.4 Data collected in previous surveys of academic engagement
Factor

Data

Characteristics of academics

Gender, age, seniority, previous
commercialization experience,
government grants awarded, and
scientiﬁc productivity
Quality of the university or department,
organizational support, incentives,
organizational experience with
commercialization, peer effects
Discipline or ﬁeld, national regulations/
policies
Scientiﬁc productivity (publications,
patents), commercial productivity,
shift to applied research, secrecy,
collaborative behavior, teaching

Organizational factors

Institutional factors
Outcomes

Source: Based on Perkman et al. 2013

information on the types of partner, such as ﬁrms, government organizations, and nonproﬁts. An example of good practice is the large 2008–9
survey of 22,556 UK academics active in teaching or research (Abreu and
Grenevich 2013; Abreu et al. 2016; Zhang et al. 2016).6 Due to the use of
a representative sample, this study was able to determine that more
academics interact with government organizations (53 percent) than with
ﬁrms (41 percent) (Hughes and Kitson 2012), that academics in regional
areas are more intensively involved in university–industry linkages than
academics in the metropolitan regions, and that teaching-oriented universities are also very active in these linkages (Zhang et al. 2016).
The main challenge for surveying academics is to reduce the costs of
surveying. A common method is to construct a sample that excludes
academics who are unlikely to develop knowledge with commercial
potential and consequently have little or no experience with knowledge
transfer. A solution is to focus surveys on academics in applied science
6

The survey questionnaire does not appear to be available online, but the questions can be
reconstructed using the tables in the following URL: https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/357117/1/
AcademicSurveyReport.pdf.
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Table 12.5 Knowledge transfer metrics from surveys of academics and
ﬁrms

Incentives for participation in knowledge transfer
Financial
Promotion
Previous experience with knowledge transfer
Informal (personal contacts, conferences/
meetings)
Training
Use of advanced equipment/facilities
Research contracts or consultancy
Collaborative research
Licensing IP
Barriers/reasons not to participate
University rules for knowledge transfer
Lack of time (teaching responsibilities etc.)
Research of little interest
Concern over publication/delays
Underdeveloped technology
Difﬁculties in ﬁnd right licensee
Costs to evaluate commercial potential
Costs to prepare legal matters involving IP rights
Potential loss of technological/competitive edge
Prices charged by licensor too high
Goals for participation
Acquire leading-edge research results
Freedom-to-operate
Close technological gaps
Funding from businesses for research, PhD
candidates etc.
Better insight to commercialization opportunities
Economic effects
New knowledge from public research
organizations incorporated in products and
processes
Sales share/imputed savings due to knowledge
from public research organizations

Academics

Firms

✓
✓

✓

✓

✓

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

✓

✓

✓
✓
✓

✓

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓

Source: Authors
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departments, or on research-intensive universities who are likely to have
experience in developing commercially valuable knowledge (Perkmann
et al. 2013), or by selecting the departmental heads for technology
disciplines, principal investigators on research projects, the heads of
research groups (Van Dierdonck et al. 1990), academics who have been
granted a patent, or academics who have founded a ﬁrm (Agiar-Díaz
et al. 2016; Czarnitzki et al. 2016).
The disadvantage of these methods for selecting academics for surveys
on knowledge transfer is that they can undervalue the opportunities for
knowledge transfer from teaching-oriented universities or from the
social sciences and result in inaccurate measures of the disadvantages
of different types of knowledge transfer activity. For example, the possible disadvantages of close university–industry linkages include a loss of
academic freedom (ability to choose to conduct basic research or
research of low commercial interest) and restrictions or delays on publication due to the interest in commercial partners in secrecy (Van Looy
et al. 2004; Tartari and Breschi 2012; Muscio and Pozzali 2013). The
importance of publication delays is likely to be greatest for early career
researchers such as PhD candidates and post-doctorates that need to
rapidly build up a list of publications. Yet this possible effect will be
missed entirely in studies that focus on the heads of research groups or
departments. This could be one reason why a study of departmental
heads ﬁnds that publication delays are given a low importance ranking
as a barrier to collaboration with industry, whereas impacts on the choice
of research is given a much higher importance ranking (Muscio and
Pozzali 2013).

12.4 Surveys of Firms
Surveys of ﬁrms can complement surveys of academics. Both types of
survey can include similar questions and thereby identify differences in
the perspectives of academics and ﬁrm managers on knowledge transfer
activities. Data from ﬁrms can be used for benchmarking performance (if
data are collected on economic effects), monitoring and policy
evaluation.
Survey research on ﬁrms consistently points to the importance of open
science methods of knowledge transfer in high-, medium-, and lowincome countries, although in middle-income countries in Asia contractual methods are often more commonly cited than open science (Siegel
et al. 2003; De Fuentes and Dutrénit 2012; Frietas et al. 2013; Grimpe and
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Hussinger 2013; Okamuro and Nishimura 2013; Dutrénit and Arza 2015;
Kafouros et al. 2015; Kruss et al. 2015; Schiller and Lee 2015). A possible
explanation is the importance of contractual relationships to building
innovative capacity and problem-solving abilities among ﬁrms.
Firms in low- and middle-income countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin
America were surveyed on their use of knowledge channels in an internationally coordinated study that used the same questionnaire
(Albuquerque et al. 2015). In two low-income countries (Uganda and
Nigeria) informal methods dominate (Kruss et al. 2015), whereas in
middle-income countries in Asia (Malaysia, Thailand, and China) the
most common methods are consultancy and research contracts (Schiller
and Lee 2015). In four middle-income Latin American countries
(Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Costa Rica) both contracts and informal
methods are more frequently used than IP-mediated methods (Dutrénit
and Arza 2015). These results indicate that surveys of ﬁrms are of value to
identifying the relative importance of different knowledge channels.
Surveys of ﬁrms face similar issues to those of surveys of academics: to
reduce costs, the 80–90 percent of ﬁrms that are unlikely to source
knowledge from public research organizations in a deﬁned time period
are usually excluded. Targeting can be improved by limiting surveys to
ﬁrms in speciﬁc sectors where the use of knowledge produced by public
research organizations is more likely (Bekkers et al. 2008), such as life
science ﬁrms, or excluding ﬁrms with few employees.
Surveys that follow the Oslo Manual guidelines (OECD/Eurostat 2018)
for measuring innovation in the business sector, such as the European
Community Innovation Survey (CIS), often collect relevant data on
university–ﬁrm linkages. For example, the CIS includes a question on
the importance of information obtained from universities to the ﬁrm’s
innovation activities and a question on collaboration with universities.
These surveys consistently ﬁnd that universities are an important source
of information to less than 10 percent of ﬁrms, but their importance is
higher for large ﬁrms and for ﬁrms in sectors such as pharmaceuticals
that draw extensively on science. R&D surveys, although limited to
R&D-performing ﬁrms that account for less than half of innovative
ﬁrms, can also include relevant questions, such as business expenditures
for R&D that is contracted out to universities or government
laboratories.
Table 12.5 identiﬁes useful indicators that can be obtained from
surveys of academics and ﬁrms. Many of the indicators are applicable
to both academics and ﬁrms, although some of the questions may need to
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be adapted to the type of respondent. For instance, questions on ﬁnancial
incentives for ﬁrms to source knowledge from public research organizations could list speciﬁc policy instruments, such as vouchers, subsidies
for collaboration, etc. To improve recall quality, these surveys need to be
limited to a deﬁned period of time of between one and three years
(OECD/Eurostat 2018) or refer to speciﬁc research outputs or inventions.
The beneﬁts of knowledge transfer for ﬁrms consist of solutions for
known problems (mostly relevant to contractual or collaborative
research) (Perkman et al. 2011), improvements in innovative capabilities
(De Fuentes and Dutrénit 2012), innovative products and processes, and
earned income or cost savings from these innovations. Knowledge transfer activities can increase costs for ﬁrms when licenses are required for
types of knowledge that were previously available at no cost or as part of
open science. Otherwise, most of the costs incurred by ﬁrms are opportunity costs.
Several additional details to the questions listed in Table 12.5 for
economic effects would assist research on the economic beneﬁts for
businesses. Relevant questions include (1) whether new knowledge
obtained through public research organization research contracts, public
research organization licensing, or informal public research organization
contacts was implemented in products and processes, (2) the total sales
revenue from these products and the imputed savings from these processes, (3) the fraction of sales revenue/cost savings attributed to knowledge obtained from public research organizations, (4) the sector of
application for products and processes, (5) expectations for the next
two years for a change in sales/cost savings for these products and
processes, and (6) total sales revenues from all products (required to
estimate the share of sales from products containing knowledge obtained
from public research organizations).

12.5 Publicly Available (Big) Data
Big data are collected automatically and available in electronic form.
Patent records, Google citations, and administrative data collected by
governments for taxation and other purposes are all examples of big data.
Another form that is attracting increasing attention is the use of Internet
data, such as web-scraping to identify innovation activities within ﬁrms
or university startups (NESTA 2018).
Big data such as patent databases can be used to directly produce
knowledge transfer metrics or combined with data from KTOs or
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academic surveys. For example, patent data can be used to identify the
share of patents produced by academics that are owned by ﬁrms or by
universities (Geuna and Rossi 2011). Big data on publications, patents, or
administrative data can also be linked to university-level data on a range
of knowledge transfer activities and outcomes (Van Looy et al. 2011;
Berbegal-Mirabent and Sabate 2015). An example is to evaluate the
relationship between regional ﬁrm capabilities and knowledge transfer
activities. Firm-level capabilities can be estimated from regional administrative data on R&D expenditures, business sector R&D intensities, and
industrial structure (for instance, the share of private-sector output in
low-, medium-, and high-technology sectors).
The use of web-scraping to produce metrics for innovation, including
knowledge transfer, is in its infancy, but experimentation in this area is
expected to produce useful results in the future. Woltmann (2018) used
web-scraping methods to try to identify knowledge transfer from the
Technical University of Denmark to ﬁrms via publications and university-owned patents. Text mining was used to identify similarities in the
text of business websites and university patents and publications. The
assumption is that ﬁrms that beneﬁt from these two types of university
output will replicate relevant text on their corporate webpages. The
method identiﬁed a small number of matches with business websites,
with matching better for publications than for patents.

12.6 Metrics for the Systemic Beneﬁts of Knowledge Transfer
The main policy goal for knowledge transfer is to support the systemic
economic and social beneﬁts of knowledge transferred to ﬁrms, individuals, and governments and the subsequent effects at the municipal
(Felsenstein 1996), regional, or national level (Cheah 2016). A review of
academic research on the economic contribution of publicly funded basic
research concludes that it is positive and substantial (Salter and Martin
2001), but it is a challenge to link speciﬁc knowledge transfer channels to
systemic outcomes. Research using patent citation data has found positive beneﬁts from academic research on the number of corporate patents
in technology-based sectors (Verspagen 1999), which could result in an
increase in innovative products and processes, but, in other sectors,
knowledge transfer via patents is likely to be less important since the
majority of innovations are not patented (Arundel and Kabla 1998). For
a region or country, the greatest contributor to systemic beneﬁts could be
via non-IP-mediated channels such as research contracts, open science,
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and the employment of individuals with university qualiﬁcations
(Roessner et al. 2013).
Collaboration between government, academia, and industry is considered to be of critical importance in enhancing regional economic and
social development (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 2000; Klofsten et al. 2010;
Urbano and Guerrero 2013). The effectiveness of tripartite collaboration
has, however, been questioned, as many regions have failed to obtain
expected beneﬁts from knowledge transfer in terms of innovation, GDP,
and employment (Asheim and Coenen 2005; McAdam et al. 2012). In
order to address this challenge, recent policy initiatives identify the need
for a more open science approach that includes social innovators
involved at various stages throughout the knowledge transfer process
(Wilson 2012). The inclusion of social innovators (Leydesdorff 2011)
reﬂects the increasing importance placed on knowledge transfer to meet
societal needs (Bozeman et al. 2015). It also emphasizes that knowledge
transfer occurs not only between public research organizations and ﬁrms
but also between public research organizations, governments, and nonproﬁt organizations.
Estimates of systemic ﬁnancial beneﬁts require data from surveys of
ﬁrms, nonproﬁts, and government organizations on the uptake, application, and economic value of knowledge produced by public research
organizations. This is very difﬁcult to estimate because many innovations
are built on multiple sources of knowledge. For all knowledge transfer
channels, estimates need to obtain data from surveys of managers, but
managers are unlikely to be able to estimate the diffuse effects of open
science on their organization and often may not know or recognize the
role of open science on key products (Mazzucato 2015).
A more feasible approach is to focus on formal knowledge transfer
channels. Data on the economic impacts of knowledge transfer on
government organizations or ﬁrms (using the data described in Section
12.5) from a random sample could be extrapolated to speciﬁc sectors. For
contracts, this would require data on which contracts led to commercialized products or processes, the sector of application, and the sales
revenue earned by the ﬁrm (or the value of services provided by governments) for products or imputed savings from processes. The reliability of
this approach depends on the willingness of managers to volunteer
information that could be commercially conﬁdential and their ability to
provide accurate retrospective information over a number of years.
Estimates of ﬁnancial beneﬁts are perhaps easiest to obtain for public
research organization spinoffs on the heroic assumption that all future
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sales derive from the initial development of knowledge obtained from the
public research organization at the time of establishment (Vincett 2010).
Other researchers have estimated the effect of public research organization research on GDP by combining data on running royalties (percentage of total sales) from licensed IP with estimates of the running
royalty rate and the value-added components of sales from sectoral
input–output models. For example, a study for the U.S. uses AUTM
licensing data to estimate output from 1996 to 2010 for assumed royalty
rates of 2, 5, and 10 percent. The estimated contribution to GDP in 2009
from licensing varied from USD 70.4 billion at a 2 percent royalty rate
to USD 16.4 billion for a 10 percent royalty rate (Roessner et al. 2013).
Although the former estimate exceeds total university R&D expenditures in 2009 of USD 55 billion, it is important to note that the
estimated contribution is based on IP developed over multiple years
before 2009. The disadvantage of this method is that it is only likely to
account for a small percentage of the beneﬁts from all knowledge
transfer channels.
A regular survey aimed at universities and public research organizations conducted by the State Intellectual Property Ofﬁce (SIPO) of the
People’s Republic of China asks patent applicants about the knowledge
transfer process and commercialization method and, for patented products, the total income earned from product sales.7 This information is
potentially of great interest, but patent applicants may not always know
the answers to questions on commercialization or income earned from
product sales.
Nonﬁnancial systemic beneﬁts are diverse and include improved quality of life from new therapeutic treatments for diseases, new business
opportunities, and social beneﬁts such as new educational and entertainment platforms on the Internet. These types of beneﬁt are rarely measured, in part due to the difﬁculty in attaching a ﬁnancial value to social
outcomes. The default is to use case studies to highlight the social beneﬁts
of university research (Kearnes and Wienroth 2011). The AUTM, as part
of its “better world project,” includes case-study examples in its annual
licensing reports of the social and economic impacts of licensed university inventions. In many cases, this is a practical solution to illustrating
the range of different types of both ﬁnancial and nonﬁnancial beneﬁt for

7

See, for the ﬁrst public release, http://english.sipo.gov.cn/news/ofﬁcial/201608/
t20160802_1284168.html.
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speciﬁc inventions based on knowledge produced by public research
organizations.
Systemic costs are difﬁcult to identify and estimate since they are based
on “what if” situations involving unmeasurable counterfactuals. For
example, a theoretical social cost would occur if academics neglect
basic research with high beneﬁts over the long term in order to pursue
applied research that meets short-term industry needs.

12.7 Conclusions
Knowledge transfer metrics are required for benchmarking changes in
performance over time and for econometric analysis to evaluate the
effectiveness of policies and practices. In both high- and middleincome countries most of the existing metrics focus on IP-mediated
knowledge transfer, such as the number of patents produced by universities and the amount of license income earned. The premise of this
chapter is that this is insufﬁcient – both because it sends an erroneous
signal to policymakers and administrators in universities and public
research institutes that IP-mediated knowledge transfer is the optimum
form, resulting in distortions in incentives, and also because it is not ﬁt
for purpose, with most knowledge transferred by means of other formal
and informal channels. Consequently, a comprehensive set of knowledge
transfer metrics to guide policy requires collecting metrics for a diverse
range of knowledge transfer channels.
In addition to the basic metrics for IP-mediated knowledge transfer
(see Chapter 2), this chapter recommends collecting metrics for other
formal channels (collaboration, contracts, consultancy, etc.) from universities and public research institutes (for instance, by surveying KTOs)
and metrics for informal knowledge transfer methods from surveys of
academics and ﬁrms. Such surveys as these can also collect useful data on
the goals of academics and ﬁrms in participating in knowledge transfer
and the barriers that they face. Surveys of ﬁrms in middle-income
countries should also include metrics to identify differences in the use
of and need for knowledge transfer by ﬁrm capabilities (see also Chapter
11) and the types of ﬁnancial incentive that they receive from government, such as vouchers. The main topics to be covered through data
collection are identiﬁed through several tables in this chapter.
Another feature of a comprehensive set of metrics is the need to collect
institutional data on policies and practices for use in policy evaluation
and monitoring. This is essential for determining which factors best
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promote knowledge transfer and support the absorptive capacity of ﬁrms
under different conditions. For example, the set of factors that promote
knowledge transfer are likely to differ depending on the outcome (startup
establishments versus adoption by existing ﬁrms), interactions with other
policies, ﬁrm capabilities, and the industrial structure of a country or
region.
Data for all types of formal knowledge channel should be collected on
an annual basis from universities and public research institutes in order
to encourage them to establish rigorous administrative records for these
types of knowledge transfer activity. The marginal cost of annual data
collection is also likely to be very low compared to the cost of biennial or
less frequent surveys. In contrast, surveys of academics and ﬁrms are
expensive and consequently these surveys only need to be conducted
every three to ﬁve years, possibly by contracting out surveys to academics
with expertise in knowledge transfer. Data on policies and practices tend
to change slowly and therefore could be collected every three to ﬁve years
from KTO surveys, although an open question could be included in
annual surveys of KTOs to identify recent changes.
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Africa has become an investment magnet thanks to its general economic
performance as measured by a continuous improvement of its gross
domestic product (GDP) and its population dynamics. Africa’s GDP
increased by 3.5 percent in 2018, about the same as in 2017 and up
from 2.1 percent in 2016. This growth is projected to accelerate to
4.0 percent by the end of 2019 and 4.1 percent in 2020.1 Projections of
population growth predict that the African population is likely to reach
1.7 billion by 2030.2 These prospects have created an environment in
which foreign ﬁrms and development partners are bound to interact with
local ﬁrms and institutions. This has led to a complex and crowded policy
environment that, if properly managed, will lead to good business outlooks, employment, and well-being for the African population.
In this space, technology and knowledge transfer will undoubtedly
play a pivotal role in sustaining these undertakings. Consequently, relevant metrics will be required to produce evidence on which better policy
can be made. Metrics will also facilitate better understanding and management of the complex patterns and interrelationships that will likely
emerge. So, knowledge needs to be acquired, stored, created, disseminated, and improved on or added into existing knowledge. To that end, we
welcome the chapter by Anthony Arundel and Nordine Es-Sadki, on
which we are pleased to comment from an African perspective.

STISA’s Call for Knowledge Transfer Metrics
The African Union adopted its current Strategy for Science, Technology,
and Innovation (STISA-24) in 2014. Its implementation is going through
a Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) phase which requires, among other
1

2

African Economic Outlook (2019), www.afdb.org/ﬁleadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/
Publications/2019AEO/AEO_2019-EN.pdf.
www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/trends/Population2030.pdf.
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things, an inclusive set of metrics that gauge the transfer of knowledge
between various actors in order to reinforce the M&E relevance for
facilitating evidence-based, transparent, and accountable decision making (Chux et al. 2018). This chapter discusses themes that are undoubtedly of use to the STISA M&E processes. These are the basic metrics for
non-IP-mediated knowledge transfer, metrics for policy and practices
related to knowledge transfer activities, and metrics to gauge the costs
and beneﬁts of knowledge transfer.
However, STISA has embraced a broader concept of knowledge that
includes formal or codiﬁed tacit knowledge as well as traditional or
indigenous knowledge. Tacit knowledge needs to be understood well
especially for service industries, which are becoming a vital source of
income and employment in Africa. Yes, tacit knowledge is difﬁcult to
write down, visualize, or transfer from one person to another but it
underpins several innovations in the service sector, as shown by the
Community Innovation Survey (CIS)3 conducted in about thirty
African countries. The compilation and sharing of lessons learnt and
other experiences and stories could be used alongside the CIS questionnaire to capture tacit knowledge. However, traditional knowledge transfer will need its own family of metrics to measure its dynamics.
STISA was designed in a way that responds to the demand of STI from
socioeconomic sectors by embedding STI in those sectors. It outlines the
key priorities that countries in Africa should collectively address through
a series of innovative programs and projects. In that manner, the strategy
aims to position STI to contribute toward Africa’s transition to
a knowledge-based economy. This strategy requires buy-in from, and
collaboration between, state and nonstate actors at various level of
implementation. These include continental, regional, and national public
institutions, the private sector, research institutions, and actors operating
in the formal and informal sectors, as well as a signiﬁcant cluster of
multinational and development partners operating on the continent. In
this complex environment, the set of metrics for knowledge transfer
highlighted in the Arundel and Es-Sadki chapter will play a critical role
if STISA seeks societal-led knowledge transfer in extending Africa’s
development toward a knowledge-based economy.
The metrics for non-IP-mediated knowledge transfer need to be
expanded and adapted to collate relevant data that will feed the analysis
of the critical factors that underpin tacit knowledge. The CIS referred to
3

African Innovation Outlook Series I (2014) & II, 2014.
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above indicates that innovation is a connected activity. Innovative ﬁrms
in Africa collaborate and their ﬁrst choice of collaborator is the client or
customer. Thus, knowledge transfer happens and needs to be measured.
This is a link that needs to be expanded for additional data collection
regarding tacit knowledge. Finally, there is a need to establish a consensus
on a framework to connect the informal economy, innovation, and
intellectual property to round up the measurement agenda for STISA
as far as “moving the continent towards a knowledge-based economy” is
concerned. As a matter of fact, the informal sector plays a major role in
the national economies, as measured by the share of its contribution to
GDP. This is estimated to be between 25 and 45 percent, and its contribution to employment ranges from 3 percent to 90 percent. In this
context, both African Innovation Outlook series pointed to several
areas that need further research, including the deﬁnition of comparable
indicators for policy purposes, understanding how innovation takes
place in the informal economy, and how knowledge is passed between
generations, and the barriers, incentives, and linkages between the informal and formal sector dynamics.

Measurement Challenges for New Data Dynamics in Africa
New technologies can help African countries harness new sources of data
and indicators by exploring knowledge transfer mechanisms between
socioeconomic actors operating at the time of the Fourth Industrial
Revolution (4IR).
The advent of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement
(AfCFTA) would, in its optimal operational phase, transform the continent into a single market of a billion people with a combined GDP
estimated to reach USD 2.5 trillion.4 The AfCFTA was signed in 2018
by the African countries. In this context, public policies, especially those
related to the digital divide, trade regulations, and tariffs, ought to be
amended or transformed to support free movement of capital and to
sustain the single continental market for goods and services.
Other interesting advances to note concern the regional and continental dialogues that are taking place in the areas related to the 4IR. For
instance, at their meeting in September 2017, ministers responsible for
information and communication technology (ICT) of the Southern
4

www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/august-november-2018/africa-set-massive-freetrade-area.
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African Development Community (SADC) noted that their region is on
the brink of a technological revolution that will fundamentally alter the
way people live, work, and relate to one another, and, in this regard, they
signed the Declaration on the Fourth Industrial Revolution to guide the
development of regional programs and projects.5 The Declaration is
a commitment to preparing SADC for the Fourth Industrial Revolution
through the use of ICT. The Declaration also calls for harmonization of
enabling digital policies and universal access to critical broadband
infrastructure.
The continent has also been home to several innovations, including the
digital payment system (M-PESA), made in Kenya – which is gradually
boosting many services ranging from e-commerce to healthcare and
transportation. Blockchain technology has been trialed in areas of microlending. The Africa blockchain conference, which was due to be held in
March 2020, offers an opportunity for African researchers to explore how
this technology might simplify and streamline systems and processes
across various industries. The question that begs for an answer remains:
How to measure? What are the appropriate and relevant metrics to
measure knowledge transfer?
Measuring knowledge transfer in this new era will require deﬁning
new sources of data. As pointed out by Arundel and Es-Sadki, big data
and web-scraping would be the technologies for continental institutions
like AOSTI to explore and invest in by continental institutions like the
African Observatory for Science, Technology, and Innovation (AOSTI).

Conclusion
The production of the African Innovation Outlook Series, including the
bibliometrics series produced by AOSTI, shows the importance of better
understanding the transfer and application of knowledge between ﬁrms,
policymaking institutions, research institutions, and the public. Yet the
African measurement community needs to invest in metrics related to
knowledge activities, especially knowledge transfer. The chapter by
Arundel and Es-Sadki is an important step that needs to be extended
by collecting more African examples. It is also important to gain knowledge on big data, blockchain, artiﬁcial intelligence, and the Internet of
Things through case studies across impact sectors in the African contexts
highlightedhere.
5

www.sadc.int/ﬁles/6315/6115/1098/Statement_ET-STI__21_June_2019_ﬁnal.pdf.
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A consensus exists that the EU’s excellence in the realm of scientiﬁc
research does not translate into a correspondingly high level of performance in terms of technological innovation. The perceived failure of
European countries to turn scientiﬁc advances into marketable innovations is often termed the “European paradox.” The innovation landscape is undergoing profound changes due to the accelerating pace of
technological development, the globalization of markets, and the shortening economic life of products and processes. Hence, support frameworks for innovation and knowledge transfer are foreseen to play a highly
signiﬁcant role in the forthcoming EU Multiannual Financial
Framework (MFF).
Although some scholars doubt the validity of this paradox, claiming
that it is also a question of lower scientiﬁc quality and weak industry
(Dosi et al. 2006), it is undisputable that Europe is lagging behind in
terms of exploitation of its research and this is also matter of culture, for
example, risk aversion, inertia, and resistance to change in universities,
limited ﬁnancial availability connected to an incomplete internal market,
and delays in enacting legislation encouraging the exploitation of R&D
such as the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 in the United States of America (U.S.).
Knowledge transfer ofﬁces (KTOs) play a strategic role in innovation
in Europe. The adoption of standard metrics and standardized performance measurements is crucial to monitor and measure the KTOs’ annual
activities, and to compare and combine their results so as to get a global
view of the European situation.
Many KTOs have established specialized staff and services for assessing knowledge transfer in terms of disclosed inventions, patenting,
research agreements, licensing and developing, and funding spinoffs
and startups. The European Commission recognizes the need for
1

The opinions expressed are those of the author only and do not necessarily reﬂect the
position or opinion of the European Commission.
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comparable and consistent metrics across Europe regarding knowledge
transfer (KT) activities in public research organizations.
A European Commission Expert Group on KT Metrics was established
in 2008 in order “to identify indicators used in several existing recurrent
surveys and nominate a small selection of these as core indicators, and
agree on a harmonised set of deﬁnitions for them” (European
Commission 2009).
Over time, the need for coherent KT metrics at the European level is
still felt, and the results of the 2008 Expert Group need to be updated to
take into account the speciﬁc evolving priorities, such as artiﬁcial intelligence, the Internet of Things, climate change, and the greater attention
consumers are paying to the social and environmental impacts of industrial products.
In this context, a new Expert Group on Metrics for Knowledge
Transfer was set up in 2019 by the European Commission’s
Competence Centre on Technology Transfer (CC TT), in partnership
with ASTP (pan-European association for professionals involved in
knowledge transfer between universities and industry) and its network
of National Associations Advisory Committee (NAAC), in order to
review the past work toward a key set of harmonized KT indicators
that would be accepted by most in Europe. Therefore, the input provided
from the authors in this chapter is both timely and useful.
The CC TT is a new service of the Joint Research Centre, which was
established in 2018, and its core mission is to provide expert services to
European Commission Directorates-General, regional and local authorities, and relevant stakeholders in three key areas: knowledge transfer
operational support, ﬁnancial instrument conception and design, and
support for innovation ecosystems and clusters.
The new expert group on metrics for knowledge transfer will take into
account the indicators from the European Commission report “Metrics
for Knowledge Transfer from Public Research Organisations in Europe”
(European Commission 2009) recent literature, current transnational
and national surveys, and interviews and recommendations from
national KT associations, gathered in the ASTP NAAC.
The expert group will adopt a broad concept in which knowledge
transfer incorporates all functions that can lead to improved use of
knowledge developed and held in the research sector for the beneﬁt of
society and its individuals. The main objectives of this expert group are
the implementation of a core set of harmonized indicators, including
identiﬁed risk mitigation, and the setting up of recommendations on IT
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infrastructures able to manage pan-European KT metrics data (database,
security). The deliverables will be published in 2020. The expert group
gathers experienced practitioners of technology and knowledge transfer
with experience in KT activities and output measurement at a regional,
national, or transnational level.
Anthony Arundel and Nordine Es-Sadki’s chapter correctly points out
that the indicators collected by KTOs are not capturing a signiﬁcant part
of knowledge transfer, which is transferred via tacit channels and,
increasingly, via open science. Therefore putting emphasis only on codiﬁed knowledge may provide a distorted analysis of the ability of
a research organization to transfer its knowledge. The authors propose
additional indicators using speciﬁc surveys of academics or ﬁrms to
complement the data from KTOs. In my view, this is an interesting
proposal from a theoretical point of view but it is also very challenging
to put into practice. Besides the high organizational costs of consulting
a large number of academics and industries (and their survey fatigue),
ASTP already ﬁnds it challenging to consult the existing KTOs in Europe,
with the result that their statistical data have a skewed geographic coverage. One of the reasons is that the current set of indicators is probably too
large, and many small KTOs cannot regularly monitor all of them. One of
our recommendations to the experts undertaking the review of the KT
metrics would therefore be to develop as simple as possible a system of
indicators and to specify other potentially important factors, in most
cases nonmeasurable, that contribute to the success of the knowledge
transfer process. Some expert readers will be aware of “Goodhart’s Law”:
“when a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure.”
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This chapter makes an important contribution to the literature on knowledge transfer from public research organizations by expanding its scope well
beyond the conventional IP-driven channel. After the enactment of the
Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 in the United States of America (U.S.), academic
and policy attention centered on streamlining the “clumsy” IPR frameworks
prevalent in public research organizations across the world. Enthused by the
US legislation, many countries, both developed and emerging (France,
Denmark, Japan, Brazil, China, and South Africa, among others), started
enacting their own Bayh-Dole-type legislations from the late 1990s onward.
There prevailed a sense of faith in such legislation as though it would act as
a magic formula to energize public-funded research for knowledge transfer
in different countries. However, the subsequent academic literature on the
US post-Bayh-Dole experience suggests that the evidence in this regard is far
from unambiguous (Ray and Saha 2011). This has not only raised questions
about the effectiveness of IP as a vehicle of knowledge transfer from public
research organizations but also redirected policy focus in many countries
toward other (perhaps more) important channels of knowledge transfer,
hitherto underemphasized.
The need to expand the scope of knowledge transfer from public
research organizations to other formal and informal channels, like collaborations, contracts, consultancies, use of public research organization
facilities and infrastructure, training, student placements, and so on, is
now fairly well established in academic and policy circles, and many of
these channels are now frequently used for knowledge transfer in both
developed and emerging nations. However, there is still a lack of comprehensive information metrics for the non-IP channels, the United
Kingdom being a noted exception in this regard, as highlighted by the
authors in the chapter. The British Higher Education–Business and
Community Interaction (HE-BCI) survey collects data on knowledge
transfer activities of British universities through multiple channels. In
460
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fact, using these data, Sengupta and Ray (2017) showed that among the
various channels of knowledge transfer in British universities, it is only
the academic exchange channel (contracts and collaborations) that
brings about a virtuous cycle. They showed that a large research base
leads to greater knowledge transfer through this channel, some of which,
in turn, further augments the research base, thus completing the virtuous
cycle. Studies on other countries have relied primarily on sample surveys
or case studies of knowledge transfer ofﬁces (KTO) and academic
researchers (in some cases). One of the few studies for India on the
subject is by Ray and Saha (2012) – a study commissioned by the
Department of Science and Technology, Government of India. It highlighted the importance of non-IP channels for selected Indian publicfunded institutions. Based on case studies of six public research organizations in India, Ray and Saha (2012) found that while success stories of
effective knowledge transfer through the IP-driven channel in many of
these institutions are limited in number, many of these Indian public
research organizations do engage in knowledge transfers signiﬁcantly
and effectively through various non-IP channels.
Despite such compelling evidence on the importance of non-IP channels of knowledge transfer in different countries, there has unfortunately
been very little attempt until now to construct comprehensive metrics of
knowledge transfer activities, including the various facets of non-IP
channels. The chapter by Arundel and Es-Sadki ﬁlls this very important
gap in the knowledge transfer literature. Without such a comprehensive
database, knowledge transfer activities can never be fully captured and
understood for appropriate policy interventions. Informational bias
toward the IP-mediated channels may lead to distortion of policy prioritization, resulting in suboptimal knowledge transfer through the other
important channels. In drawing up these comprehensive metrics of
knowledge transfer activities, the authors have correctly distinguished
between three different methods of data collection from three distinct
sources: (1) KTOs and the public research organization administration,
(2) surveys of academics and researchers at public research organizations, and (3) ﬁrm-level surveys. The importance of combining all three
sources stems from the fact that the conventional source, that is, the
KTOs, may not have information on all channels of knowledge transfer,
particularly the informal ones. Moreover, perceptions about the relative
importance of different channels of knowledge transfer and their determinants and barriers may diverge widely among the three sets of stakeholders. The paper contains an elaborate and useful discussion of the
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types of data that can be collected through each of these modes of data
collection and their limitations.
While reiterating the importance of collecting data through multiple
modes to create comprehensive metrics, I would like to add a word of
caution and a suggestion. First, if one ends up collecting information on
the same variable from all three sources, there is a possibility of ending up
with data discrepancies. For instance, the number of cases of knowledge
transfer through licensing reported by the KTO may or may not exactly
tally with the total number of these cases reported in the survey of
academics. One must, therefore, have a well-designed strategy to tackle
such data discrepancies. Second, academics are often survey fatigued, as
they are regularly bombarded with questionnaires asking for the same
factual information along with some questions on their perceptions. As
a result, academics are often reluctant to respond to survey questionnaires. This is highly avoidable if the public research organization administration mandates that all researchers submit a comprehensive annual
report of their academic activities undertaken in the preceding
academic year, including an extensive set of information pertaining to
their knowledge transfer activities through multiple channels. This could
form a database of factual information that would be compiled by the
public research organization and made available in the public domain.
Such databases could be used for numerous purposes by multiple agencies and stakeholders. The public research organization will use this
information to prepare its annual reports. Funding agencies (government
and nongovernment) may use this information to assess the performance
and accountability of public research organizations. National and international ranking agencies may use it for ranking and accreditation
purposes. And, most importantly, this database would go a long way in
constructing comprehensive metrics for knowledge transfer activities.
The survey of academics could then be restricted to a much smaller set
of questions only about their perceptions of the knowledge transfer
policies and practices. A smaller questionnaire would allow a larger
sample to be surveyed with little or no escalation of the survey costs,
a challenge highlighted by the authors. Enlarging the sample size could
potentially mitigate the sample selection bias of small sample surveys that
tend to ignore academics and departments with little or no knowledge
transfer experience.
The ﬁnal section of the chapter highlights another very important
aspect of knowledge transfer, namely, the metrics of costs and beneﬁts.
This is a complex issue as both costs and beneﬁts include a large number
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of elements that cannot be adequately captured purely in ﬁnancial terms.
The authors present a detailed discussion of the systemic beneﬁts and
costs as well as the beneﬁts and costs to the public research organizations
and to the ﬁrms, focusing on both ﬁnancial and nonﬁnancial elements.
The authors do acknowledge that nonﬁnancial beneﬁts and costs are
more difﬁcult to measure, especially in a format that is amenable to
comparisons over time, both nationally and internationally. But, unfortunately, we fail to ﬁnd much in the chapter by way of clear directions in
this regard. Likewise, the authors also highlight the difﬁculties of identifying and estimating the systemic beneﬁts and costs. But again, we do not
ﬁnd any concrete guidelines here to overcome this difﬁculty in order to
come up with comparable measures of systemic costs and beneﬁts. Of
course, neither of these limitations has a simple solution. It could be
a matter of another extensive research study just to explore possible
solutions to the highlighted problems of measuring the costs and beneﬁts
of knowledge transfer. Nevertheless, one must acknowledge that the
chapter makes a good beginning by ﬂagging the issues and concerns
pertaining to the creation of comparable metrics of beneﬁts and costs.
Overall, the chapter makes a signiﬁcant value addition to the scholarship by putting forward a concrete pathway for generating comprehensive metrics of knowledge transfer activities – facts, policies, and
practices. If the framework proposed by the authors, along with the
suggestions given here, were to be implemented judiciously, it could go
a long way in providing incisive insights on various facets of knowledge
transfer activities and their determinants and obstacles in different contexts, regions and time periods.
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Survey on Policies and Practices for IP-Mediated
Knowledge Transfer1
I General Information about the Institution
1. Number of academic and other research-active employees:
Full-time (35 hours per week or more):
Part-time (less than 35 hours per week):
2. Number of PhD students:

______
______

______

3. In which of the following technical ﬁelds does your university/PRO

conduct research?
More than one answer is possible.
Agriculture

Computer Engineering

Biotechnology

Chemical Engineering

Chemistry

Industrial Engineering

Medical Sciences*

Civil Engineering

Operation and
Transportation

Environmental
Engineering

Mechanical Engineering

Physics

Electrical Engineering

Electronics and
Telecommunications

Other

*Include pharmaceuticals, medical instruments and technologies, etc.

1

This questionnaire is a modiﬁed version of the WIPO Assessment Questionnaire for
Stakeholders from Academic and Research Institutions developed by the Intellectual
Property Policies for Universities Focus Group. It is meant as a template only for policies
and practices to support IP and IP mediated knowledge transfer. Questions for speciﬁc
types of IP, such as copyright, or trademarks, can be added as needed.
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4. What are the primary roles/missions of your institution? More than one

answer is possible.
Teaching/education
Social sciences research (humanities, business, economics, etc.)
STEM research (science, technology, engineering, mathematics)
Medical and health sciences research
Visual and performing arts (painting, sculpture, dance, theatre,
ﬁlm, etc.)
Other (please explain)
5. Does your institution have any IP policies (including IP regulations,

guidelines, rules, etc.) relevant to the creation, ownership and protection of IP, knowledge transfer, or commercialization activities?
Yes
No
Don’t know/Not relevant

II Ownership of IPRs Created at Your Institution
Questions 7–10 only need to be answered if your institution has an IP policy
6. Does your institution’s IP policy regulate ownership of the following

IPRs that are created within the institution? More than one answer is
possible.
Patents
Copyright
Industrial designs
Utility models
Trademarks
Plant varieties
Trade secrets/conﬁdential business information
No, it does not regulate ownership of any IPRs
Don’t know/Not relevant
7. Does your institution’s IP policy follow national regulations on the

ownership of IPRs?
Yes, the institution’s policies follow the national regulations
Yes, but the institution’s policies include areas not covered by the
national regulations
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No, because there are no relevant national regulations
No, the IP policy alters the national regulations
Don’t know/Not relevant
8. Who owns the IP when research is funded by public or private

sources?*
More than one answer is possible.
IP owner

Funded by public
sources

Funded by private
(business) sources

University/PRO

⬜

⬜

Funding organization/business

⬜

⬜

Inventor(s)

⬜

⬜

Other

⬜

⬜

Don’t know/Not relevant

⬜

⬜

If other, please explain.

*Include both research funded under contract, for instance for a private
business or government department, and research funded through
research grants.
9. If the inventor/creator may own the IP: Which of the following types of

inventor or creator can become owners of IPRs (excluding copyright)
at your institution? More than one answer is possible.
Students
PhD students
Researcher-employees
Professors
Visiting researchers (include researchers on exchange from other
organizations and honorary appointees).
Don’t know/Not relevant
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III IP and Technology Management in the Institution
IP Disclosure Form

10. Are academics and/or researchers required to report inventions with
possible commercial applications?
Yes
No
Don’t know/Not relevant
11. Is there a well-deﬁned procedure for evaluating the potential commercial value of research produced by your institution?
Yes
No
Don’t know/Not relevant
12. If yes to question 12: Who is responsible for reviewing research results
for their potential commercial application and/or possible protection
by IPRs? More than one answer is possible.
Administration ofﬁcer/ofﬁce
University/PRO department where the invention was made
Inventor/creator
Knowledge transfer ofﬁcer/ofﬁce owned by or afﬁliated with the
university/PRO
Private company (not part of or owned by the University/PRO)
Other (please explain)
Don’t know/Not relevant

IP Protection and Protection Against Infringement

13. Does your institution have policies or guidelines on conﬁdentiality to
protect IP?
Yes
No
Don’t know/Not relevant
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14. Does your institution have regulations, guidelines or an IP policy for
the commercialization of IP created at your institution?
Yes
No
Don’t know/Not relevant
15. Who manages IP for your institution, including the negotiation of
licenses? More than one answer is possible.
Administration ofﬁcer/ofﬁce
University/PRO department where the invention was made
Inventor/creator
Knowledge transfer ofﬁcer/ofﬁce owned by or afﬁliated with the
University/PRO
Private company (not part of or owned by the University/PRO)
Other (please explain)

Don’t know/Not relevant
16. Does your institution have a budget for ﬁling, defending and/or
maintaining IPRs?
Yes
No
Don’t know/Not relevant
17. Who shares in the ﬁnancial beneﬁts resulting from the exploitation
of IP?
More than one answer is possible.
Institution
University/PRO department where invention was conceived
Inventor/creator
Government or other public funding body
Other (please explain)

Don’t know/Not relevant
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18. Does your institution provide any of the following types of
support for its spin-off companies? More than one answer is possible.
Startup capital
Releasing researchers/academics to (partially) work in the spinoff
company
Incubator units
Management and/or administrative support from the institution
Other (please explain)

Don’t know/Not relevant

IV Incentives
19. Does your institution provide any of the following incentives or
assistance to encourage staff to actively assist in implementing the
IP policy? More than one answer is possible.
Yes

No

Don’t know/
Not relevant

1. Funding of research projects to further
develop the IP

⬜

⬜

⬜

2. Training on IP/technology management

⬜

⬜

⬜

3. Nonﬁnancial rewards to inventors (e.g.,
promotion scheme, public
acknowledgement or invention
certiﬁcates, etc.)

⬜

⬜

⬜

4. Academic recognition/reward

⬜

⬜

⬜

5. Financial rewards to inventors (e.g..
participation in licensing income)

⬜

⬜

⬜

6. Assistance in IP management (e.g., human
resources, patent information search,

⬜

⬜

⬜
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Yes

No

Don’t know/
Not relevant

7. Grants for IP protection costs (e.g., patent
ﬁling fees, prototype creation and/or legal
fees)

⬜

⬜

⬜

8. Assistance with a startup/spinoff (e.g., help
for developing a business plan, market
research, ﬁnance, identifying business
partners, etc.)

⬜

⬜

⬜

9. Other (please explain):

⬜

⬜

⬜

marketing research, patentability
evaluation, commercialization, etc.)

V Engagement with Third Parties
20. How are contacts established between potential commercialization
partners and your institution? More than one answer is possible.
Knowledge transfer ofﬁcer/ofﬁce identiﬁes contacts
Inventor(s)/researchers identify contacts
Advertising or technology databases
Scientiﬁc conferences/seminars
Other (please explain)

Don’t know/Not relevant
21. Are there written rules or guidelines for licensing, including model
contracts?
Yes (please explain)

No
Don’t know/Not relevant
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22. Are the rules for licensing ﬂexible?
Yes (please explain)

No
Don’t know/Not relevant
23. Are there rules or guidelines for exclusive versus nonexclusive
licenses?
Yes (please explain)

No
Don’t know/Not relevant

VI Funding Sources for Research and Development (R&D)
24. Approximately what percent of your institution’s total research
expenditures are funded by the following types of organization?
Estimates are acceptable.
National governments*

_________%

Private sector (businesses)

_________%

International funding agencies**

_________%

Other (please explain)

_________%
100%

Don’t know/Not relevant

* Government includes all national sources of public funding, including
national, regional and local governments, plus funding by your university/PRO or other universities/PROs.
** Include government and nonproﬁt agencies such as the UN, World
Bank, European Commission, etc.
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VII Publication/Dissemination Policy
25. Are there are any initiatives to promote the broad dissemination of
R&D results or copyrighted materials, such as Public Domain, Open
Search, Open Access, Open Source, Open Course Ware2?
Yes (please explain)

No
Don’t know/Not relevant
26. Are there are any initiatives, regulations or policies that regulate the
policies for publication delays (such as maximum length) for licensed IP?
Yes (please explain)

No
Don’t know/Not relevant

VIII IP Policy Awareness Raising
27. How are your institution’s policies on IP distributed to its employees
and other stakeholders?
Through the institution website, URL_____________________
Paper copy
Training actions for students and staff
Other (please explain)

No distribution or not relevant (if no IP policy)

2

Open Search is a collection of technologies that allow publishing of search results in
a standard and accessible format. Open Source refers to access to software or source code.
Open Access is associated with journal literature and other scholarly content. Open
Course Ware (OCW) offers course materials free to anyone with online access.
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28. Does your institution have a web page dedicated to IP matters?
Yes, URL:____________________________
No
Don’t know/Not relevant

IX Problems, Challenges and Strategic Issues
29. Does your institution face any of the following challenges and obstacles for the commercialization of IPRs? If yes, please indicate the
three most important ones.
For relevant column, tick all that apply.
Challenges and obstacles

Relevant

Three most
important ones

Weak scientiﬁc innovation capacity

⬜

⬜

Research not relevant to the needs of
businesses in your country

⬜

⬜

National or local businesses lack the
capability to use relevant research results

⬜

⬜

Lack of funds to ﬁle for patents

⬜

⬜

Lack of technical skills for patent information
searches or drafting patents

⬜

⬜

Inefﬁcient technology evaluation mechanisms
(e.g., invention disclosure procedures not
in place, inefﬁcient technology
evaluation, etc.)

⬜

⬜

Lack of appropriate institutional IP
guidelines/policies

⬜

⬜

Cultural gap between university and industry

⬜

⬜

Inadequate national legal framework
(e.g., laws, policies, regulations)

⬜

⬜
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Challenges and obstacles

Relevant

Three most
important ones

Lack of support from university management

⬜

⬜

Lack of incentives for researchers/inventors

⬜

⬜

Conﬂicts of interest (e.g., what kind of
research to undertake; which third parties
to cooperate with; whether to put IP into
the public domain or whether to seek
exclusive commercialization deals, etc.)

⬜

⬜

Other challenges (please specify):

30. What are the main goals of your institution in supporting the
commercialization of IP? More than one answer is possible.
Earn income
Support economic development in the region where your institute is located
Market the scientiﬁc and technical expertise of your institution
Identify research collaboration partners for academic research
Promote entrepreneurial attitudes among students and
academics
Attract and retain academics
Identify job opportunities for students
31. Please comment on any additional issues concerning institutional
IP policies you consider relevant to this Needs Assessment
Questionnaire.
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